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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis seeks to analyse and explain Libya’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability and 
the factors that ultimately influenced Qaddafi’s regime to dismantle the nuclear weapons 
programme. Driven by the core motive to deter external threats to its security and the desire 
to become a regional power, Libya for over three decades sought to acquire nuclear weapons, 
but failed to obtain them ‘off the shelf’. From the 1970s until 2003, Libya sought to acquire 
key elements of nuclear components. After many years Qaddafi transformed his foreign and 
security policies, which for several decades had resulted in rogue behaviour on the part of the 
state machine. This transformation applied to the ideological motivations that had generated 
the regime’s aggressive approach in the realm of international relations. Focusing on the 
Libyan case study, in three different periods has allowed the key factors influencing Libya’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons capability and simultaneously its decision to denuclearise, to be 
unravelled. 
The empirical findings demonstrate that external and internal pressure provides a satisfactory 
explanation for the reorientation of Libya’s policies. This thesis confirms that Qaddafi’s 
regime dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 was influenced by the 
domestic factors such as public pressure, and external factors such as stringent economic 
sanctions, international isolation and the very genuine threat of military action. This in turn 
reflected the fact that the Libyan case can be better explained from a realistic point of view. 
Indeed, the study found that the reaction of the Libyan government was not a response to the 
regional and international norms, but it was rather a consequence of domestic and external 
pressure. By arguing this, denuclearisation occurs when regimes comes under internal and 
external pressure, particularly from powerful actors by using coercion tools such as 
international isolation, economic sanctions and threat of military action. This thesis 
contributes to broader theoretical debates surrounding non-proliferation and denuclearisation. 
This study concludes that states can give up their nuclear weapons programmes under certain 
internal and external factors.  
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
1.1  Introduction 
“In 1946 the English poet W. H. Auden penned the Age of Anxiety, in which 
he lamented the hopelessness and universal disorder in the world. Auden 
was responding to the wholesale carnage and bleak aftermath of the 
Second World War, as well as to the recent introduction of an entirely new 
weapon of mass destruction. For Auden and others living in the shadow of 
the atomic bomb, the future was uncertain, fearful, and dangerous.”  
   (Reiss, 2004:3)  
 
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the causes of Libya’s foreign policy shift and 
denuclearisation in 2003. In this regard this thesis tries to answer the following three main 
questions: What were the factors behind Libya’s desire to obtain a nuclear weapons 
programme? What were the causes of Qaddafi’s regime transformation and concessions to 
denuclearise? What are the effective tools to persuade states such as Libya to dismantle their 
nuclear weapons programme? By answering these questions, this thesis aims to provide a 
better understanding of Libya’s motivations to acquire nuclear weapons and the conditions 
behind its denuclearisation. The systematic analysis of the Libyan case will provide important 
lessons which could be generalised in this regard (e.g. eventually implemented for other 
cases, especially ones with similar characteristics).   
Libya attempted to buy a ready-made nuclear bomb on various occasions, and whilst such 
attempts ended in failure, the Libyan regime did obtain some equipment and sensitive 
technology which could have facilitated the production of nuclear weapons. It was only after 
many years, on 19
th
 December 2003, that the Libyan government, under the Qaddafi regime, 
publicly declared its decision to abandon its entire nuclear weapons stockpile and long range 
missiles capability. The regime’s official announcement maintained that the decision to 
relinquish its nuclear weapons programme was of ‘its own free will’. Additionally, Libya 
pledged to abandon all related equipment and materials, and to remain completely free from 
unconventional weapons. The regime agreed to reduce its long range missiles to just 300km, 
and to allow full and transparent verifications by the concerned agencies such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
 16 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW). This decision to dismantle Libya’s nuclear programme 
astonished several observers and policy-makers concerned with nuclear weapons 
proliferation (Hart and Kile, 2005:629). 
The spread of nuclear weapons is a great obstacle to international peace and security. 
Especially, the Middle East and North Africa represent one of the most unstable regions, and 
at the present time there are still active states such as Iran and some of the Gulf countries, that 
are trying to acquire nuclear weapons in order to face the Iranian nuclear threat or its 
expansionist policies (Cirincione, 2005:17).
1
 Other countries such as Saudi Arabia and 
Algeria also aspire to acquire nuclear weapons for the same reasons (Solingen, 2007:3). In 
fact, nuclear weapons pose a security threat to world peace and security, especially in 
troubled regions such as the Middle East and North Africa which have been prone to nuclear 
weapons proliferation and conventional war for a long time. 
From the discussion thus far, it is evident that the subject matter of this study is extremely 
important to world peace and security. Developing countries are not exempt from the race to 
acquire nuclear weapons, and there are still states pursuing nuclear capability. The Libyan 
regime was well known for its ambition to acquire such capability as it had been evident 
since Qaddafi first came to power in 1969. Despite the fact that Libya is a signatory to the 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), it did nonetheless, seek to launch a nuclear weapons 
programme in violation of that treaty; and the decision of the Libyan government to 
dismantle its nuclear stockpile demonstrated a major change in Libya’s security and foreign 
policies after almost three decades. Indeed, Libya’s policies under Qaddafi’s regime were 
known to be aggressive and adventurous. The main outcome of this policy attitude was that 
for several years Libya was under international and multilateral sanctions, and international 
isolation, and in some instances it was threatened with force by the international community. 
Such response by the international community towards Libya reflected the fears of the 
potential threat of autocratic regimes using nuclear weapons and the dire consequences of 
such action on international peace and security. In fact, undemocratic countries and their 
regimes are more prone to conventional wars, including nuclear ones. Accordingly, 
denuclearisation is an essential step towards securing regional and global peace and stability 
(Cordesman, 1991:1). 
                                                          
1
 (i.e. Iran had similar motives in the past regarding its nuclear ambition as it had to counter the Iraqi nuclear 
threat). 
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It should be underlined that there are different paths of nuclear restraint and denuclearisation 
success. On the one hand, there are countries that surrendered their nuclear weapons or 
reversed their policy to acquire nuclear weapons (i.e. Brazil, Argentina, Ukraine, South 
Africa, Taiwan, and Iraq, etc.) due to several encouragements such as security guarantees, 
economic incentives, change in the security environment, democratisation, and national 
identity. On the other hand, there are those that were induced to renounce their nuclear 
aspirations and give up the nuclear path under various pressures (i.e. the threat of the use of 
force), such as Iraq and Libya.  
Despite the fact that considerable scholarly work has been conducted regarding the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons (i.e. Waltz and Sagan, 2003; Hymans, 2006) the analyses to 
date have mainly focused on powerful states, and little attention has been given to developing 
countries.  Even the studies carried out to understand the motivations of developing states in 
their acquisition of nuclear weapons were mainly focused on India and Pakistan and the 
historical conflict as well as the arms race between them (i.e. balance of power). Indeed, there 
is no systematic and empirical analysis for the motivations of nuclear proliferation and 
denuclearisation of other developing states including South Africa, Iran, North Korea and 
Libya. Although certain scholars (see for example, Solingen, 2007; Bahgat, 2008; Rublee, 
2009; Bowen, 2006), have provided important insights and comprehensive analyses 
concerning the nuclearisation and denuclearisation of Libya, such contributions have been 
incomplete since they have not addressed all the factors that precipitated the dismantlement 
of Libya’s nuclear weapons programme (i.e. diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, threat 
of military force, and external pressure). This thesis aims to consider these omissions, and 
provide a more systematic analysis, by exploring a wider range of factors which have greatly 
influenced Libya’s political behaviour. Within this context, the basic argument of this thesis 
is that Libya would not have given up its nuclear weapons programme without the influence 
of the combination of multiple internal,
2
 regional,
3
 and external factors.
4
  
In order to introduce the above argument, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first 
is devoted to a literature review concerning the rise of the nuclear weapons phenomenon 
since the end of WWII. The rationale behind this is to determine the main gaps in existing 
literature, how this thesis intends to fill these, and thus find a remedy to the current 
                                                          
2
 Internal factors (i.e. domestic pressure, ideology, regime type, and oil). 
3
 Regional factors (i.e. regional isolation and containment). 
4
External factors (i.e. economic as well as military sanctions, international isolation, and threat of military 
force). 
 18 
shortcomings. The chapter then discusses the most relevant IR theories (i.e. realism and 
constructivism) for explaining Qaddafi’s regime reorientation, and policy shift regarding its 
foreign and security policies, specifically its nuclear weapons programme dismantlement in 
2003. Although constructivism can provide an important explanation and enhance the 
existing understanding of the matter, this is only partial, and realist accounts are believed to 
be more appropriate for appreciating the motivations underpinning nuclearisation, and the 
factors associated with denuclearisation. Indeed, there are some scholars, such as Hochman 
(2006) and Rublee (2009), who have considered that Libya’s policy reorientation and 
denuclearisation in 2003 were due to the Qaddafi regime’s respect for international treaties, 
and institutions, and both regional and international norms. Albeit that such explanation can 
help to understand some aspects of the shift in the Libyan behaviour, the present study argues 
otherwise. In fact, by looking at the political leadership, the nature of the regime, and its 
response to the external pressure, it seems that realism is more applicable and relevant than 
the constructivist approach. Realist accounts considering factors such as compliance, 
coercion, sanctions, isolation, enforcement, and security threats, squarely fit the Libyan case. 
The third section discusses methodological issues, whilst the last part of the chapter describes 
how the argument of the study will be manifested in the rest of this thesis. 
Indeed, realism remains a controversial theory with its different variants. Traditional realism 
is known for having the capability to analyse and explain certain events and state behaviour. 
However, critics such as (Tannenwald, 2005; Rublee, 2009; Hyman, 2007 and Hochman, 
2006) regard realism as unfit to explain some events such as state behaviour, policy change 
and specifically denuclearisation. The theoretical contribution of this thesis is that the 
behaviour and the policies of the Libyan regime were influenced by internal, regional and 
international factors. In order to compel rogue or autocratic states to dismantle their nuclear 
stockpile, prevent the development and the acquisition of nuclear weapons can be attained by 
means of using the realist paradigm (i.e. international pressure, threat of military action, 
economic sanctions and isolation). 
As for the empirical contribution, the thesis has manifested that in the analysis of the three 
different periods between 1969 until 2003; the Libyan regime complied when the external 
pressure of the international system and the powerful states was in various forms (i.e. 
sanctions isolation and threat of military action) exerted on Libya and its institutions. The 
domestic pressure had also increased in the second period during Qaddafi’s rule (opposition 
groups and LIFG). Although the realist accounts can explain to a very large extent the 
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behaviour of Qaddafi’s regime regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons and 
dismantlement, it fails to explain some aspects of the Libyan case as will be discussed in the 
theoretical framework and the results of the empirical chapters.    
 
1.2 Literature Review  
 
Previous studies that have analysed cases of nuclear weapons reversal in general have 
identified several motives regarding the change in states’ nuclear policies. The issue of 
nuclear weapons dismantlement has been explored in nuclear politics, international politics, 
and international security. Countries that had nuclear weapons, or have the capacity to build 
the nuclear bomb within a short period of time, rarely give up such weapons. The literature 
reviewed suggests that there are several incentives that apply to nuclear weapons 
dismantlement such as economic encouragements, regime change, national identity, change 
in the external security environment, regional agreement to renounce nuclear weapons such 
as in Latin America where there is a ‘Nuclear Weapons Free Zone’ (NWFZ), and new 
international norms which persuade states against the development of nuclear weapons (Paul, 
2000, 102 & 103; Bergner, 2012, 91 & 93). Furthermore, the question of nuclear weapons 
dismantlement has been a prominent subject in international relations, but it can be argued 
that the literature has not been completely developed.  
It should be noted here that the number of countries that possess nuclear weapons, have 
weapons-related programmes, or aspire to acquire nuclear weapons, decreased between the 
1960s and 2005. For example, in the 1960s, there were 23 countries that had either acquired 
nuclear weapons, conducted research on nuclear weapons, or considered nuclear weapons 
acquisition, these being: the US, USSR, UK, France, China, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Israel, India, Egypt, Italy, Japan, Norway, South Africa, West Germany, Yugoslavia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Romania. In the 1980s, the number of countries 
that had nuclear weapons or were developing them decreased to 19 (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, India, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, 
South Korea, Taiwan, UK, US, USSR, and Yugoslavia). By 2005 there were only eight 
nuclear weapons states: the US, USSR, UK, France, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan. 
Additionally, North Korea has manufactured a few nuclear devices, and Iran is suspected of 
having an active nuclear weapons programme (Cirincione, 2005:20).    
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In order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology in the 1960s, the 
international community negotiated the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was 
signed in 1968, by the US, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France, which are now 
acknowledged as the nuclear states, and it came into force in 1970.
5
 The efforts made were 
meant to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the future. Additionally, the aims of 
the NPT are to cease any nuclear arms race, to promote co-operation in the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy, and achieve complete disarmament. To date, the NPT has 189 signatory 
states. It is also important to underline here, the fact that three non-NPT states, Israel, India, 
and Pakistan have acquired nuclear weapons (Bergner, 2012:84). Only one country has 
acquired nuclear weapons after acceding to the NPT, and this is North Korea which became a 
signatory to the NPT in 1985 and subsequently obtained nuclear capability. Israel, India, and 
Pakistan never joined the NPT.  
With regard to the views expressed by political and security analysts, they are various and 
generally diverging. Indeed, proponents of the NPT argue that the regulatory framework it 
promotes is effective in tackling nuclear weapons proliferation and weapons technology 
while others maintain that the NPT regime is ineffective for preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons, as in the case of North Korea. Furthermore, Iran may also follow suit and ignore 
the NPT (Hymans, 2006:6; Bergner, 2012:85). The influence and the effect of the NPT can 
be a crucial factor in nuclear decision-making or nuclear reversal. However, the lack of 
enthusiasm of some states that refuse to comply with the NPT, in particular the autocratic 
regimes which have acceded to the treaty (i.e. North Korea, Libya, and Iran), is discouraging.  
 
In fact, there are some scholars investigating the phenomenon of nuclear weapons, but of 
these only a few have explored the motivations of states’ denuclearisation decisions. For 
example, Paul (2000), Campbell et al. (2004), Rublee (2009 and 2012), Kamrava (2012), 
Solingen (2007 and 2012), and Reiss (1988), have considered cases of nuclear weapons 
dismantlement. Their studies attributed the reversal of nuclear weapons to different motives, 
and identified a set of primary factors that are common in cases of denuclearisation. The 
above-mentioned scholars agree that one of the most prominent factors is the improvement in 
state security. The second finding is related to the change in political systems. For such states, 
the transformation from autocratic regimes towards democratic ones decreases the desire for 
nuclear weapons acquisition. Thirdly, the external security guarantees are considered to 
                                                          
5
 China and France did not adhere to the NPT until 1992. 
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represent another important factor in this regard. For instance, the external security guarantee 
which is provided by the US reduces the aspiration of a state to obtain nuclear weapons. 
These contributing factors discourage states from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons 
(Cortright and Vayrynen, 2010:51). In fact, those states that have dismantled their nuclear 
weapons or nuclear weapons programme had different motives regarding their decisions to 
give up the ultimate weapon or discontinue the development of their nuclear programmes. 
Accordingly, each case had its own dynamics, and Libya’s denuclearisation in particular, was 
affected by external actors. Indeed, scholars such as Jentleson and Whytock (2005), and 
Alterman (2006), who have analysed Libya’s disarmament, maintain that the impact of the 
powerful states such as the US and Britain, was effective alongside other factors such as 
international sanctions and diplomatic isolation imposed by the UN and other powerful 
actors. 
With regard to nuclear disarmament, Kiernan (2011:1) maintains that “when states do disarm, 
they base their nuclear decisions on their own highly subjective needs”. Indeed, Libya opted 
for an exit strategy from several issues that were associated with Qaddafi’s regime. The first 
three decades of Qaddafi’s autocratic rule created concerns domestically, regionally, and 
internationally. The regime’s failed adventures regionally and internationally, had left 
Qaddafi with no options to avoid economic sanctions, international isolation, and threats to 
his regime’s survival. One of the main priorities of the Libyan regime throughout the last two 
decades of Qaddafi’s rule was to end the international perception that Libya was a rogue 
state. In fact, Libya realised that a pre-requisite to any rapprochement with the powerful 
states (the US in particular, and the international community in general), was to accept 
responsibility for its previous actions and policies. It is worth noting that the United Nations, 
the US, Britain, and France, all demanded that Qaddafi’s regime comply with the United 
Nations Security Council resolutions and transform the direction of its foreign and security 
policies (Takeyh, 2001).   
 
1.3 Theoretical Debate 
The theoretical discussion is a vital component in any study as it can unveil the ambiguity 
surrounding the puzzle being explored. According to Frankel and Davis (1993:1), “[t]heory ... 
is essential to policy. There is no way to comprehend reality in any meaningful fashion 
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without the aid of a theory”. Further, Lavoy (2006:438) argues that “academic theories can be 
of use to national security practitioners if they impart relevant knowledge about the outside 
world”. In similar fashion, Paul (2000:3) maintains that “[i]n fact, theories are very important 
tools in analysing a particular policy, as they can shed light on ambiguous policies. It is 
important to link the leading theories of IR with the practice.” The reason why academics, 
analysts and observers study the spread of nuclear weapons is that such weapons enhance the 
likelihood of war between states and regions. States fear that the possession of nuclear 
weapons by their neighbours may prompt them and other countries to react to such nuclear 
weapons (Brown et al., 2010). Thus, the spread of nuclear weapons motivates states to 
participate in nuclear armament programmes.  
 
Several scholars of nuclear disarmament such as Reiss (1988), Solingen (2007, 2012), Paul 
(2000), Sagan (1997, 2003), and Campbell et al. (2004), agree that this phenomenon is the 
result of various motivations. One such motivation is domestic pressure, which can play a 
crucial role. However, this is not the only decisive factor in nuclear reversal, and especially in 
the Libyan case this was not prominent, since domestic political participation was very weak 
due to the ban on political parties, syndicates, and trade unions that was imposed by the 
political system of Qaddafi regime. It was in fact, regional and external factors that had more 
influence on the shift in the Libyan regime’s policies.6 This argument is supported by various 
scholars such as Solingen (2012:3), who observes that international relations’ literature on 
sanctions and nuclear weapons proliferation has given little attention to the domestic effects 
of sanctions, and ignored external attempts to affect the target states’ nuclear stance. Libya is 
considered as a rentier state with a weak economy that depends entirely on oil and gas 
exports. Hence, with only one real source of revenue, Qaddafi’s regime was significantly 
influenced by international actors who were seeking political co-operation. Indeed, such 
regional and external factors can wield a great deal of pressure. In the case of Libya, 
Qaddafi’s regime was heavily affected by external pressure in the form of international 
sanctions, international isolation, and the threat of force (as was the case with Iraq). It is these 
pressures that were the genuine reasons for the change in Libya’s foreign and security 
policies, and in particular for its decision to give up its nuclear ambitions and long-range 
missiles. The compliance of the Libyan regime with the international demands reflects the 
appropriateness of realism. Indeed, the fears by Qaddafi’s regime that it might face the same 
                                                          
6
 It should be noted that the impact of the domestic factor had changed after the mid 1990s as will be seen in 
chapter 4 and 5. 
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fate as Iraq influenced it to comply with the UNSC resolutions and the demands of the 
international community.  
Realists argue that states pursue nuclear weapons in order to survive in the anarchic self-help 
system. States need to protect their national interests in the anarchic international system 
where there is no governing authority. Realists also believe that countries seek military 
capability to obtain power and prestige, and to defend their territory from outside aggression. 
In the absence of a governing authority, realists maintain that countries would not generally 
denuclearise as there is no guarantee that they will not be attacked (Paul, 2000:6). Indeed, 
“[r]ealists … believe that states should not ordinarily forgo their right to manufacture 
weapons that may deter potential adversaries and increase their own power and prestige. If 
they do so, it should be only because of constraints imposed by the structure of the 
international system” (Paul, 2000:7). Nonetheless, despite the fact that realism may offer a 
better explanation regarding the motivation to acquire and dismantle nuclear weapons 
programmes, constructivist theory is considered by a number of scholars as an important 
approach in this regard. For example, Rublee (2009:4) maintains that non-proliferation norms 
are considered significant in nuclear decision-making. In fact, social norms and the 
international social environment influence nuclear weapons decision-making, especially 
when there is an international norm against nuclear weapons.  
In a similar manner, Sagan (2003) argues in his response to Waltz (2003), that, although in 
the 1990s there were new entrant states in the nuclear field, there is still a glimpse of hope 
regarding the non-proliferation efforts. Indeed, South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons 
during the government of F W de Klerk, Argentina and Brazil terminated their nuclear 
weapons programme, and three former states from the former Soviet Union negotiated the 
end to their nuclear stockpiles, and signed the Non-proliferation Treaty. The success of the 
non-proliferation cannot be guaranteed but should nevertheless, be supported, encouraged, 
and rewarded (Waltz and Sagan, 2003:182). From this scholarly perspective, the compliance 
of states is a result of their respect for international and regional norms (i.e. adhering to 
NPT), which prohibit the attainment of nuclear weapons. It is clear that the above-mentioned 
states had different incentives to disarm (i.e. international pressure, economic sanctions, 
domestic pressure, and respect for international and regional norms). An important note that 
should be underlined here is that these cases of denuclearisation were the result of regional 
and international norms against the acquisition of nuclear weapons, except for the instance of 
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South Africa which was the outcome of a combination of international pressure and 
sanctions.  
However, applying the constructivist approach in the Libyan case can be misleading for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the Libyan concessions regarding the country’s nuclear 
programme in 2003 were not due to the intention of Qaddafi’s regime to respect international 
norms against nuclear weapons, or the wishes of international institutions such as 
International Atomic Energy (IAEA). This can be seen in the history of the Libyan regime 
which violated the NPT after ratifying it in 1975 due to its desire to obtain sensitive materials 
for its nuclear project. Secondly, and as will be shown in the empirical chapters, the 
transformation of Libyan security policy, in particular the dismantlement of the non-
conventional weapons and long-range missiles, was the result of the Qaddafi regime’s 
compliance with demands by powerful states such as the US and UK (following long and 
secret negotiations which seem to have started during Clinton’s Administration), rather than 
requests from the IAEA. Thirdly, the nature of the political system, being one of the most 
authoritarian regimes in the world, in contrast to the democratic political systems arguably in 
place in other states mentioned, makes it unlikely that the regime would naturally want to co-
operate with international actors and show respect for international norms. On the contrary, 
there is much evidence that authoritarian regimes tend to break such rules, rather than respect 
and abide by them. Fourthly, in Libya’s case, Qaddafi was widely known for his disrespect of 
international rules and norms and was seen to comply with powerful states and the UN only 
under international pressure (i.e. he ended Libyan intervention in Chad, handed over the 
Lockerbie suspects, ended the support for outlawed movements, stopped meddling in 
neighbouring countries, and accepted responsibility for the regime’s previous actions). 
Undoubtedly, nuclear non-proliferation is considered a vital step for the peace and the 
security of the world, and as shown in the cases of Brazil and Argentina, and in states of the 
former Soviet Union (i.e. Ukraine and Belarus), it is possible to achieve voluntary 
denuclearisation. However, the current international and regional climate relating to the arms 
race shows that efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are on the increase in several regions 
around the world. The Middle East is still threatened with an arms race between the Gulf 
countries and Iran or between the North African countries (i.e. Algeria and Morocco) 
(Mallard, 2008:465). Moreover, the Libyan case of denuclearisation was not voluntary as 
stated publicly by Qaddafi’s ex-foreign minister Abdulrahman Shulgum, and the Libyan 
state’s media. In fact, Libya’s decision to denuclearise in 2003 was the result of different 
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factors, most importantly external pressure which accumulated due to Qaddafi’s failed 
adventures and antagonistic policies.  
This behaviour echoes that observed by Reiss (1988), who studied several countries (South 
Africa, Sweden, India, Japan, South Korea, and Israel), and maintained that non-proliferation 
can succeed if states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons are deterred by international 
economic sanctions and international isolation. According to Reiss (1988:249-251), domestic 
pressure or domestic politics discouraged only countries such as Sweden, and Japan from 
pursuing nuclear weapons, whereas other countries such as South Korea, South Africa and 
Israel did not have the same domestic pressure to persuade their governments not to pursue 
nuclear weapons. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
This study seeks to understand the motives for Libya’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons 
capability since Qaddafi came to power in 1969. It assesses the nuclear path followed by the 
Libyan regime, and examines its eventual decision to give up its nuclear weapons 
programme, identifying the main influences upon the Qaddafi regime calculations. As has 
been noted in the previous sections, there is a scarcity of comment within the literature 
regarding the motivations of developing countries to acquire and dismantle nuclear weapons, 
and this is particularly so in respect of Libya. Accordingly, this study adopts the case study 
approach in order to explore the argument that Libya’s motivations to obtain nuclear weapons 
and simultaneously dismantle its nuclear weapons programme were fuelled by a variety of 
factors. The selection of Libya as a case study is valuable since it provides a clear picture for 
three reasons. The first relates to the understanding of regional and international 
circumstances which motivate states to seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and simultaneously 
the understanding of regional and external factors which encourage states to dismantle their 
nuclear weapons programmes. The second is that the Libyan case can be considered as a real 
test of the influence of external factors on the nuclearisation and denuclearisation of Libya 
(i.e. UN, powerful states, and economic sanctions). And the final reason for its suitability is 
the type of political regime and its political leadership which sought to acquire nuclear 
capability, and subsequently dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. These factors are not 
only important in understanding the motivations of nuclearisation and denuclearisation of the 
Libyan case, but have the potential to provide valuable lessons to the nuclear weapons 
 26 
proliferation phenomenon. In other words, it can play a role in explaining the motivations of 
other cases in this regard such as India, Pakistan, Iran, Syria and North Korea and what are 
the relevant policies to deal with such cases? 
 
Despite the importance of the Libyan case, the literature in this field remains undeveloped, 
particularly with regard to Libya’s foreign security policies and its nuclear weapons during 
the period of Qaddafi’s autocratic regime. As argued by Obeidi (2004:1), “there are problems 
and obstacles related to the security studies field in general and in Libya in particular. 
Because of the sensitivity of these topics, the scholars in the Arab countries in general and in 
Libya in particular have been reluctant to deal with or explore such areas”. In fact, research 
on Libyan foreign policy in general and national security specifically, was considered a risky 
matter in the reign of Qaddafi’s regime. Indeed, the regime would not have easily tolerated 
any criticism regarding the personality of Qaddafi, his political system and policies. 
It is important to state that when the researcher first applied to the University’s Research 
Ethics Committee for approval to conduct the fieldwork, the Libyan uprising erupted, and 
therefore such approval was refused in order to comply with the University’s safety 
regulations. However, eventually approval was obtained after the collapse of Qaddafi’s 
regime, and at that point the researcher assumed it would be relatively easy to gain access to 
the desired interviewees. That assumption was not fully borne out since some individuals 
who had worked for decades in the regime as ministers, ambassadors, and officials, were 
reluctant to speak, fearing that they would be prosecuted like their colleagues who had also 
served in this way. Indeed, had the Qaddafi regime still been in power, it would have been 
virtually impossible to secure access to the very people required to gain answers due to the 
sensitivity surrounding the issues of security and foreign policy. And in fact, irrespective of 
the demise of Qaddafi’s regime, some individuals were still reluctant to be interviewed. Such 
attitudes were, and remain, perfectly understandable as the security situation was quite 
volatile at the time of the interviews. Hence, great thanks are extended to all the interviewees 
for their bravery and their participation in interviews at such a critical time.  
In order to explain the shift in the Qaddafi regime’s behaviour in the last decade of its rule, it 
is essential to investigate the environmental influences, seen in the form of domestic, 
regional, and external factors. Indeed, the study depends upon primary resources (i.e. 
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interviews and documents from Libya) with a view to triangulating the evidence acquired.
7
 
Accordingly, it starts by analysing official documents such as public statements from 
Qaddafi’s government, documents from the United Nations Security Council, the NPT, the 
IAEA, and various other institutions such as the AU and the EU. The study also relies on a 
number of academic journals (The Nonproliferation Review, Foreign Affairs, International 
Security and Contemporary Security Policy). Moreover, several newspapers were considered 
such as the New York Times, the Financial Times, Guardian, the Daily Telegraph, The Times, 
and Al-Hayat an Arab newspaper, published in London. Additionally, the thesis relies on 
secondary sources such as Arab and Libyan newspapers, documents, personal accounts and 
books.  
The data obtained from these resources was utilised and developed during the interview 
sessions. The researcher prepared a number of questions before the interviews, which were 
devised to fill the gaps in the existing literature. The semi-structured interviews conducted in 
summer 2012 were in fact, the most valuable aspect of this research study since they involved 
personal contact by the author in Libya with former senior officials within the Qaddafi’s 
regime who were personally involved with, or had knowledge of, the nuclear weapons 
programme. This enabled the disclosure of important first-hand data (previously unpublished) 
from individuals who had served for many years in different cabinets during Qaddafi’s 
regime. Clearly, these interviewees were able to provide much illumination on some of the 
questions generated by this research study, and offer their informed accounts of the 
transformation of the Libyan regime’s attitudes towards foreign and security policies, and in 
particular the concessions made by Libya in terms of denuclearisation, during the last decade 
of Qaddafi’s rule.  
The data from the interviews is analysed and translated into English to obtain the most 
valuable outcome for the study. Furthermore, whilst interviews were scheduled with several 
academics, diplomats, and officials, when the security situation deteriorated it was not 
possible to travel to certain cities. Libya’s post war circumstances made the whole interview 
process extremely difficult. As a Libyan national, and a native speaker of the Arabic 
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biases. See the article by Yeasmin and Rahman (2012) entitled “Triangulation Research Method as the Tool of 
Social Science Research”, BUP Journal. 
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language, there was no language or cultural barrier presented to the researcher in any aspect 
of the interview exercise. Indeed, this ‘insider’ status allowed the researcher to approach 
several former officials and gain access to their time and opinions. Moreover, this study 
differs from other research in that it is the first study to assess Libya’s nuclearisation and 
denuclearisation activities, since the collapse of Qaddafi’s regime in 2011. This means that 
the participants were free from the constraints existing prior to that time, associated with the 
threat of personal repercussions carried out by the former regime’s security agencies.  
It should be noted that some individuals who were directly involved in the negotiations 
concerning Libya’s dismantlement of its nuclear programme in 2003 were not available for 
interview during the fieldwork in Libya in 2012 due to their arrest by Libya’s new interim 
authorities. For example, most of the official figures from Qaddafi’s regime (e.g. Musa 
Kussa, and Abdulrahman Shalgum Abdel Ati Obeidi, Abdalla Senusi, Mohamed El-Zway, 
and Abuzaid Durda), all of whom had great knowledge of the secret negotiations between 
Libya and the powerful states, were either in custody or had fled the country. Accordingly, 
there may be some limitations of the evidence obtained in the study due to the inability to 
interview some few former officials, and the general situation in Libya at the time which 
remained unstable after the collapse of Qaddafi’s regime. Although the interviewees who did 
participate were reluctant to provide their names, it is unlikely that this request for anonymity 
had any effect upon the information given to the researcher during the interview sessions, all 
of which were held in locations to suit the interviewees’ preferences.  
Nonetheless, the rationale for choosing Libya as a case study was robust, and this was purely 
the fact that Qaddafi’s regime that had sought nuclear weapons in the early 1970s, was the 
same regime that dismantled the nuclear programme and shifted Libya’s security and foreign 
policy after years of distrust and antagonism. The investigation uncovers the reasons for the 
change in Libya’s behaviour in the late 1990s, and in particular in 2003, and explores the 
calculations made by Qaddafi’s regime, who for years opposed the West and their interests in 
the region and further afield. As a single case study, this focus on Libya is able to contribute 
to international relations theory (IR), nuclearisation, denuclearisation, and foreign policy. 
Moreover, Libya resembles other proliferating countries such as Syria or Iran as they have 
similar regimes, and it is possible that the outcomes of the study can be generalised in some 
measure to these countries. That said, it is recognised that as a single case study, Libya 
demonstrates some unique contributing factors, and that each and every case will be 
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characterised by some different incentives to change course from one of nuclear proliferation 
to one of denuclearisation.  
 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis  
 
This thesis consists of six substantial chapters, these being the introduction, theoretical 
framework, three empirical chapters, and the conclusion. Following this introduction, the 
study constructs the theoretical framework. In doing this, it starts by establishing a 
background regarding the phenomenon of nuclear weapons since the production of the first 
atom bomb, and its development in 1945 by the US. This is followed by the literature on 
nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear weapons reversal to determine what motivations 
exist regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons in general, and whether there have been 
any attempts at the regional and/or international level to deal with the ambitions of some 
states in this respect. More specifically, the chapter focuses on important insights from 
various scholars such as Waltz, Mearshmier, Campbell, Solingen, Rublee, Bahgat, Sagan, 
Lavoy, and Paul, who have been involved in, and who have written extensively about, the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Additionally, the theoretical chapter explores several cases of denuclearisation, and reviews 
the literature on countries such as South Africa, Ukraine, Taiwan, Iraq, Brazil, and Argentina. 
Scholars such as Paul (2000), Campbell et al. (2004), and Bahgat (2008) have argued that the 
motivations of the mentioned states to acquire nuclear weapons or dismantle them could be 
explained by realist assumptions (i.e. security, balance of power, regional rivalries, and/or 
internal and external pressure). However, other scholars such as Rublee (2009), and Hyman 
(2006), have different perspectives, considering that states are influenced by regional and 
international norms. The chapter then focuses on Libya as a case study. In this regard, the 
study assumes that Libya’s nuclearisation and denuclearisation was influenced by internal, 
regional, and external factors. Indeed, and as is shown in the empirical chapters, the Libyan 
foreign and security policies have shifted due to the impact of the factors mentioned above.  
The third chapter is dedicated to the Libyan Foreign and Security Policy, and covers the 
period from 1969 when Qaddafi came to power, until 1981. There are many reasons for 
choosing this time scale. Firstly, in 1979 the US designated Libya as a state sponsor of 
terrorism and this categorisation had a number of implications for the regime’s behaviour. 
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Secondly, the first direct military confrontation between Qaddafi’s regime and the US was in 
1981 over the Gulf of Sidra. Thirdly, the behaviour of the regime at this time was different 
from in other periods as will be seen in the next chapters. The first section of this chapter 
gives a historical and geographical overview of Libya in general, it summarises the colonial 
periods, and then covers some aspects of debate concerning Libya’s independence, and its 
politics during the monarchical period. Accordingly, it opens with a historical background to 
Libyan politics since its independence in 1951, focusing particularly on Qaddafi’s regime and 
the reasons behind its nuclear ambitions. Despite the fact that this period examines the era 
after Qaddafi came to power, it is essential to shed light on the policies of the monarchy and 
what led to the removal of the royal regime from power. Thereafter, the chapter charts the 
change in Libyan politics from 1969. It starts by providing the background to the 1969 coup 
and its motivations, and proceeds to discuss the development of the Qaddafi regime’s 
political system. The chapter then focuses on the start of the Libyan nuclear programme. 
More precisely, it looks at the incentives behind the regime’s intention to obtain, at any cost 
and by all means, nuclear weapons. In this regard, the chapter considers all multiple factors 
(i.e. internal, regional, and external), which affected the direction of Libyan policies in this 
particular period. 
In similar fashion to the previous chapter, the fourth chapter covers the period between 1982 
and 2000. The rationale behind this timeframe is that several issues occurred during this 
particular period. For instance, Libya’s support for terrorism reached its peak during this 
period (i.e. the Berlin disco bombing, the Lockerbie bombing, the bombing of UTA the 
French airliner, and the killing of the British police officer, Yvonne Fletcher). In the same 
period, the US imposed economic sanctions and conducted a limited airstrike in April 1986 
on Libya. Furthermore, the UN implemented economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and 
requested Qaddafi’s regime to comply with the UN Security Council resolutions (UNSC). As 
a response to the global pressure, the Libyan regime handed over the Lockerbie suspects and 
started to approach the US for discussions regarding its (the regime’s) irresponsible policies 
and unconventional weapons programme. This period begins by highlighting the evolution of 
the nuclear programme and explaining the various reactions to it, both internal and regional, 
as well as the influential external responses. For example, it considers the reaction to Libya’s 
policies which was concretised through the imposition of economic and military sanctions on 
the regime. It also assesses the extent to which these actions affected Libyan policies. Indeed, 
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the study examines a whole range of internal, regional and external factors. In doing so, it 
evaluates Qaddafi’s regional and international policies and their consequences on Libya. 
Additionally, the regime’s support for internationally-outlawed organisations in neighbouring 
countries and in other spheres such as Latin America, is explored. An important section of the 
chapter sheds light on opposition groups to the Libyan regime and their impact on Libya’s 
domestic policies. Moreover, the chapter examines the response of the international 
community to the regime’s policies and actions regarding several issues such as the cases of 
the Lockerbie affair, the UTA incident, and the killing of the British policewoman, Yvonne 
Fletcher. This examination includes the imposition of US unilateral sanctions and UN 
multilateral sanctions, and Libya’s response to and compliance with, to the tools of coercion 
used by the international community. Despite the influence of the internal, regional, and 
international factors, the regime continued to develop its nuclear weapons programme to a 
degree which raised the fears of not only its neighbours, but also the international community 
as a whole.  
In conjunction with chapters three and four, the fifth chapter covers the period from 2001 
until 2003. This timeframe is explored in depth due to the fact that important events which 
apparently influenced Qaddafi’s policies, took place within it. One such event was the seizure 
of a ship BBC China loaded with nuclear components whilst en-route from Dubai to Libya. 
The second event was the revelation of the A Q Khan network and its illegal nuclear dealings 
with several countries including Libya. Accordingly, these events were classed as evidence of 
Libya’s nuclear weapons programme. Moreover, the events of 11th September 2001, as well 
as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, played important roles in the shift of Qaddafi’s 
position. Consequently, the regime was persuaded to comply with most of the UN 
resolutions, halting its support for terrorism and reorienting its foreign and security policies. 
Indeed, a substantial change was noticeable during this period, not only with the dismantling 
of Libya’s nuclear programme, but also with a significant evolution of Libyan foreign policy. 
This, in reality, was due to several factors, which the study explores by initially considering 
the foundation of the concession to disarm and renounce all unconventional weapons. In this 
regard, the characteristics of Qaddafi’s regime transformation at the national, regional, and 
international levels, are examined. Despite the fact that domestic and regional factors had 
played an important role in Libya’s political change, it is argued that the external/global 
factors were more influential in forcing the Qaddafi regime to adapt new policies on both 
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levels (internal and external). Indeed, the effects of the external factors are considered to have 
remained constant for several years by the international community, especially since the 
regime opted for aggressive and belligerent foreign and security policies in the regional and 
international arena. It should be underlined that the Qaddafi regime approached the 
international community, and particularly the US, to ease the economic and military sanctions 
as well as the international isolation, and to lighten the threats of force to change the regime’s 
behaviour. The ongoing constraints on Libya’s behaviour applied by the powerful actors and 
the international community had a strong impact on Libya’s policy reorientations and 
eventual denuclearisation in 2003.      
At the domestic level, the Qaddafi regime adopted new domestic policies of appeasement 
aimed at improving the image of the leadership and changing the view of the population 
regarding Qaddafi’s rule (i.e. economic reforms, release of political prisoners, and pardon of 
the opposition figures). At the regional level, the regime transformed its hostile policies and 
adopted more lenient ones with neighbouring countries in the region.  As is shown in detail in 
Chapter Five, the regime’s behaviour and ideology concerning its regional neighbours had 
changed from meddling in African politics to promoting peace and stability. At the 
international level, a fundamental shift occurred in the regime’s behaviour in which the 
country started to comply with UN resolutions and the demands of individual states such as 
the US, the UK, and France. This behavioural change could be attributed to a number of 
issues such as the extremely negative international perception of Libya after the Lockerbie 
affair, the Berlin disco bombing, the bombing of UTA the French airliner, the killing of the 
British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, and most importantly, the declared international need 
for co-operation in the ‘war on terror’ enacted in the aftermath of the 11th September 2001 
terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York and on the Pentagon headquarters. 
Qaddafi’s government became willing to try to resolve these issues. One important outcome 
of the softening of the regime’s attitudes towards the international political arena was the 
sharp increase in foreign investment and economic exchange between Libya and the rest of 
the international community. Hence, it can be understood that Libya’s desire to atone for the 
past behaviour and the negative image that had been associated with the Qaddafi regime for 
more than three decades, led to an improvement in international perceptions of the regime 
and in a willingness to deal with the country. 
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Another important element to be underlined at this point is the fact that powerful states such 
as the US and Britain, persuaded attitude change within the Qaddafi regime by offering 
material incentives (i.e. lifting sanctions, ending isolation, and allowing foreign investment) 
for it to give up its nuclear weapons programme. The most relevant and influential factor 
leading to Libya’s dismantlement in this respect in 2003 was that negotiations concerned with 
it were with the powerful states rather than with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). These powerful states, the US and Britain, compelled Libya to dismantle its 
unconventional weapons stockpile and all-long range missiles in its possession. The timing of 
these negotiations is an important factor, and this is investigated within the chapter in order to 
gain some understanding of why Libya approached the US and Britain to make progress on 
the disarmament. Questions arise such as: what were the Qaddafi regimes motives to give up 
its nuclear programme; what forced the regime to take another direction in its foreign and 
security policies, including the nuclear programme; was the invasion of Iraq a coercive factor 
for Qaddafi (as claimed by George Bush and Tony Blair); or were the attacks of 11
th
 
September a decisive factor in Qaddafi’s decision to change the direction of his irresponsible 
policies? These questions will be answered in the subsequent empirical chapters. 
The last chapter is devoted to a discussion of the scholarly contribution of this thesis. It 
should be noted that the results of the empirical chapters are explained separately due to the 
fact that there was variation not only in the behaviour of Qaddafi’s regime but also in the 
factors which influenced it. It starts by discussing the main empirical contribution. In this 
regard, it is evident that there are many reasons why states pursue the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons, and equally many reasons why they decide to abandon such programmes and 
dismantle their non-conventional weaponry. In particular, a response to external pressures is 
seen to be a deciding fact. The analysis of the Libyan case suggests that the fear of having 
force used against the country, as for example as happened in Iraq, may well have played a 
significant role in persuading Qaddafi’s regime to suspend its nuclear weapons programme 
and surrender its long-range missiles. Indeed, the systematic analysis of the Libyan case can 
be generalised as an effective model for other similar cases such as Syria and Iran. The 
second section of the chapter is dedicated to the theoretical contribution. In brief, although 
the constructivist approach can provide answers to important questions regarding the 
abandonment of nuclear weapons programmes, referring mainly to the pressure for states to 
respect regional and international norms, and the subsequent need for nuclear weapons-free 
zones, the realist approach is actually the most appropriate. Libyan compliance is shown not 
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to have been the outcome of the regime’s respect for regional and international norms 
regarding the expected behaviour of moderate states, but rather of its fear of further economic 
and military sanctions, greater international isolation, and potentially the same destiny as 
Iraq. 
To sum up, the primary drivers for the change in Libyan politics in the fourth decade of 
Qaddafi’s rule, were in fact influenced and affected by a set of contributing factors. 
Overwhelmingly, external factors were influential in promoting the transformation of the 
Qaddafi regime’s attitudes in relation to its foreign and security policies. In this respect, it is 
clear that the effects of external constraints that had been brought to bear upon Libya as a 
means of bringing the country into line with the international community, were substantial, as 
the global pressure, international isolation, unilateral/multilateral sanctions, coercion, and 
threat of military force all combined to force the Libyan regime to change its outlook and 
deeds. Indeed, the Qaddafi regime’s compliance with powerful states such as the US and the 
UK, international institutions (i.e. IAEA), and the rest of the international community was 
crucial and instrumental in allowing Libya’s return to the international community. Other 
contributing factors to the shift in Libyan policies can be seen as relating to regional and 
domestic imperatives. In fact, Libya had to amend its regional policies by co-operating with 
its neighbouring countries (i.e. security) and re-directing its political reorientation towards the 
African continent instead of towards the Arab World. Additionally, domestic factors exerted 
some pressure during the last decade of Qaddafi’s rule with the emergence of the reformists’ 
camp, led by one of Qaddafi’s sons and other figures such as Ghanem and Mahmud Jibril, 
which had attempted to make economic improvements through changes to economic policy, 
involving a move away from the state-controlled and socialist-inspired economy to a more 
liberal one. The response of the Libyan regime regarding the dire economic situation, 
unemployment, and under-development varied. For instance in mid-2000, after the sanctions 
were lifted, the Libyan government persuaded several international companies to invest in 
different sectors of the economy, and employ local people in a bid to reduce youth 
unemployment. Additionally, various international companies entered the Libyan market to 
boost the Libyan economy, develop the oil sector, and develop the country’s infrastructure.   
In order to fully understand the motivations behind Libya’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, and 
their subsequent dismantlement, the next chapter explores the issue of nuclear politics 
through the existing literature. It examines several cases of nuclearisation and 
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denuclearisation as well as theories of international relations, realism, and constructivism. 
This examination subsequently allows for the development of a systematic framework with 
which to investigate the Libyan case empirically throughout different periods. In turn, this 
investigation provides important lessons regarding the motivations for pursuing a nuclear 
programme and then abandoning it.  
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since they were developed in the middle of the 20
th
 century, nuclear weapons have become 
central to all debates in international security, and the spread of such weaponry is considered 
a significant topic in the study of international relations (IR). Essentially, the motive for such 
attention by scholars and analysts is the fact that nuclear proliferation may lead to a nuclear 
war since when more states possess nuclear weapons, the likelihood that one state may use 
them against another can increase. Moreover, nuclear weapons proliferation increases the risk 
of unintentional accidents. Not surprisingly, therefore, the issue of nuclear weapons 
proliferation by and among more states, has generated a debate between nuclear optimists and 
pessimists about the likelihood of war, including nuclear war.
8
  
With the production of the first atomic device in the United States and its use over the 
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world witnessed the destructive effect of new 
weaponry, and realised the potential significance of the atom bomb in future conflicts. 
Accordingly, the possession or otherwise of nuclear weapons has played a crucial role in 
world politics and international security, especially during the peak of the Cold War, the 
Cuban crisis in 1963, providing a vivid example. The US development and its use of the 
atomic bomb in August 1945 prompted the Soviet Union to develop its own nuclear weapons, 
and this move in turn, motivated other powerful countries such as the UK, France, and China 
to engage in the arms race and develop their own nuclear weapons. These five nuclear-
weapon states are officially known as the nuclear club (US, Russia, UK, France, and China), 
and were subsequently followed by other undeclared nuclear weapon states (e.g. Israel, India, 
Pakistan, and North Korea). Such expansion in nuclear weapons subsequently inspired or 
reinforced the will of other countries to obtain such weapons - Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya 
being examples. 
The role of nuclear weapons is to deter potential adversaries or foreign aggression towards 
states, to balance the power of other states, and to protect state security. However, when 
states seek to nuclearise and acquire unconventional weapons, regional and international 
                                                          
8
 The contribution of Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan to the optimism-pessimism debate on nuclear weapons. 
Scott D Sagan and Kenneth N Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A debate Renewed (New York: W W 
Norton: 2003). 
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stability is threatened and the possession of nuclear power becomes a menace. That said, 
many countries view nuclear weapons as essential to their security, since they are considered 
as a tool of survival in the absence of a governing authority in the world system (Paul, 
2000:6). Consequently, the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the gravest concerns 
threatening world peace and security in the modern and contemporary history of IR.  And 
moreover, despite the theory that nuclear weapons may sustain the balance between states, 
the theft of such nuclear materials or nuclear bombs by terrorists, and their eventual use, 
raises concerns over nuclear weapons proliferation. Indeed, as new states obtain nuclear 
weapons, so too will there be a greater probability that terrorist groups may get their hands on 
them (Campbell et al., 2004:26; Kroenig, 2010:189). 
In the aftermath of World War II, the arms race between the most powerful states (i.e. the 
USA and the USSR) created a motive for other states to acquire nuclear weapons in order to 
balance and protect themselves from outside aggression. This was particularly the case in 
developing countries (Cordesman, 1991:3). Several regions around the world sought to 
acquire nuclear weapons (i.e. Northeast and Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, 
and the African continent), and some other countries are still keen to obtain such weaponry, 
as for example in the Middle East. Indeed, this particular region has been prone to nuclear 
weapon proliferation and conventional war for a long time (Miller, 1989:390), having sought 
to acquire nuclear weapons from the early 1960s right up to the present time. Globalisation 
facilitates this process, as developing countries are able to communicate with other countries 
that can provide the materials to help them acquire nuclear weapons, all justified on the basis 
that their possession will deter hostilities from neighbouring states and enable a better 
balance of power (Kamrava, 2012:10; Solingen 2012:24).   
However, even if such attempts by states to develop nuclear weapons fail, inter-state conflict can 
still be caused, and preventive attacks on nuclear sites and facilities may increase as adversarial 
states seek to sabotage other states’ nuclear programmes. Such an example was seen in 1981 
when Israel attacked the nuclear reactor at Osirak in Iraq, and in 2007 when it attacked a nuclear 
facility in Syria. The US also intended to bomb North Korean nuclear facilities in the 1990s 
(Spector and Cohen, 2008). Additionally, fearing its neighbour’s nuclear ambitions, Iraq sent a 
jet fighter to attack an Iranian nuclear reactor, and an Iranian aircraft attacked the Osirak nuclear 
reactor near Baghdad, just nine months before Israel did the same. Moreover, in the late 1980s, 
the US and Israel threatened to bomb unconventional weapons facilities in Libya (Miller, 
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1989:390-394); and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was fuelled by the suspicion that Iraq was 
developing nuclear and chemical weapons in defiance of UN resolutions.  
The first section in this chapter is dedicated to understanding the causes of nuclearisation and 
denuclearisation, and focuses particularly on the Libyan case. This is followed by an 
identification of the environmental factors (internal, regional, and external) which influenced 
Libyan policy in this regard. The third section considers the main relevant IR theories and 
approaches to the analysis of the nuclear weapons field in general, and explores the extent to 
which these theories can be applied to Libya. And the final section introduces the case of this 
study, indicating that the focus will be on three different phases within the period of the Qaddafi 
regime since these three different phases demonstrate influences by different factors and led to 
various results.   
In order to fully comprehend the phenomenon of nuclear weapons, it is essential to consider the 
incentives which push states towards acquiring such weaponry.  This requires an exploration of 
the contributing factors which shape nuclear decisions and motivate states, such as the nature of 
the political system, the military apparatus, the technological establishments, and security. This 
is undertaken in the next section, which takes a global approach to the issue. 
 
2.2 Background to the Phenomenon of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 
The first decades of the development of nuclear weapons were characterised by the race 
between several powers to acquire the most powerful weapon. In 1945, the United States was 
the only power to possess the atomic bomb, and it did indeed use this in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in Japan. This strategy was not intended solely to destroy two Japanese cities, but 
was in fact directed against the country as a whole (Schelling, 2008:17). The possession of 
such a weapon served as an incentive for other states to acquire nuclear power, and as the 
Cold War unfolded, the Soviet Union broke the monopoly on atomic weapons held by the 
US, and developed its own atomic bomb in 1949. Soon afterwards, the United Kingdom 
crossed the nuclear threshold and developed its own atomic bomb in 1952, being followed by 
France in 1960, and China in 1964. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council 
formed the club of those possessing the atomic bomb in 1964, becoming known as the five 
nuclear weapons states (Maerli and Lodgaard, 2007:1). 
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Initially, the US atomic bomb was developed to counter any German project, especially in the 
military domain, and then later to guard against hostile moves by the Soviet Union. However, 
once the bomb was available to the US, it became viewed as a legitimate, strategic weapon to 
use against any enemies of the US (Freedman, 2003:15). Likewise, the Soviet Union 
considered nuclear power as forming a strategic weapon which could deter outside threats, 
especially from the US, NATO, and/or other powers. Moreover, it was also perceived as a 
legitimate weapon for use in the case of limited war as a means of deflating the threat of 
conventional war when facing a stronger adversary (Santoro, 2010:33). As for the British 
doctrine, nuclear weapons were considered essential to prevent potential threats such as those 
emanating from Nazi Germany during WWII. The same concerns were expressed in the Cold 
War period - this time against the Soviet Union and its allies. France also shared similar 
beliefs to those of Britain, regarding the importance of having nuclear weapons as being to 
deter outside attacks and guarantee national security. Accordingly, nuclear weapons were 
seen by France as a deterrent against foreign aggression or invasion.
9
 The Chinese dogma 
with regard to nuclear weapons was based on three principles: “effectiveness, counter-
deterrence and sufficiency”. Although China claims to have the smallest arsenal of the 
nuclear weapons states, it stresses that its capability must meet the national security 
imperatives and protect its territory in defensive and retaliatory situations (Santoro, 2010:29-
36). 
As already noted, other states such as South Africa, Israel, Iran, and North Korea, also 
decided to pursue nuclear power to protect their own security interests. However, the 
decisions in this respect provoked desires from neighbouring countries to also enjoy nuclear 
capability and this merely added to the number of states willing to acquire nuclear weapons. 
This attempt to proliferate such armaments was perceived as a genuine threat to world peace 
and security. One reason for this perception was that nuclear power was considered a source 
of nuclear war between states. And another related to the potential consequences of the theft 
of nuclear materials/weapons by terrorist groups (Marks, 2009:325).
10
 The increase in states 
seeking nuclear weapons still represents a major concern, particularly in a high conflict 
environment or in troubled regions such as the Middle East and North Africa.  
                                                          
9
 Possessing nuclear weapons was seen by France as a key solution to its security problems. The concept was 
deeply embedded in the minds of its leaders. 
10
The more states possessing nukes, the more likely they will be tempted to use them (Hanson, 2008:606). 
Nuclear weapons are considered the most destructive weapon that mankind has invented. They can destroy big 
cities if used. Hence, they are regarded as dangerous weapons, especially when they fall into the wrong hands. 
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However, there are scholars in the IR field such as Waltz
11
 and Mearsheimer
12
 who argue that 
nuclear weapons kept the peace during the tensions of the Cold War era, and affirm that they 
are actually tools for stability between states (Sagan and Waltz, 2003:5; Mearsheimer, 
1985:20).  Indeed, both Waltz (2003) and Mearsheimer (1985) regard nuclear proliferation as 
beneficial to world peace and security.  
In order to address the threats resulting from nuclear weapons proliferation, in 1968 the 
international community established the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into 
force in the early 1970s.
13
 The purpose of the NPT is to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons (Bergner, 2012:84), which as Lavoy (2006) observes, has been a top security issue 
for the US since the development of such weapons in the 1940s. Subsequently, there have 
been many efforts by the US and other countries to dissuade states from pursuing nuclear 
capability (Lavoy, 2006:433). 
Not surprisingly, the phenomenon of nuclear weapons proliferation has been the focus of 
various international debates in different forums such as the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA), the European Union (EU), and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO). And the questions which have dominated the discussions have been related to the 
perceived need to acquire nuclear weapons as well as their utility to states. 
In this great debate, two paradigms dominate: “more may be better” for scholars such as 
Waltz, who regards nuclear weapons as a sign of stability because deterrence will work, and 
“more may be worse” by Sagan who considers nuclear weapons as a source of instability for 
peace and security (Waltz and Sagan, 2003:1).  
The early realist perspective (post-World War II) concerning the necessity of possessing 
nuclear weapons, was met with intense scepticism amongst the powerful states and the 
international community. Accordingly, the leading powers such as the USA and the rest of the 
international community, decided to work towards nuclear non-proliferation through 
persuasion and pressure such as was the case with Germany and Japan (Bahgat, 2008:2). 
However, a number of countries received nuclear assistance from nuclear weapons states, as 
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 For more details see:  The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. 
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 For more details see: Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe. 
13
 Five states are recognised by the NPT: the US, Russia, UK, China, and France. India, Pakistan and Israel have 
not yet been officially recognised by the NPT.  
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happened when France provided assistance to Israel from 1959 until 1965, and China assisted 
Pakistan in the 1980s.  Subsequently, Pakistan provided nuclear assistance to North Korea, 
Iran, and Libya (Kroenig, 2010:1), demonstrating a mushroom effect as the assisted states 
become those providing help to enable others.  
In contrast, however, several countries such as Australia, Sweden, Taiwan, South Africa, 
Brazil, and Argentina decided to dismantle their nuclear weapons/nuclear weapons 
programme and chose not to develop further nuclear capability. Different reasons can be 
identified for such changes in policy, for example internal political changes, sanctions, the 
inability to sustain the cost of such programmes, the damage they caused to the economy, and 
a change to state identity (Burgess, 2010).
14
  Additionally, other states such as Iraq and Libya, 
were forced by external pressures to withdraw from their nuclear weapons programmes.  
Another category represents those states which had nuclear programmes but refrained from 
pursuing nuclear weapons capability. For instance, the decision of Argentina to give up its 
nuclear weapons programme came after a careful reconsideration of its security. In this 
respect, the perception among Argentinian policy-makers was that the security environment 
had changed, and that occurred after they lost the Falkland war against Britain, a nuclear 
power state, in 1982. Argentina concluded that the threats to its regional and international 
security had diminished and that it was more important to develop close co-operation with 
Brazil rather than an atomic bomb. Accordingly, co-operation between South American states 
was viewed as an enhancement to the security of all regional states. As for Brazil, its decision 
to abandon its nuclear weapons programme was based on similar reasoning to that of its 
neighbour Argentina, the perception being that a general improvement in the region’s 
security environment was evident. Both the Argentinian and Brazilian governments formed 
the opinion that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would have undermined their economic 
and security interests. And as noted by Bergner (2012: 91-95),
15
 the NPT was not the main 
motive for the reversal of nuclear policies in either country.   
                                                          
14
 There are also states such as Ukraine that viewed nuclear weapons as counterproductive to their security and 
new identity. See Steven (2008) “Identity Politics and Nuclear Disarmament” for more details on Ukraine 
nuclear disarmament.  
15
 The Treaty of Tlatelolco Prohibits Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. It stipulates: 
“Latin American parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, nor to permit the storage or deployment of 
nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries.” Article available online at: 
http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/tlatelolco 
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Some former states of the Soviet Union, such as Ukraine,
16
 Kazakhstan,
17
 and Belarus,
18
 
dismantled their nuclear stockpiles soon after their disengagement from the USSR, opting for 
a state free from nuclear weapons. For instance, by mid-1994, Ukraine had given up its 
nuclear arsenal, which had been considered the third-largest stockpile in the world. Such a 
move reflected the fact that Ukraine was constructing a new identity for itself after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, and hence it opted for a new state with a new image. The 
success of the above cases in denuclearisation is attributed to several reasons, such as abiding 
by regional and international norms, pursuing a new identity, desovietization, adopting new 
security policies, distancing themselves from the former arms race, and adhering 
unconditionally to the NPT (Steven, 2008).
19
  
In South Africa, the denuclearisation decision was due to factors such as isolation, sanctions, 
and change in the security environment (Burgess, 2010).
20
 This latter case presents 
similarities with Libya, with the exception of factors such as the change of power in the 
country, and the reduction of threats. To summarise the above discussion, it appears that there 
were differing rationales for dismantling nuclear weapons, such as internal factors (i.e. 
domestic pressure to nuclearise, cost benefit of nuclear programme, and pressure from the 
country’s nuclear establishment), regional factors (i.e. change in the regional security, and 
end of regional rivalries), and external factors (i.e. international pressure, effect of powerful 
states, isolation, and sanctions by the UN). To further this argument, the discussion now 
concentrates on the Libyan case. 
 
                                                          
16See Dunn J F Dunn, “The Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons Debate”  March 1993, Soviet Studies Research Centre. 
The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. On 16 July 1990, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet (Verkhovna Rada) 
adopted a “Declaration of State Sovereignty” by a majority of 355 to four.  Article IX of this document, dealing 
with the “External and Internal Security” stated, inter alia:  “The Ukrainian SSR solemnly proclaims its 
intention to become in future a permanently neutral state, taking no part in military blocs and holding to three 
non-nuclear principles: not to accept, produce or acquire nuclear weapons”. Article available online at: 
http://www.fas.org/news/ukraine/k16.html  
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 Aida Abzhaparova (2011, 1552) maintains that Kazakhstan was affected by the new identity as a sovereign 
and non-nuclear state. Constructing new identity requires ‘desovietization’ and denuclearisation of the state of 
Kazakhstan. 
18
Amy F Woolf (Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: Location, Command, and Control).The removal 
of nuclear weapons from Belarus initially did not provoke controversies like those in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 
In February 1993, the parliament in Belarus gave its approval to START I, and agreed that Belarus would 
accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. During debate on the treaties, some 
members of parliament suggested that Belarus seek compensation for its weapons, but the Chairman of the 
parliament, Stanislav Shushkevich, refused to place conditions on Belarus’ approval of START and the NPT. 
See article available at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/91-144.htm 
19
 The countries cited benefitted economically and in terms of security following their decision to denuclearise.  
20
 See Stephen F Burgess (2010) for more details on South Africa’s nuclear policies.  
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Libya’s shift in its security policy in general, and its nuclear weapons programme in 
particular, is the main issue to be addressed by this study. To understand the reasons behind 
the decision to denuclearise, it is relevant to go back to the origins of Libya’s decision to 
acquire nuclear capability. Hence, the subsequent sections address the Libyan desire to obtain 
nuclear weapons and the factors behind the later decision to give up the programme.   
 
2.2.1 Reasons for Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 
As already identified, there are various underlying motives for states to pursue nuclear 
weapons, such as to enhance security and prestige, to equalise the balance of power, and to 
reduce the perceived threat from adversaries. Certainly, states seek to acquire nuclear 
weapons in order to secure themselves from foreign aggression in an anarchic international 
system where there is no central authority. Additionally, states need to survive external 
threats and establish a balance of power in relation to hostile neighbours. Consequently, some 
states view nuclear weapons as being essential to their survival (Paul, 2000:5).  
Nonetheless, nuclear weapons are known to be among the most dangerous weapons ever 
conceived by human beings; a single nuclear device can cause destruction on a scale far 
greater than any other kind of weaponry. Fortunately, it is difficult to acquire or manufacture 
nuclear weapons, but despite the obstacles in this respect, countries have managed to obtain 
nuclear capability and refused to become signatories to the NPT (Cirincione et al., 2005:5-
8).
21
 North Korea, for example was the first country to conduct three nuclear tests in 2006, 
2009 and 2013, after India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear tests in the late 1990s. 
Indeed, there is a suspicion that North Korea may conduct a fourth nuclear test (Rosett, 
2014).  
As for Iran’s nuclear programme, the West suspects that Iran will develop nuclear weapons, 
and amid these growing concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities, the six world powers 
(Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany) led by the United States, held talks in Geneva 
with Iran and reached an interim agreement in November 2013 after several years of standoff. 
The six world powers agreed to support limited uranium enrichment for Iran’s nuclear 
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 Apart from the five states of the nuclear club acknowledged by the NPT, others such as India, Pakistan, and 
North Korea refused to accede to the NPT, while Israel is still denying it has nuclear weapons.  
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programme, in return for economic incentives such as the easing of sanctions,
22
 and the end 
to the hostilities between Iran and the international community. The final phase of negotiation 
was scheduled to end by 20
th
 July 2014,
23
 but no agreement to suspend Iran’s nuclear 
activities by July 2014 was reached and the negotiations have been extended. In fact, the six 
world powers and Iran met again on the 16
th
 of October in Vienna, Austria, for another round 
of tense and serious negotiation, but without reaching a compromise. The deadline of the 
formal negotiations has been extended until 24
th
 of November 2014. The US has refused to 
extend the talks after the November deadline. If the major powers and Iran did not strike a 
deal on the 24
th
 of November, the sanctions on Iran will resume.
24
 The agreement of the six 
world powers with Iran for limited uranium enrichment to its nuclear programme 
demonstrates an acceptance of Iran’s nuclear posture and the development of its nuclear 
programme.  
For Reiss (1988:248) “the decision over whether or not to acquire nuclear armament in turn 
can be best understood when placed in the larger framework of a country’s domestic and 
foreign policy objectives”. Reiss (1988:258) also highlights that:  
The motivations to acquire the technological capability which could allow 
the country to build nuclear weapons ... and the motivations to actually 
acquire weapons are very different. A country’s nuclear development may 
be motivated by many factors … all these motivations, however, are 
distinct from those which will impel a country to test and deploy nuclear 
weapons. 
The author considers that a confusion often arises regarding these two types of motivation. 
States that seek nuclear technology may not intend to use it for nuclear weaponry,
25
 for 
example, a state may seek to improve its image and envisage nuclear capability as a symbol 
of its modernity and prestige. Reiss believes that these different motivations and the way in 
which they operate to shape a state’s nuclear policy deserve more attention. 
                                                          
22
In 2013 the major powers have suspended some sanctions and released $4 billion from overseas accounts to 
Iran. 
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 See, The Guardian Newspaper, “US and Iran to hold direct talks in Geneva over nuclear programme”, 7th 
June, 2014), available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/07/us-iran-direct-nuclear-talks-geneva 
24
 Solomon, J. (2014) “Oil’s Fall, Militants’ Rise Color Iran Nuclear Talks”, 16th October, 2014, article published 
by the Wall Street Journal. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/articles/oils-fall-militants-rise-color-iran-nuclear-
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25
 Indeed, Reiss (1988) makes the point that some states seek the technical capability in order to use it for 
peaceful energy, and that they do so because they have insufficient domestic energy resources to meet their 
needs, and because they might not want to rely on foreign assistance. 
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Sagan (1996) proposed three models for understanding the incentives of policy-makers who 
pursue the nuclear weapons policy option. He contends that nuclear weapons are important 
for national security, domestic policies, and the bureaucratic apparatus, and that they function 
as a sign of a state’s modernity and reinforce state identity (Sagan, 1996:55). The first model 
he identified is known as the security model which enhances national security against 
external threats.
26
 In this analysis, the objective of policy-makers is to obtain nuclear 
weapons as a deterrent against adversaries or any potential security threats. If states do not 
have this option available to them, then they seek to ally themselves with a nuclear power in 
order to benefit from the protection offered by that relationship. However, the credibility of 
such extended deterrence might provoke retaliation (Sagan, 1996:57).  
Moreover, nuclear weapons might also be a deterrent against conventional military threats, or 
could act as a coercive tool to effect changes in the status quo.
27
 Sagan (1996) indicates that 
nuclear proliferation is a response both to the fear of being attacked by conventional 
weaponry, and nuclear weapons. He observes that prior to the first nuclear weapon designed 
by the USA there had been no need for nuclear arms.
28
 However, the use of nuclear weapons 
by the USA in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 was considered by the Soviet Union 
as the start of a new era by the Soviet Union, and in order to balance the American power, the 
USSR realised that its own acquisition of nuclear capability was its highest priority. Indeed, 
upon hearing of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin was explicit, as noted by 
Sagan (1996:58), who quoted him as saying: “A single demand of you comrades … Provide 
us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken 
the whole world. The balance has been destroyed. Provide the bomb – it will remove a great 
danger from us”.  
The second model proposed by Sagan (1996) is the domestic model, which envisages nuclear 
weapons as a political tool to enhance domestic and bureaucratic interests inside the state. 
This model shows that domestic actors play an important role in the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons,
29
 by supporting or discouraging the government’s effort to seek unconventional 
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 He argues that states exist in a self-help system, anarchy, and must therefore take steps to maximise their 
security. 
27
 According to Sagan, Israeli and Pakistani decisions to develop nuclear weapons are based on defensive 
motivations for countering the threat of conventional weapons. In the case of Iraq and North Korea, the author 
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  Sagan underlines that American nuclear capability had arisen from the dedication of massive efforts and 
resources to found an appropriate technological and organisational establishment to support a responsible 
nuclear programme. 
29
 These actors emerge from past case studies of nuclear weapons proliferation. 
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weapons.
30
 The author identifies three types of actors - the state’s nuclear apparatus,31 
military officials,
32
 and political figures.
33 
When domestic actors form coalitions and 
influence the government’s decision-making process through political pressure, or through 
the control of information, a pro-nuclear weapons decision becomes possible. For Sagan 
(1996:64), “there is no well-developed domestic political theory of nuclear weapons 
proliferation that identifies the conditions under which such coalitions are formed and 
become powerful enough to produce their preferred outcomes”. In Libya’s case, the domestic 
pressure was very weak, particularly in the first empirical period (1969-1982) where its 
influence was weaker than other regional and external factors. As will be discussed in the 
second empirical chapters, the influence of the domestic factor had increased gradually. 
However, it was not the only decisive factor. 
The third model proposed is the norms model, which emphasises the significance of norms 
regarding states’ nuclear choices. According to this model, the decision to go nuclear or not 
becomes symbolic and thus shapes and reflects the identity of the state. Consequently, states’ 
behaviour is not based only on leaders’ concern for national security, but also on norms and 
shared beliefs concerning what behaviours are legitimate and acceptable in international 
relations.
34
 However, despite the existing literature in the law and ethics of nuclear weapons, 
there is still insufficient attention paid to ‘nuclear symbolism’ and the progress of 
international norms related to nuclear weapons (Sagan, 1996:73-76).
35
 Although Sagan’s 
norms model can explain some nuclear decisions of some states (i.e. democratic countries 
and developed states), it cannot explain the decision of autocratic states such as Libya, Iraq, 
and Iran. As will be shown later, the constructivist approach can provide answers to some 
parts of the puzzle but it has its own shortcomings, whereas realism is more relevant both in 
Libya’s nuclearisation and its denuclearisation. 
As for the contrasting paths between the Middle East and Asia, Solingen (2007:276) states 
that “leaders and ruling coalitions, relying on or promoting inward-looking bases of support 
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have had greater tolerance - and in some cases strong incentives - for developing nuclear 
weapons”.36 She agrees with Sagan’s (1996) findings that the nuclear decision is a direct 
consequence of political coalitions, and that it is generally the outcome of careful, rational 
consideration that reflects the ruling coalitions’ desire for domestic survival.  
Solingen (2007) provides an insight into the incentives and motivations that have driven East 
Asian and Middle Eastern states to first acquire nuclear weapons and then abandon them.
37
 
She observes that states consider it imperative to secure nuclear capabilities for their survival 
and enhanced power, and this might be applicable to most cases in the Middle East, inspiring 
nationalistic ideals among populations. Those nuclear weapons programmes, as highlighted 
by Solingen (2007), are fuelled more by concern about regime survival than by state 
insecurity. 
The greater significance of regime survival over state insecurity emerges as a result of the 
consideration of domestic factors by political leaders and ruling coalitions, in their thinking 
about nuclearisation. As Solingen stated, countries in favour of internationalisation, and 
engaging in the global economy, avoid the costs of nuclearisation, because the domestic 
factor supports world integration, whereas leaders who refuse internationalisation or the idea 
of joining the world economy,
38
 “incur fewer such costs and have greater incentives to 
exploit nuclear weapons as tools in nationalist platforms of political competition and for 
staying in power” (Solingen, 2007:5). The political survival of Qaddafi’s regime played an 
important role in persuading Qaddafi to make concessions regarding Libya’s policies in 
particular its nuclear programme. However, the political survival was not the only motivation 
since other motivations had made an impact on Libya’s foreign policy, such as end external 
threats, retain the regime (i.e. appeasement, compliance with the international community, 
and powerful actors, and at the internal level, reforms to liberalise the economic sector and 
improvements in socio-economic welfare). Indeed, Qaddafi’s regime feared the external 
threats to Libya’s national security and regime survival more than the domestic pressures. 
The fear of the regime was more from outside than from internal populations. For example, 
Saddam's regime which was similar to Qaddafi’s toppled due to the external invasion in 
2003.  
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On the issue of nuclear armament, Hymans (2006) points out that it is leaders’ belief systems 
rather than objective environmental variables that actually trigger their actions. He identifies 
the oppositional-nationalist type of leader who considers his/her nation to be facing an 
external enemy, and therefore, opts for nuclear weapons. In this respect, he states that 
“oppositional nationalists develop a desire for nuclear weapons that goes beyond calculation, 
to self-expression. Thus, in spite of tremendous complexity of the nuclear choice, leaders 
who decided for the bomb tend not to back into it” (Hymans, 2006:2). As regards to Libya, 
Qaddafi in the early 1970s made a decision to acquire nuclear weapons and after almost three 
decades he made concessions to dismantle Libya’s nuclear weapons programme.  
Bahgat (2008) offers important insights on the issue of why states pursue nuclear weapons in 
the Middle East,
39
 noting that the decision to go nuclear is complex and cannot be addressed 
by a single model, being instead much more the result of a range of incentives reinforcing 
each other. The first motive is globalisation and technological imperatives, and in this respect 
Bahgat (2008) observes that whilst in the twentieth century the transfer of nuclear materials 
had been limited, in the era of globalisation, the market for military nuclear materials has 
expanded and despite the restrictions in nuclear technology and materials, there is more 
demand and supply, creating its own black market (Bahgat, 2008:4).
40
 This assessment of 
Bahgat’s confirms that the existing international and institutional pressures concerning 
denuclearisation are not effective in preventing nuclear proliferation. For instance, the IAEA 
does not have sufficiently strong tools to enforce disarmament upon states suspected of 
developing nuclear weapons or to force states to comply with the NPT. Additionally, the 
insufficient intelligence capabilities and technological resources to prevent or punish NPT 
violators only serve to weaken and undermine the IAEA. 
The second approach is the influence of leadership, and when seeking solutions to questions 
regarding proliferation, the belief systems of the policy-makers should be considered. 
Important roles are enacted by political leaders and political elites when pursuing the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, and these must be addressed, particularly where states 
experience substantial changes or have weak political institutions.
41
 Several studies have been 
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conducted by scholars such as Reiss, Lavoy, Byman, and Pollack
42
 on the changing attitudes 
of nuclear weapons states, and their various findings have all included reference to the roles 
played by leadership and political elites, which are seen to be of immense importance in 
national policies (Bahgat, 2008:5). The third point relates to internal dynamics, and it is 
acknowledged that domestic politics, involving states’ nuclear institutions, might affect 
nuclear proliferation. In fact, such dynamics are considered one of the most important 
components in nuclear decision-making. Fourthly, national pride and prestige are powerful 
psychological influences in the issue of whether a state decides to acquire nuclear weapons.
43
 
The fifth incentive is security, which is considered the most motivating factor for states, 
especially in regions like the Middle East.
44
 Therefore, any approach which tries to answer 
the nuclear question should address the nation’s technological capability and the domestic, 
regional, and international dynamics which come into play. 
Campbell et al. (2004) argue that one incentive is regional and/or global security. Such 
insecurity leads to systemic rivalries leading a state to consider a policy of nuclearisation if it 
has a neighbour with nuclear capabilities, as was the case with Pakistan which pursued a 
nuclear programme following India’s nuclear achievements.45 Accordingly, the impact of 
nuclear weapons proliferation in regional spheres can provoke a reaction from neighbouring 
countries to acquire the same capability. And clearly, one of the main reasons to try to stop 
countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons, is to prevent 
their neighbours from following in their footsteps and escalating the nuclear threat (Campbell 
et al., 2004:24-26). 
As shown already, regional and international developments are not the only factors 
encouraging nuclear proliferation - domestic politics can also have a very important influence 
on a state’s decision to reconsider nuclear weapons. Campbell et al. (2004:27) note that the 
national security apparatus, ministries, and military organisations are all key domestic factors 
in the decision-making regarding nuclearisation. They highlight the vital role of the Indian 
populist movement in India’s 1998 nuclear test, while in Pakistan, it was the military 
apparatus which affected the choice for the nuclear programme. 
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The authors also argue that the availability of the required technology is another factor. In 
this age of globalisation, there is the potential to transfer nuclear materials as advanced 
techniques have been developed in nuclear research meaning that there are no longer 
technological or knowledge barriers, and this may facilitate a state’s acquisition of nuclear 
capability.
46
 Information about bomb design is readily available and the most complicated 
aspect of bomb-making is obtaining fissile materials, but these materials are becoming easier 
to acquire. Indeed, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, its former states were 
suspected to be the main potential source for nuclear materials despite the huge efforts by the 
US, Russia, and other states to prevent this. Large quantities of bomb-grade material were 
dispersed throughout a large area and are difficult to account for. However, the accessibility 
of fissile materials is not sufficient to motivate a state to pursue a nuclear weapons 
programme (Campbell et al., 2004:28).  
Another identified factor is the breakdown of the non-proliferation regime (NPR); certainly, 
nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan, and Israel that are not party to the NPT significantly 
undermine the non-proliferation regime. It is believed that “the non-proliferation regime has 
been battered by the reality of newly emergent nuclear weapons states, but what is also 
critically important is the lack of real consequences for those countries that have defied the 
international community” (Campbell et al., 2004:24).  
Accordingly, there are loopholes and defects in the NPR since it was unable to make states 
comply with its regulations, as in the case of North Korea. The lack of appropriate 
“verification and enforcement mechanisms” by the IAEA, due to shortages in funding, 
intelligence abilities, and other essential resources, means that it is unable to properly 
identify, prevent, or penalise states that violate the NPT. Indeed, the ineffectiveness of 
existing non-proliferation instruments in deterring aspirant nuclear weapon states has been 
highlighted by the development of nuclearisation programmes in North Korea, Iran, and 
Syria. It is true that the IAEA can refer non-compliant countries to the UNSC which is able to 
impose sanctions. However, “political calculations have often caused deadlock at the UNSC, 
enabling nuclear rogues such as Iran to defy successive, fairly weak UN sanctions resolutions 
with virtual impunity”.47 
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After considering the various incentives which states may encounter for developing nuclear 
programmes, it is important to examine the incentives that subsequently encourage them to 
reverse their initial decisions and actions.   
 
2.2.2 Reasons for Denuclearisation 
 
Explaining the motives for nuclear non-acquisition is of immense significance in foreign and 
security policy. According to Paul (2004:4), “contexts and situations matter significantly in 
explaining the nuclear choices of nation-states”.  He argues that “whether a non-great-power 
state acquires or goes without nuclear weapons is determined largely by the level and type of 
security threats that faces and the nature of interactions or conflicts with its key adversary and 
allies in its immediate geostrategic environment” (Paul, 2000:4). From this perspective, the 
decision of Libya to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 reflected the change 
in the Qaddafi regime’s security calculations after the mid-1990s.  
The incentives for the dismantlement of nuclear programmes have been considered by several 
researchers.
48
 Solingen (2007), for instance, explains that domestic considerations are 
essential in any state’s decision to acquire or give up nuclear weapons. She argues49 that 
decisions not to travel down the nuclear path are made by leaders who seek better economic 
integration and want to avoid the political costs of acquiring nuclear weapons.
50
  
However, this analysis might not explain Libyan policy reorientation, since Solingen (2007) 
suggests that nuclear reversal results from domestic conditions such as economic stagnation 
and domestic grievances, and whilst it is true that Libya did suffer under economic sanctions 
for decades, these conditions cannot represent the only factors behind Libya’s decision to 
dismantle its nuclear programme in 2003. Certainly, Libya did have to liberalise its economy, 
but the timing of the announcement to dismantle was such as to demonstrate a clear link 
between that action and Libya’s fear of the potential threat of a military attack similar to the 
one in Iraq. In fact, the regime sought to lift the international sanctions but in order to do so, 
it had to reconsider its security strategy and reorient its foreign policy by complying with the 
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powerful states such as the US and the UK as well as the international community.
51
 These 
reforms were pre-requisites of Libya’s reintegration within the international arena. But Libya 
had also to change its behaviour in all aspects, especially politically, militarily, and 
economically. Other factors, such as the domestic dynamics, were not expected to play a 
decisive role in the regime’s nuclear decision-making.  
Harrison (2006) contends that economic incentives, the normalisation of relations, and 
security assurances are vital to persuade states such as Iran and North Korea to denuclearise. 
However, the dismantlement of a state’s nuclear programme cannot be achieved unless 
regional security concerns are resolved. For instance, Iran might accept the suspension of its 
weapons-grade uranium enrichment if it were able to receive assurances about its regional 
security (Harrison, 2006:2). Harrison (2006) also argues that a better outcome could be 
gained if the United States were to support regional nuclear-free zones. He maintains that if 
the US does not change its security assurances to North Korea and Iran regarding the use of 
nuclear weapons, it will be difficult to convince these states to forego their nuclear weapons 
programmes. 
In a study of identity politics and nuclear disarmament in the Ukraine, Steven (2008) argues 
that the country’s disarmament was due to a crisis of national identity after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Additionally, Ukraine wanted to disassociate itself from the previous Soviet 
regime’s nuclear policies. Commenting on this, Steven (2008:62) states that: 
most Ukrainian leaders could not conceptualize that Russia or the United 
States as real security threats made the offer of carrots and the threat of 
sticks workable in the Ukrainian case. Ukraine was experiencing a 
profound political and economic crisis at the same time it was trying to 
construct new national and state identities and consolidate a new state. 
For Steven (2008), neither Iran nor North Korea has been confronted with the same identity 
problem encountered by Ukraine. Therefore, the fact that both of these countries are 
experiencing economic stagnation is insufficient to produce the same outcome as in Ukraine. 
Furthermore, neither Iran nor North Korea has reacted to benefits and threats, and it is 
predicted that if security concerns are not addressed by external actors, Iranian and North 
Korean disarmament will not be seen in the near future unless a change occurs in the 
domestic political situation as in the Ukrainian case in the 1990s. The limitations in the 
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ability to obtain sensitive technology have not prevented countries with weak economic status 
such as Pakistan and North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons, and whilst technological 
constraints might pose some difficulty for states seeking nuclear weapons, these would not be 
entirely prohibitive if those states were to face security concerns (Steven, 2008:49-62). 
A study of South Korean and Taiwanese rollback of their nuclear weapons by Hersman and 
Peters (2006), found that security assurances and pressure from the United States were key 
factors in these countries’ abandonment of their nuclear capability. Furthermore, the 
decisions of both states to dismantle their nuclear programmes were linked with the 
perception of their security relationship with the US. South Korea and Taiwan have obtained 
security support and protection from the US for a long time. If either of them were to develop 
nuclear weapons, the US would withdraw its military, political, and economic aid to both 
countries. The amount of trade and economic assistance received from the US is extensive, 
and its loss could seriously endanger these countries’ economies. Such an outcome 
demonstrates the influence of the US in Taiwan’s and South Korea’s decisions to abandon 
their nuclear weapons programmes (Hersman and Peters, 2006:548).   
Investigating the Middle East, Bahgat (2008) has suggested certain factors that contribute to 
the decision by states to reverse their nuclear weapons programmes. He identifies the 
economic, diplomatic, and military measures used by the international community to place 
pressure upon countries suspected of nuclear weapons proliferation. Additionally, he 
highlights that the decision to relinquish nuclear ambition is a strategic move, and that 
technological and economic hurdles influence the decision.
52
 The decision to dismantle the 
nuclear programme occurs when the leadership is convinced that the state will function better 
economically, diplomatically, and militarily without it. Three key factors could cause a 
nuclear programme reversal. A change in the economic and political orientations of the state 
may lead to reconsideration of certain political and economic aspects; for example, an 
economic shift from the public sector to the private sector can lead to more trade and 
investment (Bahgat, 2008:10).  
United States policy regarding nuclear behaviour has played a significant role bilaterally and 
collectively, especially in creating the Non-Proliferation Policy. The proliferation of nuclear 
weapons is considered as a threat to US national security, particularly in a region like the 
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Middle East where the US has strategic economic interests (Bahgat, 2008:14; Campbell et al., 
2004:20).
53
 
Campbell et al. (2004) argue that it is not one single factor that would bring a nuclear 
disarmament decision, but rather a combination of various influences, which are mutually- 
reinforcing and serve to persuade a state to dismantle its nuclear programme. The first factor 
they identify is the direction of US foreign and security policies. According to Campbell et al. 
(2004:20), “[t]he most important ingredient in a new international calculation of the 
attractiveness - or perceived necessity - of acquiring nuclear weapons is the question of the 
future direction of US foreign and security policy”. This factor is considered very significant 
when planning to acquire nuclear weapons.
54
 The features of this policy include the American 
nuclear deterrent, American security guarantees, and rhetorical commitment to global non-
proliferation policies and regimes. Changes in these areas would lead states that had 
relinquished their nuclear ambition to reconsider their nuclear status. They contend that the 
US is expected to deal with tough security problems that its friends and allies might face. If 
the required actions are not convincing, the allies and friends may well seek their security 
from outside the US umbrella. So, whilst US policy is not the only factor in the security 
calculation, it is probably the most important one.
55
 For instance, if the US takes action 
against the North Korean programme, it will reassure South Korea and Japan and prevent 
them from considering the development of nuclear weapons programmes themselves 
(Campbell et al., 2004:22).  The absence of agreements between the US and other states does 
not oblige the former to intervene in cases of deliberate aggression, as can be seen from the 
case study explored within this thesis. Indeed, the tension between US and Libya, particularly 
concerning Libya’s attempts to acquire nuclear weapons was great, but there was no nuclear 
attack by the US as is discussed when reporting the outcomes of the empirical work. 
Without doubt, the debate on the causes of denuclearisation sheds some light on the reasons 
why a state would surrender its nuclear weapons programme, but not all cases of nuclear 
dismantlement can be explained by the factors considered, and as the literature on 
denuclearisation demonstrates, each case is unique and reflects domestic, regional, as well as 
international dynamics at specific times. What can be drawn from the above discussion is that 
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when Libya dismantled its nuclear programme, various contributory influences were seen to 
exist which together might explain why it embarked on a reversal of its nuclear ambitions at 
that particular point in history.  
 
2.3 Internal and External Factors 
It was evident that different perspectives existed concerning Libya’s shift in nuclear policy 
and these, not surprisingly, led to different conclusions being drawn.  However, what can be 
said is that only partial analyses have been conducted, and the failure to undertake a 
comprehensive approach to the Libyan case might well explain the disagreements in the 
existing literature. The originality of this study consists in its attempt to provide the literature 
with a consideration of those multiple factors - internal, regional, and international factors – 
all of which might have affected Libyan policy-making in this area.      
 
2.3.1 Internal Factors 
Internal factors usually play a significant role in most states’ decision-making policies. 
However, their influence on developing countries, such as Libya, appears to be less important 
than regional and international ones. In fact, domestic politics have greater effect in 
democratic states than in undemocratic ones because the authoritarian nature of undemocratic 
regimes pays little attention to opposition groups or political parties, if they exist. 
Accordingly, it is assumed that Libya’s domestic politics played only a weak role in 
persuading the Qaddafi regime to reorientate its policy concerning its nuclear ambitions. And 
of course, this can be attributed to the absence of political parties or a recognised political 
opposition in the country.
56
  
Secondly, the ideology of Qaddafi’s regime was an important internal factor. Qaddafi shared 
the belief of developing leaders such as Nasser, Nkrumah, Castro, and Nehru for whom 
colonialism was a continued threat to their national security. Accordingly, Qaddafi’s ideology 
was an incentive to build nuclear weapons. Contrary to the first internal factor, this one is 
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believed to have been more effective in encouraging the political regime and convincing 
Libyan citizens of the need for a nuclear deterrent for any outside threats.  
The third internal factor is related to Libyan natural resources. In fact, the availability of large 
quantities of oil and gas in the early years of Qaddafi’s rule gave him the means to acquire 
conventional armaments and eventually to establish a nuclear weapons programme. Similar 
to the ideological incentive, this availability of finance played a crucial role in allowing 
Qaddafi to pursue his ambitions to obtain nuclear capability.  
 
2.3.2 Regional Factors 
The second category of factors are those at the regional level, and these are seen to play a 
substantial role in any state’s policy. In fact, the Libyan decision to launch and later abandon 
the nuclear weapons programme was affected by several regional factors. For instance, 
Libya’s peripheral states, such as Egypt under Sadat, and Sudan under Numeiry, were 
considered a threat by Qaddafi’s regime.  
During the Cold War, Libya’s neighbouring states had to choose between an allegiance to the 
Western bloc led by the US or to the Eastern bloc led by the former Soviet Union. Regional 
rivalries in North Africa and the Middle East were a significant contributor to the decision to 
pursue a nuclear weapons programme. Additionally, the desire for leadership in the region 
was a decisive element in the acquisition of armaments. Given these two different 
circumstances – the rivalries, and Qaddafi’s personal ambitions – the Libyan government was 
persuaded to consider Libya’s neighbours as potential enemies. In fact, there were fears that 
the bordering states of Libya, particularly Algeria and Egypt, had interests in attacking and 
overthrowing the regime. The best example confirming the fears of Qaddafi is found in the 
US secret document, dated 19
th
 October 1976 (almost nine months before the Egyptian attack 
on Libya in 1977), which was declassified in 2006, and in which it was stated: 
The prospect of an Egyptian military attack on Libya was discussed with 
FCO officers during highly useful consultation on October 16. …. British 
swung much closer to what we understand to be current US intelligence 
assessment that Sadat may attack Libya as part of attempt to overthrow 
Qadhafi. … British who feel that Sadat must be so aware of the political 
and military problems involved that the purpose of the Egyptian build up on 
the border is … two FCO officers in separate conversation with EMBOFF 
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used the phrase “to shake the tree and see what falls out”. If Sadat really 
does intend to launch a conventional military attack, British experts are 
puzzled by his apparent underestimation of the political and particular 
military difficulty involved.
57
   
The second regional factor is related to the Arab/Israeli conflict.
58
 Not surprisingly, the Arab 
countries were concerned about Israel’s nuclear capability, and such a fact induced them to 
find a way to create a balance to this.
59
 In fact, the military race was not only between Arab 
states and Israel, but also between Arab regional states as mentioned above. Therefore, this 
factor seems to have had substantial influence in the formulation of Libyan security policy in 
the regional sphere.  
 
2.3.3 External Factors   
The third category of motivations for the shift in Libya’s nuclear policy is represented by a 
number of external factors. First and foremost, the impact of international and regional 
organisations such as the UN, EU, and NGOs on small states may vary. Indeed, the UN 
issued numerous resolutions against Libya.
60
 To a lesser degree, the EU also issued several 
resolutions against Libya on different matters. Indeed, as will be discussed in detail in the 
empirical chapters, the UN response to the Libyan case had an important role in precipitating 
the shift in the Libyan regime’s policies.  
The second external factor is related to the impact of powerful states on Libya.
61
 Since the 
establishment of the UN,
62
 the victors of WWII holding permanent seats in the UN Security 
Council have been able to wield huge influence on international as well as regional issues.
63
 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the main concerns of the permanent security 
members of the UNSC. In the Libyan case, all the UNSC had explicitly intervened either in 
favour of Libya (China and Russia) or against it (the US, the UK and France). 
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However, the degree of influence exercised by these actors on Libyan policies varied. For 
instance, the most dominant state actor was the US, and as will be seen later, the US pressure 
upon Libya seems to have been the most influential one throughout. Therefore, the role of 
powerful states will be considered as another external factor influencing Libyan policy. 
Clearly, as shown by the above-mentioned factors, powerful states had an impact on Libyan 
policies, as those states sought to guarantee their own national interests.   
The third factor is related to the impact of collective action by the international community 
against states suspected of nuclear weapons proliferation, such as Iraq. The researcher 
believes that such an element was indeed influential in forcing the shift in Libyan nuclear 
policy since Qaddafi witnessed the consequence of Iraq’s defiance in the face of the 
international accusation that it possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Libya did 
not want to be next and consequently, the Qaddafi regime opted for co-operation and 
compliance with the West’s demand for it to dismantle its nuclear programme rather than 
confront the world community.
64
 Accordingly, the Libyan shift regarding its nuclear weapons 
programme is very likely to have been affected by the invasion of Iraq and the fear of similar 
military intervention. 
 
2.4 International Relations Theories 
To help understand and explain the policy change, it is useful to consider International 
Relations (IR) theories, since the existing debate in academia and policy circles regarding 
nuclearisation, denuclearisation, and how to predict future nuclear proliferators, has centred 
on the dominant IR theories. These theories embody a diverse and broad range of conceptual 
approaches, some of which originated from IR, while others have their roots in disciplines 
such as economics and sociology. However, they can all be identified by the inclusion of 
factors that give emphasis to leadership, material interests, military power, and/or ideological 
beliefs.   
In terms of the dominant paradigms of IR, the realist theory is considered because nuclear 
weapons, as realists argue, are essential for states if they wish to maximise their power and 
chances of survival. Realists argue that the anarchic structure of the international system 
based upon self-help, places states in the position where they must seek their own security, 
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and that nuclear weapons thus become the ultimate deterrent. Undoubtedly, the desire for 
security remains the most common explanation for nuclear weapons proliferation (Nye, 
2009:266). 
However, constructivism is also examined, since the proponents of this approach argue that it 
is capable of explaining how culture, beliefs, and ideas shape the foreign policies of states. 
Constructivists maintain that political leaders are not only motivated by material power and 
interests, but also by identity, beliefs, and culture.  For instance “America worries more about 
one North Korean nuclear weapon than 500 British nuclear weapons, or why war between 
France and Germany, which occurred twice in the last century, is no longer considered 
possible today” (Nye, 2009:7). Moreover, constructivists argue that the development of a 
taboo against the use of nuclear weapons since 1945 has assisted in strengthening the 
effectiveness of treaties and institutions (Tannenwald, 2005). Nevertheless, whilst the 
constructivist approach does provide some explanatory power in respect of Libya’s 
nuclearisation and denuclearisation, the realist assumption seems to offer the best analysis of 
the Libyan case, and particularly in respect of the first two decades of Qaddafi’s rule.  
Nuclear weapons have been a focal point in the field of international relations, with 
prominent scholars such as Waltz, Sagan, Feldman, and Solingen for example, writing 
extensively on this issue. These IR theorists were concerned about finding an explanation for 
both the acquisition and abandonment of nuclear weapons; these are matters of great 
significance in international relations on a global scale. However, the study of nuclearisation 
and denuclearisation has particular relevance for unstable regions like the Middle East/North 
Africa where states are still seeking to secure their territories. Libya, in particular, has been 
identified for decades as a trouble-maker and was suspected of militarising itself by amassing 
unconventional weapons. 
From the understanding provided by an overview of theoretical approaches, the chapter 
examines two specific schools of thought. Firstly, there is that offered by realists who argue 
that states want to develop nuclear weapons to enhance their power and that they tend to 
adopt defensive strategies to protect their security. Secondly, there are the constructivists who 
argue that nuclear weapons enhance a state’s modernity and identity in the international 
arena.   
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2.4.1 Realism 
The realist perspective takes the view that nuclear weapons are acquired because of their 
value as a deterrent to threats. As noted by Burchill et al. (2009:31), “[p]olitical realism, 
realpolitiik, power politics, is the oldest and most frequently adopted theory of international 
relations”. Fundamentally, whilst realism has different versions, it places emphasis on the 
constraints on politics inflicted by the egoism of human beings and the anarchy which rules 
political life.  
Realism is a school of thought that describes international relations in terms of power. 
Classical realism has dominated the study of international relations since the 1940s and is 
based on the assumption that states are driven by the desire to seek power, an innate 
motivation for human beings. States have a desire for power, or what Morgenthau calls “a 
limitless lust for power” (cited by Mearsheimer, 2001:19). This means that states always look 
for opportunities to dominate other states, and hence, are inherently aggressive.  
 
Classical realism provides a mixture of influence from human nature and international 
anarchy. Hobbes (1651) makes three simple assumptions these being that: men are equal, 
they interact in anarchy, and they are motivated by ‘competition, diffidence, and glory’. The 
combination of these assumptions leads to war of all against all. Men are not different in the 
sense that the weakest can inflict harm and can kill the strongest secretly or in association 
with others. Antagonism is intensified by seeking competition and glory. Hobbes identifies 
the logic of interaction, an ideal type model of pressures and tendencies, stating “when equal 
actors interact in anarchy, driven by competition, diffidence, and glory, generalized violent 
conflict can be predicted” (Burchill et al, 2009:35).65  
Keohane (1986) notes that political realism is founded upon three key assumptions, these 
being: firstly, states are key units of action; secondly, they seek power, either as an end in 
itself or as means to other ends; and thirdly, they behave in ways that are, by and large, 
rational and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms. The author claims that 
these premises do not, by themselves, constitute a basis for the science: they do not establish 
propositions linking causes with effects. He argues that the assumptions of realism can be 
found in the first chapter of Thucydides’ book which develops his explanation of the 
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Peloponnesian war: “[t]he real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept 
out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in 
Lacedaemon, made war inevitable” (cited by Keohane, 1986:7). According to Keohane’s 
explanation, the Libyan pursuit of nuclear weapons was spurred by its intention to become a 
regional as well as international power.  
 
2.4.2 Neorealism (Structural Realism) 
 
Neorealism as a theory is an effort to describe both the behaviour of individual states and the 
characteristics of the international system as a whole. Sovereign states are the essential 
components of the international system and are treated as the main actors in international 
politics. Therefore, the theory concentrates primarily on great powers, because these states 
shape international politics and also cause the deadliest wars (Mearsheimer, 2001:17). 
Neorealists treat states as black boxes and consider there to be no differences between them, 
because all great powers act according to the same incentives regardless of their culture, 
political system, or who governs the state. The basic explanation of the behaviour of states, as 
has been argued by neorealists, is the distribution of power in the international system and the 
place of a given state within that distribution. The calculations concerning power dominate 
states’ views, and states compete for power among themselves (Mearsheimer, 2001:18).  
 
Neorealists claim that the general insecurity of international anarchy leads states to worry not 
only about how they evaluate their absolute gains, but about how well they fare compared to 
other states (relative gains). This latter concern makes co-operation difficult, even though 
states share common interests, because if all states involved in the co-operation gain from 
working together there is always the fear that one or more states will defect from co-
operation and gain more, relative to other states. For Waltz (1979:105), relative and absolute 
gains can be seen as follows: 
When faced with the possibility of co-operation for mutual gains, states that 
feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to 
ask not ‘will both of us gain?’ but ‘who will gain more?’ If an expected 
gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its 
disproportionate gain to implement policy intended to damage or destroy 
the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not 
elicit their co-operation so long as each fears how the other will use its 
increased capabilities. 
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The argument proposed by Waltz is that war becomes less likely as the costs involved rise in 
relation to possible gains. The imbalanced development of forces in new nuclear states makes 
a preventive strike more likely and might invite it (Sagan and Waltz, 2003). Waltz argues that 
the deployment of nuclear weapons enhances state security more than does the conquest of 
territory. A deterrent strategy leaves the state in a position where it can avoid fighting other 
states in order to enhance its security, and therefore, eliminates the cause of war. 
The structure of the international system leaves no choice for states to survive unless they 
maximise their chances of achieving their goals by expanding their power base and thus 
ensuring their survival. As Waltz (1979:105) claims, “in any self-help system, units worry 
about their survival and the worry conditions their behaviour”. To implement their objectives 
and goals, the units in a system of anarchy must move forward by whatever means they have 
available to them, whether these be co-operation, collaboration, or war. Without such efforts, 
states are in fact promoting their own destruction as political units. In this respect, self-help is 
one of the necessary conditions in an anarchic structure. 
The model of behaviour, as Waltz (1979) argues, becomes apparent from the ‘structural 
constraint of the system’. The need to survive is considered as the main reason for self-
protection in a world where the security of states is not guaranteed. Waltz (1979:91-93) 
explains this, saying:  
The survival motive is taken as the ground of action in a world where the 
security of states is not assured, rather than as a realistic description of the 
impulse that lies behind every act of state. The assumption allows for the 
fact that no state always acts exclusively to ensure its survival. It allows for 
the fact that some states may persistently seek goals that they value more 
highly than survival; they may, for example, prefer amalgamation with 
other states to their own survival in form. It allows for the fact that in 
pursuit of its security no state will act with perfect knowledge and wisdom 
(Waltz, 1979: 91-93). 
Waltz’s explanation of the state within the structure of the international system is that it 
strives for survival by ensuring its security among other states, but anarchy may pose certain 
constraints to reward or impose penalties for that kind of behaviour.  
There are differences between realism and neorealism. Unlike realism, which views states’ 
actions as influenced by their self-interested nature, neorealism claims that structure drives 
states’ behaviour. The structure of the international political system is defined first by its 
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organising principle, which is anarchy, where every state (as units in the system) has a similar 
interest in survival. The second defining principle - units’ capabilities to pursue their interest 
- is not equally distributed.  
The other difference between realism and neo-realism is related to the view of power held by 
the two schools of thought. Classical realists argue that power is both a means and an end, 
and that rational state behaviour is simply to build up the most power it can. For neorealists, 
power means the increase of military capability and the ability to use this capability to coerce 
states in the system. Realists believed that anarchy is the given condition of the system and 
that states act in response to it according to their size, location, domestic politics, and 
leadership quality; neorealists on the other hand, assume that anarchy defines the system and 
that states react to it according to their power capability (Grieco, 1988:487).  
Elman (1996:7-8) criticises Waltz’ argument and challenges the merits of neorealism, 
claiming that “neorealist theories cannot explain the relative stability of the cold war world; 
neorealist theories failed to predict, and now cannot explain, the end of the cold war and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union; and neorealist theories are unable to predict the future of 
international relations”. In fact, the neorealist predictions regarding the continuity of the 
competition in the bipolar system were not met, since one of these powers collapsed 
politically and economically. In this regard, Wohlforth (1994-1995:96) argued that:  
The end of the Cold War was caused by the relative decline in Soviet power 
and the reassurance this gave the West. Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev 
may have had many reasons for competing with the United States, ranging 
from genuine fear to ideological conviction, but a necessary condition for 
competition was their perception that they had the capability to do so. 
Gorbachev may have had numerous reasons for seeking to withdraw from 
the rivalry with the United States, but a necessary precondition was the 
perception of reduced capability to continue competing. 
It is worth noting that neorealism has two versions - Defensive and Offensive realism. 
Defensive realism, which was laid out by Waltz (1979), maintains that states will be at risk if 
they attempt to maximise their power, because the system will punish them for such efforts to 
increase this. If a state accumulates too much power, other states will have strong incentives 
to balance against it and consequently, will make that state more vulnerable. Offensive 
realism, which was developed by Mearsheimer, takes a different position. It maintains that 
states have to obtain as much power as possible because gaining much power will enhance 
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the chances of a state’s own survival. Indeed, offensive realism goes a step further in 
considering how much power states should gain. It argues that states must enhance their 
power when the opportunity allows this, and that hegemony should be the final goal because 
this assures the survival of the state (Dune et al., 2007:72-75). 
Due to its emphasis on issues of security, power, and state survival, neorealism appears to be 
one of the most relevant theories to understand the shift in Libya’s policies, and can certainly 
be useful in analysing the initial phase of Libyan foreign and security policy after 1969. 
Neorealists argue that survival is the main aim of every state. Additionally, they consider 
foreign aggression or invasion as a threat to most states, and that as states are believed to be 
rational, they must naturally seek their survival. Realists also assume that states have relative 
military capability and that they do not know the intentions of their neighbouring states. The 
assumptions of neorealism are able to explain the Libyan case, and in particular, its foreign 
and security policy. Moreover, the use of neorealist theory can clarify the policies of the 
Libyan state in the early period of Qaddafi’s regime. Specifically this can be seen in an 
analysis of military armament, conflicts with neighboring countries, and Libya’s alliances 
with some states. Another important approach considered by various scholars in international 
peace and security studies is constructivism, which is now discussed.  
The next section will discuss the third strand of realist theory ‘neoclassical realism’ which 
emerged in recent years and is championed by a number of scholars.  
2.4.3 Neoclassical Realism 
Neoclassical realism is the third emergent school of realism. It seeks to describe the grand 
strategies of individual states as opposed to international outcomes. Neoclassical realism aims 
to “explain why, how, and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states,66 
intervene between their leaders’ assessment of international threats and opportunities, and the 
actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those leaders are likely to pursue” 
(Lobell et al: 2009:4).  
Neoclassical realism is an important new version of the realist theories of international 
relations because it focuses on the interaction of the international system with the internal 
dynamics of states, arguing that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven 
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 The extractive and mobilization capacity of politico-military institutions, the influence of domestic societal 
actors and interest groups, the degree of state autonomy from society, and the level of elite or societal cohesion.  
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first and foremost by that country’s relative material power. Yet it contends that the effect of 
power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systematic pressures 
should be interpreted through intervening unit-level variables, such as elite and decision-
makers’ perceptions and the state structure (Rose: 1998). 
Neoclassical realists reveal that there is no instant or ideal transmission belt linking material 
capabilities to foreign policy behaviour. The choices of foreign policy are conducted by the 
political leaders and elites, and it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not the 
quantities of physical resources. Further, political leaders and elites do not have complete 
freedom to deal with resources (Rose: 1998). 
The neoclassical realism school looks upon the earlier theoretical work of neorealism such as 
that of Waltz and Giblin, without sacrificing the practical insights about foreign policy and 
the complexity of statecraft, found in the earlier work of classical realism of Morgentau, 
Kissinger, Wolfer and others. Neoclassical realism, like other strands of realism, believes that 
politics is a continuous struggle among diverse states for material power and security in a 
world of scant resources and pervasive ambiguity. Anarchy, which is the absence of 
governing power, is one of the main causes of international conflicts and antagonism. The 
incentive of states is the struggle for survival by providing the security for themselves (Lobell 
et al: 2009). 
The concept of neoclassical realism is based in the complex relationship between state and 
society found earlier in classical realism, but adds also the central thread of systemic 
constraints and the choices found in neorealism (Lobell et al: 2009). Neoclassical realism 
presents a ‘top–down’ model of the state, which indicates that systemic forces eventually 
motivate external behaviour. It envisages the state as exemplified by a national security 
executive, which consists of the top government and the ministers and bureaucrats in charge 
of making foreign security policy. The executive or elite figures, situated at the juncture of 
the state and the international system, with access to highly valuable information from the 
state’s political and military organisations, are the most capable to comprehend constraints 
and assess the national interest (Lobell et al: 2009). The military and political figures in a 
state evaluate the situation based upon the undisclosed information they attain without the 
agreement of domestic society either to endorse or implement those policies. Contrary to 
other schools such as liberalism and Marxism, neoclassical realism does not take into account 
the demands of various societal interest groups or economic groups. Rather, leaders identify 
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the state’s national interests and conduct foreign policy founded upon their consideration of 
relative power and other states’ intentions.  
The neoclassical realists realise that many states’ regimes do not function as ‘unitary’ actors. 
Elite consent or disagreement regarding the nature and the dimension of international threats, 
constant internal tensions and divisions within leadership, social cohesion, and regime 
vulnerability to abrupt collapse, all inhibit the state’s ability to react to systemic pressures 
(Lobell et al: 2009). In neoclassical realism, the state is not considered as a unitary actor, as 
in neorealism. Neoclassical realism identifies the elite officials’ calculations and perceptions 
of relative power and domestic limitation as intervening variables between international 
pressure and the state’s external policies. Relative power establishes the parameters for how 
states, or those in positions functioning on their behalf, define their interests and take up 
specific ends (Lobel et al: 2009). Neoclassical realists define the state’s extractive and 
mobilisation capacity as an important intervening variable between systemic imperatives and 
the actual foreign defence policies that states pursue. Nevertheless, mobilisation and 
extractive capacity are not the purpose of a state’s officials or the structure of the regime 
power base. Furthermore, ideational factors such as ideology and nationalism can play an 
influential role in assisting the leadership to obtain, mobilise and lead societal resources and 
draw support amidst its power base (Lobell et al: 2009).  
A Neoclassical Realism Model by Lobell (2009) further raises the question of how states 
perceive international threats, what domestic actors are the most important in threat 
definition, and what happens when domestic actors disagree on the nature of the threat.  
Lobell claims that neoclassical realist scholars consider this strand of realism as a theory of 
foreign policy. Neoclassical realism explains the foreign and security policy of great powers, 
but it can also describe characteristics of regional and small powers, developing countries, 
and even failed states. It also includes the external and internal variables in the model 
presented. While the shifts in power within the international system bring threats, so too does 
the sub-systemic or regional and domestic environment. Furthermore, neoclassical realists 
consider power as central to political life (Lobell: 2009). 
The relevant actors within the state in the neoclassical realist model are identified by Lobell 
(2009). Neoclassical realism makes various assumptions regarding the state, one being the 
presumption that the foreign policy executive (FPE) is a cohesive group of central decision-
makers. They realise that state leaders function at the intersection of the domestic and 
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international systems, and can involve the international arena for domestic purposes, or 
conversely, marshal domestic opinion for international ends. Neoclassical realists believe that 
the FPE is mainly concerned with advancing the security or power of the entire nation. 
Nevertheless, aspects such as political and social cohesion, public support for foreign policy 
objectives, and the type of government and administrative efficiency, all affect the state’s 
ability to exploit the nation’s power. Due to this issue, some neoclassical realists differentiate 
between state power and national power. Moreover, “foreign policy choices are made by state 
leaders and it is their assessment of threat that matters. State leaders occupy critical positions 
in an administration, are the sole authoritative foreign policy makers and are responsible for 
the national security and the formation of long-term grand strategies” (Lobell et al: 2009:56).   
Christensen (1962) argues that national power is not the outcome of the state or society, but 
rather the compatibility of both in dealing with external challenges. He argues that if political 
leaders are major figures, the state can prevail in tackling the pressure from society, and thus 
the nation’s policy will match with the leader’s chosen strategies. If the society is coherent 
and knowledgeable about the policy, there would be no opposition to the opted strategies. He 
notes that if the nation is influential politically, to a certain extent it shapes coalitions to press 
for polices within the national security interests (Christensen: 1962:21). 
Schweller (2006) seeks to address the occurrence of under balancing, where states have either 
failed to recognise a threat to their own security or where they have recognised the threat but 
have not balanced against it in a reasonable manner. He identifies his work as fitting in with 
the neo-classical realist school of thought rather than classical realism or structural (neo) 
realism. He writes “this book fits squarely within the new wave of neoclassical realist 
research, which emerged in the early 1990s and posits that systemic pressures are filtered 
through intervening domestic variables to produce foreign policy behaviour” (Schweller: 
2006: 6).   
Moreover, neoclassical realists maintain that structural theory does not usually offer 
sufficient understanding or prediction. Schweller (2006:6) believes that “states often react 
differently to similar systemic pressures and opportunities, and their responses may less be 
motivated by systemic-level factors than domestic ones”.  He focuses on the behaviour of 
policy-making elites, aiming to provide a theory of foreign policy concerned with human 
agency, and then off offers a theory which “centres on the behaviour and choices of 
policymaking elites” at the unit level. He identifies four domestic conditions which infringe 
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upon whether a state is likely to balance or not against an accumulation of power by offering 
a series of constraints and opportunities for state behaviour: elite consensus/disagreement, 
elite cohesion/fragmentation, social cohesion/fragmentation, and regime and government 
vulnerability. 
From this it is clear that Schweller’s analysis will not be restricted to one particular level.67 
The author distinguishes four types of balancing: appropriate balancing; overbalancing 
(hyper-balancing) which is a result of misperception; nonbalancing (inaction, normal 
diplomacy, buck-passing, bandwagoning, appeasement, engagement, distancing, or hiding); 
and underbalancing (inefficient balancing).  
It seems that there is little difference between nonbalancing and underbalancing, given that 
underbalancing is said to occur “when the state does not balance or does so inefficiently” 
(Schweller: 2006:10). The implicit distinction seems to be that nonbalancing is a descriptor of 
other options which could be adopted, whereas underbalancing is the absence of any action or 
failure to adopt appropriate action. Nonbalancing may pay off for the state, but it is difficult 
to conceive of an example where underbalancing could be an effective policy choice 
(Schweller: 2006).  
For Schweller, there are diverse reasons explaining why states react to changes in their 
peripheral environment and thus alter the preference of the relevant actors and the structural 
characteristic of the society and the government that comprise restraints and opportunities for 
actors.
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 Besides structural-level causes, there are certain unit-level factors which are capable 
of describing various outcomes in the international arena.  
He notes that “states do not make policy; governments through their leaders do” (Schweller: 
2006:46-47). Firstly, there are the elite’s “preferences and perceptions of the external 
environment”; secondly, there is a decision to be made about which of these preferences and 
perceptions “matter” in the policy-making process; thirdly, the “domestic political risks 
associated with certain foreign-policy choices” must be taken into account; and finally, the 
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“variable risk-taking propensities of national elites” feature as an indication of what chances 
the elites are prepared to take. Although different perceptions of an external actor (or threat) 
may exist within the elite community however, not all will have an impact on the policy-
making process. 
Neoclasical realism is similar to other strands of neorealism, but it takes more into 
consideration the domestic factors. The type of government is very important when analysing 
a policy change of any state. Although this strand of realism can explain the changing 
behaviour of other states, however, the Libyan case is different from other cases. The 
domestic factors in Libya’s case are rather weak and did not play major role in the shift of 
security policy of Qaddafi’s regime. It is worth underlining, that the Libyan political system 
during Qaddafi’s era did not allow the domestic to function normally. The absence of unions, 
syndicates, political parties and oppositions prevented their participation and contribution in 
the Libyan politics.  
2.4.4 Critical reflection of realism 
The realist theory has dominated international relations since World War II. Realists see 
international anarchy fuels conflict and competition among states and decreases their desire 
to cooperate where there are common interests. Realists maintain that international 
institutions are not capable of constraining influence on cooperation between states 
(Mearshiemer, 2006:1). However, several scholars agree that realism has its own limitations, 
as it can explain some events but not all of them. For instance, neoliberals argue that despite 
the fact the realist theory has some explanatory power especially regarding national security, 
neoliberals claim that international political economy is in fact neoliberal preserve (Grieco, 
1988: 485-504). The realist accounts regarding the shift of states policy and behaviour is 
considered by a number of scholars as insufficient to explain a policy change. For example, a 
change in foreign and security policies of state such as Libya could be better explained by the 
constructivist tenets (i.e. adhering to regional and international norms, change in a rogue and 
antagonistic behaviour). 
Moreover, constructivism has its own explanatory power regarding understanding the 
motivations of acquiring nuclear weapons and dismantling nuclear stockpile, particularity 
after the end of the Cold War where regional and international norms spread around the 
globe. For example, the norms of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, peaceful co-existence 
and the political and economic cooperation either at the regional or international levels. 
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Despite the importance of these accounts either by constructivism or neoliberal 
institutionalism, the realist theory ignores the effect of institutions and regional and 
international norms. It focuses only on the threat of the use of force and other punishment 
instruments to explain the denuclearisation process.   
 
2.5 Constructivism 
Constructivist theoretical tenets – namely the importance of ideas over material forces and 
the socially-constructed nature of identities and interests which are not given by nature – are 
now commonly accepted by IR scholars (Wendt, 1999:1). Constructivism is a relatively new 
approach that emerged to explain the dynamic, contingent, and culturally-based condition of 
a social world. It has key implications for the understanding of knowledge and how to 
achieve it. Additionally, it emphasises the relationship between nature and human knowledge 
(Carlsnaes et al., 2002:96). 
Constructivism was driven by three elements. Firstly, a motivation came from the effort to 
reassert the pre-eminence of individual conceptions of theory and world politics. Secondly, 
there was no sufficient explanation of the end of the Cold War by neorealists and neoliberals, 
none of whom predicted or realised the shift in the global order. Thirdly, the rise of new 
scholars in the 1990s saw the possibility for innovation in the development of the theory. The 
failure of rationalism also motivated those scholars to reflect on issues that were largely seen 
through the lenses of neorealists and neoliberals, including the control of WMDs, the role of 
the nature of strategic culture, and the implications of anarchy (Burchill et al., 2009:219).  
Wendt (1999) takes states to be agents rather than an aggregation of actors, because states are 
treated by actors within them (and externally with relation to them) as if they existed, and 
thus their identity is socially constructed. These constructed agents are recognised in the 
reality of international politics – the recognition of ‘state personality’ under international law 
(Wendt, 1999:10). Wendt is specifically interested in examining the structural influences 
rather than domestic factors, on the identities of states.
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 He accepts the conditions of 
international anarchy and the evident ‘self-help’ international system, but deviates from 
neorealists on the basis that ‘self-help’ is not a direct consequence of anarchy in and of itself, 
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but is instead generated by the fact that states are “egoists about their security” (Wendt, 
1999:18). 
Constructivism is recognised for its ability to comprehend important elements of international 
politics, and this is possibly because there is more than one version of the concept, thereby 
enabling different perspectives to be used. Moreover, Wendt (1999:193) acknowledges that 
“constructivism is not a theory of international politics. Like rational choice theory, it is 
substantively open-ended and applicable to any social form - capitalism, families, states, etc.”  
However, they all have a general concern with how ideas define international structure, how 
this structure forms the identities, interests, and foreign policies of states and also, how state 
actors and non-state actors reproduce the structure and transform it (Checkel, 1998).
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Adler (2002) observes that constructivism is now joining the ranks of realism and 
neoliberalism as models for the analysis of international relations. Three levels of 
understanding comprise constructivism: Firstly, constructivism is considered to be a 
metaphysical stance concerning the reality of scholars’ ability to acquire knowledge and 
interpret reality from that. Secondly, constructivism is a social theory about the role of 
knowledge and the knowledgeable agents in the construction of social reality. It is thought to 
be a social theory within which the roles of inter-subjectivity and social context, the co-
constitution of agent structure, and the nature of governance and society, can be understood. 
Thirdly, constructivism is an empirical IR approach that builds on the previous two layers 
and that is established on a social, ontological, and epistemological basis. Constructivists 
within this paradigm have developed this new approach regarding the role of identity, norms, 
and understanding in the formation of national interests, which offers insights about 
institutionalisation and international governance, and about the social construction of new 
territorial and non-territorial transnational regions (Carlsnaes et al., 2002). 
Constructivists are concerned with how the objects and practices of social life are composed 
and constructed. Wendt and Fearon (2002) have pinpointed four characteristics in 
constructivist thinking about social objects and practices as follows: 
 
First, constructivism is centrally concerned with the role of ideas in 
constructing social life. Second, constructivism is concerned with showing 
the socially constructed nature of agents or subjects. Third, constructivism 
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world politics are social rather than material (Checkel, 1998). 
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is based on a research strategy of methodological holism rather than 
methodological individualism. Fourth, what ties the three foregoing points 
together is the concern with constitutive as opposed to just casual 
explanations” (Cited in Carlsnaes et al., 2002:57-58).  
 
 
Indeed, these characteristics might have explanatory power in respect of various political 
phenomena, including nuclear weapons proliferation. However, applying them in the current 
case study will not be sufficient, since dictatorial regimes do not respect such characteristics 
in their policy formulation.  
 
Checkel (1998) argues that constructivists have succeeded in adding constructivism to the 
theoretical debate in IR. They deal with issues related to identity and interests that are often 
confined to neorealist-neoliberal debate, and theorists using this approach have stressed that 
“their sociological approach leads to new and meaningful interpretations of international 
politics” (Checkel, 1998:325). According to constructivism, states’ identities shape their 
conceptions of interests. Constructivism is not worried about levels of analysis per se, but is 
concerned primarily with conceptions of how the social and political world works. It is 
regarded as a social inquiry on the basis of two assumptions rather than a theory, the first 
assumption being that: “[t]he environment in which agents/states take action is social as well 
as material; second, this setting can provide agents/states with understandings of their 
interests (it can ‘constitute’ them)” (Checkel, 1998:325-326). 
Constructivists focus on the relations between domestic, social, and legal norms, and the 
identity and interests of the states. Checkel (1998:326) states the following: 
Consider nuclear weapons - the ultimate material capability. Constructivists 
argue that it is not such weapons themselves that matter. After all, the 
United States worries very little about the large quantity of nuclear weapons 
held by Britain; however, the possibility that North Korea might come into 
possession of even one or two generates tremendous concern.
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Constructivism stresses three propositions of social life that shed more light on world politics 
than do their rival rationalist hypotheses. Firstly, the structure can shape the behaviour of 
both social and political actors, whether individuals or states. The idea is embraced that 
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 So, it can be seen that constructivists worry about the kind of actor that has such weapons, not about the 
weapon itself. This might illustrate the situation in the Middle East, where some states are considered eligible to 
possess nuclear weapons without global concern arising, whilst others cannot because of their poor standing 
within the international community.    
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normative or ideational structures are just as important as material structures. Constructivists 
contend that systems of shared ideas, beliefs, and values also have structural characteristics 
and that they exert a powerful influence on social and political action. The reason why 
constructivists have emphasised these structures is their belief that “material resources only 
acquire meaning for human action through the structure of a shared knowledge in which they 
are embedded” (Reus-Smit, 2009:220). 
For instance, the US, Canada, and Cuba exist in close proximity to each other, but the balance 
of military power cannot explain that the US is closer to Canada, and an enemy of Cuba. 
Ideas about identity, logic of ideology, and the established structures of friendship and 
hostility provide the material power between Canada and the United States, and Cuba and the 
United States, with totally different meanings. Secondly, constructivists contend that 
understanding how non-material structures form actors’ identity is essential because identities 
shape interests and action. They argue that the knowledge of how actors develop their 
interests is vital to explain a wide range of international political phenomena. The formation 
of interests in constructivism focuses on the social identities of individuals and states. 
Thirdly, constructivists argue that agents and structure are equally constituted. Normative and 
ideational structure shape the identities and interests of actors, but those cannot exist if there 
are no knowledgeable practices undertaken by those actors (Burchill et al., 2009).  
Normative and ideational structures are viewed as shaping the actors’ identities and interests 
through three means: imagination, communication, and constraint. Constructivists assert that 
non-material structures influence what actors see as the realm of possibility, such as how to 
act, what is perceived as a limitation to their actions, and what potential strategies might 
achieve their objectives. Normative and ideational structures make their influence through 
communication. States and individuals seek to defend their behaviour, and in so doing, 
usually appeal to established norms of legitimate conduct (Burchill et al., 2009). 
Rublee (2009:3) presents a constructivist explanation of why states dismantle their nuclear 
weapons programmes,
72
 arguing that “constructivism indicates that multilateral institutions 
can socialize states and transform their basic preferences so that nuclear weapons are no 
longer a necessary or acceptable part of national defense”. For Rublee (2009), there is an 
international norm against nuclear weapons proliferation through institutions such as the NPR 
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and NPT, and this global social environment can exert major effects on state behaviour and 
nuclear decisions.   
The impact of norms and values on non-proliferation may contribute to the understanding of 
the issue. Accordingly, norms may influence state behaviour in the sense that nuclear 
weapons may not be valuable to a state as they may be accompanied by negative images of a 
state’s identity as well as its security. Rublee (2009) has argued that the Libyan government 
sought to reintegrate with the international community after more than two decades of 
isolation. In this regard, she observed that Libya tried to approach the US from the 1990s to 
negotiate its nuclear programme but that American policy-makers were not keen to 
participate at that time because the settlement of the Lockerbie affair was its top priority. She 
concluded that Libya had partially responded to the norms through the social environment 
(Rublee, 2009:165-168).  
Although the constructivist approach can shed some lights on the response of the Libyan 
regime, it cannot provide a better explanation due to the fact that the regime on many 
occasions was reluctant to comply and obey international norms (i.e. peaceful co-existence 
and non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states). Moreover, the regime rejected 
in some instances the UNSC’s resolutions. For example, the Libyan government breached the 
air travel embargo imposed on the regime. The argument of Hurd (2004: 19) lends another 
support to this argument, the author contended that following the accusation of the Megrahi 
connection with the Lockerbie bombing, Libya decided not to comply with the various UN 
resolutions, and the sponsors of those resolutions - the United States, Britain and France - 
viewed Libya’s non-compliance as “defiance of the will of the international community” 
(Hurd, 2004:19). 
The Libyan response was not to argue the illegitimacy of the UN resolutions, but rather to 
challenge each resolution separately and to claim that the incident had not been examined 
through the judicial channels before the sponsors provided their evidence. Libya also argued 
that the investigators had not examined all the documents, thereby pointing out that 
punishment implemented before an extensive judicial hearing breached the fundamental 
norms by which most domestic and international judicial systems function. Libya contended 
that the issue of Lockerbie should be referred to the Montreal Convention of Civil Aviation 
rather than the United Nations Security Council because all parties to the case had signed and 
ratified that treaty (Hurd, 2004). 
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Barnett (2008:165) argues that states desire legitimacy in order to be seen as part of the wider 
international community, specifically saying:   
They believe that their actions are driven by the will of the values of the 
broader international community. There is a direct relationship between 
their legitimacy and the cost with a course of action: the greater legitimacy 
the easier time they will have convincing others to cooperate with their 
policies, if their legitimacy is less their action would be more costly. The 
world orders are shaped and maintained not only by great powers’ 
preference but also by changing understandings of what constitute 
legitimate international order.
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Furthermore, the nuclear taboo has created constrains on the development and use of nuclear 
weapons. Tannenwald (2005:8) maintains that the nuclear taboo is “a de facto prohibition 
against the first use of nuclear weapons”. According to her, the nuclear taboo enhances the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and can be used as a tool to deter nuclear proliferation. 
The nuclear taboo created a normative perception for the non-use of nuclear weapons. 
Tannenwald argues that the nuclear taboo emerged from the grass-roots and state-level who 
opposed nuclear weapons. These movements used the UN and other organisations as a 
platform to encourage states to denuclearise and call for a reduction of the nuclear policies 
weapons. The discourse evidence of these movements was backed by international law and 
international conventions. The nuclear taboo is considered a strong norm regarding nuclear 
weapons. Tannenwald draws on the constructivist tenets to show how the nuclear taboo 
created a norm regarding nuclear proliferation and against the use of nuclear weapons 
(Tannenwald, 2005). To sum up, the nuclear taboo is a vital norm since its emergence, but it 
would unlikely influence the policies of states who feel threatened and whose survival is at 
stake. For instance, North Korea joined the NPT, but later suspended its membership due to 
fear that it would be attacked in future. Additionally, Iran is one of the countries attempting to 
nuclearise, yet the international taboo of the proliferation of nuclear weapons did not change 
its desire.  
The nuclear taboo does not compel autocratic states to forgo the desire to acquire nuclear 
weapons or to use them. Indeed, North Korea, Iran, and Libya would have unlikely been 
influenced by the nuclear taboo, since the peripheral environment does not encourage such 
states to be affected by the unstable regions such as the Middle East and North Africa which 
are prone to conventional and non- conventional conflict. Therefore, the impact of the nuclear 
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taboo on the above mentioned states is very weak, as they can evade sanctions and 
constraints. 
Wendt (1992) observes that the identity of the state informs its interests and actions. He 
makes a distinction between the social and shared identities of the state on two grounds, the 
first referring to the status, character, and personality that the international society offers to a 
state; and the second to internal human, material, ideological, and cultural reasons that make 
a state what it is. Furthermore, Barnett (1998) stated that Arab states find themselves worn 
out between interests and identity. For instance, Arabism was one of the common identities 
among Arab states, yet the Arab league and the Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab Maghreb 
Union failed to convene the Arab summit to call for the withdrawal of the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990. Despite the fact that individual states had called for a cessation of Iraq 
invasion, they had failed to issue a resolution. In this regard, Barnett maintains that “the 
steady demise of pan-Arab organisations suggests a decline in the centrality of Arab identity 
(Barnett, 1998: 18). Despite that most of the Arab states have membership in one of the 
oldest organisation, the Arab League and have several similarities such as identity, Language, 
culture and religion, they have failed to coordinate their policies collectively. Individually, 
the Arab states were not united, for instance Qaddafi did not approve the US led coalition to 
Liberate Kuwait from Iraqi troops at the Arab League debates. The Libyan regime drew (in 
consultation with Jordan and Sudan) a road map to peace, but this step was not welcomed by 
the rest of the Arab states, especially the Gulf countries (St John, 2014:145). This indicates 
that the Arab government did not unanimously agree on the first Gulf war.  
The influence of norms on Libya’s identity after 1969, given such causes as Pan-Arabism and 
Islam, which were not high on the Libyan agenda prior to the military coup, is readily seen. 
In addition, Libya also tried to unite with Egypt and Syria following the 1969 when Qaddafi 
came to power. Although these attempts at unity were not successful, they reflected Libya’s 
identity as an Islamic, Arabic and African state. However, regional rivalries, leadership and 
insecurity among Arab countries were more important to the Libyan regime and its 
neighbours. In this regard, political interest, leverage, power and security were 
overwhelmingly apparent in Qaddafi’s regime behaviour with several Arab and neighbouring 
countries. Arabism and Islamism were used as tools to mobilise the public opinion and 
support the regime’s policies.  
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The identity of the Middle East is bounded by religious and ethnic similarity. Libya’s identity 
is intermixed with Arab, Islamic, and African orientation. After Qaddafi seized power in 
1969 he became involved with Arab nationalism, Islam, and Africa. The early phase of 
Qaddafi’s rule shaped the state’s ideological infrastructure, with the establishment of the 
Arab Socialist Union in 1971. Libya’s political development was in fact influenced by 
Nasser’s revolution in 1952.74 
In this respect, Obeidi (2001:47) states: 
School was the most significant factor in creating an Arab nationalist 
feeling in Libya. Egyptian ideological propaganda through the mass media 
also affected Libyan youth during the 1950s and 1960s, especially Radio 
Sawt al-Arab (The Arab Voice) in Cairo, which transmitted the political 
values of the 1952 revolution and Nasser’s political speeches directly to 
most Arab countries.  
Obeidi highlights that Libyans saw Nasser as their hero: his picture could be seen 
everywhere, and due to the influence of the Egyptian revolution, the Libyan revolution could 
be considered as a product of the great Arab revolution. Indeed, the Libyan regime at the 
outset of the revolution followed Nasser’s ideology and policies (Obeidi, 2001).  
The Libyan regime used Arab nationalism as one of its revolutionary pillars. Qaddafi 
promoted the Arab nationalist ideology since it was a shared identity for Middle Eastern and 
North African countries. The rise of the Pan–Arab identity in the 1950s reflects the advances 
in education and literacy brought about by Egyptian teachers in the Arab World, in addition 
to the shared cultural, artistic, and religious traditions. In fact, the shared values among Arab 
states (i.e. religion, language, history, and culture), particularly Egypt, had their influence in 
shaping the Libyan identity. Despite the fact that Libya shares some values with Islamic and 
Arab countries, the intention of Qaddafi to become a regional power and obtain nuclear 
weapons was more significant than a shared identity and joined interests with the 
neighbouring countries. The conflicts between Libya- Egypt in 1977 and Libya-Chad in 
1980s can be considered as good examples in this regard. Moreover, the aggressive behaviour 
of Qaddafi’s regime and in particular Qaddafi himself with some monarchical Arabic regimes 
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ideology of the Egyptian revolution, in particular Arab nationalism. 
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reflected the actual intention of Qaddafi to be a regional as well as international figure on the 
expense of Islamic and Arabic identity.  
 
2.6 Review of Nuclear and IR Approaches  
After a careful review of nuclear approaches and IR theories, it can be expected that realism 
and constructivism might explain, to a certain extent, the reversal of Libya’s nuclear weapons 
policy. Accordingly, elements of each approach are considered as a means to explore this 
major change in Libyan foreign and security policy. However, the realist theory seems to be 
the most appropriate approach to understand and explain the Libyan regime’s behaviour 
concerning the reversal of its foreign and security policies in this respect. 
The realist perception of nuclear weapons is expected to provide the most accurate 
explanations for the Libyan case. Under Qaddafi, the Libyan government was quite different 
from other types of government. The same leader who was non-compliant with international 
institutions and the international community, and who sought for decades to acquire nuclear 
weapons, was surprisingly the dominant figure of the same government that totally changed 
these foreign and security policies. The factors promoting the shift in this respect were 
attributed to several influences, such as international pressure, the threat of force by the 
international community, and international sanctions. 
The Libyan regime signed and ratified the NPT but continued to pursue a covert nuclear 
programme. Some approaches such as the domestic model might explain certain cases but 
they do not offer a satisfactory explanation of why Libya’s security and foreign policy was 
completely reformulated. There was no change to the Libyan leadership for 42 years, during 
which time various ideologies (i.e. Arabism, Islamism and Africanism) were used to 
implement policies that could strengthen its power.
75
 Insecurity in general, regional 
insecurity, and the triumph of Arab nationalism drove the Libyan leadership to pursue its 
nuclear programme, and characterise its foreign policy to a certain extent.  
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 Especially in the early years of the revolution, Qaddafi used Arab and Islamic discourse to implement 
nationalist ideology in the region which sought to merge Libya, Egypt and Sudan. Pan-Arabism was a common 
theme in Libyan rhetoric, which followed the Egyptian path of mobilising the masses and adding support to the 
idea of Arab nationalism. But at some stages, pan-Arabist nationalism was in decline due to damage to 
individual states’ interests. 
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More relevance in the analysis seems to be possible by considering the realist perspective, 
since this believes in self-help and anarchy, and acknowledges that nuclear weapons thus 
become an essential tool for state survival and security. Realist scholar John Mearsheimer 
(1994:11-12), argues that “[t]he greater the military advantage one state has over other states, 
the more secure it is”. Realism can explain why states pursue nuclear programmes. Hence, it 
will be used to analyse the Libyan situation, and specifically, why Libya had to seek nuclear 
capability from the early stages when Qaddafi came to power. The issue of security was one 
of the main concerns for Qaddafi in the early phase of the 1969 revolution, when memories 
still existed of the brutality of Italian colonialism, and Libyans believed they were not 
completely independent since US and British military bases were still on Libyan soil.  
Authors such as Maria Rost Rublee (2009), and Dafna Hochman (2006), understand and 
explain the Libyan behaviour through a constructivist perspective, considering the 
transformation as a result of its new government commitment to regional and international 
norms. However, the realist account remains more appropriate for appreciating the shift in the 
Libyan position; by considering the US and Europe as exerting pressure for this change, it is 
anticipated that the Libyan response was indeed the result of these external factors which 
convinced the regime to make concessions regarding its nuclear policy. This in turn, reflects 
the Libyan fear of military invasion along the same lines as in Iraq, which is a stance that 
would feature as one of the underpinnings of a realist analysis.  
Exploring the strength of the contributory factors in the Libyan case presents a useful model 
to understand first, the motivations to acquire nuclear weapons, and then the decision to 
dismantle them. This is what the present study aims to achieve.  
 
2.7 Different Interpretations of the Libyan Case 
There are various explanations for the shift in Libyan nuclear policy, such as those focusing 
on the effects of external developments and influences associated with the post-September 
11
th 
agenda, and the war on Iraq. St John (2004) argues that the Libyan shift was due to 
economic stagnation as the country’s economic and oil wealth was heavily affected by the 
sanctions, and also due to a change in the political discourse in general and in the foreign 
policy, in particular. The reasons for this reorientation have been reiterated by Jouve (2004), 
who reports that Qaddafi’s incentive to collaborate with the West was entirely disconnected 
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from the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
76
 Nor were Libya’s isolation or lack of diplomatic 
ties the sole reasons for its transformation in the direction of peace. Qaddafi said to Jouve 
(2004:105-106) that he was driven mainly by the market economy and his desire to obtain for 
his country a better place among the international community. 
It was true that economically Libya was not healthy. Libya was, in fact, subjected to 
international sanctions for several years,
77
 and this situation might have influenced the 
Libyan calculation to disarm and change its political behaviour. The will to compromise on 
several issues upon which the regime had previously remained steadfast, such as fulfilling the 
demands of the Security Council resolutions, demonstrates that there was a desire on the part 
of Libya to comply with the West, and indeed the international community, rather than to 
confront it. And it was this change in political behaviour through co-operation that ultimately 
led to the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons programme. 
Moreover, the changing reality of the security environment after September 11
th
 2001, led by 
the US administration, and which targeted states harbouring terrorists and developing 
chemical and biological weapons, might be considered as a contributing factor. Certainly, an 
important initiative was the establishment of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which 
prompted the interception of a ship loaded with nuclear components going to Libya in 
October 2003. It is probable that the seizure of this ship accelerated the Libyan nuclear 
dismantlement. 
After decades of international pressure, accompanied by several factors ranging from 
sanctions, isolation, and threat of military action, the Libyan regime expressed a genuine 
desire to re-join the moderate states, by complying with the demands of the UN Security 
Council and the powerful states.  Libya had reached a point where it was necessary to return 
to the international community, enhance its economy, revitalise sectors such as crude oil, gas 
and infrastructure, and end its bad behaviour worldwide.  
Richard Hass (1999:5) observed similarities between Iran, Iraq, and Libya, noting that “Libya 
in some ways resembles both the Iraq and Iran cases. Libyan terrorism provided the 
inspiration for considerable common policy; explicit UN Security Council backing further 
facilitated transatlantic co-operation”. Certainly, the political and economic isolation of Libya 
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 This pressure had been present during the nineties through the combination of multilateral sanctions and 
isolation and continued until late 2004. 
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and the use of sanctions were agreed by the international community, after the Libyan 
involvement in the bombings over Lockerbie and Niger.  
At this time, the US was successful in building anti-Libyan measures with its allies and the 
international community. However, the US and Europe had different views on how to handle 
Libya. Prior to the Lockerbie and UTA bombings, the allies of the US in Europe during the 
1980s were reluctant to follow the Americans due to the fact that Libya was a strategic 
economic partner for Europe. However, later the US, Europe and the international 
community were able to agree on a form of sanctions. 
It appears from the above discussion that the different interpretations of various scholars 
cannot be redundant, but they do not cover many important aspects in detail such as the 
historical context and its repercussion on Libyan policies. Moreover, considering the regional 
and international context in interpreting the Libyan case can provide a complete picture of the 
circumstances surrounding Libya’s attempts to acquire and dismantle nuclear weapons.   
 
2.7.1 Libyan Foreign Policy  
The period between 1969 and 1981 represents the first phase of the case study of this thesis. 
During this first period, several factors can be identified as influences upon Libya’s ambition 
to acquire nuclear weapons, these being: the geopolitics of the Cold War, the building up of a 
strong military armament, strengthening Libyan leadership regionally, seeking to match the 
power of enemies, insecurity and finally deterrence. All of the above elements can be 
considered as important drivers which encouraged not only Libya, but also other states such 
as Iraq, Syria, North Korea, and Iran, to attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it 
will be useful to understand Libyan motivations in order to formulate a generalised approach 
to further cases. Regarding the theoretical debate, it is expected that the realist analysis would 
have more relevance than other theories, and certainly in the above-mentioned period. 
 
2.7.2 Libya, the Sanctions and the Development of its Nuclear Programme  
The second period chosen for its significance covers about two decades (1981-2000), and 
represents Libya’s antagonism with the international powers. During this phase, several 
events involving Libya occurred, resulting in the imposition of economic sanctions by the 
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UN. This period also witnessed serious clashes between Qaddafi’s regime and the US, which 
ultimately caused the US to conduct air strikes on Libya’s main cities and Qaddafi’s 
headquarter. This in turn prompted the Libyan regime to accelerate its efforts to acquire 
nuclear weapons, due to its fear about similar attacks in future. Additionally, other incidents 
occurred during the same period such as the killing of a British police officer by Libyan 
agents, the Lockerbie affair, the UTA bombing, and the Berlin disco bombings. Accordingly, 
analysing the change in Libya’s policy at this specific time was due to a number of internal, 
regional and external factors.      
 
2.7.3 The Last Decade; Negotiations and Dismantlement of Libya’s Nuclear Programme 
This section examines in depth, Qaddafi’s denculearisation concession made in December 
2003. In fact, this period was rich in terms of internal and external events that affected the 
choices made by Qaddafi’s regime. The technological developments in the shadow of 
globalisation had led to an increase in the internal pressure which was believed to be weak in 
the previous periods investigated, thereby illustrating a variation in the factors influencing 
Libyan policy from one period to another. The second important element in this phase was 
seen in the aftermath of the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, with all its many 
consequences. There is no doubt that this particular issue placed another pressure upon the 
Libyan regime to conform to international demands. And the desire on the part of Qaddafi to 
end Libya’s isolation and to get the sanctions lifted in order to attract foreign investments and 
improve the country’s negative reputation and image at both regional and international levels, 
served as another vital element forcing the shift in policy. The more recent events in Libya 
(i.e. the uprising in 2011) show that on the long-term basis, and despite Qaddafi’s different 
strategies, he was not able to prevent the fall of his regime.  
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Chapter Three: Libyan Foreign Policy from 1969 to 1981 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The last chapter provided an overview of the existing literature about why states seek to 
acquire nuclear weapons and what subsequently motivates them to dismantle them. 
Additionally, it explored the analytical framework for a study of Libya’s security policies and 
the international relations theories such as realism and constructivism. It was shown that a 
new era in Libya’s history unfolded when the coup overthrew the monarchy in 1969 and 
established a republic. Against the background already provided, therefore, this chapter 
addresses the development of Libya’s foreign and security policies from the onset of the 1969 
coup, led by Muammer Qaddafi and several junior officers, until 1981.  
 
The chapter begins by giving an overview of Libya’s political history and geographical 
location, and then presents a brief background to the 1969 coup, and the new rulers. 
Thereafter, it discusses the transformation of Libyan politics from monarchy to republic, and 
progresses to consider the shift of Libyan policies under the new Qaddafi regime. The 
following section explores the determinants of Libya’s foreign and security policies during 
Qaddafi’s regime, especially the early policies such as Arab nationalism, anti-imperialism, 
and anti-colonialism. In this regard, the chapter examines the domestic, regional, and external 
factors that affected these policies. 
 
In examining the shift in Libyan politics in the aftermath of the 1969 bloodless coup to 
remove King Idris’ monarchy, the chapter investigates the motives of Qaddafi and his 
colleagues for that coup. In this respect, it is important to highlight the incentives behind the 
change in the Libyan political scene in general, and in Libya’s external relations in particular. 
The military officers who led the coup made radical changes to various Libyan policies at the 
regional and international levels, producing a mixture of strategies that it adopted with 
neighbouring countries and Western powers. Libya’s previous relations under the monarchy 
of King Idris with the West changed and new alliances were formed in different spheres. In 
this regard, the chapter investigates Libya’s new foreign and security policies in general, and 
the country’s early intention to obtain nuclear weapons.    
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Several factors which contributed to the shift in Libya’s politics during the time of the 1969 
coup are considered. The alienation of the idea of Arab nationalism during the reign of King 
Idris, corruption, mismanagement of natural resources, nepotism, and the existence of foreign 
military bases in Libya had all increased the population’s dissatisfaction with the policies of 
King Idris. Moreover, at that time, several countries in the Arab World, such as Egypt, Iraq, 
and Syria, witnessed changes in their political regimes, and Libya was not exempt from this 
transformation, especially after the military officers found the reasons and incentives to make 
radical changes. Additionally, the effect of Egypt and its charismatic leadership on Libya and 
the thinking of its young population were crucial.     
 
 
3.2 Historical Review 
 
In historical terms, Libya has experienced lengthy periods of foreign control and has been 
subjected to occupation by various powers. Considering the aims of the present study, 
however, the focus of this review is particularly on the end of the Ottoman period in Libya. 
The Turks, following their defeat in the Balkan Wars, had to surrender their Libyan territory 
to Italy,
78
 in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty, thereby making Libya an Italian colony 
for more than thirty years (1911-1943). The Libyans of Tripolitania, who were pro-
independence, unilaterally declared their independence from Italian rule despite what was 
planned for their country in different chancelleries and world centres of power (i.e. secret 
agreements between European powers).
79
 Unfortunately for its founders, the Tripolitania 
Republic (Al-Jumhuria Al-Tarabulsiya) formed in 1919, was short-lived. Cyrenaica also 
formed a parliament, but despite the intentions and efforts to unite the two provinces, 
differences prevented a concrete unification under the Sanussiya movement (El-Kikhia, 
1997:19; Khadduri, 1963:8).
80
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 E.g. the Sykes-Picot agreement and its physical consequences on the future of the Arab World. The Sykes-
Picot agreement of 1916 (16
th
 May) was a secret agreement between the British and the French and the 
participation of Tsarist Russia defining their respective spheres of influence and control in the Middle East 
following the expected fall of the Ottoman Empire. This was later divided into areas of future British and French 
hegemony (for more details see Fieldhouse, 2006:50). 
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 The Sanusi order, a religious movement that originally sought to purify Islam, but after the Italian invasion, 
had to mobilise its followers to resist Italian rule. The Sanusi movement provided a sense of unity and 
leadership to the people. The movement was established in small lodges called Zawiyas, extending from the 
desert oases between Sudan and Tripolitania and providing religious and political organisation to free and save 
the country from disorder and anarchy (Khadduri, 1963:8). 
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The Sanussiya was originally a religious movement; however, scholars defined it as a 
reformist one. Its creation, in the Arab peninsula (Hejaz), goes back to the first half of the 
19
th
 Century (in 1837). In Libya, it was in Bayda in Cyrenaica that the Grand Sanusi, founder 
of the movement settled his order. The Grand Sanusi’s major concerns in the 19th century 
were to re-educate Libyan tribes on Islam and to intervene whenever a conflict appeared 
between them, without being directly involved in the tribes. In fact, the mediation of the 
Grand Sanusi put an end to a large number of inter-tribal wars. Later, the movement, which 
was worried about potential foreign encroachments in the regions, did arm its followers and 
prepared them for defensive actions in case of attack. The Sanusi Zawia-lodges played 
several roles, being centres of learning as well as centres of training. So, when the French 
penetrated the Sahara in 1902, the Sanusis had to move their capital to Kufra. The Italian 
invasion, in 1911, found the Sanusis prepared to resist the Italian colonialism and effectively, 
ready to challenge the Italian colonisers (Laoust, 1965:353-355). 
 
In 1939, at the onset of WWII, just as Italy’s optimism about moving into Libya81 seemed to 
be justified, the country’s prosperity began to decline considerably.82 Italy’s dream of turning 
Libyans into second-class Italian citizens and securing Italy’s position in Libya was shattered 
because of its choice to join Nazi Germany’s camp.83 Libya became one of the major 
battlefields for the belligerents in North Africa and the Libyans suffered enormously as a 
result. Most Italian infrastructure was destroyed, especially in Cyrenaica, provoking at the 
end of 1942, the flight of Italian colonists from that region (Vandewalle, 2006:34–37).84 
Following the surrender of the Axis forces in Tunisia in May 1943, a British Military 
Administration was established in order to administer Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, while 
Fezzan, which had been occupied by French troops in January 1943, came under the control 
of a French Military Administration. British forces continued to rule Cyrenaica and 
Tripolitania, and as early as 1942, the British promised to back the independence of Libya, 
with its three main regions. Another significant issue, which is worth underlining here, is that 
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 Mussolini symbolically appointed himself as the Protector of Islam in Tripoli in 1937. 
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 Fields and farmhouses they left behind were quickly taken over by returning Libyan shepherds 
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the British needed the support of the Sanusi on the battlefield, prompting the creation of a 
force known as the Libyan Arab Force. Although very small, this group was extremely 
important, consisting of five battalions (St John, 2008:85).
85
 The importance of the Libyan 
Arab Force could be traced back to the Libyan intention to gain independence from the 
Italian rule, as was promised by the British. Additionally, the Libyan battalions were familiar 
about the terrain of the country and they were also eager to fight the Italian fascists. 
Nevertheless, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania had to wait for the end of WWII and the 
international agreements to know their fate. The 1907 Hague Convention gave the British a 
“care and maintenance” status for the two provinces,86 while Fezzan was attributed to the 
French (St John, 2008: 86).
87
 The liberation of Libya from Fascist Italy in 1943 did not solve 
the problem of the Libyans. In the same manner as the other Italian African colonies, Libya 
was still legally under Italian rule and Italy was considered as sovereign over all its former 
colonies. Therefore, when Libyan leaders demanded self-government they soon realised that 
no decision could be taken in this regard without first signing a peace treaty with Italy 
(Khadduri, 1963:112).
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The defeat of the Italians at al-Alamein encouraged the Cyrenaicans and the Sanusi exiles in 
Egypt, who tried to assess how beneficial it would be to negotiate their independence and fit 
their aspirations with the British ambitions in the post-WWII period. However, when Sayyid 
Idris, under the pressure of the representatives of Tripolitania, discussed guarantees of post-
war independence from Great Britain,
89
 the Italians were excluded from the plan proposed by 
the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. Nevertheless, the Tripolitanians interpreted 
Eden’s exclusive attention to Cyrenaica either as an attempt by Britain itself to take on a role 
in the country’s post-war future, or to recognise the Sanusi leadership as representing the 
post-war interests of both provinces (Vandewalle, 2006:37). 
Within Libya itself, several political interests had emerged concerning the future of 
Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. In Cyrenaica, political allegiance and any discussion of 
the province’s future converged towards the Sanusis.90 In 1946 a Sanusi-dominated National 
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 The Libyan Arab Force wore the Sanusi emblem, a badge with a white crescent and star on a black field. 
86
 Such a mandate was expected to end in 1949. 
87
 The French remained in Fezzan until Independence in 1951. 
88
 Accordingly, Libya was unable to gain its independence, similarly to the other former Italian colonies, until 
Italy had given up sovereignty. 
89
 In January 1942. 
90
 The Sanusi in particular enjoyed the confidence of the British. 
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Congress was created, and the Cyrenaicans instituted their self-government policies. The 
members of the new National Association of Cyrenaica were in favour of the political 
unification of all three provinces (Khadduri, 1963:65).
91
 
 
The other Libyan province, Tripolitania, unlike Cyrenaica, had not been devised and 
according to Khadduri, its reattribution to post-Fascist Italy had not been excluded (Khadduri, 
1963:65).
92
 Moreover, in 1947, the political life in Tripolitania was quite diversified since 
there were five political parties,
93
 but all agreeing on three main points: firstly the 
independence of the country, secondly, the unity of the three provinces, and thirdly, the 
membership of the Arab League. However, the major divergence between the parties 
concerned the role of the Sanusis in the political future of the country (Vandewalle, 
2006:38).
94
  
 
Another set of political interests in the three provinces were those of the Great Powers.
95
 
Initially, the USA and the Soviet Union showed relatively little direct interest in Libya’s fate, 
but the advent of the Cold War soon changed the perspective of both.
96
 Italy, which still held 
legal sovereignty over Libya, reasserted its claim when the war ended (Khaddouri, 
1963:111&112) but was not supported by either the British or the Americans.  
 
In early 1948, the Libyan question was finally referred to a Four Power Commission. By that 
time, the political positions of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania had hardened considerably. The 
western province still declared itself overwhelmingly in favour of unity. In the east, however, 
the Cyrenaican political consensus was represented by a single political party, the National 
Congress, which wanted independence under a Sanusi government and only under Sanusi 
rule would Cyrenaica accept unity with Tripolitania. In Fezzan, almost half the population 
was in favour of continued French administration. After three years of virtual diplomatic 
deadlock the Libyan matter was passed to the United Nations General Assembly on 15 
September 1948 (Vandewalle, 2006:39).  
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 Wherein the views of nationalism which had begun to penetrate the political ideas of a younger generation 
were expressed. 
92
 At this time around 40,000 Italians resided in Tripolitania, whose interests were considerable. 
93
 Whose memberships ranged from dozens to thousands. 
94
 An obstacle that continued to bedevil the parties as the future of the country was soon to be taken up by the 
United Nations. 
95
 Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union – after World War II. 
96
 New considerations steadily intruded upon the unfolding diplomatic wrangling. 
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The infighting continued, now clearly and directly coloured by issues surrounding the Cold 
War. Initially neither France nor Great Britain would support attempts to create a united 
Libya during some of the United Nations committee debates. France was particularly keen to 
hold on to Fezzan. Trying to pre-empt a United Nations decision, the two administrating 
powers signed the Bevin-Sforza plan, published on 10 May 1949, proposing ten-year 
trusteeships for France in Fezzan, for Great Britain in Cyrenaica, and Italy in Tripolitania. 
However, external opposition to such a plan was expressed by the Soviet Union and the Arab 
protests. Unexpectedly, the Bevin-Sforza plan provoked a situation which made possible 
what had on several previous occasions eluded the Tripolitanians and the Cyrenaicans - a 
united stance after decades of indecision and disagreement (Oakes, 2011:86-87).
97
 
When the General Assembly met again in September 1949, Britain unilaterally decided to 
grant Cyrenaica self-government under the leadership of Sayyid Idris. Despite the British 
claiming that this would not prejudice future UN decisions, it effectively meant that if 
independence was later granted to the provinces, this would necessarily propel Sayyid Idris 
into a privileged position and protect British and Western interests. In February 1950, France 
followed suit, setting up a transitional government in Fezzan and creating a Representative 
Assembly for the province. By that time, the UN General Assembly had started to draft a 
resolution to decide on the means and timing of Libyan independence as a unified country. 
On 21 November 1949, the resolution on Libyan independence was adopted, stipulating that 
the country would become independent no later than 1 January 1952 (Oakes, 2011:86-90).  
The aftermath of WWII showed a growing interest in Libya not only by Western powers such 
as the United States, Britain, and France but also by the Soviet Union (Khadduri, 1963:113). 
Britain and the US convinced Italy that the best option was to grant Libya its independence.
98
 
Nevertheless, they also realised that they would never be able to ensure an international 
agreement for British control over Libya (First, 1975:66).
99
 The significant fact here is that, 
in December 1951, the Libyan authorities granted
100
 the US the right to retain Wheelus Field 
and other facilities.
101
 According to the terms of agreement, the US had to pay Libya $1 
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 The Bevin-Sforza plan referred to ten year trusteeships. 
98
 The reasons that these powers were so keen to grant Libya its independence are not stated in any public 
official documents to date. However, the fact that the US and Britain did request from the new Libyan state to 
allow them to have military bases in the country might be one element among other incentives. 
99
 Another central reason being that any trusteeship agreement, whether collective or single-nation, would 
require the surrender of their bases. 
100
 Before the formal proclamation of Libyan independence. 
101
 The need to have several bases around the world, to face the USSR induced the US to conclude a few 
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million per year, for a period of twenty years (St John, 2008:105). Such a lease was crucial to 
Libya, due to its endemic poverty. For instance, in 1952 the United Nations referred to the 
new state as “an excellent example of universal poverty in an extreme form” (Obeidi, 
2001:31). 
Following the formal proclamation of Libyan independence on 24 December 1951, the US 
recognised the new entity.
102
 The American administration and the British government, aware 
of the importance of Libya in the new context of the Cold War, made plans to maintain Libya 
under their own influence and to keep the Soviets at bay (St John, 2008:105). The French 
were also concerned about the new status of Libya and its eventual impact on the 
neighbouring French occupied territories.
103
  
Due to economic incentives, and to ensure protection from the expansionist ambitions of 
close neighbours, the Libyan king decided to have a close relationship with Britain and the 
US. He disregarded calls for Arab nationalism, which was a threat to monarchies and 
associated with a socialist ideology. The King’s policy allowed the United States, France, and 
Britain to have exceptional privileges in Libyan territory, consolidating their military 
presence and influence. Such extensive rights brought much criticism from various strata 
within Libyan society, in particular from nationalists who were not pleased with the presence 
of military personnel in Libya, considering Libya’s sovereignty to be severely damaged by 
this, and believing their country not to be a truly independent state (Simon, 2003: 41). 
In trying to define the situation which dominated Libyan politics following its independence, 
Dearden presented Libya as a country torn between two ‘imperialisms’ - an Eastern one, 
symbolised by the Egyptians, and which offered emotional satisfaction, in contraposition to a 
Western one, providing principally material assets (Dearden, 1950:408). However, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
agreements in the Arab World. In June 1951 an agreement was reached between the United States and France 
which permitted the US to operate five air bases in Morocco. Agreements were also reached with Saudi Arabia 
over the Dharhan base so that its use by the US could continue for another five years. 
102
 The US also advanced the American Consulate General to the state of a legation. 
103
 There are also other factors which were involved in the final disposition of Libya. The French colonial 
empire in North West Africa was in danger, as French possession of Fezzan linked French possessions in the 
North African region with those in Central Africa. France, therefore, claimed Fezzan and all of Libya south of 
the Tropic of Cancer; it also argued for the return of Tripolitania to Italy, since this would appease the defeated 
power in Europe and would at the same time provide another controlled area adjoining the French-run areas in 
North West Africa (St John, 2008:105). 
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opinion of this author seems to be exaggerated, since most of the Arab World at that period 
was still under colonial rule or influence.  
In the same vein as Dearden, others such as St John, argue that Libyan domestic support for 
Arab nationalism increased considerably after the Israeli state was established, and this 
continued to grow in strength and importance in the coming years. Later on, these forces in 
favour of Arab nationalism proved to be a daunting challenge for a country ruled by a 
conservative monarchy (St John, 2008:107). There are certainly other elements which might 
help in identifying the circumstances in which Arab nationalism found its inspiration, such as 
the struggle between monarchists and republicans, the fight against colonialism, and the 
existence of the military bases. Later on, the gap between the Libyan government and the 
people widened due to an increase in people’s political awareness and the awakening of the 
Arab World. In addition to the context of the Cold War and with the growing influence of the 
USSR, the struggle for independence against the colonisers in Africa, the Palestine conflict, 
the rise of Egyptian Nasserists, the Pan-Arabism Baathists, and anti-royalist movements 
throughout the Arab world, all served as factors that disturbed the pragmatic politics of King 
Idris. 
The anti-colonialism of the monarchy soon faded, due to the fact that Libya’s income was 
mainly provided by British and American air bases, and that the country was leaning more 
towards co-operation with the West in order to secure its support. The Libyan nationalists, 
who had strongly defended, and obtained independence for their country, had to face other 
internal challenges, with an opposition heavily influenced by the growing pan-Arab 
movements in the neighbouring countries.  
A national constituent assembly was created in November 1950, with a federal system of 
government, and the monarch Sayyid Muhammed Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi as Chief of State. 
A year later, a constitution was adopted and on 24 December 1951, King Idris proclaimed the 
independence and sovereignty of the United Kingdom of Libya (St John, 2008:107–108).104 
The Libyan monarchy often insisted on Libyan-Arab fraternal solidarity, but this rarely 
materialised. Indeed, far from the rhetorical discourse, and until 1953, the King prevented 
Libya from joining the Arab League, and his government never offered strong support for the 
Arabs in the Middle East. The monarch, concerned by the growing influence of Egypt, 
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 The constitution was drafted by committees formed by the constituent assembly and adopted in October 
1951.  
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decided to reduce Egyptian influence, and in 1956, he temporarily closed Egyptian 
information centres.  
In 1953, a treaty signed between Libya and Britain granted the British extensive jurisdictional 
and extraterritorial rights in return for long-term financial assistance.
105
 Libya continued to 
maintain good relations with the West, and in 1954 the USA required the use of Wheelus air 
base outside Tripoli.
106
 The fact that Libya had several large Western bases and was 
dependent on incomes from these facilities made observers consider the Libyan Kingdom as 
a pro-Western one (St John, 1987:14–15). However, Kawczynski underlines that King Idris 
could not preserve his regime from corruption and scandals. In addition, Arab nationalism 
started to affect the region and Libyans were no exception to that regional enthusiasm 
(Kawczynski, 2011:16). 
In 1959, Libya was the single biggest per capita recipient of United States largesse in the 
world, the USA providing approximately $100 million in aid to the country; thus, the income 
from aid and from renting the military bases were the source of Libya’s first economic boom 
(Vandewalle, 2006:44-45). Libya’s dependence on income from British and American air 
bases encouraged a policy of co-operation with, and support for, the West. Such an 
association with Western powers provoked discontent at the domestic level. The strength of 
nationalism which stemmed from the triumph of independence was challenged, both 
internally by opposition groups and externally by Pan-Arab movements.  
It is essential to look at the way internal unity and cohesion were dealt with and at the efforts 
made for developing the country. King Idris played a key role in the unification of Libya. In 
addition to his involvement for the recovery of Cyrenaica from Italian rule, the King had, in a 
brilliant manner, succeeded in winning over influential Tripolitanian leaders to rally in favour 
of federalism,
107
 thereby paving the way for the formation of the Libyan state.
108
 However, 
his influence on Tripolitanian leaders was limited because they disagreed about the form of 
                                                          
105
 Libya agreed, and both countries signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship and alliance. 
106
 In return for a programme of economic, technical and military assistance, Libya agreed and signed a treaty 
with the United States. 
107
 In Tripolitania, people realised that the only person who could command respect in the country was in fact 
King Idris. 
108
 With great skill, King Idris was able to win the confidence and support of Cyrenaican tribal chiefs, and he not 
only gained the support but also the love of all Cyrenaicans. Therefore, after the war there was no doubt who the 
ruler of Cyrenaica would be. 
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government they wanted to establish, and they also wanted some constitutional limitations on 
his power (Khadduri, 1963:319).
109
 
King Idris, far from being interested in the consolidation of a monarchical system, was rather 
planning to transform the monarchy into a republic.
110
 He did, in fact, state numerous times 
that ruling a country which faced grave domestic problems, and one which contained 
enormous political and economic challenges, made the preservation of the unity and 
independence of the country much more difficult than achieving them in the first place. 
Accordingly, King Idris believed that various challenges had to be addressed: the political 
loyalty of his subjects, and the consolidation of the still fragile Libyan national identity 
among the three provinces. To achieve these aims it was absolutely necessary to benefit from 
Libya’s incomes and use them appropriately (Khadduri, 1963:320). However, a national 
political identity was still to be formed. Independence unified Libya’s three provinces, but as 
in neighbouring Algeria, it did not succeed in achieving a solid sense of national identity.
111
  
The gradual rise to statehood coincided with the rise of Arab nationalism and anti-
colonialism in the Middle East and anti-colonial resistance in neighbouring Arab countries. 
Arab nationalism, with its anti-kingships stand, was not particularly appreciated by King Idris 
who feared for his own interests,
112
 and therefore the monarchy focused on directing its 
growth and influence within the Kingdom. It is assumed by some observers that a national 
consciousness took hold after the 1967 war and the Libyan government seized the 
opportunity to stress the existence of a Libyan identity with deep roots in pre-independence 
history. Consequently, national feeling grew rapidly, although it was not fast enough to 
preserve the monarchy from the Pan-Arab ideology which conquered Egypt (St John, 
1987:16-17). 
The King claimed to support Libyan-Arab brotherhood and solidarity, but this was hardly 
ever acted upon, as confirmed by the fact that it was not until 1953 that Libya became a 
member of the Arab League, when it could have joined earlier. In practice, the monarchy 
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 In fact, such thoughts may have stemmed from the fact that there was a realisation that the King was not very 
anxious to rule over Tripolitania, and he would in fact have been satisfied with the Emirate of Cyrenaica. 
Nonetheless, King Idris felt compelled to accept the throne of Libya as some form of patriotic duty, in order to 
provide leadership for a divided country. 
110
 The king made it clear in 1956 that his intention was to adopt a republican system of government. 
111
 The people continued to see themselves as Tripolitanian, Cyrenaican or Fezzanese, rather than Libyans. After 
1951, the Libyan government made many attempts to promote a cohesive national identity, but a decade later 
observers highlighted the weak sense of national identity in Libya. 
112
Arab nationalism was also socialist in its economic perspective of an ideal society. 
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regime gave hardly any tangible support for the Arab cause in the Middle East. Moreover, the 
monarch turned to the West to sign a treaty with Britain for the period of twenty years 
(Wright, 1969:232). In 1957 Libya embarked on a bilateral collaboration and multilateral co-
operation with other North African countries, and signed a bilateral treaty with Tunisia. 
However, the Libyan government was criticised, mainly by Arab nationalists who claimed 
that the purpose of the treaty had little to do with bilateral collaboration but was actually to 
further improve Libya’s ties with the West (St John, 1987:14). 
The discovery of oil in Libya, in 1959, completely transformed the economic status of the 
country and within a decade Libya had become a major producer of high quality oil. This 
greatly increased the use of distributive largesse at the expense of real economic and political 
regulation. Following the steady increase in oil revenues, King Idris, began surely and rapidly 
to promote loyalty and political identity between the three provinces.
113
 Good relations 
between the USA and Libya undoubtedly benefited both countries.
 
The United States and 
Britain were permitted to have military bases,
114
 in addition to the economic advantages they 
reaped, such as the leading role given to their respective companies for the development of 
the country’s oil industry (Deeb, 1991:29).  
Despite the blessing of the oil revenues which provided for Libya’s domestic needs, a 
growing gap between the rich and the poor was noticeable. According to Simon (2003:41), 
“the new flow of oil money was bringing graft and corruption to Libya, a development that 
was congenial to Western Oil Corporations”. Also one oil expert stated that “Idris’s regime 
was thought to be sound because it was corrupt” (Simon, 2003:41). The Libyan population 
was sceptical about the management of oil revenues, and many people questioned the slow 
rate of economic and political development, accusing the monarchy of not making good use 
of the new oil wealth (St John, 1987:15). 
 
In relation to the Arab issues, the monarch’s regime had adopted a policy of detachment from 
Arab affairs. Libya did not apply to enter the Arab League until February 1953, and even then 
only after demands from a wave of Arab nationalism, although Libya also joined the United 
Nations in December 1953. Overall, Libya’s monarchy did not live up to the expectations of 
its people and the changes in regional attitudes caused by the rise of Arab nationalism. In 
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 King Idris was at first reluctant to govern beyond his native Cyrenaica. 
114
 The Wheelus and Al-Adam airbases. Indeed, this was very practical and useful for both Western countries as 
it was strategically desirable in their pursuit of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. 
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addition, the region had witnessed a struggle between monarchies and revolutionary regimes 
aiming to end the existence of the Western presence (Zenbou, 2010:83).  
 
Moreover, the Arab defeat against Israel in 1967 was blamed on the air support provided by 
the US and British forces, which took off from military bases in Libya. The use of the 
military bases had caused young people to accuse the monarch’s government of not providing 
enough support to the Arabs, and also to object to the presence of foreign military bases in 
Libya (Simons, 1996:166). At the same time, US representatives were concerned about 
Egyptian influences via educational channels. Egyptian teachers were employed in Libya’s 
secondary schools in various regions and some of them had political leanings stemming from 
Pan-Arabism. Libya was growing closer to Egyptian Pan-Arabism and the feelings of the 
Libyan people were leaning more towards Egypt. Moreover, there were suspicions that 
Libyan students who studied in Egypt might bring Pan-Arab political beliefs back to Libya 
after the end of their studies (St John, 2002:73).
115
  
It can be added here that the new consciousness of the Libyan population in the politicisation 
of the Arab World grew considerably. Such growing interest mainly stemmed from 
contemporary events, especially those that had some effect on the conservative, traditionalist 
Libyan monarchy; specifically, the Palestinian conflict, the increased Soviet interest in the 
Middle East, and the growth of Nasserism in the Arab World (St John, 1987:14).  
 
3.2.1 The Significance of Libya’s Geographical Location 
 
The geography of Libya made it an attractive territory to be conquered as attested by the 
considerable number of nations who invaded, occupied, colonised or settled in the land.
116
 
The country is located within the Arab, Islamic, and African periphery. Its coast is along the 
northern central coastline of Africa, and it borders the Mediterranean Sea in the north, Egypt 
and Sudan on the eastern side, Tunisia and Algeria in the west, and Niger, Chad and Sudan in 
the south. The south of Libya contains a vast area of desert extending from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Red Sea. Libya is the third largest state in Africa, and is also the fourth largest 
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 Education in Libya depended hugely on Egyptian staff because of the lack of teachers in Libya. 
116
 Libya was conquered by respectively the Phoenicians, the Greeks, the Numidians, the Romans, the 
Christians, the Barbarians, the Vandals, the Byzantines, the Arabs, the Spanish, the Ottoman Turks, and finally 
the Italians.   
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country by territory in the Arab World.
117
 The geopolitics of Libya were, and still are, crucial 
in world affairs. In the aftermath of Libya’s independence, the country, as well as other 
countries in the Mediterranean basin, was considered as an important asset in the struggle 
between the two superpowers of that era, the Soviet Union and United States.
118
 (See figure 
3.1 below). 
 
 
Source: Google maps, available at: http://www.mapsharing.org/MS-maps/map-pages-state-map/images-state-
map/111-libya-map.jpg  
 
Additionally, Libya is located in a significant and strategic area. Several assets can be listed 
when considering Libya’s geographical location. Firstly, its thousands of miles of 
Mediterranean coast, secondly the fact that it faces several European countries (Italy, Malta, 
Spain, Greece, etc.), in addition to its short distance from the Italian Islands.
119
 Its coast 
                                                          
117
 Although Libya is one of the largest by size, it has a relatively small population in comparison to its 
neighbouring countries, and it was estimated in 2011 to have 6.5 million people 
118
 Both were trying to contain the expansion and influence of each other. 
119
 The area is desirable especially in maintaining access to North African oil, and the shipment of the imported 
crude cheaper than the oil from the Gulf countries or Iran.   
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facilitates maritime and commercial communications with the North of the Mediterranean 
(Europe) while its southern border opens to sub-Saharan countries. Such a location may have 
contributed to make Libyans open to other cultures and able to see the world through multiple 
and different perspectives. All the factors cited previously moulded the foreign policy of the 
Libyan regime and consequently had a huge impact on the whole region. Furthermore, its 
geographical position places it at the centre of attention of not only the former world empires 
(old powers such as Great Britain and France), but also of the new superpowers (i.e. the USA 
and the USSR), victors of the Second World War. Obeidi underlines the attraction for 
colonial powers of Libya due to its strategic geographical position. Most colonial conquests 
of Libya came via the Mediterranean Sea, and show the importance of the geographical 
location of the country (Obeidi, 2001:30–31). The Mediterranean coast is the most populated 
area in Libya due to the fertility of the soil; a vast proportion of the rest of the country is 
covered with sand dunes and is made up in large part of rocky land unsuitable for agriculture. 
 
Libya’s geographical centrality allowed the country to develop and maintain relations with 
both the Middle East (i.e. Mashriq) and the West of North Africa (i.e. Maghreb). Historically, 
this means that the country was divided into three provinces, Cyrenaica, which was 
traditionally oriented more towards Egypt, and the Tripolitania region which was oriented 
towards its Western neighbours such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. The third significant 
region of Libya, Fezzan, is in the southern part of the country. Fezzan covers a vast area of 
desert up to the border of the African countries of the Sahel and it also shares some 
socioeconomic features with the neighbouring African countries. In view of its geographical 
position the Fezzan region was, for centuries, heavily involved in the trade with its southern 
African countries (St John, 2002:13–14). 
 
The significance of Libya’s geographical location lay also in its strategic military value, since 
it formed an important asset along the Mediterranean coast for the US, Britain, and France 
after the end of the Second World War. As one of the US Mission officials put it in 1956:  
 
For the present, Libya’s strategic location is, in a sense, its most important 
commodity. As long as the military requirements of the Western powers are 
important, the political and economic stability of Libya is of direct as well 
as indirect concern to them (Deeb, 1991:23–24). 
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Deeb, quoting American officials, shows that, prior to the discovery of oil,
120
 Libya’s 
geographical location was considered a vital asset for the allies in maintaining supremacy in 
the Mediterranean Sea in the context of the Cold War. 
 
Indeed, a study undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1959 emphasised the 
importance of Libya’s position along the Mediterranean coast.121 Wright, states that in the 
1980s “North Africa, moreover, flanks the routes which the Soviets would follow in their 
efforts to penetrate Africa”. She added later that “Libya serves as a buffer between the 
Middle East and the Maghreb and at least partially shields the latter from the full force of 
Arab nationalism emanating from Cairo”. According to this author, “so long as Libya 
remains friendly to the West, the West can control the southern shore and part of the Eastern 
Mediterranean” (Wright, 1981–1982:21). And now, in the twenty first century the position of 
the West as regard to Libya’s strategic position remains unchanged. 
 
American and British bases were maintained on Libyan soil from the time of the 
independence of the country, and until 1969 when the monarchy was overthrown, they were 
unchallenged.
122
 Far from being seen as a post-colonial instrument, they were in fact one of 
the main sources of income before the discovery of oil, and a way of keeping at bay the 
Soviets, in the context of the Cold War. Additionally, such a presence of Western military 
powers proves the strategic importance given to Libya. Wright’s assessment of Libya’s 
geopolitics and geographical settings relates to the 1980s. However, Libya remains a 
significant location and it is still strategically important for various political, security, and 
economic reasons. After considering several different issues, it can be appreciated that 
Wright’s statement has as much validity today as it did 30 years ago, because of for example, 
the fight against terrorism, insecurity, arms trafficking and drug smuggling, and illegal 
migration.  
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 In the late 1950s. 
121
 The study asserted that North Africa remained a vital asset to the United States (during the Eisenhower 
administration) in maintaining a foothold in the region. The study’s assessment emphasised the significance of 
Libya’s location in the region if the US wanted to preserve its control in the Mediterranean. Should it lose 
completely its strategic position in North Africa, the West would find its control over the Mediterranean 
seriously threatened. 
122
 The establishment of British and US military bases was based on the treaty with the United Kingdom and the 
agreement between Libya and the United States. 
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The next section examines the period which followed the 1969 coup d’état, in which the Free 
Unionist Officers, led by Muammer Qaddafi a young army captain, overthrew King Idris and 
put an end to the monarchy, introducing a political regime that in fact lasted for more than 
four decades (1969-2011).  
 
3.3 Development of the Libyan Political System 
 
The Libyan political system of Qaddafi’s regime varied according to the circumstances.123 At 
the outset of the coup in 1969 against the monarchy, there was no clear sight of what political 
system the young officers were trying to implement. Later, Vandewalle (2006: 82–83) was 
able to identify three phases in the development of Libya’s political ideology, starting with 
the formation, in June 1971, of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). The intention was to create a 
new structure for wider political participation according to the framework of the ASU, and to 
reduce the power of traditional entities and organisations.
124
 This was a step taken to mobilise 
the masses, and to strengthen the new regime. However, the ASU failed to rally the masses 
and ensure loyalty for the new rulers, inducing the RCC to use drastic methods in order to 
maintain its tight grip on the country. 
 
Another step was the development of Libya’s new strategy, devised on the anniversary of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s birth, based on ‘bottom-up mobilisation’, which began in April 1973. 
On that day, in the city of Zwara, Qaddafi announced the advent of the ‘popular revolution’. 
In his speech, Qaddafi laid down the five points which comprised the new popular revolution. 
This popular revolution was meant to rally the masses with a bottom-up mobilisation, a 
method which was different from previous attempts by the ASU. Qaddafi’s five points 
included the removal of administrative and legal obstacles, the creation of new entities such 
as ‘Popular Committees’, the elimination of all elements opposing the revolution, the 
replacement of all technocrats opposed to revolutionary change; and finally allowing Popular 
Committees to run organisations (Kawczynski, 2011:22-23).
125
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 Different stages can be identified in this regard. 
124
 It is also important to note that a new law was introduced on 30 May 1972 which banned all political 
activities outside the ASU. 
125
 Despite the fact that they did not have the proper qualifications to conduct the tasks involved. 
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In 1977, Qaddafi introduced the Declaration of Authority of the People. The document in 
question was meant to represent the basic law in Libya. The lines of authority are explicitly 
defined in art.3 and art.4: “The People’s direct democracy is the basis of the political system 
in the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, where the authority is in the hands of the 
people alone. The People exercise their authority through the People’s Congresses, the 
Peoples’ Committees, and the Professional Unions”. Both articles are fundamental features of 
the Green Book, and are a central element of Qaddafi’s ideology. However, despite the 
existence of the new legal instruments and institutions, the state’s legislative and executive 
organisations did not have a determinant role in decision-making. From 1977 onwards, the 
core element of the Libyan political system was the Revolutionary Committees, which are not 
mentioned on purpose, in either the Green Book or the Proclamation of People’s Power 
(Mattes, 2008:55-57). This might be explained by the fact that the Libyan leadership intended 
to protect them from potential prosecutions by Libyan courts.  
 
Under the firm grip of Qaddafi, the Revolutionary Committees along with various other 
security services (i.e. internal and external security apparatus depending on the Ministry of 
Interior), were responsible for protecting Qaddafi’s regime. However, from 2002, despite 
their strong presence, the committees lost some of their privileges, due to a new soft approach 
towards domestic policies. Nonetheless, they remained the security organisation par 
excellence within the Jamahiryah, ready for any eventuality (Mattes, 2008:57).
126
 
 
Regarding the structure and the capacity of Libya’s security, Mattes (2004) maintains that 
Qaddafi’s regime survival was due to the security apparatus, which operated within an 
unconstrained environment. None of the security organisations was subject to political 
control or the press, or other institutions such as NGOs. The only direct command and control 
came from Qaddafi himself, and he alone. Moreover, the security apparatus functioned in a 
flexible structure meaning that it enhanced the security of the regime, ensured its continuity, 
and deposed any action against the political system introduced after the 1969 coup.  
 
The People’s Committees’ decisions regarding appointments always required the consent of 
the RCC. Popular elections were held at different levels - local, municipal, and provincial - 
with representatives of committees elected to municipal and provincial committees; at the 
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 Qaddafi wanted to reactivate them whenever it was required to do so to control the people. 
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same time elections were also held in most public corporations and select government bodies. 
The creation of the People’s Committees was very important for the development of the 
Libyan political system because they took on local administrative functions, and generally 
their chairmen became the chief administrative officials for their bodies (St John, 2011:58). 
On 2 March 1979, Qaddafi decided to increase his participation in revolutionary activities 
and to resign from his position as Secretary General of the General People’s Congress (GPC). 
At this time Qaddafi was mostly referred to as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, 
but later he adopted a new title – the Leader, or the Leader of the Revolution. In March 1979, 
a mass campaign was initiated calling for the elimination of all opponents of the new Libyan 
Revolution. Revolutionary zealots inspired by Qaddafi responded to this by launching a 
campaign of political assassinations, provoking the killing of more than thirty opponents of 
the Libyan regime. On 1 September 1979, Qaddafi encouraged Libyans abroad to take over 
Libyan embassies and to transform them into People’s bureaus,127 spreading confusion in 
diplomatic circles when the ambassadors were replaced by People’s Committees (St John, 
2011:64).
128
 Despite the existence of various committees, the Libyan state system remained 
fragile and completely dependent on the direct orders of Qaddafi. Even the Revolutionary 
Committees were totally dependent on Qaddafi’s fate; indeed, they were never expected to 
have a determinant role, being merely instruments to enable Qaddafi, the “revolutionary 
guide and protector”, to hold onto the power. 
El-Khikhia argued that the decentralised system of ‘direct democracy’ created by Qaddafi 
over the post-revolutionary period was not appropriate, and that it was almost impossible for 
Qaddafi to reform his political system without the whole structure collapsing. On several 
occasions Qaddafi acknowledged that the Third International Theory, as promulgated in 
1977, despite “being a well sound theory”, was difficult to implement. In addition, Qaddafi 
often described what happened after the 1969 revolution as being an experiment. Indeed, he 
often said that history would show whether his policies were achievements or failures (El-
Kikhia, 1997:60). 
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 People’s Bureaus was the term used to replace the Libyan Embassies. 
128 Qaddafi argued that the embassies represented governmental bodies and the governmental system in Libya 
had been replaced by people’s power.  
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As observed by Mattes (2008), the nature of the political system inside Libya affected the 
informal character of Libya, and during the first eight years after the 1969 coup, the 
institutions formed were based on the Provisional Constitutional Declaration of December 11, 
1969. However, substantial changes appeared in 1977 and as underlined by Mattes: 
None of the country’s central political personalities have been 
constitutionally defined. Their existence is based purely on their 
revolutionary legitimacy. Actors like the Free Unionist Officers Movement, 
the revolutionary committees, the forum of the Companions of Qaddafi, or 
the Social People’s Leadership Committees have internal status, but they 
were not created as the result of actual legislation. In addition, the existing 
legislative and executive organs of the state have no constitutional basis in 
the Jamahiriya (Mattes, 2008:55).  
Furthermore, the establishment of the Authority of the People in March 1977 was considered 
the basis of the political system in Libya. 
The people’s direct democracy is the basis of the political system in the 
socialist people’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, where the authority is in the 
hands of people alone. The people exercise their authority through the 
people’s congresses, the people’s committees and the professional unions 
(Mattes, 2008:56). 
The schedules and the meetings of the congress, committees and professional union were 
maintained by law. This form of structure was entitled Direct Democracy, and came into 
effect in March 1977. It created unique state institutions, with the People’s Congresses 
functioning as the legislature, and the People’s Committees functioning as the executive. 
The People’s Committees and Congresses were the main features in the Green Book and a 
core part of Qaddafi’s ideology. 
Qaddafi regarded the election process as a method which could not fulfil the wishes of the 
citizenry. He maintained that governance by a party or someone who won with only a 51% 
majority was a form of dictatorship. Qaddafi transformed the ‘Jamahiriya’ into a state 
governed by the people alone through public participation, and changed the official name of 
the country from Libya to the ‘the Great Socialist People’s Arab Jamahiriya’. This name 
implied that Libyan citizens could have some control over decision-making (Kwaczynski, 
2011:25-26). In fact, Qaddafi often criticised conventional democracies in his speeches and 
statements, doing this as a means of diverting domestic opinion away from demanding proper 
democratic elections.  
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Although there had been no political party system in Libya even under the monarchy, after 
Qaddafi came to power the state ideology disapproved even more of the party system, and all 
unauthorised political parties or political activities were considered illegal and faced severe 
punishment. Qaddafi tried to fill the vacuum established by this move by setting up a loose 
political structure for a state without a formal government; his own position as the leader of 
the Revolution being justified on the basis of revolutionary legitimacy. This notion was used 
for years by the Revolutionary Committees to justify Qaddafi’s role and actions, although in 
essence it contradicts the concept of the Green Book. Qaddafi’s involvement in almost all 
decisions taken led to criticism from various people in Libya, and concern was expressed that 
he founded a political system in which he had no official role, but of which in practice, he 
was the country’s major decision-maker (Obeidi, 2001).  
 
3.3.1 Foreign Policy-making in Libya 
 
The discovery of oil in Libya created the conditions where various groups in Libya believed 
they had a real opportunity to overthrow the old king and take over the destiny of the country. 
Qaddafi, then only a young military officer, was among them. After succeeding in his coup, 
Qaddafi realised that in order to maintain his power and his position, it was essential to 
control the oil revenues, since the income from these natural resources would allow him to 
finance a determined, aggressive foreign policy, possible because the country no longer 
depended on income from foreign bases. Qaddafi did use the oil revenues extensively to try 
to achieve his ideological objectives - the Islamic one, the Pan-Arabist one, and the 
opposition of Western interests symbolised by the United States, or colonialism. 
 
In fact, colonialism was an important factor shaping Qaddafi’s political views towards the 
West.
129
 One of the basic tenets of his views was his perception of colonialism. As Takeyh 
(2001:63) put it, “Qaddafi came of age during the 1960s, as Libya and much of the 
developing world battled to escape imperial domination. This bitter struggle against 
colonialism shaped Qaddafi’s political philosophy, infusing him with a deep suspicion of the 
West”. Takeyh’s suggestion about the origin of Qaddafi’s resentment towards the West is 
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 Colonialism has often been the focus of Qaddafi; he attacked colonialism many times, and maintained that 
there existed a new form of colonialism, by which he meant that Libya’s independence was not fully realised 
because of the remaining Western military bases inside the country. 
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plausible. However, to the suspicion of the West felt by Qaddafi and his companions it is 
possible to add other elements, related to foreign and security policies.  
 
Even after the withdrawal of the US and British military bases, Qaddafi continued to criticise 
Western policies in the Middle East. Suspicious of colonialism, Libya tried to conduct a 
foreign policy independent of the rules of the Cold War imposed by the two superpowers, in 
its own region. In the early 1970s, Qaddafi disputed the presence of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) on Maltese territory since he believed this could have had a direct 
influence in the region. However, Libya’s attempt to halt the negotiations between NATO 
and the Maltese government was unsuccessful (St John, 2002:94). 
 
Qaddafi was crucially involved in the articulation of Libya’s foreign policy. Despite the 
existence of various state institutions and organisations through which foreign policy is 
formulated and conducted, the final word in all decisions remained Qaddafi’s alone. Libyan 
policies aimed to radically change the direction taken by the previous monarchy in regional 
and international politics. The country’s international behaviour derived purely from the 
ideology and Qaddafi’s beliefs which were rooted in the recollection of Libya’s bitter 
colonial past, and in the impact of the 1956 war of the Suez and the different wars of 
independence in Africa in the 1960s. Qaddafi closely followed the struggles of Egypt under 
Nasser against Israel, France, and the United Kingdom, believing that colonial powers such 
as Italy and France had brought devastation to the region (Simons, 1996:263–274; Deeb, 
1991:5; St. John, 2002:4). El-Warfally (1988:45) maintains that the underlying ideology 
could shed some light on ambiguous policies, which were seen as unexplained and puzzling 
at the time.  
 
Qaddafi’s ideology was seen as the cornerstone of the revolution; it was nationalistic in 
nature, emphasising the zeal of Arab nationalism and seeking to unify Arab states. Qaddafi’s 
role in policy formulation was long and dominant, both internally and externally. He operated 
within an environment that was created in order to produce and facilitate the articulation of 
foreign policy.  In addition, this environment was intentionally diversified, consisting of both 
formal (e.g. government officials and General Secretariats, People Congress Affairs, and so 
on), and informal elements (e.g. tribes, and Qaddafi’s companions). Referring to the 
environment, Joffé and Pioletta underlined that “it must be integrated with the personalised 
dimension of policy formation in Libya” (Joffé and Paoletti, 2010:3). 
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The decision-making process was laborious because all decisions were based on two 
components, one pragmatic (when it comes to dealing with Western countries), and the other 
ideological (when dealing with Arab, African, and Latin American countries). However, what 
makes the Libyan case unique, was the fact that such a decision-making process was 
produced by one mind, Qaddafi’s. Therefore, this might suggest that that policy formulation 
in Libya was a combination of various practical and theoretical elements. For example, 
Libya, like Cuba and Venezuela, was under the influence of a charismatic leader, who 
determined policies neglecting the role of official channels. However, Qaddafi used both his 
experience in power and his rhetoric in order to gain complete control over the political 
scene, despite the presence of various mediatory functions (Joffé and Paoletti, 2010:3). 
 
Libyan embassies were run by zealous people guided by revolutionary inclinations, and 
instead of being entitled ‘embassy’ as is conventional for diplomatic institutions, they were 
called “Peoples’ Bureaus” and functioned in a peculiar way. Revolutionary Committees 
supplemented ministries and embassies, and played a key role in articulating the foreign 
policy process. Other formal institutions besides the Revolutionary Committee members were 
the External Security services. These changes resulted in the alteration of People’s Bureau 
objectives and behaviour (Vandewalle, 1995:28).  Indeed, St John argues that in the 1980s, 
these External Security services represented the key instrument to “eliminate the stray dogs 
of the revolution” outside Libya, while the domestic arena was under the strict control of the 
Revolutionary Committees (St John, 2008:169). The existence and behaviours of such formal 
actors did raise serious concerns at the international level, culminating with the breach of 
diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, following the shooting of a British Police 
officer outside the Libyan Embassy in 1984. 
Libyan foreign policy was not as simple as it is generally assumed, and greater scrutiny 
allows for a more accurate idea about how the decisions were taken, and which patterns they 
took, to be gained. For instance, although the final decision always remained Qaddafi’s, the 
informal process to reach such decision often involved formal and informal advisers, 
recruited according to the issue discussed. The group of advisers formed according to the 
circumstances, was temporary, and once the question of interest had been covered and the 
requested policies decided upon, the group was dissolved, although not permanently, in case 
of the need to reconsider the topic.   
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An interesting observation to make here is the minimum role given to the General People’s 
Congress, which acted as the equivalent of a parliament in conventional democracies, but 
which was called only twice a year. It is difficult under these circumstances to devise the 
foreign policy of a country. Moreover, the importance of individuals in the Libyan Foreign 
Ministry was not based on their hierarchical position in the institution, but rather on their 
relationships with those in the circle of power. Indeed, there were cases where a low ranking 
person had more influence on policy-making than his superiors because of this factor. Joffé 
and Paoletti give examples where “vice ministers might outshine their ministerial superiors 
who may just be executors of policy, not originators” (Joffé and Paoletti, 2010:16). 
 
According to Deeb (1991:9), Libya’s foreign policy was driven by national interests with an 
emphasis on security matters when it operated within its immediate periphery. When foreign 
policy operated further afield it was driven more by ideology and pragmatism (see Figure 
3.2). Deeb suggests that ideology and pragmatism played a major role in Libya’s global 
foreign policy. Soloman and Swart (2005) supported Deeb’s opinion, questioning Qaddafi’s 
decision to support Ethiopia, a non-Arab and Christian country against Sudan, a Muslim 
country and member of the Arab League (Soloman and Swart, 2005:470). Such a policy 
symbolised the priority given to national and security interests. Another case was the support 
for a non-Arab country, Iran, in its war against an Arab country, Iraq. This confirmed 
Qaddafi’s preference for the revolutionary ideology over pan-Arabism. And his further 
support for the Iraqi Kurds over the Baathist government was another indication of Qaddafi’s 
conception of foreign policy (Pargeter, 2012:124).  Qaddafi’s foreign policy can be illustrated 
through five concentric circles, each one containing both a number of countries and the 
relevant policies for each of them. 
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A Concentric View of Libyan Foreign policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Diversity of Libyan Foreign Policies 
 
As one moves from the inner circles towards the outer ones, a large number of countries is 
included, and the content of Qaddafi’s policies appears to be more diffuse and more 
ideological. 
 
 
 
 
5 Pragmatism and Ideological Fervour (The Western and Eastern blocs 
pre-1989) 
4 Revolutionary Socialism towards the Third World 
3 Islamic Ideology towards the Arab and Islamic 
Countries 
2 Arab Nationalist Ideology 
1 National Interest (primarily) 
Ideological Considerations 
(secondary) 
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3.3.2 A Review of Libya’s Foreign and Security Policies  
According to Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2002), the “foreign policies of Middle Eastern 
States, rooted in state elites’ desire to defend their regimes, aim not just at deterrence of fear 
of outside threats, but also legitimating the regime at home against domestic opposition and 
mobilising economic resources abroad” (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002:15). Libya 
certainly exemplified one of those states in the region, and its foreign policy was not very 
different from other regional states in matters of security, Arab nationalism, and the 
perception of outside threats. 
Niblock (2002), in his study of Libyan foreign policy, suggests other foreign policy actors 
apart from Qaddafi. Firstly, there was a close circle of powerful individuals, known in Libya 
as Rijal al-khaimah or ‘men of the tent’, with whom Qaddafi reviewed and debated his policy 
positions. These individuals were largely members of the Free Unionist Movement in the 
early years of the Revolution, and of the revolutionary youth in the late years of the 1970s. 
The young revolutionary generation helped Qaddafi’s transformation of the social and 
economic situation. The Revolutionary Committees were established in 1977, although their 
role was restricted after 1988. That said, the old leadership stayed close to the Qaddafi circle. 
As noted by Niblock, Qaddafi’s family, specifically those who occupied high-ranking posts 
in the security services, increasingly took on advisory roles.  
The same author identifies three durable factors that determined Libyan foreign policy, and 
that still remain today as important influences. The first is the country’s economic base 
formed by oil exports which began in 1961. Oil, as the country’s main export, represents a 
powerful instrument in Libyan foreign policy interests and ideological objectives. It also 
makes the country attractive and vulnerable to outside threats. Oil producing countries tend to 
maintain close relations with strong powers that have an interest in the upkeep of the 
regime.
130
 The second factor is the country’s culture and geographic location. 
Geographically, Libyan cities are separated by vast distances, but Libyans share many aspects 
of social life, such as the Arab culture, language, and religion. The third factor is the 
country’s strategic location within the Arab World, Africa, and the Mediterranean. 
Consequently, it is involved with a large surrounding region with no option but to interact, 
whether by reacting to circumstances, or by proactive measures (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 
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 A similar course of foreign policy had been followed by the monarchy regime that chose to maintain strong 
relations with Western powers to protect itself from perceived threats of communism and Nasser’s radicalism in 
the region.   
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2002:214-217). As regards to Libya’s policy in Africa, this was also on the revolutionary 
regime’s agenda, and consequently, various African movements such as the African National 
Congress, and the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara, found support from the regime. 
Qaddafi convinced some African leaders to cut their ties with Israel, and in this matter Joffe 
notes that, by 1973, 20 African countries severed these ties, which were reinstated a decade 
later (Joffé, 2005: 608). The regime’s polices during the first decade of Qaddafi’s rule 
towards the regional actors were fuelled by leadership of the Arab world and competition 
between the leaders. In some cases, this competition transformed to military clashes. For 
instance Egypt, the powerful neighbour of Libya, represented a real challenge to Qaddafi’s 
regime, in particular in the early 1970s. The sudden death of the Egyptian president Nasser, 
the leader of Arab nationalism, brought Sadat to power, and the relations between the two 
countries deteriorated, culminating in 1977 in an armed conflict on the border. 
Libya supported the Southern rebellion movements in Sudan, and in retaliation Sudan 
welcomed dissidents and opposition movements in Khartoum. Qaddafi’s worries about being 
encircled by both Egypt and Sudan in the aftermath of the 1977 mini-war proved to be well-
founded, since effectively, Egypt and Sudan used Chad as a platform in order to deflect the 
early confrontation on their grounds, and with the assistance of France, they supported Chad 
in its long conflict with Libya which ended in the defeat of the Libyan army which found 
itself threatened precisely because of Qaddafi’s policies. Both countries were accommodating 
opposition movements to Qaddafi’s regime. In one instance, Libya bombed a radio station in 
Khartoum because it was broadcasting news against Qaddafi (Waller, 1999:242).  
Libya’s interference in African conflicts in the 1970s continued throughout the 1980s, 
provoking tensions between Libya and the governments of many African states. For instance, 
during the hearing of the Special Court in Sierra Leone, Libya was often mentioned and 
accused of supporting plots against the governments of West Africa, and of being responsible 
for the various wars of that particular period. In addition, it was alleged that Libya supported 
military coups against Niger’s government, in 1976, and that Qaddafi’s animosity towards 
Mobutu prompted him to support an attempt to overthrow Zaire’s president in the mid-1980s. 
In the same period, Ghana and Gambia complained about Libya’s meddling in their 
politics.
131
 Soloman and Swart claimed that Libya also supported several opposition 
movements and rebels in various countries such as Tunisia, Sudan, Mauritania, Mali, Chad, 
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  Several attempts against the governments of these two countries would not have been possible without the 
support of Colonel Qaddafi’s regime. 
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and other African countries, in their attempts to overthrow their governments (Solomon and 
Swart, 2005:472).
132
 
On the other hand, as was reported in the London-based Arab newspaper Al-hayat, Libya 
helped countries such as Uganda. Ali Treki, Libya’s ex-foreign minister, interviewed by 
Sharbil, a journalist from Al-hayat, confirmed that Qaddafi provided both financial and 
material support to President Idi Amin, who under the influence of the Libyan regime, cut his 
diplomatic relations with Israel. In another circumstance, during the conflict between Uganda 
and Tanzania, Qaddafi again stood by Idi Amin and sent him Libyan forces to counter his 
opponents’ attack.133 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the issue of security was a major factor in Libya’s 
behaviour towards states in its immediate periphery. However, a secondary role was played 
by ideology when dealing with issues away from Libyan territory. Libya did not restrict its 
involvement outside its domestic borders to the African continent only, since its radical 
activism was also directed towards Europe and the US. For instance, Libya was allegedly 
linked with the assassination of the American ambassador of Sudan in 1973, and the 
massacre of the Israeli athletes in Munich in 1972.
134
 
 
The death of Nasser was deeply felt in the Arab World, so when Qaddafi appeared on the 
scene, his rhetoric and speeches gave hope to many different Arab countries. He used 
sensitive issues which he knew would have an effect on the minds of Middle Eastern and 
North African people, such as the fight against colonialism, imperialism, and the Palestinian 
issue. According to Anderson (1982:523), “Qaddafi had managed to convince his foreign 
supporters and detractors alike that he was a significant regional if not international power”. 
However, it can be argued that the opposite was in fact the case, since Arab rulers soon 
realised that Qaddafi was only offering false and empty promises. Anderson gave to Qaddafi 
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 Libya backed dissidents in different states such as Sudan, Somalia, Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, and 
Tunisia. 
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 In 1972, the former president of Uganda, Obote, who took refuge in Tanzania, tried to regain the control of 
the country with thousands of Ugandan refugees. However, the exiles failed to invade Uganda and remove 
Amin, who benefitted from Qaddafi’s support. Amin blamed Tanzania’s leader Nyerere for the attack and for 
helping his enemies. As a result the relationship between Uganda and Tanzania remained strained for many 
years. See Mambo and Schofield (2007). 
134
 Up to the present time there has been no recorded evidence of the involvement of the Libyan regime in the 
Munich 1972 murders. 
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an undeserved aura, and in July 1977, his regime was unable to prevent Egyptian forces from 
violating Libya’s territorial sovereignty. 
Qaddafi did not limit his international ambitions only to the Arab World or to Africa. In order 
to achieve his aims, he was ready to use all means, including supporting terrorism worldwide. 
As mentioned earlier, Qaddafi backed and financed numerous movements beyond Libya’s 
sphere (i.e. IRA, Sulu Archipelago, Lebanese fractions, Philippine, Polisario, and Nicaragua). 
The support given to these movements was unconditional due to Qaddafi’s ideological 
conviction.
135
 However, Libya’s international adventures and support for various movements 
did not bring substantial results on the ground. On the contrary, it considerably damaged the 
reputation of Qaddafi’s regime. The first official link between Libya and terrorism was made 
by the CIA in 1976, with the publication of a report in which Libya was described as “one of 
the world’s least inhibited practitioners of international terrorism” (Jentleson and Whytock, 
2005:56). The CIA report in 1976 was based on the Qaddafi regime’s policies and actions. 
The US had used several instruments such as diplomatic, economic, and military actions to 
punish the regime. These stringent measures were intended to compel Qaddafi to cease his 
support for international terrorism, and stop his irresponsible adventures in various countries.  
 To sum up this section, it can be said that a state which operates on idiosyncratic principles, 
such as those in evidence in Libya during the Qaddafi regime, attract negative opinion from 
the outside world, and previous American administrations were quick to condemn Libya as a 
‘rogue state’ or ‘axis of evil’, outlaw, and a state ‘of concern’. ‘Rogue’ is defined in the 
Oxford dictionary as ‘behaving badly, dishonestly or differently’. The essence of the 
definition of ‘Rogue’ is that anyone to whom this term is applied may not respect values that 
are upheld by the international community. These values are respect for human rights, 
moderate behaviour among others, not inciting violence and terrorism, and respect for 
international institutions. A person or state who bears this label may also pose a significant 
threat to world peace and security.  
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 It can be said that Qaddafi was a strong believer in Machiavelli’s statement, according to which “the ends 
justify the means”.  
 111 
3.3.3 Conventional Military Build-up after the Revolution 
 
Before Qaddafi’s coup in 1969, the Libyan monarchy depended entirely on Britain for its 
purchase of armaments. For instance, the major arms contracts signed between King Idris and 
the British consisted of the installation of a complete missile air defence system in Libya and 
a £150 million contract for the delivery of Chieftain Tanks from Britain. For ideological 
reasons (Libya moved closer to Egypt and to pan-Arabism), Qaddafi’s regime cancelled the 
first contract but insisted on receiving the tanks purchased in the second (Lutterbeck, 
2009:508).  
 
However, in 1969, and in order to be less dependent on one particular power, Libya secured 
military assistance from France by negotiating one of biggest single armament deals 
estimated at $400 million (Deeb, 1991:55). This assistance took the form of one hundred 
Mirage jet fighters, including fifty Mirage 5s, thirty Mirage III-Es for the purpose of 
interception, and twenty Mirages for training purposes. The delivery took three years, from 
1971 to 1974. The United States and Israel condemned this deal between France and Libya 
(Deeb, 1991:54). Kolodziej stated that at the period of the deal, the French were heavily 
dependent on Libyan oil (17.4% in 1970 contrasted with 2% in 1977), so the arms deal with 
Libya covered around $400 million of its oil imports from that country (Kolodziej, 1980:63). 
Moreover, during the first decade of Qaddafi’s rule, Libya spent $22 billion on arms 
purchases. The Soviet Union exported military equipment to Libya worth more than $18 
billion alone. Despite the fact that there were different ideologies between the Soviet Union 
and Libya, the Soviet Union was Libya’s main arms provider, followed by France and Italy 
(Lutterbeck, 2009:507&508).
136
 
 
The Libyan military capacity was intensely expanded after the 1969 Revolution, in several 
sectors within the military institution. According to St John, Libya’s military expenses were 
among the highest in the developing world, and the armed forces grew in size quickly. The 
military was viewed as symbolic during the monarchy regime, and did not have a strong 
influence because the regime relied heavily on its Western alliances (St John, 1987:137). 
Soon after the revolution, however, Libya began to renovate its military institutions and 
expand its military capabilities. Hard currency from oil revenues made Libya a very active 
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Libya was one of the highest arms buyers based on a per capita calculation. 
 112 
customer in military expenditure, with almost $2 billion a year being spent on military 
purchases in the first few years. According to a report from the Institute for International 
Strategic Studies (IISS), Libya’s military capability in the early years was composed of 
73,000 military personnel and 535 combat aircraft (Schumacher, 1986–1987:333). From 
1973 until 1983, Libya spent approximately $28 billion on armaments. Mattes notes that prior 
to the 1969 Revolution, the army consisted of 7,000 members, but in the years after Qaddafi 
came to power, the army grew rapidly to reach 55,000 members in 1982 (Mattes, 2004:1-3).  
 
Although Qaddafi was critical of the United States and the Soviet Union, he was willing to 
import military equipment from both these powers, as well as from other countries. Libya did 
not rely on specific arms suppliers, but rather used various states including Italy and France. 
In the aftermath of the evacuation of their military bases and Libya’s aggressive behaviour, 
the United States and Britain did not provide military assistance as the regime requested; they 
were cautious about Libya’s new policies regarding the West, and they therefore provided 
only limited arms assistance (Lutterbeck, 2009:508). It is essential to underline that when 
Qaddafi came into power he ensured the Americans that their oil companies would not lose 
their privileges, neither would they be nationalised.  
 
It is worth noting that due to the Cold War imperatives and security concerns, Libya 
attempted to acquire nonconventional military capability. Qaddafi sought to acquire nuclear 
weapons shortly after he came to power, in order to strengthen Libya’s military capability 
and enhance its security. The initial efforts to obtain readymade nuclear weapons from 
various countries, such as China between 1969-71, France in 1976, India in 1978 and the 
Soviet Union in mid 1970s, all the regime’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons ended in 
failure (Bowen, 2006:8). As will be discussed in greater details in the next chapter, Qaddafi 
regime did not spare any efforts to pursue nuclear weapons capability from different 
countries and sources including the black market. 
 
In the coming sections, light is shed on the most important elements affecting Libya’s 
political trajectory in the aftermath of 1969 until 1981. Several factors are highlighted and the 
most significant ones are discussed.  
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3.4 Factors Affecting Libyan Foreign and Security Policies from 1969 until 
1981 
In this section, all the factors which influenced Libya’s foreign and security policies (since 
Qaddafi and his companions seized power in 1969 until 1981) are raised. As discussed in the 
theoretical framework, there are several influences - domestic, regional, and international - 
that affected post-1969 Libyan politics. Indeed, after the end of the reign of King Idris, 
Libya’s international relations shifted from being friendly and peaceful, to being hostile and 
confrontational, reflecting a radical state with a defiant posture. Qaddafi and his companions 
altered Libya’s political orientation, allying the country with powerful states and adopting a 
similar ideology to its regional neighbours (i.e. Egypt, Iraq, and Syria). Moreover, the young 
political leadership of the Libyan regime had, from the early years, been antagonistic towards 
several countries. However, before embarking in analysing these factors it is important to 
analyse the historical context and its relation with the puzzle of this study. 
 
On 1 September 1969, the Free Unionist Officers Movement (a small group of Libyan army 
officers) carried out a coup d’état against the monarchy,137 took over the reins of power and 
began a radical reorientation of the domestic and foreign policy of Libya. The movement was 
led by a twelve-man central committee which presented itself as the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC). The Council’s first statement was the proclamation of the Republic, issued 
on 1 September 1969, and the denunciation of the fallen monarchy. The members promised 
the Libyan people a radical change in both socio-economic and political systems. In fact, the 
sceptical statements made by Colonel Qaddafi, the coup’s leader, concerning the usefulness 
of a modern state were merely public enunciations of what the Libyan people already thought 
(Vandewalle, 2006:79). 
In the first address to the Libyan people, Qaddafi announced that the monarchical era was 
over and that the new Libyan Arab Republic was born. “People of Libya! Your armed forces 
have undertaken the overthrow of the corrupt regime, the stench of which has sickened and 
horrified us all” (part of the speech made on 16 September 1969). During that same speech, 
Qaddafi made several historical allusions such as the following one: “By a single stuck the 
army has lightened the long dark night in which the Turkish domination was followed by 
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 The lack of support for King Idris when the coup occurred made their mission all too easy. 
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Italian rule, and then by this reactionary and decadent regime, which was no more than a 
hotbed of extortion, factions, treachery, and treason”. He announced to the Libyans the 
coming of a new era “where all will be free, brothers within a society in which, with God’s 
help, prosperity, and equality will be seen to rule us all” (Bianco, 1975:67& 68)      
The person who pronounced these famous words was the new ruler of the 1969 coup. A 
native from Sirte, Qaddafi was in his twenties when, with his companions, overthrew the 
Libyan monarchy.
138
 As a son of a Bedouin family, his early education was a mixture of 
traditional religious subjects, and then his elementary education took place at one of the 
schools in Sirte. Thereafter, his family moved to Sebha in the south of Libya. At Sebha he 
began his secondary education, most of his teachers coming from Egypt. In this city Qaddafi 
had access to a range of materials, including books, newspapers, and radio. Since his youth 
Qaddafi had been a political activist and a harsh critic of the monarchy (Blundy and Lycett, 
1987). Regarding the impact of Qaddafi’s education as a student at the Sebha School on 
Libya’s revolution, Blundy and Lycett (1987:39) noted: “If the Libyan revolution has a 
starting point, it is in the classroom of the Sebha school”.   
 
During his years at Sebha School, Qaddafi organised demonstrations opposing King Idris’ 
policies and blaming the monarch for his refusal to provide assistance to Nasser in the 1956 
Suez War. In fact, Qaddafi was expelled from Sebha School due to his political activism 
against King Idris. Thereafter, Qaddafi moved to another school in Misurata, where he 
formed a covert cell in order to organise a revolutionary change. Later, with the creation of 
other cells, Qaddafi suggested to his comrades that they join the army, not for pure military 
ambition but to use it as a tool to effect political change. Another significant and powerful 
figure close to Qaddafi was his right hand man Abdel Salam Jalloud, who was a friend, a 
companion and a supporter of Qaddafi for more than two decades (Cooley, 1982).
139
  
 
After his graduation from Misurata High School in 1963, Qaddafi joined the military college, 
together with his colleagues, and this marked the beginning of the Free Officers Movement. 
Qaddafi’s aim in the Benghazi Military Academy was not to have a successful military career 
but to use the army to achieve his political objectives, as shown in his statement that “several 
of my fellow revolutionaries studied with me. When we decided to go to the academy, it was 
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 Qaddafi was born at Sirte in 1943. 
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 Jalloud, initially wanted to study medicine, but was later convinced to join the military college along with 
others by Qaddafi.  
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not because we wanted to become professional soldiers but because we wanted to infiltrate 
the institution and prepare for the revolution” (Oakes, 2011:122). Qaddafi spent more time 
than his colleagues in the military academy because he had to resit some examinations. One 
of the British military trainers in Benghazi, Ted Lough, recalled that Qaddafi was very cruel 
and complicated to deal with, and that he was not making as good progress as the other cadets 
in the military academy. Reports were often sent to British diplomats in both Tripoli and 
Benghazi regarding unrest and disorder among the military personnel in the academy. 
According to Oakes (2011), the British Embassy was anticipating some kind of conspiracy 
against King Idris but the suspicion rested on a much more powerful figure, that being the 
Army Chief of Staff, Aziz al Shelhi (Oakes, 2011:122-124).  
 
Qaddafi and his companions graduated from the military academy college in 1966 and some 
of them were sent abroad for further training. Qaddafi himself joined Beaconsfield in Britain, 
where he completed a nine-month training course with the signal corps (Cooley, 1982). The 
military gave Qaddafi and his colleagues an opportunity to organise themselves, and recruit 
and form cells to execute their coup, which they did in a very smart way. The group also 
called themselves the Free Officers Movement, the same name used by Nasser in the coup of 
1952. Every member in the Free Officers Movement formed his own cell, recruiting civilians 
as well as soldiers from their cities. According to Oakes (2011:124), using the cell system 
was vital for disciplined army members. Communication was only through the leader of each 
cell, and the members did not know each other except the heads of the cells. Meetings and 
discussions between the conspirators were easier at the military academy than when they 
were stationed in different posts, since communications were complicated then due to the 
distance from each other. In their spare time, the conspirators formed loyalties and recruited 
friends. Qaddafi was confident that he would not be betrayed by his colleagues because they 
had the same goal which was to topple King Idris’ regime (Simons, 1996:173). 
 
The success of the 1969 coup might be explained by events leading up to that year during 
which useful preparations were made for communication during the event. Specifically, in 
1964, Qaddafi joined the Libyan army’s signal unit in Benghazi (Simons, 1996:174). It can 
be underlined here that communication was a crucial element in the plan of the Free Officers, 
who intended to be able to eventually subvert the communication network, especially 
between the high commanders loyal to King Idris. Later the main Libyan army’s signal centre 
in Benghazi was taken over by Qaddafi, who soon ordered sophisticated communication 
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devices for his unit. Additionally, he had direct access to codes and ciphers which enabled 
him to communicate with all army units wherever they were on Libyan territory (Oakes, 
2011:125).   
 
Qaddafi was particularly influenced by Nasser’s speeches broadcast by the Egyptian national 
radio. In fact, Blundy and Lycett report that Qaddafi learned Nasser’s speeches by heart and 
used to recite them to his schoolmates. Another source of influence on the young Qaddafi 
was Nasser’s book ‘The Philosophy of the Revolution’, which explains how Nasser shaped a 
cell composed of military officers and conducted a coup against the Egyptian monarchy in 
1952 (Blundy and Lycett, 1987:41). Egypt, and Nasser in particular, were significant 
inspirations to a whole generation of young Libyans during the monarchy; Nasser raised 
awareness of Arab Unity and contributed to the strength of feeling in Libya which was 
opposed to King Idris’ government. 
 
In terms of the instruments for governing once the revolution succeeded, according to Hervé 
Bleuchot (1982), Qaddafi and the RCC did not have anything ready when they made the 1969 
coup. The author underlines the fact that “[i]nitially he [Qaddafi] had nothing new to propose 
in the institutional field, and the provisional constitution of 11 December 1969 was a just a 
copy from the Egyptian constitution” (Bleuchot, 1982:141). In addition to reiterating the 
same slogans, “Liberty, Socialism and Unity”, which were borrowed from the charismatic 
Nasser, Qaddafi wanted to be seen as the champion of Islam, without adhering to the thought 
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, who did not put nationalism or Arabism as priorities 
(Bleuchot, 1982:141).  
 
Mohammed H Heikal (1975) believes that the two influences in Qaddafi’s life were the army 
and the desert. It was in the army that he first really found himself, but it was to the desert 
that he would return for solace (Heikal, 1975:185). The desert had a big impact on Qaddafi 
who, referring to his early age living as a Bedouin said: 
It was difficult in terms of the circumstances and the environment under 
which I lived. Bedouin life is mobile; the strictness of upbringing therefore 
comes from the severity of these circumstances. But socially I was free. We 
were Bedouins enjoying full freedom, and we lived amongst nature and 
everything was absolutely pure, in its true self, in front of us. We lived on 
the land and there was nothing between us and the sky. Bedouin society 
made me discover the natural laws, natural relationships, life in its true 
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nature and what suffering was like before life knew oppression, coercion 
and exploitation (Berween, 2003:50). 
 
In one of the early statements regarding their identity, the coup makers declared that their 
intentions were to faithfully follow the aims elicited in the Nasserist slogan; “Freedom, 
Socialism and Unity”. Such a slogan affiliated them with the eponymous Nasser rather than 
with the Baathists, whose slogan was “Unity, Socialism and Freedom”.140 Despite the 
similarity of the slogans, the orders in which the aspirations are listed signify not only 
different perspectives but also an ideological split. Nasser argued, quite rightly according to 
the present researcher, that unity cannot be achieved in the absence of freedom. So, Qaddafi 
and his companions espoused Nasser’s ideology and in doing so they distanced themselves 
from the Baathist camp (Heikal, 1975:67).  
 
In the regional arena, between 1950 and 1978, several attempts to unite Arab states were 
made. All failed, the only concrete unity was between 1958 and 1961, when there was a brief 
union between Syria and Egypt under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser. In 1963 the 
attempt to unify Syria, Egypt, and Iraq was unsuccessful. After the death of Nasser in 1970, 
and on 1 January 1972, a federation was proclaimed for the unity of Libya, Syria, Egypt and 
Sudan, but there were no practical effects thereafter (Choueiri, 2000:166–167). 
 
In terms of the preponderant ideologies of that period, it is important to mention first, 
‘Nasserism’ which started as a movement for Egyptian national liberation, and gradually 
moved towards espousing Arab unity and finally, Arab Socialism. Accordingly, after 1956, 
the links between ‘political’ and ‘social’ revolutions and the building of ‘a co-operative, 
democratic and socialist society’ were repeatedly stressed. Between February 1958 and 
September 1961, Nasserism was the sole political ideology in the United Arab Republic of 
Syria and Egypt. The year 1961 was officially the start of a new revolution in Egypt and the 
Arab nationalist movements at large, which heralded the arrival of social revolution. 
Socialism had become an alternative system of economic development and political 
organisation in newly-emerging non-aligned developing countries, and this was particularly 
important because at that time both the Soviet Union and the US had their own ideologies 
when dealing with the Arab World (Choueiri, 2000:188–189191). 
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 Arabists who, in order to propagate their ideology, established a political party called Baath. 
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The other large movement representing Arabism was known as Baathism (when its 
proponents created a political party called Hizb al Baath’), representing the ideology of the 
Arab Baath party. This party was formally founded by two Damascene school teachers, 
Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Baytar, in 1947. It was also called the Socialist Baath Party 
after merging with the Arab Socialist Party. It recruited its members from students, workers, 
farmers and minorities, and later on it developed into a well-organised party. The Baath party 
extended from its base in Syria and reached Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Tunisia, and the 
Arab Peninsula, but although Baathism established itself in a small way in countries like 
Sudan, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, it did not have a strong presence in other countries until 
the 1970s. The Baath ideology is based on Arab unity, freedom and socialism, a philosophy 
which was espoused by various Arab parties (Choueiri, 2000:197 
 
3.4.1 Domestic Factors Affecting Libyan Behaviour 
Regarding the development in post-1969 Libya, Qaddafi, in his first major speech, attacked 
the existing social order, calling for a complete transformation of the social, economic, and 
political systems.
141
 He described the key themes of the ideology which the new 
Revolutionary Committee would go on to expand and develop in the future. Contrary to what 
has been discussed in the theoretical framework, concerning the significant role often played 
by domestic factors,
142
 the new Libyan military rulers were not inclined to allow the Libyan 
public to be major players. It is worth underlining that when Qaddafi came to power, many 
people rallied with him in the expectation of a new era. Effectively, Qaddafi and the new 
RCC were able to gain the support of various segments of Libyan society. This civilian 
support was of immense importance to Qaddafi and the RCC, who were backed by university 
graduates, government officials, students, and relatively low ranking military officers. In fact, 
all these people were dissatisfied with the policies of the government of King Idris.
143
   
The domestic scene in Libya did not have a substantial role during King Idris’ era and 
Qaddafi followed the same stance; he prevented the people from participating in Libya’s 
domestic politics. Banning domestic associations, unions, syndicates and political parties was 
the strategy adopted to weaken public involvement and strengthen Qaddafi’s own position. 
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Indeed, Qaddafi and the RCC believed that the existence of political parties would be 
threatening to their role and would jeopardise the new government led by Qaddafi. Moreover, 
granting such permission for political parties and unions was believed to leave the country 
exposed to partition (Mattes, 2007:61).   
Kwaczynski (2011) notes that Qaddafi’s 1973 Green Book was the main feature of 
‘statelessness’ in which there was a call for all citizens of Libya to avoid the trap of political 
parties and political representation. Political parties were seen in the Green Book as 
instruments which go against the interests of the Libyan and which might misguide naive and 
apolitical people. In addition, representatives of elected government were seen as 
manipulative. Qaddafi claimed in the Green Book that people should not leave power to the 
elected representatives but rather participate directly in decision-making. He was quite clear 
about the conventional political parties when he wrote in the Green Book that: “The purpose 
of forming a party is to create an instrument to rule the people”. For him, parties were 
“fundamentally, based on an arbitrary authoritarian concept” of domination by a few over the 
majority, and a pretext to have access to power, by claiming that they represent the people’s 
aspirations (Qaddafi, 1970:3).  
In domestic politics, the RCC was the top authority in Libya with the power of choosing the 
Council of Ministers. Consequently, most of the ministerial positions, occupied previously by 
civilians, became filled by military people, with the exception of the Oil Ministry because the 
RCC members themselves did not have enough experience to manage it. During that time, the 
army became a powerful actor, and many youths were encouraged to join (Vandewalle, 
2006:82). 
 
3.4.1.1 The Role of Ideology 
 
The Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), like most revolutionary regimes, 
blamed the previous regime for the country’s ills and, in order to legitimise its dismissal, 
exaggerated its level of corruption. The period in which Qaddafi came to power was quite 
exceptional, the world was divided between the two superpowers, and new ideologies 
appeared in the Arab World, mainly in Egypt, and Syria. While the 1952 coup in Egypt 
promoted Nasserism,
144
 in Syria, Arabist ideologists entered the political arena and founded 
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 Nasserism referring to the name of the new Egyptian leader, which was a form of Arabism. 
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the Baa’th party.145 Niblock suggests that Libyan foreign policy was created to reflect 
ideological purposes, specifically the interests of Arabs, Muslims, and Africans, which could 
only be achieved by independence (Niblock, 2002:213). 
 
The philosophy of the Baa’th, as well as Nasser’s Egypt, was based on three major concepts. 
The first was ‘Unity’ which meant uniting all the Arabs under the same banner. The second 
element was ‘Freedom’, relating to full independence from foreign powers and influence, and 
the third factor was the economic model to be adopted, ‘Socialism’. The revolutionary trinity 
of ‘Unity, Freedom and Socialism’ was adopted by the RCC. Therefore, it is clear that the 
early statements of the RCC were inspired by previous revolutionary movements and 
governments (St John, 1987:18).  
 
The ideological elements of freedom, socialism and unity were considered to be the basis of 
the revolution by Muammar Qaddafi (Obeidi, 2001:45).
146
 Heikal described this as an 
“ideological split” (Heikal, 1975:69), suggesting that Libya’s revolution was oriented towards 
Egypt and Nasser rather than the Baathists of Iraq and Syria.
147
 However, for El-Warfally, 
one of the core drivers of the 1969 Revolution was the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially after 
the defeat of the Arabs in June 1967 and the accusation of the Arabs that the United States 
and Britain had provided air support from military bases in Libya. This was what motivated 
the young army officers to execute a coup against the monarch’s regime (El-Warfally, 
1988:45). 
 
The principles of Nasserist Arab nationalism played a direct role in the theory of Libya’s 
stateless state, which developed during the first three years after Qaddafi seized power in 
September 1969. Therefore, those sources that informed the construction and operation of the 
Libyan political system also informed the intellectual project behind foreign policy. In 1973 
Colonel Qaddafi produced the Green Book, the document defining the ideology underlying 
the Libyan state; the Green Book emerged in stages, with the final version being completed in 
1976 (Joffé and Paoletti, 2010:5).  
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 The slogans articulated by the new regime were similar to those of other revolutionary regimes and 
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 The Syrian and Iraqi Baathists believed that unity comes before freedom. 
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Qaddafi’s ideological convictions were an important element in Libya’s politics and foreign 
policy. As Obeidi put it:  
Ideology is what the regime has based its political legitimacy on. Through 
ideology the new regime tried to overcome loyalty to the remnants of the 
monarch regime. The ideology of the new regime played a significant role 
in facilitating political mobilisation and in shaping foreign policy (Obeidi, 
2001:45). 
 
Article 1 of the 1969’s coup communiqué described Libya as part of the Arab nation and 
discussed the country’s commitment to comprehensive Arab unity, but it also recognised that 
Libya is part of Africa. In the 1970s, Libyan foreign policy began to stress pan-African unity, 
with additional elements borrowed from Islamic law. Following Arab nationalist leaders who 
succeeded in overthrowing monarchies,
148
 Qaddafi tactically anticipated support for a 
potential Islamist opposition and introduced more religious authority in his form of 
government. In fact, as soon as he took power he started a campaign of Islamisation aiming to 
add this to his pan-Arab socialist revolution. Qaddafi claimed that his revolution was 
compatible with Islamic values. However, Libyan religious scholars were sceptical about 
Qaddafi’s awkward interpretation of Islam (Pargeter, 2008:83-84). 
Joffé describes the way Qaddafi used religion to fulfil his own aspirations: “Islam became the 
vehicle through which Qadhafi attempted in his usual popular fashion to reject the old 
religious order and to justify his own ideological alternative” (Joffé, 1995:146).149 Article 1 
stated that Islam was the religion of the state, similarly to most Arab and Islamic countries. 
The rest of the articles in the first chapter covered Libyan socialism and the way governments 
operate. It can be underlined here that, although it underwent many changes, according to the 
circumstances, most of Qaddafi’s ideology remained the same (St John, 1987:18).  
To sum up, Qaddafi based Libya’s foreign policy on neutrality, non-alignment, and assistance 
for all liberation and freedom movements around the globe. Accordingly, he insisted on the 
removal of the US and British military bases from Libya in order to complete Libya’s 
freedom (Deeb, 1991). Additionally, the post-coup period witnessed support for various 
foreign movements, stretching from liberation movements in the region, such as Palestinian 
and Lebanese factions, and further beyond Libya’s sphere as far as the IRA. 
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Vandewalle, St Martin: New York.  
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An important note which should be underlined here is the fact that aspects such as ideology 
and identity can affect the choice of decision making, particularly foreign policy preferences. 
From this perspective, it is clear that constructivist accounts can be appropriate for explaining 
and understanding the behaviour of governments, even the dictatorial ones. It is evident from 
the discussion above that Qaddafi’s regime was influenced by Arabism, religion and 
liberation phenomenon. However and as will be seen in the next chapters, the realist approach 
is still more suitable when used to explain and understand the motivations of Libya’s 
nuclearisation and denuclearisation. 
 
3.4.1.2 The Role of Oil 
 
The significance of the economic sector was very important to Libya’s policy-makers. In fact, 
oil was, and remains, the most exported commodity from Libya; in 1963 the total export 
income from oil revenues reached 98.3% percent of all exports, and oil production has never 
fallen below 90% of export revenue. The income from this commodity goes directly to the 
state, which has a relatively small population compared with Egypt or Algeria, so Libya was 
able to maintain oil revenues and provide housing and welfare for its citizens (Niblock, 
2002:214). 
 
In 1969, when the RCC came to power, there were major disputes throughout the oil-
producing world concerning whether it was best to seek broader control through a strategy of 
greater participation with the oil companies, or to attempt outright nationalisation. At first 
Qaddafi’s government tried to implement the former strategy, but it met with no success so it 
moved to the latter. In the process, Libya strengthened its relations with Iran and Algeria. 
Furthermore, Libya had established continuing contacts with Algeria in order to take 
convergent decisions regarding oil policies (St John, 1987:108–109). 
 
When Qaddafi came to power, oil became a political tool to enhance Libya’s foreign policy 
objectives both regionally and internationally. There was a suspicion that oil was vulnerable 
to external threats from Western powers because the regime assumed that the West was 
conspiring against it. Therefore, the regime established closer relations with the Soviet Union 
as a response to the perceived threats. However, Qaddafi continued to promote policies 
intended to weaken the superpowers, which were permanently attempting to undermine his 
regime (Niblock, 2002:214–215).  
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In Libya the revolutionary government’s first step in raising oil prices was taken towards the 
end of 1969, when the pricing committee tried to negotiate with the oil companies. After 
several unsuccessful attempts, on 4 April 1970, the government adopted a stronger approach 
and despite the appointment of the former Prime Minister, Maghrabi, as Chairman of the 
Pricing Committee, it appeared later that the real decisions were taken by Abdel-Salam 
Jallud, the RCC member who had successfully negotiated the early withdrawal of US and 
British forces from Libyan base facilities. The appointment of Jallud for negotiating with the 
oil companies showed the importance Qaddafi was giving to that dossier. The RCC 
particularly targeted independent oil producers such as Occidental, because Libyan supplies 
constituted a large part of their crude oil resources outside North America (Allan, 1981:183; 
Shukri Ghanem, 1985:164; St John, 1987:108). 
 
In the summer of 1970 there were gradual cuts in Libyan oil production, and there was a 
break in the tapline which carried oil from the Middle East to the Mediterranean. This caused 
temporary shortages in petroleum products, provoking two major consequences; firstly, an 
increase in both oil prices and freight rates and an occasion for an increase in the Libyan 
posted price, which the oil companies could not ignore. Secondly, exploration and 
development investment from the oil companies fell drastically in Libya. With increasing 
concern about the new direction of Libyan oil policies, the foreign oil companies were 
willing to agree to higher oil prices (Simons, 1996:198-199). 
 
Libya’s substantial financial resources and recognised oil reserves, contributed to the 
successful negotiations with the oil companies. Additionally, these negotiations took place 
when the European demand for oil, Mediterranean oil in particular, was at one of its highest 
levels because of the closure of the Suez Canal. The excellent quality of Libya’s crude oil, 
along with the RCC’s recognised interest in greater conservation measures, also contributed 
to Libya’s success in oil negotiations. Furthermore, the oil companies were divided among 
themselves and the major players refused to go to great lengths to protect the independents 
(Lenczowski, 1975:64). 
 
In 1971, following the nationalisation of BP by the Libyan government, a Libyan company 
called the Arabian Gulf Exploration Company took over the share of the BP-NB. In addition, 
the production of all other oil companies operating in Libya was frozen in order to prevent 
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them from supplying BP. Shortly afterwards, the oil companies took action by amending the 
Libyan Procedures’ Agreement to include total or partial nationalisation of the properties of 
any party by the Libyan government. Qaddafi justified the action as a protest against the 
British government, who, by evacuating the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands off the coast of 
the UAE, gave the opportunity to the Shah of Iran which brought them under his sovereignty 
(Waddams, 1980:251). This reflects the fact that the ideology of Qaddafi was based on 
supporting the Arab world’s causes (i.e. Palestinian and Lebanon conflicts with Israel as well 
as the October war between Egypt and Israel 1973).
150
  
 
There was a major oil crisis in the early 1970s, as a result of various interdependent factors. 
The first one was the increasing power of the oil producing countries of the Middle East; until 
that point the oil companies had always discovered, developed, and controlled the oil in the 
Middle East themselves. Secondly, by this time the United States was extremely dependent 
on Middle Eastern oil. The third factor was the different phases of annexation by Israel in 
Palestine, which was very much opposed by the Libyan and other Arab governments but 
which had the complete support of the United States (St John, 1987:116). 
 
Following the October 1973 war, the Arab oil-producing countries, with the strong support of 
the Libyan government, imposed oil restrictions. New price levels were imposed by unilateral 
decree as opposed to negotiation. In late October, Saudi Arabia drew up an agenda of 
restrictive measures that mostly involved general production cutbacks and an export embargo 
to specific countries. With full backing for such measures, the Libyan government sought to 
cut off oil exports to countries supporting the Israeli state. Accordingly, its oil exports to the 
United States were cut off and shortly after Libya also halted oil supplies to the Netherlands 
(Simons, 1996: 200-201). 
In accordance with an OPEC decision taken in Kuwait on 16 October, Libya reduced its 
overall oil production by 5%. Moreover, on 20th October a resolution announced that the 
price of oil was to be increased from $4.60 to $8.90 per barrel; this was justified on the basis 
of inflation, increased demand for oil, and fluctuations in currency exchange rates and freight 
charges. The UNSC intervened by adopting Resolution 338 in order to end the military 
conflict. However, Libya, Iraq, and Kuwait denounced the United Nation’s order and 
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described it as unwarranted foreign intervention in an Arab conflict. Nonetheless, Egypt and 
other Arab countries accepted the ceasefire, thereby adding to Libya’s isolation in the Arab 
World (Lenczowski, 1975:64). 
 
The Libyan regime believed that oil was a target for regional and international powers.  Deeb 
elaborates on the significance of oil to the Libyan regime: “Oil wealth … has been perceived 
by the Libyan leadership as the main reason the nation and the regime are endangered. Time 
and again Libya has accused its neighbours and others of planning to take control of the oil 
wealth through invasion” (Deeb, 1991:15). 
 
European countries such as Italy, France, and Germany benefited greatly from Libya’s oil 
reserves. Libya’s strategic location and the low price of Libyan oil in comparison with other 
oil-exporting countries were the main reasons for such preference. Oil was one of the tools 
used by Libya as a political weapon for bargaining and financing foreign policy activities, 
such as support for various movements in the region and beyond. The fears of Qaddafi’s 
regime were neither exaggerated nor unfounded since Sadat, in dire financial crisis and to 
confirm his leadership of Egypt, did attempt to seize part of the Libyan territory in 1977.
151
  
Rogan stated that: “In his desperation to increase Egypt’s revenues, in July 1977, Sadat did 
attempt to seize Libyan oil fields”. In order to justify his aggression, Sadat cited the military 
help given by the Soviets to Qaddafi. Rogan notes that “In a mad opportunism, Sadat 
considered the Soviet arms deliveries to his wealthy neighbour a pretext to invade – as 
though the Libyan arsenal represented a threat to Egypt’s security” (Rogan, 2009:487-488).  
Sadat withdrew his forces from the Sinai to use them against Libya. Such a decision was far 
from being popular in Egypt and soon the president had to halt this aggression following the 
pressures from several countries (Algeria, Kuwait, the PLO, Washington, and Moscow). 
 
The Camp David Agreements between Egypt and Israel turned the Libyan neighbour into a 
big and permanent threat for the revolutionary state. Egypt went from being a model political 
system into an enemy for the Libyan regime and the unlimited faith Qaddafi had shown in 
President Nasser’s ideology disappeared. Joffé states that since the death of President Nasser, 
his successor Anwar Sadat never trusted Qaddafi and saw Libya as a real and enduring threat 
to his country, which explains the short border war in July 1977. Qaddafi, whose regime was 
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 Sadat as well as Numeiry of Sudan, Chad, and the Saudis etc... 
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still relatively fragile and fearing its Eastern neighbours, pre-empted a potential danger, and 
in 1975 made a mutual-defence agreement with Algeria, known as the ‘Hassi Messaoud 
Treaty’. Accordingly, when two years later, Egypt unilaterally attacked Libya, Algeria 
intervened vigorously to stop the invasion (Joffé, 2005:609). 
 
 
3.4.2 Regional Factors Affecting Libya’s Foreign and Security Policies 
 
The regional factors which affected Libyan policies were the result of various tensions with 
Libya’s regional neighbours. For instance, countries such as Morocco and Saudi Arabia 
disapproved of the overthrow of the Libyan monarchy and the establishment of a 
revolutionary state. Likewise, the Egyptian state was not on good terms with the Qaddafi 
regime.  
 
The relations between Sadat and Qaddafi deteriorated when the Libyan regime later blamed 
the Egyptian government, accusing it of inertia and of not attempting to rescue the Libyan 
plane and guiding it to safety before it was shot down by an Israeli jet fighter.
152
 In order to 
retaliate against the perpetrators, Qaddafi as the Chief Commander of the Libyan Armed 
Forces ordered the commander of an Egyptian submarine stationed in Tripoli at that time, to 
sink the Queen Elizabeth II en route to Israel (Heikal, 1975:192).
153
 It should be noted that 
the submarine stationed in Tripoli was part of the naval unit of Egypt under a defence 
agreement negotiated between Libya and Egypt during Nasser’s era (Simons, 1996:274).  
 
According to Ronen (2008), Qaddafi’s hostility and confrontation with the former president 
of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, and the United States, increased dramatically with the shift in 
Egyptian foreign policies. Qaddafi believed that Sadat did not have the stature of his 
predecessor, Nasser, and accused him of abandoning the Nasserite ideology and becoming a 
pro-Western leader (Ronen, 2008:5). Rogan believes that Qaddafi never forgave Sadat, who 
for economic incentives, wanted to conquer Libya in 1977 (Rogan, 2009:487).  In addition, 
and despite his rejection of communism, Qaddafi made a strategic move by allying himself 
                                                          
152
 The flight was scheduled to arrive in Cairo but due to weather conditions it lost its way over Sinai, occupied 
by Israel.  In that tragedy, 108 passengers were killed, among which was Libya’s former Foreign Minister. 
153
 This voyage was part of the celebrations for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the creation of the state of Israel, 
and on board were wealthy Jews from the US and Europe (Heikal, 1975:192). The Egyptians did not take this 
action, which would have had very serious consequences. 
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with the Soviet Union to save his regime from the two perceived threats.
154
 Libya’s reliance 
on the Soviet Union led the US to designate Libya as a threat to its interests in the Middle 
East (Ronen, 2008:5).  
 
El-Warfally (1988:98) also notes the animosity between the two leaders, adding another 
factor precipitating the attack on Libya. The author refers to the intentions of the Egyptians 
and Sudanese, acting de concert, to isolate Libya by encircling it. Under the claim of 
countering a Soviet-Libyan influence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, Numeiry and 
Sadat signed a defence treaty in 1976. A year later (in 1977), Syria and Saudi Arabia joined 
Egypt and Sudan in order to counter Soviet and Libyan policies in Africa. In the same year, 
Egypt tried to expand its territories by trying to annex part of southern Libya. The attempts 
against Libya were certainly motivated by the country’s oil wealth as well as other factors. 
The vulnerability of Libya was due to its very large territory, and a relatively small 
population, making it attractive to potential invaders, both at the regional and international 
level.
155
 
 
Another significant regional issue for post-1969 Libya, was the Palestinian one. Qaddafi 
provided moral and financial support to various Palestinian factions, including military 
organisations. Moreover, Libya denounced the lack of enthusiasm and support from other 
Arab governments for the Palestinian cause (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002). Often, 
Libya’s behaviour towards other Arab regimes in the region depended on their stance 
regarding the Palestinian-Israeli dispute; Qaddafi never compromised on this issue in his 
dealings with other Arab countries. For instance, in 1974, when Sadat agreed to the US 
proposal to disengage and make peaceful arrangements with Israel, Qaddafi reacted by 
denouncing the action and by stating “there was no justification for providing Egypt with aid 
due to the violation of the three nos’ of the 1967 Khartoum Conference” – no peace – no 
negotiation - no recognition of Israel (Ronen, 2001:3).   
 
Heikal (1975:196) argued that Qaddafi was convinced that an armed conflict between the 
Arab states and Israel was unlikely to happen despite the prolonged tensions between Israel 
and the Arab World. Sadat, who did not trust Qaddafi, kept him in the dark about the date of 
                                                          
154
 Qaddafi allied his regime with Soviet Union in the mid-1970s, and improved his relations with the Soviets. 
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 Qaddafi’s interference with the internal matters of neighbours such as Chad, Tunisia, Sudan and Egypt. 
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the 1973 war.
156
 In the aftermath of that conflict, The Libyan ruler criticised the scale of the 
operation. According to Heikal, Libya participated financially by giving at least $1,000 
million for the 1973 war, as well by supplying Egypt with arms, food and medicine (Heikal, 
1975:197). It should be noted that after the October war 1973, there was a high level of co-
operation between Libya and Egypt. However, differences between Qaddafi and Sadat clearly 
appeared in their perspectives regarding how the Arab issues could be dealt with.  This co-
operation between Sadat and Qaddafi was based on Qaddafi’s ideology to support Arab 
issues and oppose the West. Nevertheless, the co-operation deteriorated and the two countries 
changed from being allies to enemies. The tension between them reached its peak during the 
war in 1977.
157
 In fact, one of the causes of this animosity was the unexpected visit of Sadat 
to the Israeli Keenest in 1977 and the peace initiative in 1978 which were considered by 
various states as an individual reaction which breached the collective Arab security 
agenda.
158
 
 
Another regional issue affecting Libya was that concerning its border with Chad.
159
 Libya 
and Chad had a boundary altercation over the Aouzou strip, which goes back to the colonial 
period
160
. The issue was raised again in Libya post-1969, leading to border clashes between 
the two countries. In the 1970s, the Qaddafi regime had to deal with the question of the 
ownership of the Aouzou strip again. Ultimately, the case was referred to the International 
Court of Justice (Simons, 2003:60-61), which rejected Libya’s legal argument and based its 
decision on instruments in Annex I to the 1955 Treaty. Evans stated that “The ICJ thereby 
upheld the principle of the stability of frontiers” (Evans, 1995:687). 
 
 
3.4.3 External Factors Affecting Libyan Foreign and Security Policies 
Domestic and regional factors in Libya’s foreign and security policy (1969-1981) seem to 
have played a lesser role compared with the external ones. Since coming to power, Qaddafi 
wanted to have international status through a defiant and unconventional way of conducting 
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 Sadat was cautious because of the eventual repercussions that might arise from leaked information. 
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 This unprecedented surprise visit by Sadat was critised by the Libyan regime as well as other countries (i.e. 
Algeria, Yemen, and Syria) 
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 For more information regarding the distrust between Libya and Egypt, see Ronen, Y (2001:3-5) 
“Personalities and Politics: Qaddafi, Naser Sadat and Mubarak (1969-2000)”.  
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 It can be underlined that, during the monarchy regime, there were no major arguments or boundary disputes 
between Libya and its neighbours. 
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 France and Italy, former colonisers of Chad and Libya, had some friction over the Aouzou strip. 
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politics. Rather than following the path of his predecessor who allied himself with Western 
countries, Qaddafi chose to challenge the norms of the Cold War era.   
 
3.4.3.1 Libya’s Anti-Western Measures and Alignment with the USSR 
 
At the outset of Libya’s revolution, Qaddafi did not differentiate between the United States 
and the Soviet Union; he considered both superpowers as enemies of the Arab World. This 
stemmed from his religious beliefs, and his initial hostility towards the Soviets derived from 
the atheist status of the Soviet Union. According to Heikel, Nasser tried to convince Qaddafi 
to take a different approach with the Soviet Union, since the Cold War period demanded 
more pragmatism in foreign policy, and to ally with the Soviets rather than the United States. 
However, during the first years, Qaddafi did not change his attitude towards the Soviet Union 
despite his respect for Nasser (Heikal, 1975:187). 
 
After the 1969 coup, the new regime reassured the US and Britain of the security of their 
economic interests, including American oil companies, inside Libya. The US had anticipated 
that the new regime would embrace pan-Arabism, be allied with Nasser, and oppose 
communism. And the Nixon administration soon recognised Libya’s new regime because of 
its early statements, which did not demonstrate any hostility towards it. The US ambassador 
in post at Tripoli in that crucial period, David Newson, encouraged the administration to 
recognise the new revolutionary regime, mainly because of Libya’s anti-communist attitude, 
while Henry Kissinger, in contrast, advised for the adoption of a tough policy towards the 
new regime in Libya.  His advice, was however, not followed for fears that such an approach 
would jeopardise access to oil and result in the new rulers of Libya choosing to become allied 
with the Soviet camp (Matar and Thabit, 2004:51-52). That said, the crisis which followed 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli war dramatically changed the relations between Libya and the United 
States, especially when Libya nationalised the American oil companies which operated most 
of the oil fields in the country (Hagger, 2009:102).
161
 
 
The first real shift in the relationship between Libya and US was in March of 1973, when a 
Libyan Mirage fired on an unarmed US Air Force reconnaissance plane over eighty three 
miles off the Libyan coast. The US plane managed to escape unhurt. In fact, the pilot had 
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 The American support for Israel had an impact on the future of the US-Libyan relationship. 
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ignored an instruction to follow the Libyan jet fighter to land at a Libyan field (Matar and 
Thabit, 2004:55.)
162
 It was reported by the Washington Star on 23 March, that the planes 
were gathering intelligence information. Despite the fact that Libya denied firing on the US 
plane, a similar incident occurred on 30 March when Libyan jet-fighters intercepted fourteen 
phantom planes. The Libyan government claimed that the airplanes violated its territorial 
waters (El-Warfally, 1988:65-66). In fact, Finney maintained that it had been normal practice 
for the Americans to gather electronic intelligence – through missions “performed by 
American reconnaissance ships and planes along the coasts and borders of other countries” 
for more than two decades (Finney, 1973). And in reality, Qaddafi’s regime’s revolutionary 
activities were considered a threat to international peace and stability (i.e. training and 
supporting various terrorist organisations in Libya), thereby providing the US with sound 
motives to gather intelligence information on the Libyan territory.  
 
The American suspicions appeared over Libya’s foreign policy misconduct regarding several 
issues between the two countries, and in particular their views regarding the Arab-Israeli 
issue, and their ambiguous position in the Cold War. Libya’s belligerent attitude towards 
Israel, which was evident by supplying arms for the 1973 war, worried the Americans. The 
Libyan regime always claimed that its intentions were not to nationalise the oil industry and 
that the rise in prices would be agreed upon through negotiations with the oil companies 
themselves. It was clear that the Libyan government wanted to have more control of the 
country’s oil sector, without aggressively challenging the West (St John, 1987:107). 
However, the Libyan revolutionary government never accepted the fact that their oil was 
controlled by the West, and as Qaddafi’s oil policy unfolded, the influence of the key 
fundamentals of Libyan foreign policy, such as Arab nationalism and non-alignment, were 
evident (St John, 1987:119). 
 
One of Qaddafi’s statements in the early years revealed the aggressiveness of the revolution: 
“We resort to wise and just means [that is, negotiations] to enable us to liberate our land, but 
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 In 1973, Gaddafi declared unilaterally The Line of Death, delimitating the Libyan internal waters in the Gulf 
of Sidra and drawing a straight line at 32 degrees, 30 minutes north between a designed point close to Benghazi 
and Misrata, giving to Libya a fishing area of 62 nautical miles. Any attempt to cross it without permission 
would be considered as an intrusion and lead to a military response (Beecher, 1973). The US reacted by 
conducting naval operations in the area, and on March 21, Libyan fighter jets fired on a US Air Force C-130 
while it was conducting signals intelligence off the Libyan coast. However the American plane managed to 
escape through the use of a cloud cover. 
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if fighting becomes inevitable, then let there be fighting” (Ronen, 2008:10–11). This 
statement shows that the new regime was about to become more active in confronting all 
perceived threats, either from the West or from its neighbours.
163
 Libya was also accused of 
active involvement in terrorist activities, and was regarded as a principal financier of 
international terrorism. The country was believed to have connections with the Black 
September Movement that killed eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972.
164
 
Libya’s efforts succeeded in undermining Israeli influence when, on 12 April 1972, Uganda 
decided to cut its relations with Israel and instead created diplomatic relations with Libya. 
Furthermore, ten other African countries, under Libyan influence, proclaimed their support 
for the Palestinian Resistance Movement (El-Warfally, 1988:70). 
 
Qaddafi publicly supported various movements in the region and worldwide. He declared that 
Libya supported all liberation movements, and supplied arms to several organisations such as 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA), militant black groups in the United States, the Muslim 
minority in the Philippines, groups in South America, and most importantly for him, 
Palestinian movements and the creation of training camps in Libya (St John, 1987:38). 
Libya’s support for these movements stemmed from Qaddafi’s beliefs regarding the 
legitimacy of using armed struggle in certain circumstances to achieve revolutionary goals. 
 
However, Qaddafi denied all accusations in an interview with the West German newspaper 
Der Spiegel on 26 July 1976. A couple of months later, in an interview with the Daily 
Telegraph in London, Major Jalloud revealed that Libya had only trained guerrillas from 
Palestine, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. He also stated that all past plane hijackings were 
‘mistakes’ due to personal initiatives rather than being guided or supported by the Libyan 
regime. That was consistent with what happened in April 1976, when Libya rejected an 
asylum plea from three Muslim Filipino men who asked to land a hijacked plane in Tripoli 
(El-Warfally, 1988:71). However, despite the fact that Jalloud denied the Libyan 
government’s involvement with several plane hijackings, the Libyan regime had been 
involved in similar incidents in civil aviation, and as is discussed in the next chapter, 
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 For instance, in its immediate periphery, Libya had a particular way of applying its policies. For example, in 
terms of military interventions, Libya’s involvement in sub-Saharan countries shows another aspect of Libya’s 
foreign policy and the huge amounts of money spent on adventurous and costly operations. Uganda in April 
1979, and more significantly in Chad in October 1981  
164
 In fact, until the present time, there has not been any proofe regarding the Libyan connection with the 
terrorist attack at the Munich Olympics 1972.  
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Qaddafi’s regime was accused of downing Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie and the French 
airline UTA. 
 
In January 1974, The US played a leading role in the signing of the first Israeli-Egyptian 
disengagement agreement. However, the American position and policies towards the 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict encountered the deep disapproval of Qaddafi, known 
for his enmity towards Israel. Libya feared that US influence in the region would continue to 
spread, thereby affecting the international balance of power (Ronen, 2008:83–87). Indeed, the 
Soviets also had their reasons for strengthening relations with Libya. Firstly, they too had a 
standing influence in the region, and wanted this to increase. Secondly, they needed Libyan 
hard currency from oil revenues. Major Jalloud visited the USSR in 1975 and the 
controversial issue of two arms deals (signifying the essential and most important aspect of 
Libyan-Soviet relations) was discussed. The first deal was concluded in December 1974, and 
was described as involving TU-22 supersonic bombers, SAM missiles, tanks, and anti-tank 
missiles. The second deal involved one thousand tanks and six F-class submarines. However, 
despite their accelerating relations, there was still concern within the USSR about Qaddafi’s 
beliefs and actions as confirmed by Roger Pajak, who said at the time: “the Soviets no doubt 
are concerned about Qaddafi’s strong anti-communist feelings and his erratic behaviour” (El-
Warfally, 1988:62). 
 
In 1976, relations worsened between Egypt and Libya, and both the Ford administration and 
its successor, the Carter administration, in the White House immediately sided with the 
Egyptian regime and made an agreement to assist Egypt against any potential aggression 
from Libya, which was supported militarily by the Soviet Union. While economic relations 
between the United States and Libya were good, there were allegations by the Ford 
administration against Libya in respect of its activities abroad, which ranked Libya as the 
fourth most dangerous enemy of the United States (Cooley, 1982:265, 284).   
  
A particular issue over which disagreement occurred was the American decision to block the 
release of approximately $400 million-worth of equipment which had already been paid for 
by Libya. The American rationale for not respecting the terms of the contract was the fear 
that once delivered, the material would eventually be used for military purposes. Before the 
crisis, it had been agreed to deliver ‘eight Lockheed C-130 heavy transport aircraft and two 
Boeing 727 airliners, as well as 400 Oshkosh heavy lorries’. However, in the same period 
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(i.e. 1977), the Pentagon listed Libya as a potential enemy of the US, arguing that its regime 
was supporting ‘international terrorism’ and backing different armed groups such as 
Palestinian guerrillas and the Irish IRA (Wright, 1981:215). What was publicly claimed, from 
both the US administration and the Libyan regime did not reflect what was happening on the 
economic side. For instance, through the 1970s until well into the 1980s, the US remained the 
main importer of Libyan oil while Libyan needs in technology and expertise in various fields 
were provided by the US (Cooley, 1982:284).  
 
When Carter came into power, Qaddafi wanted to take the opportunity to soften the 
American attitudes towards Libya. He thought that the newly-elected president might change 
the US policies and opt for a more balanced position on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Accordingly, Qaddafi made friendly overtures towards Carter, and was willing to normalise 
relations by appointing a new ambassador to Tripoli, but Qaddafi’s expectations were short-
lived when the Americans claimed that they had discovered a plot to assassinate their 
ambassador in Egypt, Herman F Eilts. After that particular episode, Carter considered the 
Libyan leader as untruthful, and perceived Libya as a terrorist state, later imposing an 
embargo on the country (Simons, 1996:317). 
 
The Carter administration was angry with the Libyan government for failing to protect its 
diplomatic mission in Tripoli from the mob who set it on fire in support of Iranian 
revolutionary militants who were holding US hostages in Iran. In a letter addressed to the 
Libyan official in charge of Libyan affairs in the US, President Carter blamed Libya’s 
government for its position on the incident. Relations went further downhill in 1980 when 
Libya’s diplomatic mission in the US was closed. Libyan diplomats were accused of plotting 
to murder Libyan students who failed to return to Libya (St John, 2002:113-114). Such 
accusations emerged after the federal authority had kept members of the Libyan diplomatic 
mission under surveillance for several months, and had become convinced that some of them 
from the Libyan Bureau in Washington DC were plotting to kill such students. Similar 
assassination incidents happened in several European capitals targeting outspoken Libyan 
dissidents who had been opposing Qaddafi’s regime since the 1980s (e.g. in Rome, Athens, 
Manchester, London, and West Berlin (El-Kikhia, 1997:140). 
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Another incident occurred in the 1980s between the two countries resulted in the loss of two 
Libyan jets. Simons (1996), when referring to that particular incident states:                                
The provocative naval exercise off the Libyan coast, thousands of miles 
from the US, was deliberately designed to lead to a military confrontation; 
and in this aim they succeeded. A massive Sixth fleet battle group, 
including the nuclear power aircraft carrier Nimitz, sailed into the Gulf of 
Sirte (Simons, 1996:319).  
Simons mentions that the Pentagon did later acknowledge that there was no proof that the 
Libyan jets were acting in a hostile way. Chomsky, quoting Edward Haley, referring to the 
1981 incident, said that it was mainly an anti-Qaddafi message which “was reinforced by the 
trap laid for Libya in the Gulf of Sidra”, a trap “elaborately planned on the US side with the 
intent of confrontation in which Libyan jets could be shot down as they were” (Chomsky, 
2002:88).   
Under Reagan, the relations between the US administration and the Libyan regime went from 
bad to worse. According to Laham, one particular incident worsened an already tense 
situation. In August 1981, during the US Sixth Fleet Freedom of Navigation exercises, two 
Libyan jet fighters were shot down after they fired at two American F-14 fighters. Libya 
claimed that territorial waters in the Gulf of Sirte were violated by the US Sixth Fleet in the 
Mediterranean, which was operating outside its legal limits (Laham, 2008:83). 
Reagan intended to deter Qaddafi’s policies in the region and worldwide. He was determined 
to cripple Libya’s activities, imposing economic sanctions and campaigning to isolate the 
country from its European neighbours. The Reagan administration wanted to prevent Libya 
from supporting international terrorism, and the unilateral sanctions imposed by the US 
constrained Libya to turn towards its European neighbours for commercial relations. 
However, Reagan’s determination to isolate Libya did not converge with the European 
interests because of oil deals (Laham, 2008:84). Nor did the sanctions and constant threats 
made by different American administrations prevent Qaddafi from pursuing his peculiar 
policies based on his revolutionary radicalism. 
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3.4.4 Multiple Factors, Domestic, Regional and External Influencing Libya’s Foreign 
and Security Policies 
As discussed in the introduction, a number of factors can explain to very large extent the 
Libyan foreign and security policies, particularly the country’s intention to acquire nuclear 
weapons programme from 1969 until 1981. In this respect, multiple factors (internal, 
regional, and external) were identified as having played an important role. However, there 
was variation regarding the influence of these factors. In the previous sub-sections, the 
domestic factors such as the effects of colonialism, and the new political ideology were 
shown to have created a platform which allowed the Libyan regime to conduct aggressive 
policies, pursue power, leadership and security. The legacy of colonialism produced a 
perception of neo-colonialism and imperialism that placed the West in a very negative 
picture, and this ideological factor was most apparent in Libyan foreign and security policies. 
However, its significance varied. For instance, when Libya dealt with an issue distant to its 
periphery, the ideology was seen to be appropriate, but when there was a threat to Libya’s 
immediate boundaries, it was not. Moreover, other internal factors such as oil and natural 
resources were of immense importance to the regime, since oil revenues facilitated the 
importation of huge quantities of arms and equipment. In fact, there was relatively little 
influence from domestic factors, in particular on Libyan security and foreign policies, 
although oil was used as a tool by the Libyan regime, such as in the oil embargo in 1973.  
At the regional level, the factors that affected Libyan policies were seen to be more 
influential than the domestic ones. As discussed, the insecurity and fear of the Libyan regime 
stemming from attempts by neighbours to seize its oil fields contributed to the rise in 
conflicts in the region, created tensions with Egypt (under Sadat), Chad and Morocco, and  
affected Libya’s policies. These widespread tensions confirm the greater influence of the 
regional factors over the domestic ones. Moreover, the tensions and conflicts with 
neighbouring countries such as Chad, Sudan, Egypt, and Tunisia extended to different 
perceptions of general politics because of Libya’s ideological stance, and precipitated conflict 
with regard to several regional and security issues. The importance of regional factors in 
Libya’s security policy was vital, especially as the Qaddafi regime was trying to become a 
regional power with a quite specific agenda such as leadership in the Arab World, security 
concerns, exporting Libya’s revolution, and intervening in the internal affairs of some 
African states as well as Arab states, particularly those with monarchies.
165
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Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, and Oman).  
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In the same vein, Arab nationalism and the Arab/Israeli conflict were important issues for 
Qaddafi’s regime in its first decade. Qaddafi used the Arab/Israeli conflict to mobilise the 
Libyan people and declared that he would become the new Arab leader after the death of 
Nasser. Moreover, Qaddafi’s self-proclaimed leadership of the Arab World in the first decade 
of the regime was an important factor, although its influence is considered to have been 
moderate in this period.   
On the international level, the factors that affected Libya’s security between 1969 and 1981 
were stronger than other influences. However, the regional and international factors varied in 
terms of their impact upon Libya’s security policy and its quest for a nuclear arms capability. 
For instance Libya’s antagonism was mostly directed towards Western countries, especially 
the US and Britain. Moreover, the Libyan regime was not hostile to the US and Britain from 
the onset of the coup in 1969, after which Qaddafi had assured those countries that their 
interests in the country would be protected (i.e. that their oil companies would not be 
nationalised). However, after the evacuation of the military bases in Libya, the aggressive 
turn in the foreign policy of Qaddafi and the RCC surprised the US, and tension began to 
appear between Libya and the US as well as with other countries at the beginning of 1973. As 
already mentioned, the first tensions occurred when Libyan jet fighters attacked a US 
reconnaissance plane, but other similar incidents also arose in that decade, as for example 
when Libya fired on the US Sixth Fleet,
166
 and when several terrorist actions took place in 
Europe.  
In assessing the importance of the factors discussed, it can be said that domestic, regional, 
and international factors, all affected Libya’s policies to a certain extent, but apparently there 
were variations in the effects of these factors. For example, some domestic factors were more 
influential upon Libya’s policies than others. As is clear from the discussion above, oil 
provided the financial capacity for the regime to acquire nuclear weapons and simultaneously 
enabled it to support different movements around the globe financially and militarily. 
Regional factors also played an important role in determining the Libyan foreign policies, 
rather than domestic factors. Finally, although internal and regional factors had their 
influence on the Libyan polices, the external pressure by powerful states which stemmed 
from the international scene and the bipolar international system was more influential. 
Indeed, several issues occurred in the early period of Qaddafi’s rule (i.e. Cold War era, the 
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status quo of Libya in 1969, the US and British military bases, political ideology, regional 
conflicts and proxy wars).   
 
3.4.5 Theoretical Discussion 
The theoretical framework as presented, has demonstrated that there are different 
perspectives within International Relations theories regarding the incentives of states in 
determining their security as well as foreign policies, and that the main relevant theoretical 
schools in IR can explain the direction of some of the Libyan policies between 1969 and 
1981. Of these, the most relevant school of thought seems to be realism, which can explain 
Libyan policies between 1969 and 1981 better than other theoretical schools such as 
constructivism, and liberalism.  
 
This does not present that constructivism is out of meaning in this context. Indeed, as 
discussed earlier, Qaddafi’s regime policies were influenced by many factors such as identity 
and ideology which can be considered as recognised norms in international relations. 
However, the realist accounts can better explain the policies and behaviour of Qaddafi’s 
regime, especially when Libya was attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. In this period, 
Qaddafi considered the status quo of the Libyan state as weak, and hence, in need of military 
strength which in his vision, included the acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Libya’s 
conventional armament stock increased radically in the first decade of the Qaddafi regime, as 
also did the military role in civilian life, but there was no nuclear capacity, which was seen as 
a deficit by the regime. Moreover, Qaddafi’s regional inspiration to be one of the Arab and 
African “big men” can be explained from a realist point of view. His reaction to the 
international environment such as the fears from the big powers in intervening in his rich 
country convinced him to seek power and ultimately acquire a nuclear deterrent. 
Additionally, Qaddafi’s ideology was pragmatic and it was used only according to the 
regime’s core interests. Despite the fact that Qaddafi wanted to achieve Arab Unity and 
especially among the powerful Arab countries, he supported non-Arab countries against Arab 
countries in contradiction with his ideology (i.e. Ethiopia against Sudan, Iran against Iraq). 
Accordingly, Qaddafi’s ideology is analysed from a realist perspective. 
Regarding the neoclassical realism account which explains the extent to which the internal 
dynamics can influence state’s policies, its role in this particular period of this case was very 
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weak due to the fact that the internal factors (i.e. political parties, syndicates, civil society 
groups and pressure groups and labour unions) were not influential on the regime’s policies. 
It is not odd that the internal factor was weak since the autocratic regimes used to ignore and 
marginalise the sources of internal pressure. Additionally, regimes such as Qaddafi’s or 
Saddam's feared external threats more than domestic.  
Libya’s involvement in regional issues, such as in the conflicts with Chad, Egypt, and Sudan 
which had resulted from different political standpoints, agendas, and alliances, and the 
country’s desire to protect the regime from outside forces, were perceived as critical threats 
to Libya’s national security, especially as the armed forces were considered as weak and 
small compared to those of Egypt or Algeria. Indeed, Libya’s natural resources (i.e. oil and 
gas), large territory, and small population combined to compel the Libyan government to 
develop and build its military capacity. Accordingly, accumulating military might was seen 
by Qaddafi’s regime as crucial to protect the country not only from its neighbours, but also 
from other states further afield. This was particularly a source of concern for the regime since 
during that same period Libya’s relations with the West in general and with the US 
specifically, had worsened due to the defiance of the Qaddafi regime and its reckless vision 
of world politics.    
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the dramatic changes in the Middle East in the wake of the Libyan 
coup in 1969 when Qaddafi and his military colleagues overthrew the monarchy and brought 
the era of the Libyan Kingdom to an end. It has shown how Libyan history and geography 
influenced the foreign policy of the revolutionary regime under Qaddafi. Thanks to its 
geographical context, Libya sought to play a leading role not only on the regional scale, but 
also within the wider Arab World. History has also been shown to be another influence upon 
Libya’s foreign policy, since decades of colonialism maintained the suspicions held by the 
revolutionary regime that the West could not be trusted to remain outside of Libya’s internal 
affairs. Additionally, ideology and the particular beliefs of the revolutionary regime, 
contributed to the formulation of Libyan foreign policy and the conduct of Libya outside its 
own territory, a situation which was especially obvious when issues arose internationally 
rather than close to the Libyan periphery. The chapter has shown how a radical change 
occurred in Libyan foreign policy in the aftermath of 1969. The priorities of Qaddafi in terms 
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of Libya’s foreign and security policies were to maintain the country’s national interests, such 
as its security, to enhance Arab nationalism, and to a lesser extent, to support other 
revolutionary movements. 
 
In fact, the flow of oil and the regime’s control of this important asset facilitated the shift 
from Libya’s friendly stance under the monarchy of King Idris to the confrontational position 
adopted by Qaddafi and his revolutionaries. Moreover, the regional insecurity encountered by 
Libya in consequence of historical events and its new confrontational approach, contributed 
towards the militarisation of the Libyan state, and enhanced Qaddafi’s radical policies. These 
radical policies emerged because the regime considered some regional neighbours such as 
Egypt, Algeria, and Sudan to be a definite source of threat to its security, and the national 
interests.  Another important element in the first decade of Qaddafi’s rule was the antagonism 
between Libya and other countries further afield, such as the US and the UK. And it was 
shown how this hostility continued even under different US administrations.  During the Cold 
War era, the West was seen to view Qaddafi and his regime as being involved in international 
terrorism and as collaborating with the Soviet Union, and in turn Libya considered the West 
as potentially causing instability within Libya and therefore, being a danger to its national 
interests. By the end of the first period (1969-1981), the US and the UK governments started 
to exert pressure on Qaddafi’s government in order to stop meddling in some countries, cease 
Qaddafi’s antagonistic policies and end Libya’s support to outlawed organisations. The 
international pressure which was led by the US did not completely compel Qaddafi to stop 
his regime’s policies. However, international pressures accumulated on Libya compelled 
Qaddafi’s regime to change its policy and behaviour in relation to some issues (i.e., 
antagonism with the US, Britain and meddling in neighbouring countries). As we will see in 
the next empirical chapters, the behaviour of Qaddafi’s regime started to change gradually 
due to effect of external pressure, namely economic sanction, threat of military action and 
international isolation.  
 
In the next chapter, the escalation of the enmity between the US and Libya is addressed. This 
is seen through the various crises which occurred, such as the continuing involvement of 
Libya with international terrorism, confrontation with United States, and the development of 
the Libyan nuclear programme. In this respect, the chapter will discuss the Reagan 
administration’s use of force against Libya under the claim of combating terrorism. It will 
also elaborate upon Libya’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, discussing how Libya, in the 
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1970s, tried to purchase a ready-made nuclear bomb from different countries. Additionally, it 
will explore the UN Security Council resolutions which required Libya to collaborate more 
fully in the investigations related to terrorist activities which targeted the Berlin club, the 
UTA’s French airliner, and the Lockerbie bombing.  
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Chapter Four: Libya’s Sanctions and the Evolution of the Nuclear 
Programme 
 
4.1 Introduction   
In the previous chapter the origins of Qaddafi’s policies and actions at regional and 
international levels were discussed, from which it was seen that in the aftermath of the 1969 
military coup d’état, the lack of an adequate defence system, as well as Qaddafi’s perception 
of having inherited a weak state, were huge concerns. Accordingly, these issues represented 
the first priorities to deal with. The new Libyan leadership changed Libya’s foreign and 
security policies, not only with its neighbours but also with the major world powers.    
Initially, Qaddafi and his companions denounced the monarchy and criticised King Idris, not 
only for his domestic policies, but also for his pro-Western stance in regional and 
international spheres.
167
 Various factors in this regard were highlighted and came under 
strong denunciation by the new rulers.
168
 Certainly, the fact that Libya’s natural resources 
were not completely under Libyan control, and the continued presence of foreign military 
bases on Libyan soil, undermined Libya’s sovereignty.169 Additionally, the country was 
perceived as a weak state and consequently, vulnerable in case of foreign aggression. To 
address these concerns and distance the new regime from the policies of King Idris, 
significant changes in Libya’s politics were enacted by Qaddafi and his companions, starting 
with the abolition of the monarchy, the evacuation of the bases, and the building of more 
adequate Libyan military forces. Such were the changes, that after just a few years since the 
military coup in 1969, the Qaddafi regime’s policies projected an antagonistic image to the 
world superpowers (US and USSR), as well as to states such as Britain, and France. Clearly, 
Qaddafi had to adapt to this situation, and make choices regarding where to place his 
loyalties. Initially, he did not side with either superpower. 
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 The regime of King Idris had chosen to be closer to the West and preferred to align the newly born country 
with the victors of the WWII. For instance, the monarchy formed several alliances with the US, UK, and France 
in relation to security and economic assistance. However, this friendly relationship faded when Qaddafi came to 
power. 
168
 Such as the lack of sovereignty and the huge dependence on Western powers for the management of the 
country.   
169
  The British and American bases in Libya owed their existence to agreements made with the monarchy of 
King Idris.   
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On the regional scene, it is worth recalling that Nasserism was another factor which 
influenced the new rulers and increased their zeal for Arab unity. However, following 
Nasser’s death, Libya’s relations with Sadat’s Egypt and other Arab countries deteriorated, 
despite a promising debut with its early attempt to unite Libya and Egypt. Qaddafi’s 
perspectives and projects were not shared by the Egyptian leader and other statesmen. In 
addition, there were many suspicions about the involvement of Qaddafi in Egyptian domestic 
politics. These emanated as the consequences of Libya’s policies and interference in domestic 
issues in the region, such as the conflict in the Western Sahara, with open support by Qaddafi 
for the Polisario Front, his support for several rebellions in Sudan, his involvement in Chad, 
and his attempts to destabilise Tunisia, and other states in the region and further beyond. 
Indeed, Libya under Qaddafi, did its utmost to export its revolution through the financing of 
several movements and by backing dissident activities in neighbouring countries. 
It appears that from the outset of the 1969 coup, Qaddafi’s encouragement for armed 
movements was motivated by his belief that all revolutionary activities should be supported, 
identifying them with his own cause.
170
 In view of Qaddafi’s background, the way he came to 
power, and his rhetoric after he took power, it was quite natural for him to be involved, in 
different forms, in all ‘liberation’ movements, whether in Africa, Europe or South America.    
An insight into the personality of Qaddafi is found in Heikel’s evocation of his meetings with 
the new young ruler. Heikel observed the ‘naiveté’ of Qaddafi regarding how international 
politics work, stating:    
Qaddafi could at times display a terrifying innocence of how things worked 
in the modern world. He was capable of gross oversimplification. Many of 
his friends, for example, were annoyed at the way Qaddafi interfered in 
countries like Ireland (Heikel, 1975:186).
171
     
Qaddafi strongly believed in the cause of the IRA, the Basque’s ETA, the Polisario Front, the 
Kurds, and several other movements across the world. All of them were seen as independence 
and liberation movements and had the right to seek self-determination, through all means. 
However, Qaddafi’s support for all these movements was not only moral but also material as 
he provided money, arms, and logistical support such as training camps.  
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 Qaddafi acknowledged in 1992 that: “In the 1970s we supported liberal movements without knowing which 
were terrorist and which were not. In the 1980s we began to differentiate between terrorists and those with 
legitimate political aspirations” (quoted by Simons, 1996:263).  
171
 He later added that Qaddafi “was fascinated by the game of power” (Heikel, 1975:186).    
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Accordingly, Qaddafi’s regime established, and consolidated in particular, ties with 
numerous radical leftist movements, in addition to a panoply of Palestinian organisations, and 
Muslim insurgents in the Philippines. These bonds and Qaddafi’s foreign policy were shaped 
according to a perception and ambition to raise the status of Libya and make it a proactive 
player on both the regional and international scenes (Bahgat, 2005:44). However, the regime 
seems to have chosen the wrong path by which to attain its aims. As is elaborated in the 
coming sections in this chapter, Qaddafi’s external and internal policies made the 
international community associate Libya with terrorism, identifying it as a ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah’ 
state and considering it as a problematic country for world peace and security. In order to 
reach his aims, Qaddafi needed to finance his political ambitions and promote his ideology in 
some parts of the world, and in this particular connection, the country’s oil revenues were 
indispensable as they effectively allowed Qaddafi to export his revolution and support 
various movements, especially in developing countries. As part of this attempt to disseminate 
his revolution, Qaddafi was critical of governments that were friendly to the West, such as 
Egypt during Sadat’s presidency, Jordan, Morocco under Hassan II, and Saudi Arabia, all of 
which had special relationships with the United States (Tanter, 1998:124).
172
  Furthermore, as 
a rentier state, Libya relied heavily on its oil and gas income, which was mainly spent by 
Qaddafi without accountability or transparency, and which provided the Libyan regime with 
the means to import huge quantities of military hardware.
173
  
It was observed in Chapter Two in the construction of the theoretical framework for this 
study, that the Qaddafi era could be divided into three distinct periods; and that the realist 
tenets such as power, security, and economic sanctions are essential to explain the Libyan 
case as it progressed through these periods. Specifically, it became clear that the Qaddafi 
regime’s intentions to get the sanctions lifted, end the country’s diplomatic isolation, and 
avoid military confrontations with the West and particularly with the US, were necessary for 
Libya’s return to the international community. Certainly, the realist paradigm can assist in 
developing an understanding of the initial shift in Libya’s behaviour, specifically in the 
second phase between 1982 and 2000. As is discussed in this chapter, the incentives for the 
shift of the Qaddafi regime’s policies varied.  It was in fact, compelled to comply and co-
operate with the UN, the US, and the rest of the international community, and to avoid 
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 All Qaddafi’s actions worried several states, both regionally and internationally.  Qaddafi was seen as a 
troublemaker by states such as Sudan, Chad, Uganda, Cameroon, Gabon, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal 
and Sierra Leone, which had all detected some acts of subversion and interference in their affairs.   
173
 For more detail see Zartman, W, “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971-1980” March 
(1983). 
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military confrontation in order to achieve the removal of the international sanctions, the end 
to Libya’s diplomatic isolation, and to engage in economic investment in various aspects. In 
this respect, Qaddafi’s regime was required by the US, Britain, France, and the international 
community to end support for terrorism, stop its subversion activities, end the pursuit of 
unconventional weapons, and most importantly, change its attitudes and behaviour to the 
West.  
The next section examines Qaddafi’s involvement with terrorism as well as his support for 
revolutionary movements. Without doubt, the activities associated with Libya drew attention 
from the world community and led several states to isolate and boycott Qaddafi’s regime and 
in some instances, to attack it militarily. 
 
4.2  Libya and Armed Militancy 
Qaddafi’s revolutionary activities within and outside Libya posed a formidable threat to the 
stability and security of several states.  The Western bloc also suspected Qaddafi of being the 
Soviet surrogate in the region and of turning the Libyan territory into a USSR base. In fact, 
Qaddafi believed that the achievement of his self-assigned mission towards Arab unity 
required revolutionary and radical changes in the Arab World, to be brought about by him 
provoking the fall of what he considered as reactionary and ‘rotten’ Arab regimes (Ronen, 
2008:85). Qaddafi’s ideology, rhetoric, policies, and actions in the region, were more than 
sufficient to greatly worry Arab and African leaders, thereby compelling those figures to 
react in order to protect their states and their regimes.  
Libya’s early involvements in Africa were meant to assist liberation movements such as the 
ANC in their fight against the Apartheid regime of South Africa. In addition, however, 
Qaddafi was involved in helping other African states to be less dependent on their former 
colonisers. During that particular period, Qaddafi - seeing himself as the legitimate heir of 
Nasser - was still pursuing his dream of achieving what his hero had failed to do, unite the 
Arab World (Huliaras, 2001:5). It was this commitment to Nasserism that encouraged 
Qaddafi’s interference with African states’ politics. Indeed, Libya’s heavy involvement in 
African politics in the 1970s and 1980s represented the peak of the regime’s revolutionary 
activities. Such involvement was seen in Qaddafi’s attempt to destabilise African regimes 
perceived as pro-western, by providing support to their opposition movements. At the same 
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time, other regimes which he endorsed, were financed and supported. World leaders had 
different ways of describing Colonel Qaddafi’s military adventures. For instance, Kissinger 
described Qaddafi as a ‘rogue criminal’, Numeiry considered Qaddafi to have ‘split 
personalities both evil’, Castro preferred to describe him as a ‘reckless adventurer’, while 
Regan referred to him as “the mad dog of the Middle East” (Solomon and Swart, 2005:469-
471). Certainly, Qaddafi’s regional and international meddling created tensions and concerns 
for several countries; and in return, this interference was countered with similar actions by 
the affected states (i.e. support was given to Libyan dissidents, training was provided for 
Qaddafi’s opposition, and threats were made regarding international isolation, and military 
retaliation). 
In the regional sphere, Sudan, due to its geographic location, was constantly under Qaddafi’s 
intrigues. The Libyan ruler interfered with the domestic politics of that country by plotting 
against the regime of Numeiry such that the Sudanese president was induced to seek alliances 
with Egypt in order to counter Qaddafi’s actions. Other neighbouring countries were also 
targeted by the Libyan regime; for instance, the tensions with the Moroccan monarchy 
resulted in freezing the relations between the two countries from 1975 until the middle of 
1981. In that year, Qaddafi assured Hassan II that he would no longer provide military 
support for the independent movement of the Western Sahara, the Polisario Front. Libya’s 
western neighbour, Tunisia, also had to counter Qaddafi’s plans to intervene in Tunisian 
domestic affairs in the 1980s. In this respect it was claimed that Qaddafi was supporting 
rebels eager to overthrow President Bourguiba, an action that led to a low-intensity conflict 
on the borders. Relatively good relations existed between Libya and Algeria until Qaddafi 
changed his position regarding the issue of the Western Sahara by standing with the 
Moroccan king, and at this point Algeria reacted by excluding Libya from its alliance (Joffé, 
2005:609-610). 
Not surprisingly, Libya’s neighbours were extremely concerned about the potential threats 
posed by Qaddafi, and consequently formed alliances to deter any subversion or military 
aggression against their respective countries. For instance, Tunisia, Algeria, and Mauritania 
signed the treaty of Brotherhood and Concord in 1983, based mainly on national security and 
defence matters. And when Libya’s relations with Tunisia worsened, Tunisia allied with 
Algeria as a means of countering Libyan’s threats (Mezran, 1998:4-5). 
 146 
Another treaty, the Maghreb Fraternity and Co-operation Treaty between Algeria, Tunisia, 
and Mauritania was signed in 1983, without including Libya and Morocco. As a response, 
Morocco concluded the Treaty of Oujda with Libya in 1985. By signing that treaty, Morocco 
broke its isolation in North Africa and gained an ally in the region. However, the treaty 
collapsed soon afterwards. In 1988, Algeria asked Libya to join the existing Treaty of 
Concord, to contain and accommodate Qaddafi’s behaviour in the region. In this connection 
the Algerian President Benjedid stated:  
a policy of accommodation and political restraint would ‘neutralise’ Libya, 
‘freezing’ its efforts to destabilise its neighbours and engage in terrorism. 
By signing the treaty, Qaddafi would be promising, in effect, ‘not to 
interfere, not export one’s experience to any other country and to respect 
the existing regimes (Mezran, 1998:14). 
The policies of Libya together with its open defiance of the Western World, induced the 
United States to take strong measures against Qaddafi’s regime. Unilateral sanctions were 
implemented by the American administration, such as the ban on arms exports to Libya and 
the closing of the American Embassy in Tripoli. The Libyan Embassy in Washington was 
also ordered to close and American citizens were banned from travelling to Libya. These 
American decisions were due to Libya’s involvement in, and support for, international 
terrorism. Accordingly, Rose affirms that during the mid-1980s, Libya’s actions and deeds 
were not only confined to the Libyan periphery, but also extended to other parts of the 
Middle East and North Africa, provoking an increase in international terrorism (Rose, 
1999:141-142). Edward Schumacher stated in 1986 that Qaddafi’s regime “at one time or 
other backed subversive groups in almost every other North African country” (Schumacher, 
1986-1987:332). Effectively, Qaddafi publicly acknowledged Libya’s position towards the 
Western powers in a speech addressed to the Organisation of Non-Aligned Movements in 
September 1986, when he stated: “I will do everything in my power to divide the world into 
imperialists and freedom-fighters” (Ganor, 1992:1). This statement was perceived as 
preaching violence against a number of countries. According to Qaddafi’s view, any attack 
against ‘imperialist’ countries was legitimate. Therefore, the following section explores the 
rise and fall of Qaddafi’s adventurist activities in the region and around the globe. 
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4.2.1 Qaddafi’s Regional and International Policies   
Qaddafi refused to make any distinction between terrorism and legitimate struggle. For him, 
it was perfectly acceptable to use revolutionary violence to achieve political gains, such as 
prestige, power, and allies. The regime provided training, financial support, and shelter to 
armed organisations such as the IRA, Spain’s ETA, Italy’s Red Brigade, and different 
Palestinian groups. Indeed, Edward Hoover, the first director of the FBI, claimed that Libya 
represented “[t]he greatest threat to the internal security of the country” (Burweila, 
2006:13).
174
  
After a few years in power, Qaddafi arrogantly claimed that the Libyan political platform was 
not enough to fully express his ambitions and realise his future plans; he needed a different 
and wider environment to be recognised as a regional leader, as somebody with a certain 
weight in world politics. As a visionary, keen to realise his ideas and projects, he was 
convinced that his revolutionary views had to be known and acknowledged beyond Libya’s 
geographical borders. He also knew that his plans would not be achievable without using 
Libya’s oil revenues. Accordingly, he financed his ideology and beliefs in order to provoke 
the desired changes in the region and beyond, but the outcomes were far from matching the 
level of the investments made, and in reality very little success was achieved. In addition, 
Qaddafi’s desire to be seen as a true leader in the Arab World, Africa, and Latin America, 
was not realised, despite the constant emphasis in his speeches, on sensitive issues such as 
colonialism, imperialism, uniting the Arab world, and later on, uniting the African continent 
(Pargeter, 2012:118). Qaddafi’s intentions were to alienate the populations from their rulers, 
by popularising his image among Arab and African masses through inflammatory speeches, 
and to reach his aims, he did not hesitate in investing significant resources in terms of 
propaganda and finances. He supported people who adopted his ideologies and were working 
towards overthrowing their governments.  
Qaddafi’s beliefs and approaches towards specific issues such as Arab unity, Western 
imperialism, and Israel were not shared by Arab rulers. During the Cold War, both Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia refused his offers due to his overt defiance of the superpowers and his pretences 
to defend noble causes.
175
 So, despite Qaddafi’s repeated attempts to attract Arab rulers to his 
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 Aya Burweila, Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) Research Paper no. 105 
(2006) Libya after Rapprochement: Implications on Energy Security. 
175
  The antagonism with Egypt occurred in the post-Nasser era, with the presidency of Anwar Sadat (1970-
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world design, the governments of these countries were nevertheless suspicious about his real 
intentions and very early distanced themselves from the Libyan regime. Moreover, other 
leaders, instead of waiting for his intrigues, mischiefs, and tribulations, used in anticipation a 
large variety of means to encounter Qaddafi’s actions such as attempts to destabilise his 
regime and weaken his rule, by backing Libya’s opposition movements in exile and helping 
assassination attempts against him (Pargeter, 2012:119-120).   
The radicalism promoted by Tripoli’s regime, its engagement in support of armed struggles, 
and its backing of regional and international terrorism, by different groups, liberation 
movements and subversive ones, reached its height in the 1980s. During that decade, Libya 
was heavily involved, whether directly or covertly, in a series of incidents that upset many 
Western countries, concerned by the radical stance and policies adopted by the Libyan 
regime. The following section sheds light on various militant and revolutionary activities 
outside the Libyan sphere. 
 
4.2.2 Qaddafi’s Support for Outlawed Movements  
 
During the last decade of the Cold War (1979-1989), Libya was suspected of being an 
instrument in the hands of the Soviets by being involved in proxy wars for the USSR.
176
 For 
instance, in 1975 the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Libya that allowed the 5
th
 
Eskadra to use Libya’s ports at Tobruk and Baida. Qaddafi’s regime also allowed the Soviets 
to access the military bases at Wheelus and El Adem. Additionally, the Soviet Union made 
similar agreements with Tunisia and Morocco for the same purpose (McCormick, 1987:14). 
Moreover, Libya’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union raised some concerns due to the fear 
that the Libyan military capability could be used by the Soviet Union in eventual conflicts 
with the West or in Africa. On the other hand, Egypt conducted several military manoeuvres 
conjointly with the US in response to Qaddafi’s meddling in neighbouring countries and in 
Africa. Libya reacted by strengthening its relations with the Soviet Union, acquired more 
military equipment, and conducted joint military exercises in 1982, 1983, and 1984 in the 
Mediterranean Sea (El-Kikhia, 1997:126-127). Moreover, commercial contracts and mutual 
interests overcame the ideological incompatibility between Libya and the Soviet Union 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1981). Saudi Arabia and Egypt were in fact considered as part of the western bloc. 
176
 In view of Libya’s relations with the Soviet Union, it is worth noting that after the Soviet advisers’ 
withdrawal from Egypt during the Sadat era, Libyan-Soviet relations became closer.   
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For Qaddafi, opposing Western hegemony in general and the United States in particular, 
meant to support indiscriminately all movements and groups that were ready to challenge 
such supremacy. Therefore, various opposition groups, liberation movements as well as 
radical organisations across the world, benefitted from the generous backing of the Libyan 
regime, without being accountable for their unethical actions. In reality, the fact that these 
movements conducted terrorist activities did not concern Qaddafi greatly. Instead, the 
outcomes of such actions were significant for the Libyan ruler who approved when the targets 
of terrorism were either Western countries or regional governments with different ideologies 
from the Libyan one. St John captures the real essence of Qaddafi’s understanding regarding 
the issue of revolutionary activities, when he states that “Qaddafi unsuccessfully attempted to 
differentiate between terrorism, which he claimed to reject, and revolutionary violence, which 
he openly advocated” (St John, 1987:45-46). 
Qaddafi’s vision and strategy for becoming the incontestable leader of the Arab World was 
achievable through the help of revolutionary movements, who (according to him) once in 
power would be grateful and faithful to the Libyan leader. With the purpose of encountering 
Qaddafi’s activities, few Arab regimes used the same strategy as the Libyan leader by 
backing some Libyan opposition movements in exile, providing them with the appropriate 
logistics, and in some instances training them. In order to prevent all attempts from abroad, a 
campaign of assassinations on Libyan dissidents started worldwide, whether in neighbouring 
countries, in Europe or in America.
177
 Alterman believed that, due to Qaddafi’s radical 
policies, Libya became a problematic country to the West in general and to its neighbours in 
particular (Alterman, 2006:3). 
Regarding Libya’s support for revolutionary movements, Anderson (1987) underlines the fact 
that Qaddafi was considered by the other Arab leaders as the main promoter and permanent 
instigator of a wide revolution in the Arab World. However, the failure to provoke such 
revolution, and the decision of Egypt and Jordan to engage in a peace process with Israel, 
created real tensions and disappointed Qaddafi and upset his plans. On the other hand, the 
real and strong support for the Libyan regime came from states such as Syria and Iran who 
had excellent relations with Libya. According to Anderson (1987:65), “[o]nly Iran and Syria 
remained on good, if occasionally competitive, terms with Libya, whose support of Persian 
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 Libya’s actions had reached a high level in the early eighties. For instance, in 1993 Libya’s security services 
abducted and killed Mansour Elkihia, who was attending a conference on human rights in Egypt.  
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Iran in its war with Arab Iraq reflected the growth of revolutionary solidarity at the expense 
of Arab causes in Qaddafi’s foreign policy”.  
In another instance, Qaddafi supported Ethiopia, which is largely Christian, over a Muslim 
and Arab country, Sudan. Such backing puzzled some analysts for whom such a stance was 
in contradiction with Qaddafi’s claims (regarding the solidarity within the Muslim world) 
(Solomon and Swart, 2005:470). In fact, Qaddafi did have a peculiar perspective, and in this 
particular case he regarded Numeiry’s regime as the real enemy,178 regardless of the religion 
of the people of Sudan. Qaddafi did not pardon Numeiry for siding with Sadat over the Camp 
David Agreements. Jalloud, one of his close companions confessed in an interview that 
Qaddafi told him: “I won’t bring Numeiry down, but I will make him bleed, and when that 
happens, the opposition in the North will bring his regime down” (Pargeter, 2012:131). 
Therefore, revolutionary activities targeting regimes judged inimical to the Libyan system of 
governance were part of Libya’s foreign policies.   
 
Qaddafi’s domestic and foreign policies, claims,179 threats, and reckless decisions to support 
indiscriminate violence, affected the image of Libya worldwide, and as a consequence, the 
country was considered as a ‘rogue’ and ‘pariah’ state, exactly the opposite of Qaddafi’s 
expectations. However, Joffé and Paoletti conceded that the ideological commitment of 
Qaddafi could quickly change when there was a risk to Libya’s security (Joffé and Paoletti, 
2010:18). These observations by Joffé and Paoletti confirmed what Deeb had stated in 1986, 
that Qaddafi was rational in decision-making, especially when he felt that his regime was 
under threat. In fact, Deeb criticised analysts who described the Qaddafi as irrational,
 180
 
saying: “[i]f Qaddafi was so out of touch with reality and his perceptions and expectations so 
irrational and distorted, it is unlikely that he would have remained in power for so long or 
played such an active role in Arab and African Affairs over the past sixteen years” (Deeb, 
1986:152). Deeb’s opinion seems more plausible and the evidence of her position is 
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 In the speech delivered during the Summit of the Organization of Non-Aligned States in September 1986, 
Qaddafi defiantly stated: “I will do everything in my power to divide the world into imperialists and freedom-
fighters”. Any violent action against one of the ‘imperialist’ states is just and welcome. Those perpetrating these 
attacks are not ‘terrorists’ according to Qaddafi’s understanding, but rather ‘freedom fighters’, because “national 
liberation can only be achieved through armed struggle”. Any attempt at bargaining, negotiating or reaching a 
compromise with the ‘imperialist bloc’ is doomed to failure and will harm the Arab cause”. 
 
180
 This school of thought considers Libya’s foreign policies according to the psychological determinants of 
Qaddafi. 
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illustrated by the involvement of Qaddafi in faraway areas, such as South America by 
supporting Nicaragua, El Salvador and M19 - the Colombian separatists’ movements. 
 
4.2.3 Libya’s Support for Latin American and Asian Revolutionary Movements 
Qaddafi supported revolutionary and liberation movements almost everywhere in the world. 
Professor Ganor,
181
 an expert on terrorism, commented on this, pointing out that the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua and other armed factions in El Salvador were mainly financed by 
Qaddafi. Additionally, he mentioned another incident which occurred in Brazil in April 1983, 
when a huge amount of arms were found on board a Libyan plane. The Libyans pretended at 
that time that the plane was carrying medical supplies intended for Nicaragua. However, it is 
believed that the arms were in fact destined for the Colombian group M19.
182
 Additionally, 
Ganor observed that Libya supported the IRA in Northern Ireland, the ‘Brigade Rosse’ (Red 
Brigade) in Italy, and groups in Japan, Turkey, and Thailand among other places. The 
backing of several Palestinian groups, was also mentioned by the author (Ganor, 1992:28-
29). 
 
This support led some countries and governments to respond using different means (i.e. 
financing and training the exiled opposition movements). According to Allman (1975:305), 
Qaddafi’s assistance and the aid which was delivered to the liberation or revolutionary 
movements such as the IRA was fruitless and unproductive. However, this assertion was 
challenged by The Independent newspaper in 2009, which revealed that the UK government 
made a financial offer of 14 million Pounds to Qaddafi’s regime in return for its cessation of 
support for the IRA.
183
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 Dr Ganor’s article was published in the “Survey of Arab Affairs - A periodic supplement to Jerusalem Letter 
/Viewpoints” SAA: 28 29 Iyar 5752 1 June 1992. Dr Ganor is a member of the International Advisory Council 
of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Article available 
at:http://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=429 
182
 Originally, the 19
th
 of April Movement or M-19, was a Colombian guerrilla movement, that after conducting 
an armed revolutionary struggle (1980s), decided to enter political life (late 80s and 90s) by creating their own 
political party, the M19 Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democrática M-19), The ideology of the M19 was a 
mixture of populism and revolutionary socialism, which might explain Qaddafi’s support.  
183
 The Independent reproduced a copy from the National Archive in Kew. See the article online, available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/britain-offered-gaddafi-16314m-to-stop-supporting-the-ira-
1797754.html  
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Former American Ambassador to the UN, Jeane J Kirkpatrick,
184
 underlined that the 
relationship between the Libyan and Nicaraguan governments was similar to the one between 
ordinary people (in terms of friendship). Referring to the ties between the Nicaraguan 
President Daniel Ortega and Qaddafi, she reiterated the message about the 1986 bombing of 
Qaddafi’s headquarters: 
My brother, wrote President Daniel, given the brutal terrorist action 
launched by the US government against the people of the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriyah, I wish to send my sentiments and solidarity from the FSLN 
National Directorate and the Nicaraguan people and government 
(Kirkpatrick,1991:205). 
Kirkpatrick observed that the two leaders had, in fact, shared a friendship with very strong 
bonds for decades. She pointed out that, as early as 1979, before they came to power in July 
1979, Sandinista leaders were involved in the Middle East and North Africa, training the PLO 
camps in Libya and Lebanon. The strong ties between the two counties were reinforced when 
the Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua. Qaddafi then promised political and financial aid to 
the new rulers, and indeed kept his promise. 
“Our friendship with Libya is eternal”, said Sandinista commander Tomas Borge on 
September 1, 1984.  While Sergio Ramirez, another influential Sandinista, stated that: 
the solidarity of the Libyan people, of the Libyan government and comrade 
Muammar Qaddafi was always patently manifest. This solidarity has been 
made real, has been made effective, and has been made more fraternal since 
the triumph of our revolution (Kirkpatrick, 1991:205-206). 
The Sandinistas received a $100 million ‘loan’ from Libya in the early years and had 
commercial agreements with the Libyan regime, exchanging oil for bananas and coffee. 
However, these apparent trades were merely a smokescreen protecting the other dimension in 
the relationship, which emerged in April 1983, when during an inspection, Brazilian 
authorities found eighty-four tons of military equipment (missiles, machine guns, bazookas, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
It is claimed that Harold Wilson’s Labour government was in negotiation in the 1970s to halt the supply of arms 
from Tripoli to the Provisional IRA. Britain made a secret offer to pay 14 million pounds to Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi.  In a ‘personal message’ to Gaddafi sent in 1975, the British Prime Minister said that Britain would 
make the payment as part of an agreement to end Libya’s material support for the IRA. “I do not want to 
anticipate the results of the forthcoming talks, which we shall enter into in a truly constructive spirit, but it might 
be helpful nevertheless to mention two questions of particular importance to us. The first of these concerns 
Northern Ireland”, he wrote.  
184
 See Kirkpatrick J J (1991:205-207) The Withering away of the Totalitarian State ... and Other Surprises.   
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mortars, bombs, cannons and two unassembled fighter planes) in four Libyan planes. All 
these arms were for the Nicaraguan regime (Waller, 1999:192).  
The reality of Nicaragua’s training with the PLO and Libya cannot be denied: nor can the 
Libyan economic, financial, and military assistance given to the Sandinistas. Nicaragua’s 
capital Managua was transformed as a consequence of Qaddafi’s aid, and it soon became the 
capital city of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere. For instance, groups such as the German 
Bader-Meinhoff gang, the Basque ETA, Colombia’s M19, Peru’s Sendero Luninoso, and El 
Salvador’s FMLN often met Libyans and Palestinians in Managua. The Italian authorities 
publicly complained of the presence of fugitive Italian terrorists in Managua. When the 
Colombian M19 group conducted their deadly operation against Colombia’s Supreme Court, 
more than 100 people were killed. It was found afterwards that the guns used during the 
terrorist raid were linked with Libya, Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua.
185
 The link with Libya 
was also clear. People like Diana Morales, who inflicted the most casualties on the military 
were trained in Libya and in Latin America. Speaking after the American bombing of Libya, 
Sandinista commander Tomas Borge commented: “Who has given the United States 
government the right to determine what is terrorism and what is not terrorism?”  (Kirkpatrick, 
1991:205-207). 
Brian Davis
186
 listed the countries in the Western Hemisphere, which benefitted from 
Qaddafi largesse. Specifically, he observed: 
The western hemisphere did not escape Qaddafi’s attention, especially in 
the 1980s. Libya cultivated strong ties with Cuba and with the Marxist New 
Jewel regime on Grenada, providing an interest-free loan for the airport 
construction project over which Washington openly expressed worries. 
Qaddafi also sent missiles and other weaponry to Argentina in its 1982 war 
against his nemesis Great Britain. 
Davis confirmed previous claims concerning the Libyan relationship with the Sandinistas, 
underlining the fact that the Sandinistas had received Libyan training and arms since the early 
1970s. More detail is provided about that relationship by Davis, in the comment that:  
                                                          
185
 Some of the rifles used in the raid had been sold by the Vietnamese to Libya and from there were shipped to 
Nicaragua and then to the Colombian guerrilla movement. Sandinista army rifles (M-16s and R-16s) were also 
found at the scene. The Sandinistas directed preparation for the attack, which was modelled on their 1978 
seizure of the parliament building in Managua. An FSLN commando group traveling on Colombian passports 
arrived in that country a day before the bloody occupation and co-ordinated it. Other Nicaraguans handled 
communications. And Tomas Borges himself eulogised the slain Colombian guerrillas at a ‘people’s mass’. 
186
 See Davis B L. “Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya” (1991:17-18). 
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The Jamahiriyah supplied the Sandinista government with large loans and 
weaponry, invested in joint agricultural ventures, and sent advisers to help 
fight the contras, to assist in ‘interrogation techniques’, and to train 
terrorists in Nicaraguan camps (Davis, 1991:17-18). 
Moreover, there were close ties between Libya and the military regime in Suriname. Indeed, 
it was feared that such links might provide terrorists with sanctuaries where arms funds 
and/or training would be provided by Qaddafi (Davis, 1991:17-18).
 187
  
Nonetheless, the overwhelming activities of Qaddafi and his regime did not deter the 
opposition which, however small, did play a certain role in the Libyan saga, and several 
writers have tried to explore the different opposition groups and the methods they used to try 
to overthrow Qaddafi. As history reveals, however, Qaddafi managed to thwart all 
conspiracies in this respect. 
 
4.2.4 Libyan Opposition to Qaddafi 
Qaddafi wanted to be recognised as a revolutionary philosopher, thinker and great leader, and 
was ready to concretise his aspirations by all means. In fact, he used violence and terror to 
reach his aims - domestically, regionally, and internationally. On the domestic level, Libyan 
citizens were often oppressed by the revolutionary committees and many violent scenes were 
shown on national television including hangings, and executions of businessmen, students, 
and soldiers as well as of other ordinary people who opposed the regime.  
However, this overt repression did not prevent attempts to topple Qaddafi through military 
coups. Such efforts became more frequent after the 1980s, with one of the most significant 
coups against Qaddafi being in May 1984. This was conducted by the military wing of the 
National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), when the NFSL members attempted to 
storm Qaddafi’s compound in Tripoli but were unsuccessful.188 Indeed, most of the people 
involved were captured and publicly executed. Other attempts by military officers to topple 
                                                          
187
The other recipients of Qaddafi largesse were the Colombian M-19 guerrillas; the Peruvians Sendero 
Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement; the “Alfaro Vive, Carajo!” terrorists 
of Ecuador; Marxist guerrillas from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela; terrorists from Uruguay, 
Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominic Republic, and Haiti; and leftist political groups in Panama, Antigua, Dominica, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
188
The National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL) is an opposition movement based abroad but with 
sympathisers within Libya. 
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Qaddafi were also foiled and again, the officers responsible were arrested and executed 
(Anderson, 1987:65). 
Qaddafi did not even spare the life of one of his closest companions and RCC members, 
Omar El-Mheyshi.
189
 Following the failure to depose Qaddafi in 1973 and the arrest of 200 
military officers who were involved in the plot (Oakes, 2011:135), El-Mheyshi sought refuge 
first in Tunisia, then in Egypt, and finally in Morocco. The late Moroccan King, Hassan II, 
was keen to gain the support of Qaddafi concerning the thorny question of the Western 
Sahara, so he struck a deal with Qaddafi in 1984, in the form of a treaty, known as the ‘Treaty 
of Oujda’.190 In return for his rapprochement with Qaddafi and Qaddafi’s policy change, 
King Hassan II handed El-Mhyeshi to the Libyan regime, and shortly afterwards, El-Mhyeshi 
was executed. As for domestic politics in Libya, Qaddafi ordered the killing of people from 
his own tribe, such as Hassan Ishkal,
191
 when they expressed their disapproval of the way he 
was ruling the country. Black stated that:  
Qaddafi has had to eliminate at least one member of his extended family 
when his primacy was threatened. His cousin Hassan Ishkal, in charge of 
domestic security and Libyan troops in Chad, was gunned down by regime 
supporters after it became clear that he was no longer willing to adhere to 
Qaddafi’s orders (Black, 2003:253). 192 
Qaddafi used demeaning terms such as ‘stray dogs’ and traitors to describe dissidents because 
they had contacts with the West or formed opposition movements abroad. Liquidation of 
exiled Libyans was one of the most used tools to remove the regime’s political opponents. 
And from the 1980s, the political assassinations of Libyans by the revolutionary committees 
across the world brought much attention and exerted pressure on Libya (Anderson, 1987:67).  
In October 1993, a group of military officers led by Colonels Muftah Gharum, Mustafa 
Balguasim, and Saad Salim Faraj from the cities of Bani Walid, attempted a military coup 
against Qaddafi but, the coup was foiled and the army officers were executed in 1997 by the 
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 El-Mheyshi was Minister of Planning at the time of the failed coup in 1973 against Qaddafi. 
190
The deal in question was to ensure that Qaddafi change his position on the Sahara and refrain from backing 
the independent Sahraouian movement, the Polisiario Front. 
191
 Hassan Ishkal was Qaddafi’s cousin. Mattes wrote that Colonel Hassan Ishkal was Commander of the Sirte 
military region and because of in-fighting with Qaddafi during the Chad intervention was eliminated on 24 
November 1985. See Hanspeter Mattes’s paper entitled Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle 
East: The Libyan Case. Paper presented at the Workshop on “Challenges of Security Sector Governance in the 
Middle East”, held in Geneva 12-13 July 2004, organised by the DCAF Working Group on Security Sector 
Governance and Reform in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
192
 See Black C R (2003). Muammar Qaddafi and Libya’s Strategic Culture. (Chapter 9) “Know the enemy” 
(2003).   
 
 156 
security forces (Oakes, 2011:135). Accordingly, Qaddafi’s regime issued a ‘Law of 
Collective Punishment’ allowing the regime to punish whole families, towns and tribes for 
any illegal activities against Qaddafi or the regime. This law was passed in 1997 (Eljahmi, 
2006:4). Following the numerous coups attempted by the military establishment, Qaddafi’s 
attitude changed drastically, and he managed to weaken this institution to such a level that it 
became a ‘negligible quantity’ as an actor on the Libyan scene. He then decided to rely 
heavily on the traditional tribal loyalties, either from elements in his own tribe, el 
Qadhadhfah, or through alliances with other tribes and clans, in order to ensure his own 
security and consolidate his power. As discussed previously, Qaddafi’s priorities were always 
to guarantee his survival and to strengthen his power by any means. He also considered 
whoever opposed his concept of state as an enemy.   
The Libyan political opposition groups abroad were diverse; some consisted of prominent 
Libyans in the regime, lawyers, businessmen, students, or military officers who had escaped 
from Qaddafi’s war in Chad and found refuge in the United States of America. What can be 
observed regarding the Libyan opposition is the fact that dissidents organised small political 
parties and operated outside Libya. Several groups were active such as the National Front for 
the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), the Libyan National Alliances, Libyan Movement for Change 
and Reform, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). However, despite being based 
abroad, they were constantly harassed, threatened, and faced several assassination attempts in 
the countries where they were living, or during their travelling (Vandewalle, 2006:128-130; 
Anderson, 1986:232-233).  
Nevertheless, the Libyan opposition never gave up, and since their movements were not 
restricted, they were very active, through the organisation of conferences, the publication of 
newsletters, press releases, documents and photos, denouncing the regime’s abuses of human 
rights, and shedding light on Qaddafi’s crimes, persecutions, and unjust policies. Most of 
these dissident groups and movements shared their radical opposition to Qaddafi’s regime, 
and voiced their opposition to Qaddafi’s policies on issues such as human rights violations at 
home and abroad. They were keen to present an alternative to the Libyan people and to be 
directly involved in Libyan politics after Qaddafi. Accordingly, they stated their various 
political perspectives in terms of constitution, and the establishment of political parties with a 
real role in a democratic Libyan state (Barger, 1999:67). 
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Violation of human rights was seen in the secret executions of Libyan citizens which the 
regime used to eliminate political opponents who rejected the political system and the 
authoritarianism of Qaddafi in Libya. Several Libyan citizens faced political violence because 
they requested their political and civil rights. Such brutality turned many Libyans into exiles, 
some as early as the beginning of the 1970s. The Revolutionary Committees represented the 
instrument used to terrorise Libyans. Lawyers, university lecturers, intellectuals and students 
were often blamed for the failure of the Libyan revolution, and hence, it was ‘legitimate’ for 
these committees to eliminate and crush the dissidents who threatened the regime 
(Henderson, 1980:18-19). The elements constituting the Revolutionary Committees (RCs) 
were ideologically brainwashed by Qaddafi’s discourse and consequently, were reliable, 
loyal, and ready to implement, by all means, the ideology of the regime.  
The most challenging opposition was represented by Islamist groups, who were thrashed by 
the Qaddafi’s regime thrashed them with an iron fist. In the late 1980s, members of the 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), formed small cells and engaged in military activities 
against Qaddafi’s regime, and indeed attempted to assassinate him in November 1996 while 
on a visit to a small town south of Libya.
193
 The Libyan Islamist movement was determined 
to get rid of the ‘Pharaoh’ of Libya, and Qaddafi security services used repression to uproot 
it,
194
 detaining most of the members of the LIFG and their close relatives. Moreover, in June 
1996, Qaddafi’s regime committed one of the biggest massacres in Libya, the ‘Abusleem 
Prison Massacre’, around 1,286 prisoners revolted because of the detention conditions; 
security forces killed them all in the courtyard and buried them in mass graves in the prison. 
Consequently, the LIFG members were dismembered and the survivors escaped from Libya 
(Pargeter, 2012:169-170). This massacre might be considered as one essential factor for the 
2011 popular uprising. Nevertheless, the tragic event of Abusleem was not buried, and its 
implications will be addressed in the next chapter.
195
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 Addullah Al-Grew, who was a member of the LIFG threw a hand grenade at Qaddafi but it did not explode.  
The perpetrator was caught, and summarily executed. The members of the Al-Grew family were thrown out of 
their home which was demolished. 
194
 Some of the Islamists who had in fact fought against the Russians in Afghanistan decided to return to 
Afghanistan to escape Qaddafi’s repression, others went to Europe.  
195
 Once the people knew about what happened in Abusleem, Qaddafi’s regime tried to contain the victims’ 
families and members of the LIFG, by offering compensation to the relatives of the victims. 
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4.3 Libya and the West 
The rise of international terrorism in the 1980s attracted increased international attention, as 
Libya’s state-backed terrorist activities caused immense suffering throughout the world in 
general, and to Libyans in particular. Indeed, the victims of the Qaddafi’s regime’s terrorism 
were not only Libyan citizens but also other foreign nationals. European states came into 
direct confrontation with Qaddafi’s regime because of Libyan violence that also reached 
European cities. For instance, in April 1984, Libyans studying in the UK were peacefully 
protesting in front of the Libyan Embassy at St James’s Square in London, in solidarity with 
their fellow students at Libyan Universities, and against the violent scenes at different Libyan 
campuses and against Qaddafi. WPC Yvonne Fletcher was one of the police officers 
deployed to guard the protest and subsequently died from gunfire coming from inside the 
Libyan Embassy, while several Libyans present at the scene were also injured. Following that 
tragic incident, the Libyan Embassy was surrounded by the police and under siege for eleven 
days. Eventually, the Libyan diplomats were allowed to leave the embassy (Jentleson and 
Whytock, 2005:58). 
The UK government reacted by freezing diplomatic relations with Libya, and Libyan 
diplomats were expelled from the UK. The murder of WPC Yvonne Fletcher was pursued 
with the Libyan government from the day she was shot dead until the late 1990s. It was not 
until 1999 that the Libyan government acknowledged its responsibility and paid Fletcher’s 
family compensation. A team from the British police flew to Libya to question the suspects 
(Simons, 2003:126-127).  
According to the British newspaper The Telegraph, after several visits to Libya the 
Metropolitan Police were given the names of two suspects in the killing of PCW Yvonne 
Fletcher. They were both high profile figures in Qaddafi’s regime, Matoug Mohammed 
Matoug and Abdelgadir Mohammed Baghdadi. However, after the 17 February 2011 
uprising, another suspect name was added, Salah Eddin Khalifa. According to Ashur Shamis, 
Mr Khalifa was one of the pro-Qaddafi students in London. After he returned to Libya, he 
was appointed head of the Tripoli High Institute for Electronics, and remains at large 
(Gilligan, 2012). 
 159 
Due to the regime’s support for terrorism, the Reagan administration decided to impose 
unilateral sanctions in 1981, in a bid to persuade Qaddafi to change his policies.
196
 In fact, the 
previous Carter administration had imposed partial economic sanctions on the regime, but 
this action had no major effect on the regime’s behaviour, and certainly not once the US oil 
companies had left Libya and been replaced by European ones.
197
 Additionally, before the 
bombing of ‘La Belle discotheque’, the US conducted air and naval manoeuvres (March 
1986) over the Gulf of Sidra, which Qaddafi claimed as Libya’s territorial waters. These 
manoeuvres occurred at the peak of the antagonism between Qaddafi’s regime and the 
Reagan administration. On 23 March 1986, American and Libyan armed forces clashed and 
the American military destroyed two Libyan missile boats and an anti-aircraft battery located 
in the Sirte basin on the coast of the Gulf of Sidra (Laham, 2008:102-103).  
The terrorist attack on ‘La Belle discotheque’, on 5 April 1986 was shocking. The club was 
very popular with American military personnel and targeted for that reason, with the 
explosion killing two American soldiers and a Turkish woman, and injuring more than 200 
people. Libya was immediately suspected of this act of terror, especially after certain 
messages were intercepted suggesting this, and the Libyan security agents who operated in 
East Berlin were accused of planting the explosives. When the intercepted cables between 
Tripoli and East Berlin were thoroughly analysed, the Reagan administration was sure it had 
proof that Qaddafi’s regime was behind the attack (Stanik, 2003:144), and although the main 
perpetrators were not identified in the immediate aftermath of the incident, and the case was 
still under investigation, the Reagan administration explicitly confirmed the Libyan 
government’s involvement in the terrorist incident.  
The bombing of the La Belle discotheque in 1986 was perceived as a retaliatory attack for the 
sinking of the two Libyan navy boats by the US, and the Reagan administration quickly 
reacted on 15 April 1986 by making a limited air strike on targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. 
One of the main targets was Qaddafi’s barrack in Tripoli, in an operation entitled El Dorado 
Canyon (Simons, 2003:127). After the bombing of Qaddafi’s headquarters, Qaddafi appeared 
as a victim of American bullying, several governments including the Arab League 
condemned the bombing of Libya, and the European countries were reluctant to support the 
                                                          
196
 In 1982 the Reagan administration imposed an embargo on oil imports from Qaddafi’s regime and prohibited 
technology transfers to Libya. By 1986 the US had cut off its economic ties and imposed a series of economic 
sanctions, which damaged Libya’s oil industry due to its dependence on US technology. 
197
 President Jimmy Carter ordered the closure of the US embassy in Tripoli in February 1980. 
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US in this attack (Laham, 2008:108). The operation was seen by the Libyan government at 
that time as an assassination attempt against Qaddafi.  
The air raid targeting Qaddafi’s compounds in both Tripoli and Benghazi killed dozens of 
civilians and injured many others. According to the Libyan regime, 36 civilians and one 
soldier were killed, but other estimates indicated a higher number of deaths from the military. 
An American jet fighter F-111 was shot down and its two pilots were killed. A combination 
of psychological and covert pressure such as contacting dissident groups in Libya was co-
ordinated in order to unseat Qaddafi. Military unrest occurred because of the discontent 
among military officers with Qaddafi’s policies that had led to confrontations with states such 
as the US, France, Chad, Egypt, and Tunisia. Undoubtedly, the American airstrike had an 
impact on ordinary Libyans, the military, and Qaddafi himself, but it was ineffective in the 
long term since other terrorist incidents continued to occur in which the Libyan regime was 
connected either directly or indirectly (Schumacher, 1986/87:335-337).
198
   
British bases were used by the F-111s and other jet fighters A-6s, A-7s, and F-18s flew from 
an aircraft carrier stationed at the Libyan coast. In fact, the French and the Spanish authorities 
did not grant the US planes permission to use their airspace for the British based F-111s to 
join other jet fighters due to the fact that these were the only jet fighters able to achieve the 
type of low-level precision airstrike needed.
199
 The raid resulted in the destruction of 
civilians’ houses and other buildings, as well as damaging the diplomatic residences of 
France, Austria, and Finland (Sidaway, 1989:41).  
However, as indicated, the US counter-terrorism campaign intended to halt the training of 
terrorists on Libyan soil, and to destroy the training facilities themselves, was not successful. 
Clearly, this military action was designed to end Qaddafi’s support for terrorism, and to 
alienate the Libyan military from Qaddafi and his regime. Another objective was to convince 
the European allies that if they really wanted the US to refrain from using unilateral military 
actions, the best way was to impose collective sanctions against the Libyan regime (Bowen, 
2006:41). 
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 The Reagan administration bombing of Qaddafi’s headquarters did not prevent the hijacking of the Pan 
American aeroplane in Karachi just a few months later in September 1986, in which a Libyan link was 
suspected by the presence of several elements.  
199
 The F-111s jets were induced to use a longer route over the Atlantic Ocean. French and Spanish authorities 
judged that it was ‘unnecessary’ for US aircraft to conduct their mission by using their airspace. 
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The Reagan administration claimed that the American raid in April 1986 forced Qaddafi to 
abandon his support for international terrorism. Indeed, Joffe and Paoletti (2010) believe that 
the April 1986 bombings marked a wake-up call for Colonel Qaddafi and his regime. They 
pointed out that the Libyan leadership “could no longer ignore the reality of American 
power”, and that the foreign policies in support of subversive movements, international 
terrorism, whether through rhetoric or in a more concrete manner, had to be revised (Joffe 
and Paoletti, 2010:22). 
In the same vein, Ronen mentioned that Qaddafi benefitted from two serious setbacks within 
the US terrorism policy, which occurred later in 1986. The first one related to the discovery 
of a plot to overthrow Qaddafi, through which it eventually became clear that the US 
administration supported the idea of toppling Qaddafi. This action was accompanied with the 
manipulation of the US media to enhance the prospects of his political elimination (Ronen, 
2008:34). The second setback was the infamous ‘Iran gate’ in which the media revealed that 
whilst operating an arms embargo against Iran, the US was simultaneously providing arms to 
this country. This was reported by Ronen who stated that: 
Washington was supplying weapons to Tehran, with the aim of bringing 
home US nationals held hostages by pro-Iran terrorists in Lebanon. The 
publicization of these affairs heavily damaged the moral standing of the 
United States as a champion of antiterrorism, and in turn, benefitted 
Qaddafi’s Libya (Ronen, 2008:34). 
 
Nonetheless, despite these flaws in the US behaviour, the pressure on Qaddafi was mounting 
from several fronts, economically, diplomatically, and militarily (Schumacher, 1986/87:337). 
At the same time, however, Libyan support for terrorism remained undeterred as evidenced 
by the terrorist acts perpetrated against two civilian aircrafts - the bombing of Pan Am 103 
over the Scottish town of Lockerbie in 1988, and the downing of the French airliner UTA in 
the subsequent year. 
 
4.3.1 The Lockerbie and UTA Cases 
Two major air incidents occurred in 1988 and 1989, which were later connected with the 
Libyan regime. In the case of the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, this took place on 21 
December 1988 over the small Scottish town of Lockerbie, killing all 259 people on board. 
The jumbo jet was en route from Heathrow airport to John F Kennedy airport, when a bomb 
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exploded in the cargo hold which damaged the plane’s electric power. There was no chance 
of an emergency landing, and all passengers on board were killed, in addition to 11 people on 
the ground. The Lockerbie air disaster was one of the most tragic cases in civil aviation 
history. The criminal investigation into the Lockerbie case began a comprehensive search to 
find the perpetrators and their sponsor (Matar and Thabit, 2004:7). 
 Less than a week after the start of the official investigation, the joint team of British and 
American investigators found that the destruction of the airplane was no accident but the 
result of an intentional bombing. Between January 1989 and November 1991, the 
investigators questioned more than 15,000 people in different countries and continents, and 
sea  rched some 845 square miles around Lockerbie. In the mid-1990s, a Palestinian group, 
the PFLP of Ahmad Jibril, was thought to be behind the terrorist act. According to the 
proponents of this theory, Ayatollah Khomeini commissioned such an action against an 
American airliner in revenge for the shooting down, by the USS Vincennes, of an Iranian 
Airbus containing pilgrims to Mecca in July 1988 (Black, 1998:207).
200
 However, the results 
of the investigation were quite surprising since on 14 November 1989, the Scottish and US 
prosecution authorities announced that they had brought criminal charges against two Libyan 
citizens. The two men, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al-Megrahi, and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, 
were accused of being agents working for the Libyan intelligence service.  
The main factor pointing to Libya’s involvement in the Lockerbie bombing was the discovery 
of a microchip of the bomb, followed by the arrest of two Libyan intelligence agents, in 
possession of explosive devices (in Senegal in 1988). Further investigations showed a link 
between the Lockerbie timer and the two Libyan suspects (Plachta, 2001:93).
201
 
Due to the absence of diplomatic relations with Libya, the UK and the US made informal 
extradition demands, through the Belgian Embassy, to Tripoli. Two weeks later, the US and 
the UK issued a statement, which required Libya to hand over the two suspects for trial. The 
Libyan government refused to extradite the suspects because this undermined its sovereignty, 
and instead started its own legal proceedings.
202
 Qaddafi’s regime stated that Libya had its 
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own competent judicial system and could not hand over its nationals, who were kept in 
custody. The Libyan government offered the US and the UK governments observer status 
during the trial of the suspects in Libya, but both governments refused to accept. After further 
negotiations, the Libyan authorities suggested that the suspects could be tried either in a 
neutral country or that the International Court of Justice could decide where the trial could 
take place. Eventually, Libya agreed to hand over the suspects to be tried in The Hague, by 
Scottish judges (Plachta, 2001:127).  
Another tragic incident occurred on 19 September 1989 when a French airliner, UTA 772 
exploded over Niger after a brief transit in Chad, within less than an hour of its departure 
from Brazzaville, the Republic of the Congo. The huge explosion killed all the people on 
board including the crew. The debris of the blasted aircraft was scattered over the desert and 
the cockpit was found five kilometres from the explosion (Simons, 2003:142). 
According to Younis Lahwej, the suspicion of Libyan involvement in the downing of the 
French plane UTA 772, was due to the belief that Mohammed Al-Maghrief, a Libyan 
opposition leader and the head of (NFSL), was on board that plane (after a brief stop in 
Chad). Another incentive was the presence of the wife of the ex-American Ambassador to 
Chad. There was an assumption that the Libyan government thought that Colonel Robert Lee 
Pugh was transforming former Libyan prisoners in Chad into fighters against Qaddafi’s 
regime. The Libyan involvement in this matter was proclaimed before the accusation of 
Libya in the Lockerbie bombing. France required the assistance of the Libyan government 
during the investigation on the causes of the blast. More specifically, the French authorities 
wanted to investigate the matter of the crash plane with Libya’s head of security Abdullah 
Al-Sanusi and other Libyan officials. However, the Libyan regime refused to participate in 
the investigation launched by the French. The results of the inquest show that Libya was 
linked to the crash (Lahwej, 1998:356).  
 
4.3.2 US Unilateral Sanctions and UN Multilateral Sanctions  
 
The international community was united in condemning these two horrific acts of terrorism, 
and the US, Britain and France demanded Libya’s full co-operation with the investigations 
launched to determine responsibility for the Lockerbie and UTA bombings. It was the 
reluctance of the Libyan regime to co-operate in these investigations which prompted the UN 
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in 1992 to demand that Libya officially respond to the accusations made by the US, Britain, 
and France. Consequently, on 11 January 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) issued 
Resolution 731 which required the Libyan government to co-operate and “immediately 
provide a full and effective response” to the earlier four demands of the US, the UK, and 
France; firstly, by turning over the two suspects, secondly, by disclosing all information 
about the bombings, thirdly, by ending its support for terrorism, and fourthly by paying 
compensation to the victims’ relatives. According to Hurd: 
There was no mention in the resolution of further action should Libya fail 
to comply, and it did not specify what Charter provisions it was relying on 
for its authority. It did contain a statement that international terrorism 
“constitute[s] a threat to international peace and security”, which is 
important Charter language for justifying Council involvement in an issue, 
but this reflected the inability of the sponsors to negotiate a more direct 
reference to Chapter VII  (Hurd, 2005:505). 
Several states approved the imposition of sanctions in order to make Libya change its 
behaviour. If Libya did not comply with the demands of the UNSC, it would be faced with 
military action. It is worth noting that Libya’s main ally, Russia, joined the US in its demands 
to solve the Lockerbie case. The Russians suspected Tripoli of being involved in the bombing 
(despite the denial of Qaddafi) and were aware that the sanctions would have a negative 
impact on Russian economic relations with Libya (Maerli and Lodgaard, 2007:76).  
However, the Libyan failure to surrender the two security agents suspected of involvement in 
the Lockerbie bombing Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi, and Al Amin Fhimah, to the US or Britain 
resulted in another resolution. On 31 March 1992, the UNSC adopted Resolution 748 which 
stipulated that States should (1) deny permission to any Libyan aircraft to take off from, land 
in or overfly their territory; (2) prohibit any provision to Libya by their nationals or from their 
territory of arms; (3) reduce the number of staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and control 
the movements of the remaining staff; (4) prevent the operation of all Libyan Arab Airlines 
offices.
203
  
Another UNSC resolution (883) was passed in November 1993 after Libya’s refusal to 
comply with the UN demands. Resolution 883, issued by the UN prohibited Libyan airlines 
from selling tickets, froze Libyan assets, and banned the export of oil equipment. The 
sanctions were implemented in order to force Libya to comply with demands and modify its 
behaviour. The Libyan government tried to avoid the earlier resolutions but Resolution 883 
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seemed to have had more effect on the Libyan regime (Collins, 2004:10-13). Moreover, the 
Libyan government hired international legal teams in order to find an exit strategy for this 
problem and to defend its position regarding these debates (Waller, 1996:75).  
 
4.3.3 The Libyan Response to US and UN Sanctions 
Libya did not react immediately to the sanctions imposed since, in the first instance, 
Qaddafi’s regime was convinced that friendly states would violate the embargo and help him 
to resist the various pressures resulting from the hardship of the situation. His judgement was 
incorrect in this respect, and when it appeared that his calculations were wrong, he decided to 
opt for compliance and co-operation. Accordingly, it is important to measure the level of 
Libya’s compliance with the international institutions’ demands, and in doing this both the 
external and internal effects of the sanctions are now examined, as also is the pressure from 
the international community. Furthermore, Libya’s incentives to attract economic investment 
in order to sustain its economic ability and to preserve Qaddafi’s regime are explored. On 
several occasions, Libya complained that the sanctions were unjust and argued that the issue 
should have been dealt with through legal channels. The argument used by Qaddafi was that 
the sanctions would directly affect Libyan citizens and domestic airlines, since they 
prevented Libya from importing parts and technology for its aviation. For instance, the 
Libyan regime claimed that the explosion of a Libyan civil aircraft en-route from Benghazi to 
Tripoli, which cost the lives of all people on board, was a consequence of the sanctions.
204
  
In the mid-1990s, the US did change strategy and this did seem to bring effective results. 
Instead of acting unilaterally, the Clinton administration decided to seek the United Nations’ 
involvement and acquire wider support from most member states, with the purpose of being 
able to implement multilateral economic sanctions and achieve the isolation of Libya (Nolan, 
2007:85). The changes in the geopolitical scene, in particular after the end of the Cold War 
period, with the fall of the Soviet Union as a superpower, had a positive impact on Libyan 
matters.  
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UN sanctions were indeed imposed in order to force Libya’s compliance with the UN 
demands to stop its support for terrorism. Commenting on this situation, Cortright and Lopez 
(1999:2) underlined that “sanctions can serve as a middle ground between mere diplomatic 
protest and ultimate military force”. In terms of effect, it can be observed that UN and 
American sanctions against Libya weakened Libya’s economy and hardened life for Libyan 
people. The regime itself struggled internally due to the low income from the oil revenues 
during that period. Popovski (2011) posits that UN sanctions, and especially the air embargo 
and the freezing of funds, exerted pressure on Qaddafi’s regime. The UNSC did not require 
an oil embargo due to the fact that many states, which depended on Libyan oil, would have 
been indirectly penalised. Nevertheless, other elements contained in the UNSC measures 
weakened Libya’s oil industry.205 Cortright and Lopez pointed out that UN sanctions on 
Libya ‘impeded Libya’s aspirations to earn a larger international role commensurate with its 
great oil wealth’ (Cortright and Lopez, 2000:119).206 Effectively, according to World Bank 
estimates, Libya lost around $18 billion, mainly because of the lack of foreign investment in 
the oil and gas industries.
207
 
The economic situation in Libya deteriorated and worsened after an extensive trade embargo 
was imposed by various US administrations. Under the sanctions, the performance of the 
Libyan economy was weakened as several projects were postponed or abandoned through 
lack of funding. Schumacher underlines that budget restrictions in 1985 forced the 
cancellation of a $4.2 billion Soviet nuclear power plant, more than $1 billion in housing and 
road projects, and $700 million in military construction projects (Schumacher, 1987:344 & 
337).
 
However, military spending was not cut despite the low oil returns, due to its priority 
for the regime’s survival. In consequence of the multilateral sanctions, the public sector, 
which represented the large part of the Libyan economy, was unable to implement 
appropriate policies to face the challenges. Libyan oil fields suffered from the absence of 
investment by the US and as an alternative, the country resorted to the European market. US 
measures such as freezing the Libyan assets, compelled Libya to invest in Eastern European 
countries, Egypt, and Malta.
208
 The oil production did not go below Libya’s OPEC quota. 
Yet, Libyan oil was sold to the United States through the European markets, and overall the 
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US unilateral sanctions were not as effective as they were meant to be (Vandewalle, 2008:40-
41). Nevertheless, the US sanctions had a modest influence upon Libya’s oil sector as the 
lack of technology and equipment prevented the sector’s modernisation.   
In 1996 the Clinton administration introduced the Iran Libya Sanction Act (ILSA), and 
imposed economic sanctions on companies investing over $40 million in Libya.
209
 However, 
the extension of the ILSA did not prevent European companies investing in the Libyan 
market since there were loopholes in the act (such as the date of signing the contract), and 
several European countries used these to avoid its impact. Vandewalle (2008:41) observed 
that “companies simply amended old contracts to accommodate new investments, and 
avoided signing new contracts that could have triggered ILSA regulations”. However, despite 
the ineffectiveness of the ILSA on Libya in the short term, UN sanctions were extended over 
the period of seven years, and gradually the sanctions gained more significance by affecting 
and damaging Libya’s economy. 
The measures taken by the UN to constrain Libya were unavoidable given the fact that 
Libya’s behaviour outraged various countries. Particularly, the issue of extradition of Al-
Megrahi and Fhimah was difficult to resolve due to the enduring disagreements between the 
US, Britain, and Libya, and it was only in August 1998, ten years after the tragic incident, 
that a solution was reached. At this point the parties agreed to have the suspects tried before a 
Scottish court in The Hague, and under Scottish law and procedures.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union as Libya’s supplier of military and logistics might have 
been one of the factors behind the decision to surrender the two suspects for trial. The Soviet 
Union was one of Qaddafi’s main allies, relied upon for support especially when dealing with 
rivals. Accordingly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, Qaddafi’s regime lost a 
strong ally and consequently had to change its foreign policy. Qaddafi also witnessed Russian 
co-operation with the US after the collapse of the USSR, and Russian support for the US 
coalition in the first Gulf war against Iraq. Therefore, Libya’s former ally - Russia, was no 
longer on Qaddafi’s side and in this situation, the regime concluded that it was better for 
Libya to comply with the UN resolutions (Ronen, 2008:100).  
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Furthermore, Russia also mediated the handover of the Lockerbie suspects. According to 
Plachta (2001), Russia joined the efforts of the former General Secretary of the UN Kofi 
Annan to convince Qaddafi to handover the suspects. He stated “Annan orchestrated a 
discreet but relentless political campaign to persuade Qaddafi, including a hitherto secret 
appeal by the Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov of Russia. As part of this appeal, the US 
assured Libya that the trial would not be used to undermine Qaddafi’s rule in Libya” (Plachta, 
2001:135). In fact, the Libyan regime did realise that the loss of a powerful protector such as 
Russia, necessitated a review of its foreign policies, the cessation of its unconditional support 
for terrorism, the surrender of its weapons of mass destruction, and an end to its systematic 
and open opposition to the West.  The terms and conditions of UN Resolutions 731, 748 and 
883 were maintained despite several attempts by the Libyan regime to have these suspended 
or removed.
210
 On 27 August 1998, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1192, suspending the 
measures (i.e. sanctions) set forth in its resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) upon the 
certification by the UN of the arrival of the suspects in The Hague for trial (Niblock, 
2001:3).
211
  
Among the conditions set by the Libyan government was the need for an assurance by Kofi 
Anan and Nelson Mandela that the two defendants would not be questioned by the US or 
Britain. Finally in April 1999, Qaddafi complied with the UN demand and handed over the 
Lockerbie suspects for trial in the Netherlands. On that occasion, he stated that “the world has 
changed radically and drastically. The methods and ideas should change, and being a 
revolutionary and progressive man, I have to follow the movement” (Takeyh, 2001:66).  
Following the trial,
212
 al-Megrahi was found guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment with 
the recommendation of serving a minimum of 20 years, while the other defendant, Fhimah, 
was found not guilty. Megrahi made an appeal, which was rejected by the Court on 14 March 
2002.
213
 However, Libya agreed to compensate the victims’ families and accepted its formal 
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responsibility, and such behaviour resulted in the lifting of the sanctions in September 2003 
(Jentleson and Whytock, 2005:70).
214
 According to St John, the priorities of the American 
policy-makers towards Qaddafi’s regime were: firstly, the Lockerbie affair, secondly, its 
unconventional arms programme, thirdly, Libya’s regional policies, and finally democracy 
and human rights, although these were to a lesser extent (St John, 2008:136).  In fact, the US 
was determined to prevent Qaddafi’s regime from acquiring nuclear capability. 
 
4.3.4 Libya’s Policies: From Defiance to Co-operation 
The issue of Lockerbie raised the solidarity of several African nations which, on the one 
hand, tried to mediate, and on the other, in view of the inflexible position of the US and 
Britain, defied the UN sanctions and defended Libya at the level of other international 
institutions. Qaddafi regarded the attitude of the Arab World as a betrayal because the 
countries involved did not challenge the sanctions, while some African leaders did violate the 
measures stipulated by the UN resolutions to help Libya. In 1999, Libya turned its attention 
to Africa again (due to its disappointment with Arab leaders, and Qaddafi’s intention to 
reward African leaders), and invested in different institutions, giving diplomatic aid in return 
for diplomatic engagements. Libya was one of the initiators of the transformation of the 
Organization of African Unity to the African Union in 1999. The African Union would deal 
with the political, economic, and social challenges facing the African continent, with Qaddafi 
orienting his attention during the end of the nineties towards these and away from the Arab 
World. He also changed the state radio from the ‘Voice of the Greater Arab Homeland’ to the 
‘Voice of Africa’ (Pham, 2010). Qaddafi’s ideological conception was not productive. Hence, 
he had to comply with the international institutions and the powerful actors. Furthermore, in 
March 1999 Qaddafi stated “I have no time to lose talking with Arabs. ... I now talk about 
Pan-Africanism and African unity” (Takeyh, 2001:67). In this remark he might have been 
referring to the crucial role played by Nelson Mandela in the Lockerbie crisis. Other African 
leaders also supported Qaddafi, while Arab leaders’ attitudes were equivocal in the 1990s. 
According to Joffé (2011), after the suspension of the UN sanctions, various European States 
and the European Commission (EC) showed interest in reconsolidating relations with Libya, 
primarily because of their interest in the energy sector and commercial ties, but also because 
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of a new phenomenon which necessitated Libya’s co-operation. This related to illegal 
immigration to Europe by large numbers of Africans fleeing their own countries in search of 
protection from civil conflicts, violence, and better economic opportunities. European leaders 
considered the issue of illegal immigration as one of the main concerns in the late 1990s 
(Joffé, 2011:233), and the EU attempted to secure a deal with Qaddafi’s regime to stop the 
flow of illegal immigrants from Libya’s shores, despite the fact that the regime was well-
known for human rights abuses. In fact, on various occasions, the Libyan regime stated that it 
could not patrol the Mediterranean basin on its own, and Qaddafi demanded that Europe 
should contribute financially in order to avoid what he called ‘black Europe’. Libya received 
£42 million from the EU to fund and assist it in improving the conditions of the illegal 
immigrants. However, Qaddafi demanded £4 billion in order to stop the flow. Indeed, during 
the EU-African summit in Tripoli in 2010, Qaddafi stated “[w]e should stop illegal 
immigration. If we do not, Europe will become black, it will be overcome by people with 
different religions, it will change” (Waterfield, 2010).215 
 The deal between the Libyan regime and the EU to halt illegal immigration was 
controversial because of the Libyan regime’s poor record of human rights. Accordingly, 
several human rights groups criticised the EU because of the agreement with that regime, 
stating that Libya was not a safe haven for asylum seekers and refugees (Vandvik, 2010). 
Finally, Qaddafi agreed to help but stipulated several conditions, such as logistics,
216
 
financial compensation for the returned illegal migrants, and the need to address the root 
causes of the problem (i.e. the poverty of Sub-Saharan countries, the civil wars, ethnic 
cleansing, and lack of investment by the West). The co-operation between Qaddafi and EU 
indicated that both parties shared strategic interests. Regardless of the nature of Qaddafi’s 
regime, the EU viewed Libya as a partner in the security of the Northern Mediterranean sea. 
In the previous chapter, realism was shown to be a robust analytical tool for explaining the 
foreign and security policies of Qaddafi’s government from his rise to power right through to 
the 1980s. This chapter indicates that realism can also better explain the second period, and is 
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relevant as an analytical instrument in discussing the shift of Libyan policies from defiance to 
compliance.  
 
 
4.4 Libya’s Nuclearisation Project 
“In 1969 and the early 1970s we did not reflect on where or against whom we could use the 
nuclear bomb. Such issues were not considered. All that was important was to build the 
bomb.”217  
 
The first Arab country that tried to acquire nuclear capacity was Egypt, under the leadership 
of Nasser. Kolodziej and Kanet (2008) pointed out that Egypt had a nuclear weapons research 
programme from 1954 to 1967 (Kolodziej and Kanet, 2008:204), while Bhatia (1988:59) and 
(Lefever, 1979:73) indicate that Egypt attempted to acquire nuclear technologies from China 
and the former USSR between 1963 and 1967.218 This information might be helpful to 
determine where and when the idea of pursuing a nuclear programme crossed Qaddafi’s 
mind. In addition, Heikal, an influential Egyptian journalist stated that Libya’s first attempt to 
buy nuclear weapons, goes back to 1969 (the same year as the coup that overthrew the 
Libyan monarchy). This important revelation demonstrates that Qaddafi’s aspirations 
regarding unconventional armaments were expressed very early in his career as Libya’s ruler.  
 
Bhatia (1988) notes that from the 1970s, there were links between Libya and Egypt with the 
aim of establishing nuclear co-operation between the two countries.
219
 However, despite the 
existing potentialities within Egypt, its leaders abandoned the idea of becoming a nuclear 
power in 1968. Qaddafi, on the other hand, still keen to develop nuclear capability, decided to 
benefit from Egyptian know-how and recruited Egyptian scientists due to their expertise in 
the nuclear field. According to Bhatia, the transfer of scientists suggests the first Pan-Arab 
attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. Libya lacked the know-how, but possessed the financial 
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resources for such a big project, and consequently, Egypt was requested to provide Libya 
with scientists to assist in launching the nuclear programme (Bhatia, 1987:64-65).
220
  
 
The conflicting situation in the Middle East during the Cold War had compelled most of the 
states in the region to build alliances with one of the superpowers. According to Mearsheimer 
(2001:5), “[p]olitics in almost every region of the world were deeply influenced by the 
competition between the Soviet Union and the United States between 1945 and 1990”. The 
Middle East and North Africa were not exceptions from the influence of either the USSR or 
the US. Libya’s relations with some regional neighbours in the early years depended on the 
Arab states’ stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict.221 Qaddafi, as Nasser’s heir, regarded the 
security of the Arab World equally important as the security of Libya; thus, it was essential to 
counter all potential foreign threats on Libya’s periphery (Rothman, 2007:305).  
 
Jo and Gartzke (2007:167) pointed out that “[s]tates that lack the ability to produce nuclear 
weapons are likely to seek other options such as enhancing their conventional forces or 
pursuing diplomatic solutions (Libya)”. From 1969, Qaddafi made intensive efforts to 
strengthen Libya’s armed forces by acquiring huge amounts of conventional weapons 
(Khikhia, 1997:138). Qaddafi’s charisma, as well as his dream to become a regional leader 
after Nasser, seems to be one of the factors that explain the original choice of the Libyan 
regime. According to Qaddafi’s own logic, such an aim would only have been possible by 
possessing a significant amount of weaponry and strengthening the status of Libya, on 
regional and international levels, and simultaneously protecting his regime. Since their 
seizure of power in 1969, the new rulers of Libya were acutely aware of the country’s 
weakness and desperately wanted to remedy that weakness by building up its military 
capability and acquiring nuclear weapons.   
 
Unsurprisingly, from 1976 to 1989, Libya invested more than $28 billion in its conventional 
forces, with approximately 2/3 ($20 billion) being spent on deals with the former Soviet 
Union (El-Kikhia, 1997:133). Indeed, the quantity of imported arms was well beyond the 
needs of Libya’s armed forces. Additionally, military equipment was acquired from Western 
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states, including the UK, Italy, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, and the United States 
(Wiegele, 1992:159). It can be observed that Qaddafi was keen to balance and diversify his 
armament purchases and not to rely on one main supplier such as the former Soviet Union.
222  
Such hasty spending on conventional weapons puzzled analysts trying to identify Qaddafi’s 
real intentions. The main question asked was why so much money was being spent when the 
regime was already thinking about the nuclear option.
 
 
The other option was to ‘buy the bomb’, and Heikel (1975) asserts, this was something 
Qaddafi was determined to acquire (following the 1967 defeat by Israel) to ensure the 
security of the Arab countries.
223
 Accordingly, Qaddafi sent one of the Free Officers, Major 
Abdusalam Jalloud, to Cairo in order to consult President Nasser regarding the purchase of 
nuclear bombs.
224
 Nasser explained to the Libyan envoy that in the context of the Cold war, 
none of the super powers would sell a ready-made nuclear bomb. For Jalloud, the other 
alternative was to approach China and make an offer, but Nasser knew that nuclear weapons 
were never for sale. The Chinese refused to sell the nuclear bomb and Jalloud returned to 
Libya empty-handed (Heikel, 1975:74).
225
 
 
Abdsalaam Jalloud who was a close companion of Qaddafi,
226
 disclosed the fact that Libya 
attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for several decades. Jalloud 
declared that “we were enthusiastic and were frustrated to see other states possessing  nuclear 
weapons ... and we thought that Arabs as well should have a nuclear deterrent” (Sharbil, 
2011).
227
 According to Jalloud, acquiring nuclear weapons would have contributed to the 
emergence of a powerful Arab World, since an Arab state possessing nuclear weapons would 
be able to preserve the national security of all Arab states by using the threat of such a 
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Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971-1980” published by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
223
 In particular countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordon and so on. 
224
 Rather than consulting, Jalloud in fact informed Nasser of the Libyan intention to buy a nuclear bomb from 
China. See Heikel (1975:74). 
225
 The Chinese were nevertheless ready to co-operate with Libya in terms of research in the nuclear field. 
226
 The interview was conducted by Gassan Sharbil of Al hayat newspaper, and the article was published on 30 
October 2011. Abdsalam Jalloud defected from Qaddafi’s regime post the 17 February 2011 uprising. This was 
the main incentive for trying to pursue nuclear weapons from China. 
227
 Sharbil, G (2011)  article available at: http://tamimi.own0.com/t72160-topic#510674  
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weapon as a deterrent. He mentioned the first Libyan attempt to purchase nuclear weapons 
from China.
228
 Jalloud was the main negotiator during the talks with the Chinese government. 
Recalling the 1970s meetings, Jalloud reported that, in a very diplomatic way, the Chinese 
officials informed him that nuclear weapons require a nuclear base and advanced technology, 
which were non-existent in Libya. Faced with this polite refusal, the Libyan delegation 
nevertheless tried to convince China to at least assist Libya in developing a nuclear 
programme (Sharbil, 2011).  
 
Another former government official, Saad Mujber,
229
 during an interview given for the 
present study, stated that the idea of Libya’s nuclear programme resulted from the hope that 
Libya, Syria and Egypt would have a nuclear deterrent when they were eventually united as a 
political entity. However, when the Union between these three countries collapsed, Libya 
found itself in a difficult position since the know-how that was expected to come from Syria 
and Egypt, which had a better reservoir of engineers and scientists, was not forthcoming. 
Mujber stated that the nuclear programme commenced in 1974. Libya’s incentives to acquire 
nuclear weapons were reiterated by Jalloud (in 2011) and Mujber (in 2012). 
 
The failure of various union projects with Egypt, Syria, and Sudan convinced Qaddafi to alter 
his initial motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons and instead made him focus on 
consolidating his leadership and the regime’s interests. Another influential figure in Libya, 
Abderahman Shalgum, Libya’s former foreign minister, asserted that the driving force behind 
Libya’s nuclear project was to strengthen the regime and make it a regional power. Libya 
post-1969 had a nationalistic outlook, its aspiration deriving from the orientation of the 
regime towards the Nasserist camp and the politics of the region during the Cold War. In an 
interview with Sharbil of Al hayat newspaper, the Libyan ex-foreign minister during 
Qaddafi’s regime Abderahman Shalgum revealed that the motivation for going nuclear was 
‘leadership’. Qaddafi wanted to be ‘the Arab leader’ and such leadership required him to 
display military power in order to weaken the states in Libya’s periphery (Sharbil, 2011). 
 
However, Qaddafi made contradicting statements during his rule over Libya. He 
acknowledged, at a very early date, that his regime sought to develop nuclear capacity but 
                                                          
228
 In reality, Jalloud was acting as a chief negotiator. 
 
229
 Mujber also served as Libyan ambassador in several countries. 
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only for peaceful purposes. For instance, in an interview with Youssef Ibrahim of the New 
York Times,
230
 Qaddafi stated:  
We have signed all agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Our nuclear research is conditional on international conventions. But we are 
serious as the rest of the world in our desire to reduce our dependence on 
oil and to find alternative sources of energy including atomic sources. We 
are victims of the story that we want to build an atom bomb. It is not true 
(Ibrahim, 1980). 
In fact, Qaddafi’s statements were contradicted by other Libyan officials. For instance, Ali 
Treki, the former foreign minister in Qaddafi’s regime, along with his Syrian and Iranian 
counterparts, stated clearly in 1985 that they would certainly seek to obtain nuclear weapons 
in order to encounter the threats posed by Israeli nuclear capability (Bowen, 2006:21). These 
declarations regarding the question of nuclear weapons often cited the case of Israel and its 
undeclared nuclear capacity. Indeed, the danger of Israel’s nuclear weapons was a focal point 
in Qaddafi’s discourse. In one statement he said “Israel’s arsenal of nuclear weapons and 
missiles is capable of hitting targets in Libya” (Black, 2000:18). Consequently, he was 
determined to confront such a threat by all means including by developing a nuclear weapons 
programme.  
Certainly, the perception of threat from Israel was expressed in the period of the heyday of 
Arab nationalism and Qaddafi’s quest for Arab unity. Later, it was the issue of regional 
insecurity, inter-state rivalries, and constant fear of foreign aggression by foreign powers that 
were the incentives for possessing nuclear weapons. Regional insecurity and the instability in 
North Africa was also a factor in Libya’s desire for nuclear weaponry. In this connection, 
Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and European states, such as Italy and France, with their larger armies 
were the subjects of concern for Qaddafi. These perceived regional challenges necessitated 
stringent military calculations, especially in the early years of the regime (Takeyh, 
2001:69).
231
   
Several observers and analysts attributed Libya’s pursuit of nuclear capability to various 
factors. For instance, Braut-Hegghammer (2008) believes that the Libyan desire to acquire 
nuclear weapons was inspired by military, political, and symbolic motivations. Accordingly, 
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 The interview goes back to December 1979 and was published in 1980 by Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy under the title of Libya and the World. 
231
 Qaddafi who was neither consulted nor informed, prior to the 1973 war against Israel, was willing to prove to 
the Arab leaders that he was able to propose better options (i.e. by pursuing the nuclear weapons option).  
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Libya’s top priority was to obtain nuclear capability for national security purposes. This was 
a key instrument for deterring potential antagonistic forces and to secure Libya’s vast 
territory from external threats.
232
 The Libyan ruler wanted to be less dependent on the Libyan 
army; this later represented another potential internal challenge for the regime itself.
233
 
Moreover, the regime’s ambition to play a leading role in Arab and Middle East politics was 
an additional incentive to pursue nuclear weapons. Indeed, pan-Arabism was initially used as 
guidance for Libya’s foreign policy but was abandoned (due to lack of support from the Arab 
governments on the issues of Lockerbie and the sanctions) and shifted towards Africa in an 
effort to enable Qaddafi’s leadership, power, and leverage to be realised (Braut-
Hegghammer, 2008).  
 
According to Rublee (2009:151), and Lutterbeck (2009:511), Libya wanted to prevent and 
deter any foreign threat or intervention, balance Israeli nuclear capability, proclaim the 
leadership of the Arab world, and serve the national security of the Arab states collectively. 
And in Solingen’s analysis, Libya’s incentive to become a nuclear power had been since the 
early seventies, the wish to consolidate and strengthen the security regime in order to protect 
Qaddafi’s personal power rather than to protect the state security (Solingen, 2007:216). 
Solingen’s statement suggests that the circumstances in Libya did not change with time; the 
domestic pressure on Qaddafi’s regime was not high, and consequently, there was no need for 
sophisticated armament. 
 
Despite the fact that the argument of Solingen can explain some aspects of Libyan behaviour 
during that period, her emphasis that the internal challenge was weak is questionable. Indeed, 
the domestic factor was apparent and persuaded the regime to undertake a number of policies 
and consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons prerequisite not only to the Libyan national 
security but also the Arab security in general. This in fact means that the concern of the 
regime was not only to protect itself by acquiring this kind of weapon but also to serve as a 
deterrent weapon under the framework of Arab collectively. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Qaddafi’s regime did not spare any efforts to assist various Arab states politically 
and militarily, its support to Egypt and Lebanon can be considered in this regard as a case of 
point. In light of the foregoing, it is clear that realism is not the only approach to explain 
                                                          
232
 Libya experienced a brutal colonisation under Fascist Italy and consequently, the regime was committed to 
devising a firm national deterrence policy in order to survive outside aggression. 
233
 The numerous assassination attempts by the military establishments might have influenced the decision to 
acquire nuclear weapons (Braut-Hegghammer, 2008). 
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Qaddafi’s regime behaviour since the collective cooperation among the Libyan and Arab 
states suggests that the regional norms or constructivist accounts can play an important role in 
explaining the transformation of Libyan policies. 
 
Actually, Qaddafi perceived various threats to his regime from different groups in Libya. It 
was a well-known fact that Qaddafi was the dominant figure in Libya. He had the monopoly 
on all decision-making, and in particular on Libyan foreign policy, but most importantly 
wealth and power. For instance, his regime announced the confiscation of any additional 
houses owned by Libyans or local investors and encouraged people to seize rented properties. 
The confiscated properties were unfairly redistributed to other people according to the 
prevailing economic policies of the Qaddafi regime.
234
 Moreover, Qaddafi replaced the 
regular army with ‘people’s militias’ and he oppressed religious scholars, intellectuals, and 
students. He also created tensions between tribes by favouring one against another. By these 
means, Qaddafi tried to eradicate any and all individuals who opposed his policies, ideology 
or the political system he espoused. His domestic policies increased the enmity of the Libyan 
people towards their ruler. Not surprisingly, regime security and the protection of his power 
were Qaddafi’s main concerns, especially since he had much to fear from inside as well as 
outside the country (Black, 2003:257). Regime security might have been one of the motives 
behind the desire to obtain unconventional weapons, in particular after the dissolution of the 
military and their replacement by Qaddafi’s own brigades.  
 
However, in the 1980s the driving force to acquire nuclear weapons shifted towards ensuring 
Libya’s security, and specifically this was the situation after Libya’s relations with Western 
countries and the United States deteriorated. In the aftermath of the American raid on Libya 
in 1986, the political survival of the regime and the deterrence of external threats became the 
priorities for Libya’s decision-makers; and in the period that following (during the 1990s), 
Libya used two strategies simultaneously. The first strategy consisted of improving the 
country’s relationship with the US administration, while the second aimed to conduct a secret 
programme on nuclear and WMD activities.
235
 Indeed, when it became clear that the US was 
not willing to normalise its relations with Libya, the determination for acquiring nuclear 
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 In the 1980s the regime declared that entrepreneurs and traders did not contribute to the economics of Libya. 
Consequently, small businesses such as jewellers, restaurants and private factories were banned. For more 
information see Kawczynski, D. (2011:221) “Seeking Gaddafi”. 
235
 The second strategy was devised in case the Americans rejected the Libyan diplomatic approach. 
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weapons became stronger since it was the only perceived alternative left for the Qaddafi 
regime’s survival (Corera, 2006:178-179).236 
 
An example of regional and Western threat is that of Libya’s conflict with Chad which 
prompted some states such as France, Egypt, and Sudan to support Chad rather than Libya. 
When confronted with such an alliance, Libya decided to protect its state and territory by 
seeking to acquire nuclear weapons (Bahgat, 2008:132). The Libyan-Chadian relations were 
peaceful when there was no perceived threat against Qaddafi, but when the regime believed 
there was a menace from this neighbour, it supported rebels against the Chadian army. 
Consequently, the Chadian government cut its diplomatic ties with the Libyan regime 
because of its Chadian foreign policy. Libya’s military intervention in Chad caused some 
countries in region to react to the aggression. For instance, Sudan and Zaire, fearing 
Qaddafi’s expansionist policies, helped some Chadian factions fight against Libyan troops 
(Huliaras, 2001:7).
237
 Additionally, Libya’s meddling in other African and neighbouring 
countries compelled some states such as Sudan and Egypt to enhance their involvement in 
Chad. According to Deeb (1991:133), “Qaddafi’s military intervention was therefore not 
merely a defensive action against the perceived threat of anti-Libyan forces in Chad. It was 
also an aggressive pursuit of interests in extending Libya’s influence and increasing his 
power”. Several Libyan politicians, such as Shalgum and Mujber, share the opinion of Deeb 
regarding Qaddafi’s real objectives, although their confessions of these opinions were only 
made after the fall of the Libyan ruler. 
The insecurity in the region, and Libya’s ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons might have 
triggered the moves by Algeria to acquire its own nuclear capability.
238
 Indeed, Solingen 
asserts this, suggesting that the timing of Algeria’s move was due to Libya’s ambition to 
nuclearise (Solingen, 2007:214-215).  This is supported by Gertz (1991) who maintains that 
Algeria’s motive to acquire nuclear capability was due to the perceived threat from Qaddafi’s 
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 For instance, in 2000, Libyans requested A.Q. Khan, who was the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, to 
provide them with a complete enrichment programme (Corera, 2006:178-179). The link and relationship 
between Khan and Libya will be discussed in detail due to its relevance for the present study.  
 
237
 The name of the country changed to Democratic Republic of Congo. 
238
 According to Solingen, Algeria in the 1980s received a research reactor from China before joining the NPT 
treaty. In 1991, Algeria agreed to put its research reactor under the auspices of the IAEA and in 1995, signed the 
NPT in order to be under the safeguard of the IAEA and prove the peaceful purposes of its projects.  
 179 
radical regime, especially after the Libyan-Algerian relations deteriorated.
239
 These claims by 
Solingen and Gertz were not unsubstantiated.  
It is worth underlining that Libya’s capacity to acquire a nuclear programme had several 
dimensions. Libya's attempt to obtain off the shelf and later develop a nuclear programme 
was driven by internal, regional and external factors. The most important element which 
compelled the Libyan regime to obtain non-conventional weapons was the external threat, but 
this nuclear policy was not the only one. For instance, Qaddafi’s regime nuclear policy was 
not only to compensate for the weakness and the ineffectiveness of the regime’s military 
capabilities, but also to enhance Libya’s fighting capability. Moreover, deterring regional and 
foreign adversaries was another vital nuclear policy for the regime’s national security and 
survival. Additionally, Libya’s vast territory and large neighbours (i.e. Egypt, Algeria and 
Europe in the North of Libya’s Coast), compelled the regime to prepare itself for foreign 
aggression and attacks whether from regional or international powers. Despite Libya’s 
nuclear policy shift during the first three decades after 1969, external threats (i.e. regional and 
international), national security, balance of power and survival could explain Libya’s nuclear 
policy to a large degree. Moreover, internal challenges to the regime, compensating the 
weakness of the regular army and enhancing the regime’s fighting capability were also 
important factors to the regime’s nuclear policy, but to a lesser degree.  
 
4.4.1 Libya’s Development of Nuclear Capacity 
Before elaborating on the development of a nuclear programme and discussing the different 
agreements with states and private companies, it is essential to shed some light on Libya’s 
official stance regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Libya became signatory to the 
NPT in 1969, prior to Qaddafi’s coup, and the new regime ratified this in 1975. However, 
Cirincione et al. (2005:321) underline the fact that despite Libya’s status in the NPT it did not 
enter into a safeguard agreement with the IAEA until 1980. 
 
The incentives for signing the NPT were various. Firstly, the Russians would not have 
provided the promised nuclear reactor without such a pre-condition. In fact, when Libya 
                                                          
239
  For more details see the article published by Bill Gertz in the Washington Post on 11 April 1991 “China 
Helps Algeria Develop Nuclear Weapons”. 
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ordered a nuclear reactor, Russia reiterated its conditions for providing it.
240
 Secondly, Libya 
wanted to openly acquire the nuclear technology from several developed countries, such as 
Argentina and Belgium.
241
 Libya’s membership in the NPT implied that the regime was able 
to acquire, from several states and multinational companies, sensitive technology and nuclear 
materials without being suspected of developing a nuclear weapons programme.
242
 Despite 
Libya’s status within the NPT it was suspected by various governmental bodies and analysts 
that Libya may have conducted nuclear research intended for military purposes.
243
 The water 
project for irrigation known as ‘the Great Man-Made River’, despite its objectives, was 
believed to be used also for the nuclear weapons programme (Hart and Kile, 2005:636).
244
 
The US in particular was very cautious towards Libya’s real intentions and since the 
beginning put pressure on several countries (i.e. Russia, Belgium, and Argentina) suspected 
of providing nuclear assistance to Libya. Eventually, in the mid-1990s Libya supported the 
NPT Review and Extension Conference without conditions, while Israel refused to join the 
NPT. In addition, Libya was among the 43 African countries that signed the African Nuclear-
Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty in April 1996 (Cirincione et al., 2005:322).   
Having discussed Libyan incentives to become a nuclear power, and the country’s stance 
towards the international regulations and treaties, it is appropriate to consider the concrete 
steps taken in the attempted development of a nuclear programme since such consideration 
will reveal some evidence of Libya’s genuine effort to implement its nuclear policy. Without 
question, the nuclear weapons development represented a huge challenge for Libya’s rulers 
because as mentioned earlier, it was difficult to acquire the modern technology and 
manpower necessary to realise the completion of the nuclear project. The Libyan state was 
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 Russia requested Libya to adhere to the IAEA safeguards prior to providing and installing the 10 megawatt 
nuclear reactor. Indeed, Libya fulfilled the Russian prerequisites in order to obtain the 10 megawatt nuclear 
reactor, but it had violated the NPT and attempted to manufacture nuclear weapons. Qaddafi’s real intention was 
not to abide by the NPT or international norms regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons programme, but 
rather to obtain the 10 megawatt nuclear reactor from Russia. Autocratic regimes, such as Qaddafi’s, are 
characterised by their tendency to violate international conventions such as those on human rights abuses and 
freedom of speech. 
241
 It should be noted here that the intention of Libya to build a power reactor, with the help of Russia, near the 
Gulf of Sidra, was abandoned due to American pressure on Belgium, which was the potential supplier at that 
time. See Cirincione et al. (2005:322).  
242
 On more than one occasion Qaddafi made contradictory statements regarding the issue of nuclear weapons. 
243
 The United States in particular were very sceptical of Libya’s declared intentions and since the beginning put 
pressure on several countries suspected of providing nuclear assistance to Libya. The Chad Affair raised the 
attention of European powers and the IAEA as an institution was judged inefficient in terms of controlling the 
behaviour of rogue states. 
244
 The water project was conceived to provide water to cities, towns and to irrigate agricultural lands.  
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less than twenty years old when Qaddafi started thinking about acquiring nuclear weapons, 
and there was neither the technical expertise nor the manpower to bring such a project to 
fruition.   
 
After failing to purchase nuclear weapons from China,
245
 Libya resorted to India in the 1970s, 
and suggested it would pay off all Indian foreign debts (approximately $15 billion) in return 
for the sale of nuclear weapons (Solingen, 2007:213). Later, in 1974, the Libyan regime 
approached Pakistan, offering to finance the Pakistani nuclear programme in exchange for 
Pakistan’s nuclear expertise,246 especially on plutonium-reprocessing and uranium 
enrichment.
247
 One of the Egyptian nuclear scientists working in Libya noticed an increase in 
Pakistani nuclear scientists after 1975 (Bhatia, 1987:67).
248
 However, in a statement to an 
Indian newspaper in 1986, Qaddafi denied any Pakistani assistance in its nuclear weapons 
programme, saying “[w]e consider nuclear weapons production against humanity” (Solingen, 
2007:213). Indeed, it has been reported by the IAEA that in 1985 Qaddafi’s regime exported 
uranium concentrate (yellowcake) and uranium hexafluoride (UF6), to a ‘nuclear weapons 
state’, and this was processed and exported back to Libya. The nuclear components were 
intended to be used in testing for a uranium conversion facility but were never utilised. These 
activities were not declared by the regime to the IAEA (Hart and Kile, 2005:639). 
Moreover, Qaddafi’s regime did not cease its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons even though 
it had failed to obtain a ready-made bomb from various countries. Despite the fact that the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was not beneficial to Qaddafi, in the mid-1990s, his regime 
attempted to revive the development of its nuclear weapons programme and take advantage 
of the inherited nuclear stockpile from the disintegrated countries (Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan), and negotiated on the black market in order to obtain nuclear components 
(Jentleson and Whytock, 2005:61). And although Libya’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons 
were not fruitful, the regime still pursued the acquisition of other non-conventional weapons 
(chemical weapons) in order to secure power, security and leverage. 
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 Nasser facilitated the contacts between Libya and the Chinese authorities in 1970s. 
246
 Libya sought Pakistani assistance in order to set up a nuclear programme. 
247
 In spring 1976 it was reported by the international scientific community that there was $1 million in gold in a 
Swiss bank which Qaddafi had offered for a nuclear weapons. 
248
 The agreement of nuclear assistance between Libya and Pakistan was revoked after Bhutto was executed. 
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As will be shown in the subsequent sections, Qaddafi’s regime did not give up its quest to 
obtain nuclear weapons and continued to train Libyan scientists, finally resorting to the black 
market again.  
 
4.4.2 Qaddafi and Chemical Weapons 
It is important to underline that chemical weapons have been important assets to states and 
armies. Chemical weapons have been developed since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century and have been used (i.e. WWI) or stockpiled by a number of armies. Indeed, during 
the Second World War and Cold War, massive quantities were produced by a number of 
countries. In fact, some states have pledged to eliminate their chemical stockpiles under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).However; several states evaded or boycotted the 
CWC and engaged covertly to develop chemical weapons (Falkenrath, 1998:47).  
  
Indeed, chemical weapons differ enormously from other nonconventional weapons (i.e. 
nuclear and biological) such as the threats posed by the lethality of these weapons, including 
costs, use and effectiveness. Unlike Nuclear weapons which are very difficult to develop or 
manufacture, and have the capacity to destroy cities and can cause a massive destruction and 
radiation. Chemical weapons are relatively easier to produce and can also cause limited 
damage on a small area and dissolve very quickly (Cirincione et al., 2005:3).  Despite the fact 
that there is a huge different between chemical and nuclear weapons in relation to the cost, 
production, effectiveness and the intensity of destruction, both of them are regarded as 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or nonconventional weapons.  
Libya was long suspected of developing chemical weapons; indeed this suspicion can be seen 
to have emerged in the early period of Qaddafi’s regime. And according to Spector 
(1990:175-180), the focus on chemical weapons intensified in the late 1980s when the 
interest on nuclear weapons waned. This focus was due to the fact that chemical weapons 
were less complicated to acquire. In 1971 Libya became a signatory to the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons,
249
but it did not sign the 
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. With the assistance of foreign expertise, Libya had 
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 Despite Libya’s membership in the NPT (from 1975) and the BWC (from 1982), analysts believed Libya was 
pursuing a range of WMD programmes, albeit not entirely successfully. See CRS Report for Congress, Order 
Code RS21823, April 22, 2004. Squassoni S A, and Feickert A; Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.  
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built a complex in the town of Rabta, a mountainous region on the outskirts of Tripoli
250
 
(Sinai, 1997:93-94).
251
 The Pharma 150 factory in Rabta was capable of producing chemical 
weapons (CW), and was considered to be one of the largest production facilities in the 
region.
252
 This facility had a CW production unit, storage, and a steel mill. Sinai (1997) notes 
that effective production within the plant began in the 1990s, but as noted by Wiegele 
(1992:131), the facility was heavily dependent on foreign experts and the assistance of 
private companies from several countries.
253
 Not surprisingly, the Libyan government 
claimed the facility was for pharmaceutical production, but reports assert that the plant did in 
fact, produce chemical weapons and nerve gas, and that Libya was working on offensive 
chemical warfare (Hart and Kile, 2005:644). 
Naturally, Libya’s chemical weapons factory in Rabta was a major concern to the US, 
especially after the US intelligence sources discovered that the factory was capable of 
producing poison gas. Libya denied such allegations, claiming that the plant was part of an 
irrigation system known as the Man Made River. In the mid-1990s, the US Defence Secretary 
William Perry announced a potential US strike on the chemical factory, using the B-61 
nuclear warhead to demolish the facility. The project continued, however, and in 1997 Libya 
received equipment from the chemical and biological weapons unit, known as ‘Project Coast’ 
from South Africa (Cirincione et al., 2005: 323 & 324).  
Sinai (1997) suggested that the information leaked to the CIA, and the fear of military 
reaction from the US induced Libya to move the facility further into the desert, close to 
Sebha, to avoid detection. Nonetheless, the international community remained very 
concerned about Libya’s chemical activities because of the regime’s support for terrorism 
(Sinai, 1997:93). The CIA also reported that “Tripoli has not given up its goal of establishing 
its own offensive [chemical weapons] progam” (Takeyh, 2001:68).  
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 Different European states such as Germany, France, Belgium, France, and Italy and Japanese private 
companies and China were involved in the building of that particular complex. 
251
 Companies from all over the world were involved at various degrees in building, developing and 
participating in the functioning of the plant. Several nationalities were employed in the Rabta Chemical Plant. 
For instance, more than a thousand Thai nationals were reported to have been employed there, as well as 
Pakistanis. 
252
 See Zanders J P (2001) Libya’s Chemical Weapons Programmes (1980-2000) Track Two Vol.10 (3) Dec. 
2001. Article available online at: http://www.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/10_3/libya.html  
253
 A West-German company called Imhausen-Chemie was allegedly paid ten times the standard price to equip 
Rabta’s plant. See Wiegele T C (1992:131). The Clandestine Building of Libya’s Chemical Weapons Factory. 
Southern Illinois University Press: Carbondale.   
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A second Libyan CW plant, Pharma 200, was in fact a duplicate of the Rabta plant, built 
underground in a deserted area, about 650 miles south of Tripoli in the Sebha Oasis, a 
military base about 95 kilometres north of the Chadian-Libyan border. Construction of the 
Pharma 200 plant started in the late 1980s and was completed in 1992. It is believed that the 
German company, Imhausen developed and delivered plans for the plant.
254
 Two other 
German companies, Rose of Stuttgart, and Abacus in Ulm, were suspected in June 1990 of 
helping to design the facility.
255
 
According to a report by the Soviet Foreign Intelligence Service, Libya attempted to acquire 
technology related to the production of chemical weapons from Iran and Iraq, but without 
success. Libya’s chemical plant production and research programme suffered hugely from the 
sanctions (imposed in 1992) and the facilities constructed for this purpose had to be 
transferred to more than one location, and in some cases, were converted into facilities for 
medical purposes. The Soviet report also indicated that Libya was in possession of 
approximately 70-80 tonnes of chemical weapons. It had manufactured phosgene, sarin and 
sulphur mustard, but in limited quantities. According to this report, most of the production of 
the chemical stockpile came from Rabta’s chemical complex (Hart and Kile, 2005:643). 
According to Tucker (2009:363), “Libya’s chemical weapons (CW) capability was the most 
advanced of its WMD programs and the only one for which a stockpile actually existed”. 
Libya CW stockpile and activities posed a grave threat to regional as well as international 
peace and stability.  
Again, not surprisingly, the US Secretary of State, George Shultz voiced his concerns that 
Libya might deliver unconventional weapons to terrorist groups. In fact, Libya provided the 
IRA with SA-7 anti-craft missiles and plastic explosives (Semtex). However, According to 
Terrill, Qaddafi’s regime considered the acquisition of chemical weapons as defensive and 
offensive benefits to its military, rather than being intended for support for terrorism. The 
Libyan regime also believed that chemical weapons capability would enhance its status 
within the Arab World as a regional power. Acquiring such weapons were considered to be 
risks worth taking due to the benefits this would bring to Libya’s foreign policy, especially in 
that region (Terrill, 1994:58). It has been shown that Qaddafi believed the acquisition of 
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 In the 1990s, Juergen Hippenstiel-Imhausen, the President of Imhausen was convicted and sentenced to five 
years in prison for tax evasion and export control violations in connection with work on the Rabta project. “West 
German Firm Said To Have Aided Libya With New Chemical Weapons Plant”, Inside the Pentagon, August 23, 
1990:7. 
255
 Marc Fisher, “Libya Deal Ends in Jail for German”, The Washington Post, June 28: 1990: p:33. 
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nuclear weapons was significant for his regime’s survival, particularly given the existing 
hostile relations with several countries in the region and worldwide, but the failure to acquire 
such weapons forced Libya to resort to chemical weaponry as it is considered easier to 
manufacture in an effort to deter external threats and foreign aggression. 
 
4.4.3 The Training of Libyan Scientists   
An Egyptian nuclear scientist Salah Hedayat asserts that the option of Libya building its own 
infrastructure was chosen following the country’s inability to purchase nuclear weapons 
(Bhatia, 1987:67). And the intentions were clear in this respect, as noted by Cooley, who 
stated in 1981 that: 
Of the 2,000 Libyan students now in the United States, approximately 200-
300 are studying nuclear physics. If Qaddafi ever acquires a nuclear bomb, 
its creator may be either Dr. Fathi Nooh, a Libyan nuclear physicist trained 
at Berkeley, or Dr. Fathi Shingi, another Libyan trained in the British and 
Indian nuclear establishments (Cooley, 1981:87). 
Cooley’s statement was supported by Müller who mentioned the presence of Libyans 
studying nuclear physics in different parts of the world,
 256
 both in the East and West.
257
 As a 
defensive measure, the US administration decided to prevent Libyan students to study nuclear 
physics (Müller, 1987: 264).
258
 
Furthermore, in 1984, three years after the building of Tajura, a research centre was 
established at the same site. This was reported to be 
staffed by 750 Libyan specialists and technicians aided by Soviet staff. 
Many students were sent abroad; a group of 200 was studying in the United 
States until early 1983 when the United States proscribed training Libyans 
in nuclear science.
259
  
According to one Libyan senior official with an extensive knowledge of Libya’s 
nuclearisation programme, the Libyan government went through financial, technical and 
economic hardship to continue with the programme. This official stated that:    
The nuclear programme requires a huge amount of money as well as the 
establishment of a whole infrastructure with companies and factories. If 
such a programme was implemented, it would have been very difficult to 
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hide its resources, its functioning and its purposes. Libya has always been a 
country with limited technical capabilities, represented by a small number 
of experts who studied in Western Universities. Additionally, relying on 
foreign expertise is not a wise policy, because if identified, it will unveil to 
the international community a Libyan nuclear weapons programme. The 
other dissuading factor is the economic one, since Libya does have only one 
main natural resource, oil. So, due to the enormous financial needed for any 
nuclear programme, most of the oil revenues would have been dedicated to 
such a project.
260
  
 
The declarations of this high ranking official lead to the conclusion that a nuclear project was 
something beyond Libya’s capacity in terms of the country’s financial and technical 
capabilities. Indeed, according to this individual, Qaddafi’s ambition to obtain nuclear 
weapons was far from being achievable. The Libyan case cannot be compared with that of 
other nations such as Iran because of its lack of technical base and indigenous experts 
(Müller, 2007:78). Several reasons accounted for the failure to implement formal agreements 
with the countries that could have assisted Libya. One external factor was the pressure 
brought to bear by the US, and internal considerations from other political actors within the 
various countries (Bowen, 2006:27).
261
    
 
For example, in 1977, Moscow was asked to provide assistance for the construction of a 
natural uranium heavy water moderated reactor, heavy water production facility, reprocessing 
plant for irradiated nuclear fuel and plutonium separation, and other related facilities. 
Negotiations started between Libyan and representatives of the Soviet company 
Atomenergoeksport in order to build a nuclear power with two 440MW reactors in the Sirte 
province. According to Timerbaev (2008), Libya offered $10 billion for the development of a 
closed nuclear fuel cycle. However, the Soviets were against nuclear proliferation and the 
emergence of new nuclear weapon states, consequently the Qaddafi regime’s offer was 
rejected. Moreover, Libya’s behaviour on the international stage was another obstacle 
towards finalising any further nuclear agreements due to the unpredictability of Qaddafi’s 
reactions. In 1980 the IAEA demanded that Libya allow international inspection of its 
facilities, and following Libya’s compliance in this matter, the Russians delivered a light 
water 10MW reactor that was using highly enriched uranium, for the Tajura Nuclear 
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Research Centre (TNRC) (Timerbaev, 2008:113).
262
 The TNRC had 15 research departments 
and laboratories which encompassed critical facilities with the intention of generating and 
producing nuclear activities (Hart and Kile, 2005:636). Between 1981 and 1983, the newly-
built reactor began to operate in Tajura, but subsequently, it was reported that the nuclear 
programme was not in operation due to the hesitation from foreign companies to provide the 
needed supplies (Solingen, 2007:217).
263
 
 
According to IAEA documents, Libya had taken significant steps in nuclear activities 
between 1983 and 1989, by conducting a small-scale uranium conversion at the Tajura 
Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC). However, there is no evidence that through the research 
project, there was any use of uranium hexafluoride (UF6). The training itself was provided on 
power systems, mass spectrometers, welding, gas handling, quality control, computerised 
matching techniques, and heat treatment of materials. It is understandable that such training 
raised international concerns and it was feared that by mastering the process of uranium 
conversion, Libya would be able to go further and develop nuclear weapons (Hart and Kile, 
2005:640). 
 
After that period and until 1994, a small quantity of uranium was converted. This process was 
considered significant and potentially to be used for military purposes. According to Bahgat 
(2008), in 1984 “Libya ordered a modular uranium facility from a Far Eastern country” and 
decided, a decade later, in July 1995 to revive its nuclear activities including gas centrifuge 
uranium enrichment. It is believed that North Korea was that country, although not 
specifically mentioned by name, and that it delivered UF6 to Libya between September 2000 
and February 2001 (Bahgat, 2008:130-131). 
 
However, the material did not arrive in Libya until 1986 as the Libyan authorities concealed 
the equipment in several locations in order to evade international inspection. In fact, real 
difficulties were encountered while trying to assemble this equipment because the instruction 
guide was not delivered with the components which had been stored for several years without 
use. For almost ten years, the Libyans tried to assemble these components to create 
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centrifuges but without success (Corera, 2006:108). Unlike other nuclear aspirants such as 
Iran and North Korea, Libya found its nuclearisation programme to be daunting. 
Additionally, a nuclear plant necessitates a significant amount of uranium, and in pursuit of 
this, Libya imported large quantities of yellowcake from Niger between 1978 and 1991, and 
engaged in uranium conversion in the late 1980s (Cirincione et al., 2005: 322).
264
 According 
to Hart and Kile (2005), Libya’s nuclear infrastructure was modest, yet a former Libyan 
representative at the IAEA stated that Libya imported depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF6) 
on various occasions in 1985, 2000, and 2001, but failed to declare it to the IAEA. The UF6 
is a compound used for the uranium enrichment process, and which produces fuel for nuclear 
reactors and nuclear weapons. Uranium has less than 1% of the fissile uranium 235, while a 
nuclear device requires uranium enriched to at least 20% U-235. Libya also failed to declare 
to the agency, its activities related to concentrated uranium and uranium oxides, uranium 
tetrafluoride (UF4), and the transfer of waste resulting from this process. Additionally, the 
Libyan government did not inform the IAEA about its use of uranium for radiation, its 
treatment, or the design of centrifuge stations.
265
 Uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) is an 
intermediate compound which is used for uranium conversion; it can be also converted to 
uranium hexafluoride for enrichment, especially in centrifuges (Cirincione et al., 2005:464).  
 
4.4.4 American Efforts to Discourage Nuclear Proliferation 
The spread of nuclear weapons has always been a major concern for the United States. 
During the presidencies of George H W Bush, and Bill Clinton, the US assisted former soviet 
republics such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in dismantling thousands of nuclear 
weapons installed in their region before the collapse of the Soviet Union. This initiative could 
be attributed to the diplomacy of various US presidents, keen to convince the new states to 
give up nuclear weapons after the fall of the Soviet Union (Cirincione et al., 2005:8).  
The proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, and in particular the Middle East as well 
as North Africa, is closely monitored by the two superpowers. For instance, concerning 
Libya’s nuclear weapons programme, initially (in the 1970s and 1980s) the country was not 
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considered close to obtaining nuclear weapons and consequently Libya’s nuclear programme 
did not pose a threat to international peace and stability during the first two decades of 
Qaddafi’s regime. However, in the 1990s the progress of Libya’s nuclear programme induced 
states such as the US to reassess Libya’s nuclear and missiles programmes (Campbell et al., 
2004:62). 
Preventing Libya from acquiring sensitive technology and nuclear materials was a policy 
pursued by the US for more than three decades. In this respect, the US campaigned 
successfully to prevent the transfer of dual use and military technology to Libya, by winning 
the approval of 33 nations’ members of the Charter of the ‘Wassenaar Arrangement on 
Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Goods and Technologies’. The ‘Wassenaar 
establishment’ functions as a control for the transfer of sensitive military technology. The 
said arrangement was formerly known as the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral 
Export Control, having been founded during the Cold War era to prevent the spread of 
military technology to the Soviet bloc (Cirincione et al., 2005:318). It was effective, as shown 
in 1984 when the Belgian government tried to enter into an agreement with the Libyans but 
were placed under pressure from the US and other European states not to do so (Müller, 
2007:78).  
Kroenig (2010) also notes that in 1985, Argentina tried to transfer some nuclear technology 
to Libya under a bilateral agreement intended to provide Libya with plutonium reprocessing 
facilities. When the US discovered that Argentina was prepared to export nuclear technology 
to Libya, it placed pressure upon Argentina to call off the deal and cancel the transaction. 
Kroenig (2010:105-110) also underlines the fact that states enjoying security guarantees and 
alliances, such as Taiwan and Argentina, are less likely to provide nuclear co-operation when 
faced with US pressure. Accordingly, Argentina understood the demands of the US and did 
not resume the deal with the Libyan government. However, there are reports which contradict 
Kroenig’s account. For instance, Cirincione et al. (2005:322) assert that Libya and Argentina 
had in fact co-operated in nuclear technology and information through the provision by 
Argentina of a plutonium reprocessing facility. 
The evolution of the Libyan project to secure nuclear weapons was assessed by the CIA in 
the late 1990s, the outcome being that the CIA reported that Libya was far from developing a 
nuclear capability and becoming a nuclear threat.
266
 The report maintained that Libya’s 
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nuclear programme did not have the appropriate funding, lacked the relevant experts, and did 
not benefit from nuclear co-operation with foreign firms.
267
 It concluded that Libya’s nuclear 
programme was dependent on the Soviet research reactor which was under the safeguards of 
the IAEA (Takeyh, 2001:68). However, despite the fact that the US assessed Libya as being a 
long way from manufacturing a nuclear bomb, the US remained concerned about Libya’s 
ambitions, probably due to the potential for Qaddafi’s pursuit of nuclear weapons to trigger a 
similar move amongst his neighbours, willing to protect themselves from the Libyan threat. 
Takeyh (2001) saw Libya’s desire to pursue nuclear weapons capability as understandable, 
especially given that the country’s natural resources had been, in several instances, coveted 
by powerful neighbours such as Algeria. At the same time Libya’s relations with Egypt were 
unstable. These circumstances, according to Takeyh (2001) should have been enough to lead 
the US to conclude that Libya’s pursuit of nuclear weaponry was entirely to be expected, and 
that diplomacy was required to realise a sensible outcome. On this issue, he stated:   
Tripoli has chosen to build up its air power, missile force, and chemical 
weapons in order to deter potential adversaries with larger armies. Both of 
these factors - the rudimentary level of Libya’s WMD program and the 
genuine basis for its regional insecurity suggest that it might be possible to 
persuade Tripoli to abandon its plans for WMD. US diplomacy should 
persuade Libya that its WMD projects will only precipitate a regional arms 
race that will exacerbate, rather than alleviate, its vulnerability (Takeyh, 
2001:69).  
The reinvigoration of Libya’s nuclear programme in the mid-1990s was simultaneous with 
Libyan government efforts to normalise relations with the US on issues related to terrorism, 
Lockerbie, and nuclear proliferation. In fact, Qaddafi’s regime contradictory statements and 
behaviour in particular regarding its rogue foreign policy, nuclear policy and Libya’s 
relations with the US. On the one hand, the regime due to several reasons (i.e. economic 
sanctions, low oil prices, threat of military action and international isolation) attempted to 
approach the US and at the same time opted to reinvigorate its nuclear weapons programme. 
The tipping point behind the shift of Qaddafi’s regime policies was politically calculated. 
Despite the fact that the regime’s behaviour was contradictory, due to  Qaddafi’s perception 
that his approach to normalise Libya’s relations with the US would end in failure, therefore 
he would opt to continue a rogue foreign policy and develop a nuclear capacity. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
nevertheless pressured the potential suppliers in order to avoid the transfer of nuclear materials to Libya. 
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These efforts were indicated for instance, in 1999, when Qaddafi sent a formal offer of 
rapprochement to the US, through his representatives who secretly attempted to negotiate 
with their US counterparts on the surrender of Libya’s WMD programmes, during the Clinton 
administration (Hochman, 2006:66). In fact, Qaddafi’s regime feared that its efforts to 
normalise its diplomatic relations with the US might be rebuffed, and that if the sanctions and 
isolation did not come to an end, it would be necessary to follow its other strategy to obtain 
unconventional weapons. Libya’s concerns about the international community and the 
powerful states such as the US, UK and France, did in fact, compel it to develop its nuclear 
weapons programme in parallel with its rapprochement with the US and the international 
community.   
 
Another example of Qaddafi’s wish to re-establish relations with the US was seen in 1989 
with the statement by Libya’s former foreign minister, Jadallah Azzuz al-Talhi that the 
Libyan government wanted to reinstate these links. In the same vein in 1993, Libya’s 
ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim Al-Bishari 1993 said “the United States is an important state 
in this world, and we can only seek to establish the best relations with it in the framework of 
respect and mutual interests”. After the collapse of the USSR, Qaddafi’s regime had to be 
more pragmatic in its relations with the world’s sole superpower. Thus, it could not ignore 
the reality of the post-Cold War era, especially after being labelled as a rogue state. 
Furthermore, after the inauguration of Bush’s Presidency, Qaddafi indicated that he was 
prepared to negotiate disarmament and resolve the issues between Libya and the US (St John, 
2002:153). 
 
The evidence of this desire for rapprochement was provided by Al-Bishari and Al-Talhi, two 
senior officials in Qaddafi’s regime, who stated that Libya’s intention was to end the mistrust 
and hostilities between the two states. According to Moss (2010:2), “for nearly a decade, he 
[Qaddafi] tried in vain to facilitate rapprochement through various intermediaries, including 
U.S. congressman Gary Hart and other foreign leaders such as Saudi Prince Bander Bin 
Sultan and the South African leader Nelson Mandela”. The stringent measures such as 
diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions imposed by the US and the international 
community because of the Qaddafi regime’s aggressive policies, had considerably damaged 
Libya’s economy and interests such that Qaddafi was searching for some solution to the 
problems.  
 
 192 
However, Qaddafi’s early attempts at rapprochement with the US failed due to the Lockerbie 
affair. For relationships to be resumed, Libya had to accept responsibility. According to the 
former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Martin Indyk, “[i]n October 
1999, Libya repeated its offer on chemical weapons and agreed to join the Middle East 
multilateral arms control talks taking place at the time. Why did we not pursue the Libyan 
WMD offer then? Because resolving the Pan Am 103 issues was our condition for any further 
engagement” (Hochman, 2006:72-73).  
 
Indeed, since the early 1990s, and even before the implementation of the sanctions, Libya 
wanted to normalise its relations with the West in general and the US in particular, but the 
Lockerbie affair posed a major obstacle. There was also legal concern from the US Congress 
regarding US terror victims. However, the penalties imposed upon the Libyan regime which 
harmed the country’s interests, and especially its oil infrastructure, also damaged US 
investments in that sector. Clearly, the solution was to readmit the Qaddafi regime to the 
international community but Qaddafi would have to be pragmatic in order to persuade the US 
and the UN to lift the sanctions and bring the diplomatic isolation to an end; and 
simultaneously, to stay in power. The regime could not ignore the reality of international 
institutions such as the UN in the post-communist era, which was dominated by the US, 
Britain, and France (Chorin, 2012:60). And, as will be shown in the next chapter, the regime 
had to comply with the US conditions prior to any rapprochement (i.e. solve the Lockerbie 
crisis, end state-sponsored terrorism, and dismantle its nuclear weapons programme). 
 
 
4.4.5 Libya and the Khan Network 
 
The relationship between the Libyan regime and Pakistan goes back to the first two decades 
of Qaddafi’s rule, but more concrete development occurred in the 1990s with what became 
known as the Khan Network. A Pakistani official, Altaf Abbasi,
268
 asserted that Salem Bin 
Amer, an important member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) travelled with 
him to the Netherlands to meet A Q Khan and discuss the possibility of assisting Libya’s 
nuclear programme in return for financial assistance. After this meeting Qaddafi agreed to 
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extend financial support for Pakistan’s nuclear programme in exchange for co-operation in 
the development of Libya’s own programme (Solingen, 2007:217). 
Libyan officials first met the nuclear scientist A Q Khan in January 1984 (IAEA report) when 
he briefed them about nuclear production technology. Libya had the option of buying the 
centrifugal uranium enrichment technology, but this acquisition would have been useless due 
to the lack of Libyan technical knowledge.
269
 The contacts with Khan were more frequent 
between 1989 and 1991, and through these contacts, the Libyan regime was able to gain more 
information about the centrifuges established by the Pakistani scientist.
270
 The ready-made 
centrifuges are rotary cylinders used for uranium enrichment. Eventually, the regime did 
order some components which turned out to be unsuitable for the implementation of a nuclear 
programme, and having discovered this, the Libyans bitterly criticised the people who sold 
them these devices. 
 
Libya was prevented from purchasing an assembled centrifuge by the UN Security Council 
embargo; it was not possible to get the purchased equipment in storage in Dubai. Despite the 
early disappointment with the lack of progress with Khan, Libya kept the communication 
channel open, and in 1995 Pakistan agreed to send 20 assembled P-1 readymade centrifuges 
to Tripoli, together with the components to assemble at least another 200 centrifuges 
(Cirincione et al., 2005:463).
271
  
 
Another attempt to revive Libya’s nuclear programme was made in 1995 and that proved to 
be more rewarding. The link with Khan’s network had introduced Libya to the black market 
which allowed the country to obtain the required material, components, and technology 
through Khan.  In 1997, Khan’s network managed to sell Libya twenty centrifuges and an 
additional two hundred parts (relevant for building), amounting to sufficient equipment to 
establish a research programme. In the same year, Khan and his colleagues met the head of 
the Libyan nuclear programme, Matoug Mohamed Matoug, in Istanbul. The Libyan official 
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requested a complete centrifuge facility, since Libya did not possess the ability to 
manufacture its own (Corera, 2006:109).  
After several failed attempts, the L-1 test eventually succeeded in October 2000.
272
 Later that 
year Libya began the installation of cascades with 9, 19 and 64 centrifuges,
273
 and by
 
September 2000, Libya had received two L-2 centrifuges.
274
 Subsequently, another 5,000 
with the appropriate equipment were ordered.
275
 In reality, Khan was only acting as a 
mediator in the production and delivery of components and equipment in different countries. 
Behind that network, people and companies from at least thirteen countries were involved.
276
 
In terms of costs, the Libyan state paid 100 million dollars to the Khan network (Laufer, 
2005). By 2000, Libya had received thousands of P-2 centrifuges from Khan’s network.277 
Such a quantity is usually sufficient to produce fissile materials for several bombs. The 
delivery included all related equipment, design, and twenty tons of UF6 (Corera, 
2006:109).
278
 The Libyans were satisfied with the services of the Khan network, in particular 
because they were able to evade IAEA safeguards and detection.
279
  
Libya’s former foreign minister, Shalgum, states that the Head of Libya’s nuclear weapons 
programme Matoug Mohamed Matoug requested that he send some Libyan scientists to 
Pakistan. Accordingly, Shalgum visited Pakistan and secretly discussed the proposal in a 
military air base with Pervez Musharraf.
280
 Accordingly, close co-operation developed 
between Libya and Pakistan, providing the Libyan trainees with Pakistani ID cards during the 
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phase of their preparation for Libya’s nuclear programme. On the whole, the Libyan official 
acknowledged that Libya’s nuclear programme suffered from mismanagement and corruption 
on a massive scale. He also stated that Libya’s decision-makers paid huge amounts of money 
in the efforts to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Shalgum also argued that 
in addition to Libya’s mismanagement of the programme, there was also the problem that 
Libya was not capable of producing the atom bomb, due to lack of expertise and manpower.  
 
Shalgum asserted that the Pakistani Head of State, Pervez Musharraf, knew about the 
clandestine nuclear activities with states considered as radical, such as Libya. However, when 
it was discovered that Pakistan was dealing in nuclear components with Libya, the 
government denied the allegations and maintained that Dr Khan, their chief scientist, had 
provided Libya with the required equipment, in particular with the weapon design, without 
the knowledge of the Pakistani government (Campbell et al., 2004:137). 
 
Mohamed Elbaradei, the former head of the IAEA, confirmed Shalgum’s statement. 
According to him, Libya had engaged in a uranium enrichment programme for several years, 
and during this period had received equipment and the design of nuclear weapons from the 
Pakistani nuclear scientist Khan network as well as from other private firms.
281
 The IAEA 
official stated that he had been informed that one of the causes of Libya’s nuclear programme 
was a response to the US attack on Libya in April 1986 (Elbaradei, 2011:149). However, the 
explanation given by Elbaradei seems inconsistent with the facts since the bombing of Libya 
did not occur until 1986, and all the evidence shows that Qaddafi’s regime started the process 
of obtaining nuclear capability in the early 1970s. In fact, the airstrike of the 1986 accelerated 
Libya’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, due to its fears of similar attacks in future. 
 
The black market network, offering nuclear technology and equipment, played an essential 
role in the transfer of materials and technology to states such as Libya, North Korea, and 
Iran,
282
  since it served to reduce the technology barriers for states seeking to acquire a 
nuclear weapons programme covertly. For instance, the IAEA did not know about Libya’s 
uranium enrichment prior to Libya’s own announcement of its secret nuclear weapons 
programme (Campbell et al., 2004:343). Clearly, despite being a signatory to the NPT, Libya 
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did not respect its provisions.
283
 The acquisition of nuclear weapons was seen as essential for 
the Qaddafi regime’s survival yet the only way to secure these was by violating international 
norms concerning nuclearisation. In fact, autocratic countries such as Libya, North Korea, 
Iran, Iraq, and Syria did not comply with the IAEA safeguards or with the NPT. Had the 
IAEA been able to coerce these countries into compliance, they would quite likely have had 
to surrender their nuclear weapons programmes. 
 
4.5 Factors Affecting Libya’s Shift in Foreign Policy and Nuclearisation 
In this section, all the factors which influenced the initial shift and new formulation of 
Libya’s foreign policy (from 1982 until 2000) are raised. As discussed in the theoretical 
framework, there were several influences - domestic, regional, and international - that 
affected Libyan politics between 1982 and 2000, especially the development of its nuclear 
programme. Indeed, during this period, Libya reached the peak of its antagonism with the 
US, the West, and regional countries. However, at the end of the same period, Libya started 
to change its foreign policy with its neighbours, powerful states, and international 
institutions. Furthermore, on more than one occasion Libya attempted to reconcile and cease 
its previous policies, such as those concerned with its sponsorship of terrorism, meddling in 
the affairs of other countries, and the aggressive ideological stances on various issues.  
4.5.1 Domestic Factors Affecting Libyan Behaviour 
Although the domestic element did not play a major role in the previous period between 1969 
and 1981, in the period that followed (1982-2000), domestic issues substantially increased in 
their influence. As already explained in this chapter, several aspects of Libya’s domestic 
policy had an impact on its shift in foreign policy, not least being Qaddafi’s oppressive rule 
and the treatment of Libyan individuals who opposed his policies and the regime’s political 
system. Domestic policies concerning political belief compelled hundreds of people to flee 
the country (i.e. businessmen, students, army officers, ambassadors, and ministers) and form 
opposition groups to the regime in countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Algeria, the US, 
Britain, and France. Since there was an absence of communication channels with the outside 
world they made it their responsibility to reveal Qaddafi’s gruesome domestic policies. They 
had also formed political groups such as the National Salvation of Libya. Some of these 
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groups received training and logistics to topple Qaddafi and his regime, as for example, 
former soldiers (i.e. Khalifa Hafter) who had fled from the Chad war to the US. 
Another domestic group which played a role during this period, was the Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (LIFG) who continually opposed Qaddafi.  Qaddafi focused on this particular 
group and considered them enemies, because they not only opposed him, but they actually 
wanted to assassinate him and bring an end to his regime. In fact, the LIFG fought against 
Qaddafi’s security forces for several years, without achieving much, since most of them were 
either arrested or fled the country. 
The third category on the domestic front was the military. Qaddafi feared the military 
institutions, perceiving them as a source of threat to his regime. After the first coup attempt 
carried out by Qaddafi’s colleague, other attempts were made by groups of military officers 
from different cities. Although these all failed, Qaddafi continued to dissolve the regular 
army and formed brigades to save his regime from the perceived internal threats. Dissolving 
the regular army might have contributed to Qaddafi’s quest to acquire nuclear weapons as a 
means of compensating for the vacuum left by the dissolution of the army.  
 
4.5.1.1 The Role of Ideology 
 
The importance of ideology in Libya between 1982 until 2000 varied since this represents a 
time period of almost two decades. In fact, the role played by ideology in Qaddafi’s regime 
varied in strength according to the issue at hand. The most significant point to grasp is that 
the regime’s interests and survival outweighed any ideology. However, Qaddafi used 
ideological approaches in order to obtain support in the developing countries and he provided 
them with assistance purely because he wanted to be perceived as a leader of a revolution. 
Therefore, he supported several movements and organisations that were outlawed by their 
governments. In Libya, ideology was used to mobilise the population and to obtain 
legitimacy. Additionally, Qaddafi used his ideology in different instances to criticise some 
countries (i.e. the West, the US, Israel, and some Arab countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, and Morocco.). However, ideology had no influence upon issues such as national 
security or trade.  
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According to Black (2003:254), “Qaddafi’s ideology and rule are constantly changing”. His 
interests and pragmatism overwhelmed the role of ideology, especially in security and trade. 
The pragmatism and interests of Qaddafi could be seen in the Lockerbie, UTA airliner, and 
Berlin discotheque cases. For instance, the regime’s ideology and rhetoric against the US, 
Britain, and France was not constant, and interests surpassed the rhetoric in order to get the 
sanctions lifted. Additionally, Qaddafi used his ideology when dealing with several issues 
such as the Arab/Israeli question, Libya’s sovereignty, imperialism, and colonialism, yet 
abandoned it during the sanctions period when the regime was seeking opportunities to re-
engage in the international arena, and end the threat of military action, the sanctions, and the 
isolation.   
 
 
4.5.1.2 The Role of Oil 
 
Oil certainly played a substantial role in directing the Qaddafi regime’s behaviour, since the 
economy was almost entirely dependent upon that sector. In the period under review, the low 
prices of oil revenues, international sanctions, and absence of big oil companies, all combined 
to compel the Libyan regime to comply with the UNSC resolution, and the demands of the 
Western states, in order to remove the economic sanctions and end the country’s political and 
economic isolation. In fact, the declining oil revenues during the sanction periods and the 
discontent of Libyan citizens with the regime, because of the low wages and unemployment, 
definitely had an impact on the change in Libya’s foreign policy. According to a former 
senior official in Qaddafi’s regime “The UN sanctions did have an effect on Libya in all 
fields”.284 In fact, international sanctions affected various Libyan sectors (i.e. oil industry, 
aviation, infrastructure and the military). In view of the above discussion, it is evident that the 
oil factor had a modest impact on the continuation of Libya’s nuclear weapons programme.  
 
Libya’s dependence on oil revenues was heavy and as a result, the UN sanction weakened its 
economy. As one former Libyan ambassador stated “the sanctions did weaken the Libyan 
economy and did take their heavy toll on the economy”.285 This argument is supported by 
Black (2003:256) who maintains that “UN sanctions in effect from 1992 to 1999, influenced 
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  Interview with senior a former senior official in Qaddafi’s regime, Libya 
285
 Interview with former ambassador during a fieldwork interview, Libya 
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the Libyan economy and isolated the country from the world community”. The lack of oil 
income resulting from low oil exports during this critical period of Qaddafi’s rule had 
affected several projects and undermined the regime. Consequently, the role played by oil did 
have a modest influence on persuading the regime to reconsider its policies regarding the 
development of its nuclear weapons programme. 
 
4.5.2 Regional Factors Affecting Libya’s Foreign and Security Policies 
 
Despite the fact that Libya’s relations with its neighbouring countries were relatively better 
than in the previous decade, Qaddafi still appreciated that his regime was in danger of being 
attacked by states such as Egypt and Sudan, purely because his policies clearly revealed his 
regional ambitions which were at odds with those of his neighbours, and which were 
evidenced in Qaddafi’s meddling in their internal politics. Indeed several neighbouring 
countries accused Qaddafi of attempting to overthrow their regimes. For example, during this 
period, Libya was accused by the Sudanese government of supporting rebel groups in the 
South of Sudan. And strong differences of opinion existed between the Egyptian government 
and Qaddafi regarding the Arab/Israeli conflict and Qaddafi’s policies in the region. This type 
of behaviour led to conflict and the skirmishes which Libya had with most of its neighbours 
convinced them to contain the Libyan regime and its policies, especially during the sanctions. 
 
In fact, countries in the region exploited the situation in Libya both politically and 
economically. On the political level, most of the Arab countries in Libya’s periphery isolated 
Qaddafi during the international sanctions. For example, the bordering countries ignored 
Qaddafi, refusing to acknowledge him as an effective actor since the international isolation 
had reduced his influence. On the economic level, they tried to gain economic benefits and 
advantages due to the fact that Libya needed to use their territories for importing goods, 
transportation, and travelling.  
 
Moreover, Tanter (1998:136) maintained that the Arab World deliberately isolated Qaddafi 
during the sanction period in order to prevent his subversive acitvities towards their countries. 
This regional isolation of Libya by its neighbouring countries prompted the Libyan regime to 
re-think its attitudes towards the region, and consequently to shift its policies significantly, 
resulting in the regime’s later focus on Africa and not the Arab World. 
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4.5.3 External Factors Affecting Libyan Foreign Policy and the Nuclear Programme 
 
The external pressure exerted on Qaddafi’s regime was of huge significance in forcing the 
shift in Libya’s behaviour and policies as there were various measures taken the regime to do 
this. Libya’s affiliation with outlawed organisations and its quest for nuclear weapons were 
genuine concerns for the rest of the world and hence, it was possible to effect a collective 
resistance to Qaddafi and to sustain that. In fact, Libya’s behaviour shift was motivated by 
several external elements, an important one being the international isolation of Qaddafi’s 
regime, and especially the attitude of powerful states such as the US, Britain, and France. 
This entrenched isolation forced Qaddafi to accept any opportunities for rapprochement so 
that the issues underpinning the isolation could be addressed. Another element was the matter 
of Libya’s nuclear weapons which was considered a threshold to any re-engagement with the 
international community, and especially the US as America had no intention of lifting any 
sanctions unless Qaddafi’s regime made concessions regarding Libya’s unconventional 
weapons. Other external factors were Libya’s support for terrorism, and the dispute 
concerning the trial of the Lockerbie suspects. 
In fact, the Libyan regime started to re-orient its policies and behaviour after several years of 
isolation and sanctions, as it was coerced to co-operate with the powerful states (such as the 
US, UK, and France), and the international community, and comply with international 
institutions. Being a small outlawed state, Libya found itself under sanctions, diplomatically 
isolated, and threatened militarily due to its association with terrorism and its adventurist 
policies. Qaddafi’s regime tried to avoid the costs of more sanctions and threats of force, 
having eventually come to realise that its interests rested in compliance with the international 
community, and that it had to bring an end to certain issues related to its unconventional 
policies and behaviour. The concerns about terrorism and nuclear weapons were top priorities 
for the international community. At the same time, Qaddafi’s regime wanted the removal of 
unilateral/multilateral sanctions and a change to the country’s isolation. It was hard for Libya 
to challenge the UN Security Council and the post-Cold war reality. Hence, it was decided to 
co-operate with the international institutions on these issues of concern. Qaddafi was aware 
that only by changing his foreign policy, by complying with the UNSC resolutions and co-
operating with international institutions, the country would be able to reintegrate within the 
international community.   
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The effects of sanctions had been dire throughout the Libyan economy, and could not be 
sustained by the country in the long term. In line with new pragmatism and intentions to be 
reintegrated within the international community, and desperate to ride Libya of the economic 
burdens occasioned by the sanctions, Qaddafi announced “[n]ow is the era of economy, 
consumption, markets, and investments. This is what unites people irrespective of language, 
religion, and nationalities” (Takeyh, 2001:66). Qaddafi’s long-standing ideology became 
obsolete; in its place he opted for pragmatism and complied with the demands of the 
international community. He decided to adapt new policies and re-engage in international 
politics, in the hope of finding a new role for himself as a regional leader.  
The aims of the various US administrations were not limited purely to finding a solution to 
the Lockerbie crisis, but also to bringing an end to Libya’s support for international terrorism. 
And another often-mentioned and important matter was Qaddafi’s ambition and intention to 
acquire different types of non-conventional weaponry, including his desire to develop a 
nuclear weapons programme (Takeyh, 2001). An ex-Libyan representative at the IAEA who 
was interviewed during the fieldwork pointed out that UN sanctions had an impact on the 
continuity of Libya’s nuclear programme, saying: 
The UN sanctions imposed on Libya did have a negative impact on the 
Libyan nuclear programme. The states started following the Libyan foreign 
economic policies, its financial transactions, monetary transfers, and 
enquiring how Libyan money was spent. Finally, the last step was to ‘dry’ 
the only source left to the Libyan regime, represented either by official 
companies and others.  
 
The effect of sanctions on states such as Libya that were trying to acquire unconventional 
weapons was immense. Moreover, Libya could not continue to develop its programme 
without being held responsible for the consequences of such activity by the international 
community.  
 
It can be appreciated that the external factor had a much stronger impact than the other 
factors because Qaddafi wanted to save his regime from collapsing which would have been 
the logical outcome of the external pressure by the international institutions and powerful 
states such as the US. Within this context, it is clear that the negative impact of Libya’s 
isolation convinced the regime to try to end the stand-off, since with increasing globalisation, 
it had become apparent that states cannot survive on their own. 
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4.5.4 Multiple Factors - Domestic, Regional and External Influencing Libya’s Foreign 
and Security Policies   
 
From the previous discussion, it is evident that in this particular period, there was variation in 
the role played by the many factors which exerted an impact on Libya’s initial policy shifts. 
The importance of the domestic factor had grown from the previous period, due to increasing 
opposition to Qaddafi’s regime by several segments within Libyan society which could voice 
an opinion and spur into action because of communications development resulting from the 
globalisation phenomenon and technological advances. In fact, it is widely accepted that 
globalisation prevents the domestic affairs of any state from remaining secret. And despite 
the previous track record of the regime in maintaining a strong grip in Libya, there was strong 
opposition from various elements of Libyan society, including military personnel, Islamists, 
and largely the general public. To sum up, the role of the domestic factor was important in 
forcing Libya’s policy change because society had become stronger, more able to 
communicate, more vocal about its oppression, whereas in the previous period the domestic 
players were kept under greater control. 
The regional factor also motivated Libya’s reconsideration of its policies because Libya did 
not enjoy good relations with its neighbours due to Qaddafi’s interference in their affairs, and 
the deterioration in those relationships were potential threats to his regime. Therefore, Libya 
was isolated during the sanction period by its neighbouring countries, as well as by the rest of 
the world, and the knowledge that his government was unpopular regionally, encouraged 
Qaddafi to alter his behaviour not only towards African states but also towards the 
international community, particularly the powerful states.  
The relationship with the powerful states stands as the most important of all factors, however, 
as this conditioned other external factors which almost brought the regime to its knees. 
Pressure from outside, in various forms such as threats by the US to destroy the chemical 
plant, international isolation, absence of investment in the oil sector, US and UN sanctions, 
combined to produce an extremely strong influence upon Libyan policies such that their 
previous emphasis on supporting terrorism and pursuing nuclear weaponry was removed. At 
the same time, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, whilst not an open threat in itself, 
meant that the Libyan region had lost an important supportive ally and altogether, these 
outside influences compelled the Libyan regime to reconsider its external policies.  
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4.5.5 Theoretical Discussion 
In view of the foregoing debate, realism can be understood to be the most relevant theory for 
explaining Libya’s motivations to pursue nuclear weaponry, and subsequently abandon that 
action. Essentially, in the face of a real and present danger coming from the West, the US, 
and the disintegration of its ally, the Soviet Union, the Qaddafi regime chose to comply with 
the major powers and the UN resolutions and demands, rather than confront them. Moreover, 
Libya ended its support for the outlawed movements in this period due to a genuine desire to 
bring its international isolation to an end, to improve the dire economic circumstances which 
the country had found itself in, and to avoid military attack (e.g. 1986 air raid). Therefore, the 
regime was seen to recognise the futility of its policies and to opt for a pragmatic approach 
rather than confrontation with the West and the US. The Libyan regime was convinced that 
its strategic interests must be in accordance with the rules of the international community.  
 
In contrast to the last chapter, the neoclassical realism accounts can be seen in this period of 
time. Since the beginning of the 1980s the internal pressure started to increase, for example 
the activities of the opposition groups inside and outside Libya had become clearly 
noticeable. Due to the regime’s policies (internal, regional and external) which had negative 
consequences on the Libyan population, the attitude of the Libyans was not conformed to the 
regime’s outlook.  There was a growth of extremist groups who wanted to topple the regime 
in some parts of the country and the rise of assassination attempts against Qaddafi. 
 
In this regard, several former senior officials agreed that the impact of the external factor in 
different forms had a great impact on Libya’s policy shift and the continuation of its nuclear 
weapons programme; and most of the interviewees also stated that the external factor had an 
impact on Libya’s policies relating to terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. This 
theoretical argument is not only appropriate to explain the Libyan case, but it can also be 
generalised to understand other cases. As discussed above, the external factor in different 
forms, such as international isolation, sanctions, and the threat of using military force did 
persuade the Libyan government to change its long-held policies and associated behaviour. 
The success of these tools can be considered as useful means to persuade other countries 
suspected of nuclear proliferation such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea to give up their 
nuclear weapons. This theoretical perspective challenges the opinions of various scholars 
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who claim that constructivism is the best approach to explain the shift in Libya’s policies and 
behaviour, because it is clear that Libyan compliance was not simply a response to the 
demands of the international community’s norms, but to the regime’s fear of further 
economic sanctions, political isolation and threat of military action (i.e. regime change). It is 
evident from the previous chapters that the regime did not respect the international norms, 
particularly those who are related to nuclear non-proliferation, intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states and supporting terrorism groups. Indeed, to achieve its geopolitical, 
social and economic interests, the regime had to change its policies in order to avoid domestic 
and external pressure.   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined several of the major issues featuring within the theoretical 
framework, and has highlighted their relevance to this period of study. It began with an 
analysis of Libyan policies between 1982- 2000, pointing to a significant change in the 
behaviour of the government. A number of internal, regional, and external factors were 
shown to be the cause of this shift, and in contrast to the situation revealed in the previous 
chapter, the domestic influence on Qaddafi’s government was seen to have grown. This 
advancement in internal pressure was seen to be linked to the emergence of opposition groups 
and their ability to communicate worldwide given increasing globalisation which opened 
Libya up to the rest of the world and vice versa. Simultaneously, the influence of the external 
pressure was shown to be important in effecting Libyan policy and behaviour change. Indeed, 
this external pressure and collective action by UN member states was significant in delaying 
the development of Libyan nuclear weapons. The actions by the US and UN members to end 
Libya’s support for terrorism and nuclear proliferation compelled Libya to alter its policies. 
International actions and extreme measures such as sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and threat 
of military force coerced Libya to re-think its foreign and security policies, and after years of 
defiance, the Libyan regime finally agreed to comply and co-operate with the international 
community and the powerful states with regard to terrorism and nuclear proliferation. 
Regarding the regional factor, even though the effects of domestic and external factors were 
more influential, that too had a modest effect on Libyan polices. The influence of the external 
actor can be seen clearly when we compare the behaviour and the policies of the regime 
empirically in different periods. For example, while the regime was reluctant to obey the 
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international demands, its level of cooperation increased between 1982- 2000. This indeed 
was a result of the affect of external pressure namely economic sanctions, international 
isolation and threat of military action. It is worth mentioning here that these conditions may 
also be applicable to other countries involved in such activities.    
 
Accordingly, the study suggests that realism is the most suitable approach when trying to 
understand the Libyan regime’s behaviour and its reaction to the international community. 
Despite the fact that the internal pressure aspects started to appear on the Libyan public 
policies, its influence on the regime remained weak. In fact, the behaviour of Qaddafi’s 
regime was according to its national interests and not in order to respect the regional and 
international norms as argued by constructivists. As will be seen in the next chapter, 
Qaddafi’s regime abandoned its ideology which it had followed since Qaddafi came to 
power. For example, he believed in Libya’s sovereignty but eventually surrendered the 
Lockerbie suspects to another authority, a step which contradicted his original ideological 
stance. This shows that states can change their policies under pressure regardless of their 
ideologies.  
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Chapter Five: The Last Decade; Negotiations and Dismantlement of 
Libya’s Nuclear Programme 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the origins of the influence of domestic, regional, and international 
insecurity on Qaddafi’s regime were discussed. Additionally, the impacts of the particular 
issues which Libya had to deal with, such as the Lockerbie affair, the UTA bombing, the La 
Belle discotheque bombing, and the sanctions imposed by the international community, on 
the continuation of Libya’s nuclear programme, were considered. 
Against that historic background, this chapter analyses the negotiation process which led 
eventually to the dismantlement of Libya’s nuclear weapons programme. It starts by focusing 
on the consequences of this shift at the national level on one hand, and the relationship of the 
regime internationally, on the other hand. At the national level, the concentration is on 
Libya’s policy changes, and in particular, the concessions made with regard to the 
denuclearisation and dismantlement of its stockpile of unconventional weapons. The chapter 
sheds light specifically on the most important phase of Qaddafi’s changing policy, from 2001 
until 2003. It should be noted that the study will consider both the internal and external 
policies of the regime after its denuclearisation in order to assess the implications of these 
policies on the internal and international levels. 
Libya’s dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 is a vital aspect of this 
chapter.
286
 Indeed, this action by Libya was a result of several factors, which are discussed 
later in detail. At the international level, the focus is on the effects of external factors on the 
shift. In this regard, the events of 11 September, the invasion of Iraq, and the Libyan political 
leadership’s desperate need to return to the international fold, stand as important motives 
which altered Libya’s foreign and security policies. It is worth noting that in the aftermath of 
the terror attack of 9/11, Libya co-operated closely with the US and other Western countries 
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 Kelsey Davenport reported that:  “On December 19, 2003, long-time Libyan President Moammar Gaddafi 
stunned much of the world by renouncing Tripoli’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and 
welcoming international inspectors to verify that Tripoli would follow through on its commitment”.  See the 
Chronology of Libya’s Disarmament and Relations with the United States. Article Available at: 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology  
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regarding terrorism. Libya decided to join the West in the war on terror in order to divert the 
pressure it was receiving itself from the US and the international community. After reviewing 
the internal and external factors forcing Libya’s denuclearisation, the implications of this 
event on domestic and foreign affairs, and the extent to which the Libyan case might be 
generalised to other cases such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea, are considered. It should be 
noted that this chapter covers extensive fieldwork interviews with former senior high 
officials, diplomats, intelligence officers, and ambassadors in Qaddafi’s regime. Indeed, the 
data gained from these interviews has been extremely useful and productive, playing a 
principal role in filling the gaps in the existing literature by providing exclusive and 
unpublished information.  
 
5.2 Features of the Libyan Policy Shift at the National Level 
As discussed in the last chapter, the influence of domestic, regional, and international factors 
had changed the regime’s policies at the national level. In fact, in the late 1990s, the regime 
seems to have had full control of the domestic scene as the Islamist groups were soundly 
crushed, especially after the failed assassination attempt upon Qaddafi and other military 
officers. As a reaction to these domestic threats, Qaddafi intentionally weakened the military 
establishment by not paying army personnel, and making several influential officers 
redundant. Later, he decided to completely dissolve the regular military institution, creating 
in its place, new special brigades consisting of members of loyal tribes and kinships. He 
particularly relied upon his own sons, who were commanding the various forces. Lisa 
Anderson captured the essence of this when she stated: 
Qaddafi has successfully ensured that the state, as a mechanism for 
regulation and focus on loyalty, is largely alien to Libyans. For better or 
worse, tribal loyalties now trump Libyan patriotism and Arab nationalism 
among much of the population (Anderson, 2001:516). 
At this stage, it is essential to underline the fact that most of Qaddafi’s colleagues who 
carried out the military coup with him in 1969, were marginalised or assassinated. The few 
who remained were assigned to insignificant duties such as welcoming African presidents. In 
this situation, Qaddafi’s close family came to the fore, being groomed to interact more with 
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Libyan politics. For instance, one of Qaddafi’s sons established a charitable foundation which 
mediated in some instances to release hostages abducted by terrorist groups.
287
  
The political scene in Libya started to change to reflect more family-oriented control. Other 
sons of Qaddafi became hugely involved in different spheres of life and industry, such as in 
sport, in the military, and in telecommunication companies.
288
 Influential figures such as 
Jalloud, who played an important role in Qaddafi’s regime for the first two decades, as well 
as others among Qaddafi’s companions, were arrested or placed under house arrest for more 
than 30 years.
289
 The economic and trade situation was appalling, and unemployment, 
poverty, and frozen salaries contributed largely to Libyans’ dissatisfaction with the policies 
of the Qaddafi regime. To counter the public discontent, the regime made some minor 
internal reforms but these did not include addressing the major concerns of the population 
such as the need for a constitution, allowing political parties, and accepting genuine 
opposition (Interview with former senior official Saad Mujber, Libya, summer 2012). 
It is essential to highlight the fact that within the Libyan political establishment, there were 
two groups who were considered as either reformists
290
 or hardliners.
291
 The reformists 
recognised the consequences of a radical and defiant stance towards the international 
community and the US, and that same group tried to convince Qaddafi to pursue a better 
relationship with the world, and to make significant changes to Libya’s foreign policy and 
international outlook. On the other hand, the hardliners were mainly people from the 
revolutionary committees who wanted to retain a challenging attitude towards the world order 
as defined by the West, and pursue more radical policies as the basis of the regime’s 
legitimacy. Qaddafi was clearly placed among the hardliners, who dominated the scene for 
three decades (Takeyh, 200:65). 
The hardliners (mainly from the old guard) remained one of the pillars which the regime 
depended upon to implement its policies. Essentially, the regime relied upon a structure 
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 It was in 1998 that Saif al-Islam created the ‘Qadhafi International Foundation for Charity Associations’,  
later renamed  ‘the Qadhafi Foundation for Development’, which was meant to be a non-governmental 
organisation but which was working very closely with the Libyan government. 
288
 Qaddafi’s son Mohamed, was in charge of the state-owned telecommunication company, which owns the 
only two mobile phone network providers, Madar and Libyana. 
289
   Awad Hamza and Bashir Hawadi were Qaddafi’s colleagues in the military coup of 1969; both were under 
house arrest for two decades. 
290
 The former Foreign Minister Umar al-Muntasir, and Energy Minister Abdalla Al Badri were calling for better 
integration and international investments. 
291
 Most of the hardliners were members of the revolutionary committees and some of them were Qaddafi’s 
relatives e.g. Ahmed Ibrahim and Mohamed El Majdoub. 
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comprised of several people from the revolutionary committees, and other informal actors 
such as from certain tribes, to implement policies in line with the regime’s ideology. 
However, a new force appeared at the beginning of 2000, with the decision of the regime to 
attract Libyan intellectuals living and working abroad, and offer them government positions, 
albeit mainly in the economic field. Consequently, a new wave of economic policies allowed 
the liberalisation of the Libyan economy (Pargeter, 2006:222-223). In fact, the regime’s 
domestic policies in the 1980s and 1990s, far from adopting coherent plans, created only 
confusion in several economic sectors due to their impracticality, and simply led to a 
deadlock in this domain. 
The revolutionary committees (the old guard) whose members were considered the elites of 
the regime, were unable to provide a solution to save the failed economic sectors. 
Subsequently, the role played by Qaddafi’s sons increased substantially, especially that of 
Saif al-Islam Qaddafi who contributed to the liberalisation of the country’s economy. A 
struggle between the reformists and hardliner groups in the cabinet ensued, as seen for 
instance in the removal of Shukri Ghanem in 2006 from the position of Minister of 
Economics, because of his reformist policies. Shukri Ghanem had only been appointed in 
2003, but the General People’s Congress challenged his reformist ideas. According to Obeidi, 
the 2006 formation of the government revealed the influence of the old guards (Obeidi, 
2008:124), as the policy reforms introduced by the technocrats in that period were intended to 
secure public support for Qaddafi’s regime. In fact, the Libyan regime had been initiating the 
economic reforms since the late 1990s but due to the clashes with the Islamist opposition, 
these had not been implemented. 
The advocates for reforms, openness, and shift of foreign policy towards the West in general 
and the USA in particular, were later joined by Qaddafi’s son Saif, who among his other 
involvements, also headed his father’s charitable association (semi non-governmental 
organisation). This group was pursuing reforms in both domestic and foreign policies, and 
started to do this by trying to give more freedom to the media, reducing censorship, and 
calling for a constitution. However, it was challenged by a conservative group which was 
headed by Qaddafi’s cousin Ahmed Ibrahim who believed that if Libya abandoned its 
aggressive posture change, the regime would lose its domestic support and the Libyan elite 
(old guard) would subsequently lose numerous privileges within the new, reformed Libya. 
This clash between reformers and conservatives in Libya reflects how the latter viewed 
security. It can be seen that at the end of this dispute, the reformists won over the 
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conservatives, since a new direction characterised by concern for economic interests and 
pragmatism, was chosen (Rublee, 2012:74). The achievement of reconciliation with various 
states, and openness towards more moderate countries, were the main objectives of the 
reformist group.  
Qaddafi’s regime accepted the views of the reformists due to their ability to bring about 
several socio-economic changes such as providing financial support for private companies, 
youths, small businesses, allowing Libyan nationals to enter into partnerships with players in 
the high street market (i.e. Marks and Spencer), and absorbing the changes in the regime’s 
view of world politics. The new elites who emerged in the 2000s did so with the increased 
involvement of Saif al-Islam. And the rise of this group was associated with a greater 
tendency to pragmatism and less concern for ideology. According to Obeidi (2008:124),  
this new elite that now routinely spends in the West will have an effect on 
their agendas, on their worldviews, and on their own ideas and ideology. 
Moreover, one can expect that the new elite may be more pragmatic and 
less ideological than the old generation. The change in the language and, in 
particular, elements of the ideology of the regime expressed in Qadhafi’s 
own political discourse, may well be a harbinger of the changes taking 
place within Libyan politics.  
The changes brought to Libya’s domestic politics by the reformists were in the same tone of 
the Qaddafi regime’s new political discourse and rhetoric. Qaddafi’s posture in the late 1990s 
was less confrontational and aggressive due to the regime’s new pragmatic outlook and 
reorientation. Conversely, whilst remaining loyal, the old guard was unable to offer to 
Qaddafi an exit strategy.  
It is worth underlining that Libyan advisers to Qaddafi have maintained that the country’s 
previous posture and policies brought a negative image to the regime. The domestic economy 
had witnessed a severe downturn as a result of the double sanctions imposed upon the 
country, and falling oil prices. These circumstances convinced Qaddafi that his regime had to 
drastically change its foreign policy and embrace the age of globalisation and international 
trade. For Libya, international reintegration was a vital component in the effort to sustain the 
regime’s survival and return the country to mainstream politics. Qaddafi’s new elites 
acknowledged that Libya’s posture of defiance towards the international order would 
undermine the state’s interests (Litwak, 2008:26).   
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It was readily apparent that the new direction of Qaddafi’s regime was motivated by the 
belief that Libya would benefit more if it were to resolve its problems by reaching a 
settlement with the West and, hence, normalising its relations. Consequently, after several 
years, the Libyan ruler realised that times had changed, and with that realisation, abandoned 
his earlier radical stance and opted for reform and openness with the international 
community. Qaddafi acknowledged that with the era’s evolution, so too must his policies 
change, and consequently, he became more sympathetic towards the reformist views, saying: 
“We cannot stand in the way of progress; no more obstacles between human beings are 
accepted. The fashion now is the free market and investment” (Takeyh, 2001:66). 
Domestically, Qaddafi pardoned various opposition groups in exile, among which was the 
Islamist movement. Pardons were given both to individuals and to groups. Indeed, Libya’s 
return to the international community after the dismantlement of its nuclear programme had 
motivated the regime to approach the exiled groups to convince them to return to Libya and 
cease their opposition to Qaddafi. The regime had established a branch in the Libyan Foreign 
Ministry entitled the Administration of Immigration and Expatriates, and appointed Ali El 
Rishi to deal with Libyan opposition and expatriates outside Libya. El Rishi, was one of the 
opposition figures residing in the US, but returned after being granted an amnesty by the 
regime. Several envoys were sent by the regime to various US and European cities between 
2005 and 2010 in order to provide incentives for Libyans (i.e. travel tickets, housing, and 
jobs), who were willing to return to Libya and accept Qaddafi’s regime (Interview with Saad 
Mujber, summer, 2012). For example, many dissidents who had been living abroad for 
decades in different continents returned to Libya, and some, such as Mahmoud Jibril, and El 
Rishi, became important policy-makers. Another aspect of the regime change was related to 
the economic sector, where a number of reforms, such as returning private properties 
confiscated in the mid-1980s (according to Libyan Economic Law) to their original owners, 
and giving important loans to several Libyan youths, were implemented. Additionally, the 
regime funded many Libyan students to study either inside the country or abroad, elsewhere 
in the Arab World, and in the West. An important aspect of these economic shifts was the 
fact that Qaddafi mandated his sons to engage in the reforms.
292
 
 
                                                          
292
 Ibid. 
 212 
5.3 Features of the Libyan Policy Shift at the Regional and International 
Level 
The change in the regime’s policies was not only at the national level but also on the regional 
and international levels. In fact, at the regional level, Libya’s attention shifted from the Arab 
World to Africa and its European neighbours; and at the international level, the regime 
changed its stance, tensions, and enmity towards the Western world to facilitate more 
amicable interaction. In other words, it began to reconcile with the international community 
in respect of many important issues, such that it started to co-operate in the war on terror, 
accept responsibility for the Lockerbie Affair, the UTA (the French airliner) and the Berlin 
discotheque disasters, and started the process of negotiation in respect of Libya’s 
denuclearisation. As is explained in the subsequent sections, the regime made concessions 
regarding the above issues in order to end its isolation from the international community, to 
achieve the removal of the US sanctions, to return to the international fold, and secure 
economic investment.    
Certainly by 2000, Libya’s political spectrum had begun to change, and the gradual 
settlement of the disagreements between Libya, the US, UK, France, and Germany paved the 
way for the Libyan regime’s reintegration into the international arena. In fact, it had been the 
unsettled issues of Lockerbie and the UTA matter which had delayed the return of Libya to 
the international community. This standstill situation did not allow Libyan officials to pursue 
discussions regarding Libya’s nuclear weapons programme.293 In this scenario Libya was 
desperate to find an ‘emergency exit’ solution and decided to shift its major foreign policy 
agendas, by withdrawing its support for revolutionary movements and other groups. In 
addition, the regime became involved in promoting peace in conflict areas.
294
 Quite clearly, 
Qaddafi’s regime realised that its internal, regional, and external policies were 
counterproductive and had created several problematic issues on all levels.  
According to Pargeter (2010), Libyan officials realised that the international isolation and 
sanctions imposed on Libya had a very large impact on the country, since they had brought 
not only external problems, but domestic challenges which the country was struggling to 
overcome. Accordingly, some of Qaddafi’s trusted figures, such as Musa Kusa, Abdul Ati al-
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Obeidi, Belgasim Zawi, and Abdurhman Shalgum believed that Libya had to rebuild its 
relations with the international community in order to combat the crisis it was experiencing. 
In this respect, Pargeter maintains that Qaddafi himself started the reforms when he handed 
over the Lockerbie suspects, since this action resulted in the suspension of the UN sanctions. 
However, despite the fact that the regime had to allow some internal reforms and adopt new 
policies at the national level, reforms were mainly driven by the need to rehabilitate the 
country within the international community after its prolonged period of political and 
economic isolation. To participate in the globalised world, Libya had to adopt new reforms 
(Pargeter, 2010:2), and it did so because the regime considered the era of the Cold War to 
have finished, and that this situation required a change in its national and international 
policies. 
 
5.3.1 Aspects of Change at the Regional Level 
At the regional level, Qaddafi’s regime shifted its focus from the Middle East to Africa. The 
reorientation of Libya’s policies towards Africa was due to several reasons, such as African 
solidarity with Qaddafi during the sanctions, Qaddafi’s aspiration for leadership in the 
continent and most importantly to gain leverage, and security as well as power. Qaddafi 
recognised that by investing in Africa he would increase his chance of becoming the regional 
leader, and achieving his hoped-for political reintegration. Thus, several initiatives were 
considered by the regime, and among the projects which Libya pushed hard for, was the 
creation of the African Union (AU). In fact, one of the projects which Qaddafi launched was 
the creation of the United States of Africa.
295
 Libyan funds were used by Qaddafi to support 
several organisations in Africa such as the African Union, and the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States CEN SAD, and to integrate other regional organisations (Pham, 2010).
296
  
 
Moreover, in addition to Libya’s own financial contribution to the AU, Libya paid the dues of 
other countries that were unable to meet their financial contribution. The African Union and 
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other institutions were used by Qaddafi to raise issues such as the need to end the UN 
sanctions.
297
 Furthermore, Libya hosted several meetings and gatherings of similar 
institutions such as CEN SAD in order to promote free economic trade in the African 
continent. Through these initiatives, Qaddafi who was known for his socialist leanings, 
renounced his ‘Third Universal Theory’ due to its failure, and became a promoter of free 
economic trade. The new policies indicated Qaddafi’s wish to reinforce his power in Africa. 
Indeed, on 9 September 1999, in Sirte, he presented his vision for a ‘United States of Africa’, 
with a single army, currency, and powerful leadership (Sturman, 2003:110-111).   
Such rallying calls as the invitation to help create the ‘United States of Africa’ were not 
Qaddafi’s only interests in Africa, there being substantial investments made by the Libyan 
regime in various joint ventures in telecommunication, agriculture, infrastructure, and other 
projects. Investment in such projects did not cease with the end of the sanctions. Indeed, they 
continued and new projects were funded even after the sanctions were suspended (Huliaras 
and Magliveras, 2011:174). Indeed, the behaviour of Arab states convinced Qaddafi to shift 
his policies and alliances towards African states. In this respect, Mujber argues:  
Because they (the Arabs) did not stand with him when the sanctions of the 
UN were imposed, and frankly speaking, many African leaders have come 
challenging the sanctions of the UN by landing their planes in Tripoli 
airport without authurisation from the UN, while no Arab state did so. They 
did not because they knew him very well and by that time he was an 
enigma for everybody, for the Libyans and for the Arab countries, and for 
the West.
298
  
That said, Qaddafi’s reorientation to Africa was motivated purely by self-interest since his 
thirst for more power was evident in his proclaimed dream to become the new leader of 
Africa. And the fact that Libyan initiatives towards Africa continued after European 
companies entered the Libyan market and the sanctions were partially lifted is more evidence 
of Qaddafi’s goals in this matter. Thus, Qaddafi had simultaneously, two objectives, these 
being to rehabilitate his country with the Western world, and to invest in sub-Saharan Africa 
with a view to assuming a supreme role of leader of the continent.   
The Libyan regime started to pursue a rather positive and more reasonable direction in its 
relations with neighbouring Europe. In this respect it had been integrated in various forums 
such as the Barcelona Process (BP), which refers to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
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between members of the North and South of the Mediterranean basin. This initiative was 
meant to enhance political, economic, and social relations between the members of the 
partnership. This regional integration was hoped to bring Libya closer to the international 
community, allowing its return to the international fold, and its co-operation on the security 
of the region (Bahgat, 2010:44). As one of the high-ranking former diplomats commented on 
Qaddafi’s shift: “the hawkish Qaddafi of the early years, defiant, talkish and supporting 
terrorism and revolutionary military groups across the world … all that stopped. The 
incentives were to see Libya reintegrated into the international arena and particularly to gain 
the support of Europe and of the United States”.299      
 
Indeed, as mentioned by the diplomat concerned (who requested anonymity), Libya realised 
that the support given to revolutionary groups using terrorism was counter-productive to its 
foreign and security policies. Qaddafi’s regime comprehended the consequences of its 
previous policies which had affected the country in all aspects - socially, economically, and 
politically, and hence, it began rehabilitating itself domestically, regionally, and 
internationally in order to be welcomed back into global politics. In fact, the dire 
consequences of the regime’s external policies (i.e. several years of isolation, sanctions and 
economic stagnation) created domestic disapproval of Qaddafi’s rule. Whilst the regime 
attempted to make some domestic reforms such as respecting human rights, allowing freedom 
of speech, and writing a constitution, these reforms were not serious in their nature. The 
regime’s intention was to gain an international status, leverage, and appease the Libyan 
people. If Qaddafi’s regime granted concessions, such as writing a constitution, allowing 
freedom of speech, and political parties, it would have undermined Qaddafi’s power. For that 
reason, the domestic reforms were elusive to obtain or be granted by Qaddafi. Despite the 
fact that there was political reform at the beginning of 2000s and onwards in several 
countries, such as in Eastern Europe, and Latin America, and that various African nations had 
elections, the Arab regimes did not take any steps regarding the transition of powers (Egypt, 
Libya, Iraq, Syria, Tunisia, and Yeman). (Interview with a senior official in Qaddafi’s 
regime, summer 2012).
300
  
 
The continuous external pressure exerted on the regime for many years (i.e. threat of military 
action, sanctions, and isolation) compelled it to change its stance regarding the support of 
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revolutionary movements, meddling in neighbouring countries, and its aggressive foreign 
policy. Accordingly, Libya significantly decreased its support for terrorism by evicting 
terrorist organisations such as the Abu Nidal group, closing the training camps, and 
facilitating the extradition of fugitives to Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan. These moves were 
indeed welcomed internationally, as indicated in the Report of the US State Department of 
Global Terrorism which acknowledged and praised Qaddafi for “having repeatedly 
denounced terrorism since September 11 (Jentleson and Whytock, 2005:68).  This  volte-face 
by the US administration seemed to have placed Libya in the same boat as Western countries 
in the newly proclaimed ‘war on terror’.     
 
Libya’s long years of  international and diplomatic isolation had a dreadful effect on the 
country, and consequently the government recognised that for the West, terrorism was a very 
serious issue. In this scenario, there would be no contemplation of an ending to Libya’s 
international isolation before the Qaddafi regime ended its support for  terrorism. This was 
fully appreciated by the regime, and on various occasions it made statements to the effect that 
it had stopped supporting acts of international terrorism and had ended its support and 
training for groups using violence to reach their political aims. According to Alterman 
(2006:4), one member of the US administration stated in an unofficial interview that “Libya 
had been out of the terrorism business for at least a decade”.  Indeed, had Libya continued its 
support for terrorism it would have faced the consequences of the ‘war on terror’ proclaimed 
soon after 11 September, 2001. However, Qaddafi and his regime choose to publicly 
denounce all forms of terrorism and took this opportunity to show their solidarity in the war 
on terror. It is perfectly clear that Libya understood the negative outcomes of its previous 
policies, especially after being categorised as a pariah state for more than three decades. 
Hence, the necessity to change foreign policy was quite obvious to Qaddafi. According to 
Takeyh (2001:64), “Qaddafi realised that he had to accept the passing of the age of 
revolutions and the arrival of the age of globalisation”. 
  
The idea of promoting peace and security represented a new strategy. Qaddafi believed that 
by changing the direction of Libya’s regional policies, the results might be very positive for 
the ruling regime. For instance, Qaddafi amended his stance on the Arab/Israeli question in 
2002, becoming more pragmatic after he realised that his previous behaviour and aggressive 
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foreign policy had not been fruitful.
301
 Subsequently, the previous rhetoric and statements 
regarding the elimination of Israel were brought to an end, and as a result of his new outlook, 
Qaddafi proposed an initiative, based on a one-state solution, where both Arabs and Jews 
would live in peace, security and prosperity. He even went so far as to suggest a new name 
for the one-state envisaged, that being ‘Isratine’, a combined name suggesting that both 
Palestine and Israel could live harmoniously in one democratic state. The proposal was 
published in more detail in a booklet entitled ‘The White Book’ (Lutterbeck, 2009:155), 
which revealed a quite simplistic perspective on the part of Qaddafi, and which did not offer 
anything original to the international efforts to reach a long-lasting peace. Basically, the 
Palestinian/Israeli issue presented a much more complex problem than indicated in The 
White Book. 
Nonetheless, Qaddafi found the opportunity to show his solidarity with the US after the 
events of 9/11, and this was a vital ingredient in Libya’s re-integration with global politics. In 
the face of the new challenge by terrorism, the US Bush Administration declared its ‘war on 
terror’ and sought to involve most countries, including Qaddafi’s Libya. Such participation 
by Libya in this essentially Western initiative was motivated purely by the desire to gain 
political recognition and economic interests. 
 
 5.3.2 Libya’s Co-operation in the War on Terror 
The tragedy of 11 September was one of the major acts of terrorism perpetrated against a 
civilian population seen thus far in the 21
st
 century, and the war on terror which followed this 
attack was led by the US, with several other countries’ governments joining the international 
efforts, and forging alliances with the US on this matter. Libya was not exempted from this 
initiative, and in this circumstance the opportunity to re-join the international community, for 
which Libya had been waiting, was provided. Not surprisingly, Libya seized this unexpected 
chance and pledged its willingness to participate actively in the fight against terrorism. In 
fact, Qaddafi’s regime faced the threat represented by Islamist groups at home, and 
consequently this gave greater substance to the regime’s positive participation in trying to 
combat terrorism together with the US and the international community. On this matter, 
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Qaddafi stated “[w]e have been terrorised by what happened in America and we express our 
condolences to the American people who suffered from this unexpected catastrophe” (Chorin, 
2012:70).  
By condemning the tragic atrocity of 2001, Qaddafi reminded the international community 
that he had been fighting ‘terrorism’ in Libya since the 1990s. In fact, the Qaddafi regime 
offered to collaborate with the US prior to 9/11 in tackling al-Qaeda groups in North Africa. 
This desire to co-operate came in the aftermath of the failed attempt to assassinate Qaddafi in 
1996 by a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which the regime had 
argued was financed al-Qaeda (Hochman, 2006:67). Accordingly, Libya’s Head of 
Intelligence met with US officials soon after the incident in Europe and supplied his 
counterpart with a list of names of people and organisations suspected of having been 
involved in the 9/11 attacks (Stottlemyre, 2011:59). An interview with a senior Libyan 
official302 supports this argument. This official maintained that:  
You know well that in the mid-1990s there were bloody confrontations 
between the regime and the Islamists and I think the two sides did get heavy 
casualties. The regime was able to defeat and suppress that particular 
movement. After 9/11 the US become more active in the fight against 
terror, and tried to get the co-operation of most countries and I think Libya 
was among the countries which helped a lot the US in this field. Libya was 
also the first country which condemned the actions on the American soil. 
 
Qaddafi’s security forces were long involved in the conflict with the Islamic extremist 
militants who considered themselves the grassroots of domestic opposition to Qaddafi’s rule. 
The emergence of militant Islamists began in the early 1980s in various Libyan cities, but the 
regime did not tolerate these groups and consequently, they were pursued, arrested, and 
imprisoned. In other cases they were simply eliminated. A few cells fled to Afghanistan and 
once they gained military experience from the war against the Soviets, they returned to Libya. 
By the beginning of the 1990s, the jihadist movement, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group 
(LIFG), appeared on Libyan soil again and established a foothold in the East of Libya. Two 
or three years later, the Qaddafi regime discovered that these groups, and especially the 
militant ones, had begun to spread. Qaddafi then launched a massive operation on the militant 
groups and other moderate Islamists as well, the result being that most of these groups were 
brutally repressed and their members arrested (Pargeter, 2006:221). 
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It is important to note that after the terrorist attack on 9/11, Qaddafi did not blame the US or 
its foreign policy for provoking such an attack on itself, and this was the first time he had 
refrained from doing so. Rather, he immediately aligned himself with the US in the war on 
terror in order for his regime to be accepted in mainstream politics. According to Walt 
(2005:110), “[i]nstead of resisting US power, a few states - Libya is the most recent example 
- ‘bandwagon’ with the United States. To appease Washington, bandwagoners realign their 
foreign policies according to Washington’s dictates”. Evidently, Qaddafi realised that closer 
co-operation and assistance regarding the fight against terror with the West in general and the 
US in particular, would benefit his regime. Additionally, it would alter the international 
perceptions of Libya’s previous posture (i.e. support for revolutionary and outlawed 
movements).  
In reality, Libya was not the only Arab or Muslim country that supported the US. For 
instance, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco all united in 
the global fight against al Qaeda and Islamic extremism, due to the perceived risk to their 
countries and regimes from terrorist groups and organisations.
303
 It is important to highlight 
that the states mentioned above are not genuine democracies, and do not share the same 
values as true democracies in terms of human rights and freedom of expression. However, for 
various reasons such as overlapping interests with liberal democracies, they aligned 
themselves with the international community on the objectives of the war on terror. And 
despite the fact that the Libyan regime did not respect the human rights of its citizens, or 
allow political parties, or give its citizens the right of freedom of expression, the US accepted 
Qaddafi’s collaboration in its fight against al-Qaeda and terrorism.  
In the regional sphere, the Libyan regime started to co-operate with other Arab governments 
regarding the issue of Islamic extremists. The activity of these extremists in the region 
prompted Arab states such as Egypt and Tunisia, to co-operate in an effort to cripple their 
terrorist activities in accordance with the Arab League’s official position on the issue. For 
instance, Qaddafi’s regime extradited Islamist militants to other countries such as Yemen and 
Jordan (Takeyh, 2001:68). Tackling Islamists was an important challenge for all Arab states 
despite their ideological divergences and their disagreements on other political and economic 
matters. On this particular issue there was a degree of unanimity within the Arab League and 
full co-operation was forthcoming from Arab governments.  
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Dealing with the problem of al Qaeda and Islamic extremists represented a top priority for 
Qaddafi’s regime. During the Libyan rapprochement with the US, Libyan officials met with 
US representatives secretly in May 1999 in Geneva, to discuss various pending issues 
between both states. The Libyan officials informed the US about the Islamist threat in the 
region and both sides agreed to co-operate and tackle al-Qaeda (St John, 2008:134). Libya 
recognised that it was vital for the regime to get closer to the US and fight a common enemy. 
Nonetheless, whilst there was indeed close co-operation on this matter, other standing issues, 
such as the compensation to the Lockerbie victims’ families, remained a barrier to full 
normalisation of relations.  
A former senior official in Qaddafi’s regime reiterated that the attacks on 11 September 2001 
and the subsequent war against terrorism did have a huge effect on the Libyan foreign 
policy.
304
 It prompted the country to moderate its discourse and opt for a more prudent policy 
of appeasement. This attitude was taken after observing the reactions of the United States to 
states and terrorist organisations in Afghanisatan, Iraq, Yemen, Kenya, Tanzania, and in the 
Arab Maghreb which includes Libya and that is close to its borders.  
 
5.3.3 The Reconciliation of the Lockerbie, UTA (the French airliner), and the Berlin 
Discotheque Affairs 
The Libyan government agreed to settle in respect of the UTA bombing and pay 
compensation, but the Lockerbie affair took years to reach its conclusion. However, 
Qaddafi’s will to resolve these conundrums  indicates that he was determined to find a way 
out and rejoin the international community, diplomatically, economically, and politically. The 
new dimension in Libya’s behaviour, integration within various institutions in Africa and 
Europe, reflects the Qaddafi regime’s acknowledgement that it was imperative to return to the 
international fold. 
As mentioned, the Lockerbie affair resulting in a standoff between Libya, the USA and the 
UK, lasted for several years before Libya agreed to the conditions set by the other parties in 
the dispute. In trying to reach a settlement, Qaddafi encouraged his representatives to engage 
in further talks with the US, as he had successfully done with the European countries 
involved in the other two terrorist events. The aim was to secure a full normalisation of 
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relationships through economic, political, and cultural integration, but this required Libya to 
show it was no longer among the list of states supporting terrorism. After taking a few steps 
towards resolving the UTA issue, and handing over the Lockerbie suspects for trial, Libya 
had still to accept formal responsibility for the bombing, and make compensation to the 
families’ of the victims. Permanent campaigns and pressure from Lockerbie victims’ families 
on the US administrations prevented a political settlement between the two states. In fact, the 
main concern for the Bush Administration was a successful outcome to the Lockerbie affair, 
rather than the other issues that Libya wanted to negotiate upon, such as the country’s 
unconventional weapons project. In this respect, the observation is made by Vandewalle 
(2008:216) that although Libya approached the Clinton administration concerning its 
unconventional weapons, for the US this matter was not a priority. Lockerbie clearly 
represented a very genuine dilemma for Qaddafi. He did not want to be held accountable or 
personally responsible, as this would have tarnished his new image of peace promoter and the 
wise man in the region, yet, the remaining US sanctions represented a barrier to Libya’s 
reintegration into the world order, and consequently a solution had to be found.  
 The Lockerbie Trial 
The surrendering of the Lockerbie suspects to the Scottish jurisdiction was an indication of an 
important shift in Libyan external policy. Libya was also required by the US to accept 
responsibility for the tragic incident in order to obtain the full normalisation with the US 
which it desired. From this perspective, Qaddafi believed that by opposing and denouncing 
terrorism, he would have more chance of being welcomed and accepted by the international 
community, as he had realised that the regime’s former policies had caused Libya’s political 
isolation, and resulted in two decades of UN and US sanctions which had caused stagnation 
in the economic and investment sectors. Reflecting on the hardship suffered by his country, a 
former senior official in Qaddafi’s regime maintained that: 
I believe that the US embargo had an effect, although it did not affect a lot on the 
material side, it had nevertheless a moral impact and led to the reconsideration of 
numerous policies and practices. Libya realised that it was for its own benefit to return 
to the international fold (community) and to provide the most favourable conditions for 
investments and developments. (Interview with a senior official in Qaddafi’s regime, 
summer, 2012).   
For three decades, terrorism and the threat of nuclear weapons capability had been considered 
by Qaddafi’s regime as tools to achieve political aims. However, in acknowledgement of the 
need for new policies on terrorism and nuclear proliferation to be in place if Libya’s rulers 
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wished to remain in power, the whole policy outlook shifted. In this respect, Qaddafi 
recognised that his own political and economic survival depended on such changes in 
behaviour towards the international community and the West in particular.  
In fact, the jury at the Lockerbie trial took almost three months to reach a decision, which 
was eventually that one of the defendants, Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi was convicted, while the 
second defendant, Fhimah was acquitted due to the lack of strong evidence against him. 
Fhimah was a station manager at Malta Airport and the allegation that he supplied the tag to 
allow the luggage to proceed to the airliner was weak from the beginning. The end of the 
Lockerbie trial in the Netherlands came after the election of President Bush, who, since his 
inauguration in office maintained that his administration would not deal with perceived 
terrorists. 
 Indeed, George Bush reacted to the verdict of the Lockerbie trial by reiterating that the 
Libyan government was required to address its commitments under the UNSC resolutions. 
The conditions were that Libya should accept responsibility for the actions of its citizens, 
unveil its own information about the bombing, cease its support for terrorism, and pay 
compensation to the victims’ families (Stottlemyre, 2011:57). It was clear that President Bush 
followed the footsteps of his predecessor regarding the Lockerbie victims’ families’ 
compensation, and renunciation of terrorism. Moreover, the tragic atrocity of 11/9 made the 
Bush administration firmer in its stance towards international terrorism, although it did take 
the spotlight away from the Lockerbie affair for some time.   
In this circumstance, the negotiations between Libya and the US continued until the end of 
2003, by which time the Libyan government and the US had reached a final agreement on the 
Lockerbie case. Libya agreed to pay a substantial amount of money to the victims’ families, 
and acknowledged its responsibility for the actions of its citizens. Regarding the financial 
reparations, Libya agreed to pay the families of the victims US$2.7 billion for the Lockerbie 
bombing (Ronen, 2006:280). The payment was made in three instalments and was contingent 
upon some elements, such as removing Libya from the list of states declared as supporting 
terrorism. 
Two main factors played in Libya’s favour, and ended its status of pariah state. The first was 
the surrender of the Lockerbie suspects to international justice, and the second was Libya’s 
letter to the UNSC of 15 August 2003, which stated that:   
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 out of respect for international law and pursuant to the Security Council 
resolutions, Libya as a sovereign state has facilitated the bringing to 
justice of the two suspects charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103, 
and accepts responsibility for the actions of its officials;  
 has co-operated with the Scottish investigating authorities before and 
during the trial and pledges to co-operate in good faith with any further 
requests for information in connection with the Pan Am 103 
investigation. Such co-operation would be extended in good faith 
through the usual channels; 
 has arranged for the payment of appropriate compensation. To this end, 
a special fund has been established and instructions have already been 
issued to transmit the necessary sums to an agreed escrow account 
within a matter of days.
305
 
The UN sanctions were lifted immediately after receiving the letter of acknowledgement 
from Libya. However, the compensation for the victims’ families was not neglected by the 
negotiators since Libya had to pay US $2.7 billion. The total amount was deposited at the 
Bank for International Settlements.  
  
5.4 The Process of Dismantling the Libyan Nuclear Weapons Programme 
Once the question of Lockerbie was resolved, Libya found itself confronted with another 
problem, that being its nuclear programme. The US was unwilling to lift its sanctions and 
normalise its relations with Libya until details of Qaddafi’s unconventional weapons 
programme had been revealed and were transparent for the international community to see.  
There is no doubt that the process of solving issues relating to nuclear weapons capability is 
not an easy task. In fact, the process of denuclearisation needs a long time and strong efforts 
to reach a compromise. As is shown shortly, the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons 
programme took three different approaches.  
  
5.4.1 The Path towards the Rollback of Libya’s Nuclear Programme 2003 
From the end of the 1990s Qaddafi had wanted absolutely to put an end to the sanctions by 
changing Libya’s behaviour. At the same time, Europe wanted to embrace Libya’s new 
outlook on security and economic interests. Following the lifting of the UN sanctions, 
European companies found Libya to be a promising supplier of energy, and these joint 
                                                          
305
  See Libya’s letter addressed to the President of the Security Council in full.   The transcript of a letter sent to 
the UN Security Council from Libyan UN envoy Ahmed Own, accepting responsibility for the 1988 Lockerbie 
bombing, published on 16 August 2003, available at : http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/3155825.stm 
 224 
economic interests encouraged the governments of Italy, Germany, Britain, and France, to 
support their companies in efforts to access the Libyan market. Essentially, European co-
operation with Libya started after the handing over of the Lockerbie suspects and the 
fulfilment of the conditions included in the UNSC resolutions. Trade and energy were 
important aspects in the co-operation between Europe and Libya. Due to the sanctions, the 
Libyan oil sector had not been exploitable for decades, and thus it required investment in 
appropriate technology, which could be supplied by foreign companies (Joffé, 2011:238). 
Indeed, the renewal of relations in all fields with the European countries was essential to 
boost Libya’s economy, and at the same time was of benefit to European investment 
companies. However, the co-operation was ultimately more important for Libya than for 
Europe, as it opened the gates for Qaddafi to be accepted and deal with other governments 
and statesmen on a global scale. Basically, Libya’s European rapprochement in economic 
terms paved the way for more positive relations with other countries. In respect of oil in 
particular, Libya’s oil sector was operated by the Libyan National Oil Company (LONC), but 
suffered from under-development because of the sanctions, and after the partial suspension of 
sanctions, Libya once again became attractive to international oil companies for several 
reasons, such as the quality of its crude oil, its short distance from Europe, and the fact that 
its territory remained largely unexplored (Vandewalle, 2008:217). 
With regard to the Libyan rapprochement with the US, whilst there was fierce opposition to 
efforts towards this from pressure groups representing the families of Lockerbie victims, 
unofficial meetings did take place between Libyan and US representatives on the subject of 
Libya’s relations with the West. Accordingly, a former Prime Minister in Qaddafi’s regime 
maintained that, during the last two years (before the official declaration and before the 
agreement concerning the compensation of the Lockerbie victims’ families), there were secret 
‘popular’ discussions in parallel with the secret official negotiations.306 These were attended 
by American, and former influential and trusted Libyan officials. Despite the fact that the 
representatives did not have official positions in their respective governments, the discussions 
were more open and included issues not addressed in the official negotiations. Indeed, 
Qaddafi was absolutely adamant in his wish to reach a deal with the US and was ready to 
make the required concessions by changing Libya’s behaviour. 
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 Interview with a former Prime Minister in Qaddafi’s regime in Libya, 2012. 
 225 
American oil companies, like their European counterparts, campaigned to ease the sanctions 
on Libya. In view of the changing Libyan policies, the Department of Energy task force, and 
the lobby of US oil companies advised the Bush administration (in April 2001) to reassess 
relations with Libya. By mid-2001 US officials had refrained from labelling Libya as a 
‘rogue state’, preferring to use the term a ‘state of concern’, thereby demonstrating a more 
lenient stance towards the regime (Chorin, 2012:68). This indicated the mutual interest in 
aiming for a normalisation of relations between the two countries. Consequently, Libya’s 
rehabilitation was facilitated by the rapprochement which brought the opportunity for the 
country to rejoin mainstream politics and the international community.  
In fact, in the aftermath of 11 September, any states that intended to acquire or pursue a 
nuclear weapons programme, were sure to face the dire consequences of the implementation 
of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the wrath of the US, the only superpower 
remaining after the fall of the Eastern bloc. With this perspective in mind, the Libyan regime 
started to reconsider its nuclear project, thinking that it was more likely to have a negative 
rather than positive impact on its security. Moreover, the costs and benefits of the nuclear 
programme were not as expected, especially after the long decade of international sanctions. 
That said, according to an anonymous interviewee, the effects of the sanctions on the Libya’s 
nuclear programme were limited, as Libya resorted to the black market network. When asked 
about their influence, he said: “Yes, the sanctions had an impact but not a huge one, although 
it delayed the programme for years”.307 From this angle, it can be said that a definite shift 
occurred in the regime’s interests about unconventional weapons such that they were 
considered to enhance Libya’s negative image and bring further isolation.  
 
5.4.2 The Negotiations Concerning Libya’s Denuclearisation 
This section focuses on the negotiation process between three parties - Libya, Britain, and the 
United States - in the aftermath of the Iraq war, and explains how a compromise was reached. 
It considers the negotiations process and who was behind the initiative (as well as the timing 
and location). This section evaluates the initial US and British responses when these countries 
were approached by Libyan officials to discuss Libyan nuclear denuclearisation. The section 
also evaluates the steps that were taken to reward Libya for giving up its programme, such as 
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the suspension of the UN and US sanctions, and Libya’s return to the international 
community. 
As mentioned previously, Libya had approached the US in order to offer concessions 
regarding its pursuit of unconventional weapons. Martin Indyk has acknowledged that Libyan 
officials approached him to talk about Libya’s nuclear programme while the secret 
negotiations started effectively in May 1999 in Geneva, Switzerland (Corera, 2006:178 and 
179).
308
 According to a senior source in Qaddafi’s intelligence service as well as other senior 
figures in the Libyan regime, it was the collapse of the former Soviet Union which affected 
the course of Libya’s foreign policy (Interview with an intelligence officer, summer, 
2012).
309
 Qaddafi’s regime had opted for more concessions in order to return to the 
international fold, especially after settling the Lockerbie affair and other issues with the UK 
and France. The rationale was to save the ageing regime which had started to crumble due to 
numerous external and internal factors (i.e. the end of the Cold War with the loss of a 
powerful ally, the effects of international sanctions, the diplomatic isolation, the growth of 
internal opposition and the several attempts to overthrow Qaddafi himself).   
The first priority of the US following the 9/11 terrorist attack was to prevent further tragedies.  
Accordingly, President Bush promised the American people that the administration would 
fight international terrorism and pursue all terrorists and tyrants who gave terrorists shelter. 
This was a pledge to which Bush was totally committed. Afghanistan was the first target of 
Bush’s policy towards terrorism; another priority for the Bush administration was the issue of 
Iraq and its ‘alleged’ weapons of mass destruction. During the time when the issue of Iraq’s 
WMD was mounting, and when President Bush asserted that certain states were considered as 
representing the ‘axis of evil’ (in 2002), Libya was not mentioned explicitly but was still an 
object of concern. The Bush Administration suspected Qaddafi’s regime of having been 
developing nuclear and chemical weapons since the 1980s  (McCormick, 2010:224), and 
John R Bolton, the former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security, stated in May 2002 that Libya was still a ‘rogue state’ that was actively involved in 
developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. John Bolton also reiterated his 
suspicion on 26 May 2002, by stating:  
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 Indyk was Assistant Secretary of State during the Clinton Administration. 
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  In fact, various senior figures interviewed in Libya stated that Libyan foreign policy was affected by the fall 
of the former Soviet Union. 
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There is no doubt that Libya continues its longstanding pursuit of nuclear 
weapons. We believe that since the suspension of UN sanctions against 
Libya in 1999, Libya has been able to increase its access to dual use nuclear 
technologies. Although Libya would need significant foreign assistance to 
acquire a nuclear weapon, Tripoli’s nuclear infrastructure enhancement 
remains of concern.
310
 
However, the Libyan government denied any sort of involvement in the nuclear business. 
This statement by the regime did not reflect the full picture as Libya was definitely involved 
in nuclear weapons proliferation, but at a low level. In fact, St John and Zoubir maintained 
that Bolton’s argument regarding Libya’s advanced nuclear and chemical weapons 
programme was groundless and inaccurate. They argued that Bolton’s assertion that Libya 
would have nuclear weapons in a few years’ time was over-estimated, and the idea that Libya 
represented a nuclear threat was exaggerated (St John, 2004:395; Zoubir, 2006:60).    
As early as the late 1990s, Libya was willing to negotiate its disarmament with the US but the 
lack of interest in this question of disarmament by the American administration postponed an 
eventual agreement on the matter. Another gesture by Qaddafi was made in 2002 during the 
official visit of the British Foreign Minister, Mike O’Brian to Libya. According to Corera 
(2006:180) “when O’Brian brought up the issue of non-conventional weapons, Gaddafi did 
not utter his usual denial. Instead, Gaddafi surprised O’Brian by acknowledging that weapons 
of mass destruction were a serious issue, and said he was keen to improve relations in order 
to get foreign investment for his oil and gas industries”. The British representatives 
maintained that it was crucial for them to make an offer to Qaddafi such as improving 
relations with the US and the West in order to convince him to give up his unconventional 
weapons (Corera, 2006:180). Furthermore, the British and US intelligence officials knew 
about Libya’s nuclear weapons programme, and had warned the Libyan representatives 
through secret messages, that if Libya continued its defiant posture regarding its nuclear 
programme, the international community would act to coerce Libya to surrender that 
programme (Corera, 2006:182). 
Tucker (2009) has reported that Qaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam, who was then a post-graduate 
student at London School of Economics (LSE), approached the British Secret Intelligence 
Service MI6, to discuss the issue of Libya’s WMDs, long before the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
A few months later, during a meeting at Camp David, the former British Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, requested President Bush to look at the Libyan initiative. The primary 
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discussions were between officials from both the British and US intelligence agencies, and 
Libya. In order, to prevent any leakage to the media the matter was considered top secret by 
all the involved parties. From the American side, Robert G Joseph
311
 and Stephen R 
Kappes
312
 were appointed to deal with the issue. The instruction was given directly from 
President Bush, who also required a minimum number of officials to be kept from the State 
and Defense Departments. Libya, for its part, sent Musa Kusa
313
 the head of Libya’s external 
intelligence organisation to represent the country (Tucker, 2009:364).  
Various meetings took place in London, Geneva, and Tripoli, between March and September 
2003, and in September 2003, representatives from the CIA and MI6 met Qaddafi in Tripoli 
to discuss the possibility of a visit by British technical experts to assess Libya’s programme 
(Tucker, 2009:365). According to the former head of the nuclear weapons portfolio in 
Qaddafi’s regime, Matoug Mohamed Matoug, the negotiations with the US and the UK for 
the dismantlement of Libya’s nuclear weapons programme lasted nine months. Matoug stated 
that there was a Libyan intention to inform the IAEA agency about the talks between the 
three parties but the secret character of the negotiations prevented the regime from doing this 
as the discussions between the parties were still in process (Elbaradei, 2011:150).  
Additionally, the former Libyan Prime Minister, Abdulrahman Shalgum, stated in an 
interview given to the London-based Arabic newspaper Al Hayat, that the final phase of the 
negotiations started after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Sharbil, 2011). However, he pointed 
out that the talks started a long time before 2003. According to him, the negotiations were 
already at an advanced stage, well before the invasion and occupation of Iraq and that it was 
erroneous to think or claim, as some people did, that Qaddafi was afraid after the invasion of 
Iraq. Shalgum, who affirmed that the discussions on the dismantlement of Libya’s WMDs 
started in 2001, revealed that he discussed the issue with Qaddafi in that same year. He also 
stated that he told Qaddafi that Libya did not need the nuclear weapons programme, and that 
the need to abandon it was quite urgent. The reasons presented by Shalgum to Qaddafi were 
related to the geographical space taken by such a project, the difficulty of storage of such 
sensitive material, and finally, the risk of a leakage with its disastrous consequences to the 
country. Furthermore, during a meeting in the US, Bush asked Bouteflika the Algerian 
president, to deliver a message and warn Qaddafi regarding his pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
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Bush stated that if Qaddafi did not renounce his nuclear weapons programme, he would 
suffer dire consequences. Bouteflika informed the Libyan foreign minister Shalgum about 
Bush’s warning to Qaddafi, and Shalgum in turn delivered the message to Qaddafi, who 
subsequently accused them both of being cowards (Sharbil, 2011).  
According to Saad Mujber, a former official diplomat, Qaddafi was contradicting himself 
regarding the negotiation of Libya’s denuclearisation. Despite the fact that he authorised and 
approved the negotiation to dismantle Libya’s nuclear programme, Qaddafi accused his 
negotiators (Abdel Ati el-Obeidi and Musa Kusa) of betrayal, in contradiction to Qaddafi’s 
earlier authorisation to start the negotiation of Libya’s nuclear dismantlement.  As Mujber 
noted, during the course of negotiating Libya’s nuclear reversal, “he (Qaddafi) even accused 
Abdel ‘Ati el Obeidi of a treason, but he was lying”. When asked who was suspecting Abdel 
‘Ati el-Obeidi, Mujber said:  
Qaddafi, Qaddafi, of course, but he was lying. He wanted the negotiations 
to succeed and he accepted the advice that if you want to have better 
relations with the US you have to surrender. I am sure he was scared, I 
know him personally, he had three of his close advisers to negotiate how to 
resolve the problem with the West and London.  Abdel ‘Ati el Obeidi, he 
was Prime Minister before, Foreign Minister before, he was speaker of the 
General People Congress. And Muhammad Zawi who was Minister several 
times, information and interior, and Musa Kusa who was his chief spy, 
under the auspices of Abdallah Senoussi (Interview with Saad Mujber, 
summer 2012). 
Indeed, Qaddafi did not want to be associated with Libya’s nuclear programme personally, 
nor did he want to be held responsible responsible if there was any setback during the 
process of the negotiation. 
Other sources interviewed in Libya stated that Libya’s representatives in the negotiations 
with the British and US officials were Musa Kusa, Ahmed Mahmud, Farj Boughalia, 
intelligence service officers, and the deputy foreign minister Abdel ‘Ati el-Obeidi. All of 
these individuals were assigned to deal with the dossier of the WMD programme. There were 
meetings with delegations or envoys from the UK, the USA, and the European Union. In the 
same period, internationally-mandated experts on nuclear weapons often visited Libya, 
usually going to Rabta, or Tajura or Tarhuna.
314
 However, an unexpected difficulty appeared 
when a boat loaded with dangerous goods was intercepted on its way to Tripoli. There was 
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speculation about the shipment, and it was claimed that this might have been nuclear or other 
dangerous materials. A dismantling operation took place, followed by the loading of the 
confiscated parts from the boat involved. At this stage it was important to have more 
precision about the role of the experts, and the interviewee denied the presence of members 
from the IAEA. According to him, all the foreign visitors were delegates from foreign 
governments, in particular from the USA, and were not IAEA experts. Unlike the US, Britain 
and France, the IAEA did not exert pressure on Qaddafi’s regime for its foreign and security 
policies as well as its pursuit of its nuclear programme. In this regard, the IAEA was not an 
effective actor in the Libyan case and did not play an independent role. These visitors brought 
their own translators, and several meetings took place between the Libyan intelligence 
services and the delegations. The former high Libyan official was not able to obtain more 
details due to the fact that tough security measures and restrictions were put in place to 
maintain secrecy in respect of the negotiations. 
Libya’s nuclear reversal was enhanced during the final phase of the negotiation, when a ship 
loaded with nuclear materials en-route to Libya from Dubai was intercepted by the British 
and the American authorities in October 2003. It was reported that the nuclear material 
contained centrifuge parts assembled in Malaysia. The seizure of the ship was conducted by 
members of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an international initiative led by the US 
in its attempt to cripple any transfers of nuclear materials by state and non-state actors 
(Cirincione, 2005:321). On the one hand, the Libyan regime wanted to negotiate its nuclear 
disarmament with the US and Britain, but at the same time it was importing nuclear material 
to continue to develop its nuclear programme in case the negotiation failed. However, the 
seizure of the merchant ship made such a manoeuvre impossible. 
In fact, the interception of the ship gave the US and British intelligence a clear picture of 
Libya’s nuclear programme, and given the circumstances, the Libyan negotiators could not 
deny that the ship was indeed being used to transport materials for Libya’s nuclear weapons 
programme. The seizure of the ship was proof that Libya was developing a uranium 
enrichment programme, and this was a decisive element in the negotiation. Accordingly, the 
Libyan government allowed technical experts from the US and Britain to access weapons 
sites, laboratories, and military factories. The preliminary scrutiny of Libya’s weapons sites 
showed more Libyan activities in the nuclear and chemical weapons fields (Jentleson and 
Whytock, 2005:74).   
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The researcher asked a former senior official about the seizure of the ship, and whether it had 
affected the course of negotiation, to which he replied: “I do not think so, because at that 
time, the decision to get rid of the nuclear programme was already taken. The dismantling 
was already planned and I keep insisting that the programme itself was not a serious one”.315 
Qaddafi’s regime realised that Libya’s nuclear progarmme would be counterproductive to its 
own secuirty and concluded that it would gain more leverage if it were to denuclearise. Also 
the calculation of the costs and benefits of such progarmme showed that it would be costly to 
Libya, especially after years of economic sanctions.  
 
5.4.3 The Announcement of the Dismantling of Libyan Nukes 
On 18 December, the night before Libya’s announcement that it would dismantle its nuclear 
programme, an American and British proposal was made to the Libyan regime, suggesting 
that as soon as Qaddafi announced Libya’s intention, President Bush and the British Prime 
Minister Blair would react publicly to that statement, showing their approval for such a wise 
decision (Sharbil, 2011). However, the Libyan ruler was unwilling to go as far as what was 
requested by the Western leaders, and according to Shalgum,
316
 on the morning of 19 
December, Abdulrahamn Shalgum, Musa Kusa, Abdul Ati Obeidi,
317
 and Mohamed El- 
Zway
318
 met at the Foreign Ministry, where they waited for the final phase of the statement.  
Qaddafi proposed to record the statements on the Libyan TV network, but Blair and Bush 
disagreed with this proposal and insisted that Qaddafi should make a statement first. Qaddafi 
did not want to be involved directly with such a statement,
319
 and it was the former Foreign 
Minister Shalgum who read the statement of Libya’s dismantling of its nuclear weapons 
programme, after which Bush and Blair commented positively on the shift regarding the non-
proliferation.  
When Libya’s Foreign Minister announced the dismantlement of Qaddafi’s regime nuclear 
weapons and long range missiles, the whole world was astonished, due to the fact that for 
several decades Libya had attempted to acquire unconventional weapons. Moreover, the 
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timing of the announcement came only few days after Saddam Hussein was captured in Iraq. 
The dismantlement of Libya’s nuclear weapons programme indicates that Qaddafi saved his 
regime’s survival, especially after Iraq was invaded for the same reason (its pursuit of nuclear 
weapons).  
The Libyan Foreign Minister, Abdulrahman Shalgum, confirmed that all substances, 
equipment and programmes with the potential to produce nuclear weapons would be 
dismantled. Specifically, Tripoli pledged to do the following: 
 Declare all nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and sign the additional protocol. 
 Eliminate ballistic missiles beyond a 300km range. 
 Eliminate all chemical weapons stocks and munitions, and accede to the chemical 
weapons conventions. 
 Allow immediate inspection and monitoring to verify all these actions. 
 
In the declaration, Libya pledged to give the relevant international institutions access to its 
unconventional weapons. Subsequently, inspectors from the US, the UK and IAEA visited 
Libya to verify the dismantlement. In return for Libya’s goodwill, the US and Britain 
promised to assist Libya’s reintegration with the international community and to end the 
remaining sanctions. Furthermore, Britain and the US affirmed that it would help Libya in 
various projects, such as in the development of its oil industry, its domestic infrastructure, 
and in the provision of medical assistance. Several high ranking officials from the US and 
Britain, including the former Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Libya, in order to gain access 
to the Libyan market, to extend the share of BP in the country, and to co-operate in different 
programmes (Muller, 2007:80). 
Various interpretations about the motives of Libya’s decision to abandon its nuclear weapons 
programme have been made. One was that the disarmament was a by-product of the invasion 
of Iraq, and given the announcement’s timing which was just a few days after Saddam 
Hussein was captured, this was a sensible conclusion. It is true that there was a strange 
coincidence between the invasion of Iraq and the time chosen by Libya to dismantle its 
nuclear weapons programme. Moreover, officials in the White House reiterated the same 
claims that Libya feared it could be next. For instance, George Bush stated that: 
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As we hoped, the liberation of Iraq had an impact beyond its borders. Six 
days after Saddam’s capture, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, long 
time enemy of America and state sponsor of terror - publicly confessed that 
he had been developing chemical and nuclear weapons. He pledged to 
dismantle his WMD programs, along with related missiles, under a system 
of strict international verification. It is possible the timing was coincidence. 
But I do not think so (Bush, 2010:267-268).  
Other policy-makers in the Bush administration, such as Dick Cheney, reiterated that one of 
the positive results of Iraq’s invasion was Qaddafi’s denuclearisation concessions. Dick 
Cheney described Libya’s public announcement to disarm as “one of the great by-products ... 
of what we did in Iraq and Afghanistan”, stressing that just “five days after we captured 
Saddam Hussein, Mu’ammar Qaddafi came forward and announced that he was going to 
surrender all of his nuclear materials to the United States” (Jentleson and Whytock, 2005:48).  
Others, such as Campbell et al. (2004), shared the same opinion, pointing out that Libya’s 
decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme was connected with the military action 
in Iraq; this direct involvement (by the USA and its allies) in an Arab country in March 2003 
represented a decisive moment and convinced Qaddafi to alter his foreign policy, to avoid a 
military confrontation. For Campbell et al., another crucial reason for Qaddafi’s actions was 
the desire to see the rehabilitation of Libya in the international arena (Campbell, 2004:322). 
The link between Saddam Hussein’s capture and Qaddafi’s declaration certainly seems 
plausible given the timing of the two events. However, informed people and participants in 
the secret negotiations (Qaddafi’s men, the US and the British) knew that Libya’s statement 
was, in fact, the result of long and extended discussions between the parties. 
In reality, Saif al-Islam two months before the announcement, asserted in October 2003 that 
Libya wanted to return to the international fold in order to gain commercial interests and 
restore its diplomatic relations with the US. He added that “Libya would soon make an 
important announcement”. In view of this statement, St John maintained that Libya made its 
decision in September 2003, when US and British weapons inspectors were allowed to visit 
the weapons sites. However, the formal agreement between the negotiators was not reached 
until December, a few days before Saddam’s capture (St John, 2004:397). St John’s 
conclusion is undoubtedly very sound, but it is, nonetheless, quite possible that the Iraq 
invasion in 2003 may well have accelerated the process of Libya’s dismantling.  
Another official in the Bush Administration contradicts Campbell’s explanation. According 
to the former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s memoirs, Qaddafi’s decision to give up 
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the nuclear weapons programme came prior to the capture of Saddam. She stated that “the 
Saturday before the Libyan announcement [i.e., December 13, 2003], I’d called in Dan 
Bartlett to tell him about the coming good news [the Libya announcement]. I was surprised 
when he looked disappointed. ‘I thought you were going to tell me that we had found 
Saddam’, he said. ‘That will be next week’, I said in jest (quoted by Chorin, 2012:71).  
Senior figures in the Bush Administration, such as Under Secretary of Defence Douglas 
Feith, made a direct connection between toppling Saddam and Qaddafi’s abandonment of his 
nuclear programme. Feith stated that Qaddafi did not want to be next after witnessing the fall 
of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes. Others, such as the US Energy Secretary, 
Spencer Abrams, supported Feith’s claims regarding the relationship between the war in Iraq 
and Qaddafi’s announcement, in particular the timing of Libya’s concession which was just 
days after the capture of Saddam (Salama, 2004). However, a former senior officer in the 
Libyan regime believes that despite the false pretext invoked by the US for the invasion of 
Iraq, Qaddafi knew that the American administration would prevent (by all means) any 
country from acquiring nuclear programmes. The Libyan diplomat also affirmed that while 
Iraq was being invaded, negotiations were taking place between the Libyans and the 
Americans with British mediation. He confirmed that during these negotiations in the middle 
of 2003, the decision was taken to announce Libya’s decision not to pursue nuclear capacity 
and to openly declare the existence of its secret programme.
320
 
Hence, according to government officials, there were various factors which contributed to 
Libya’s dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programme. One of the key figures in this 
debate was the then Prime Minister, Shukri Ghanem, who “asserted that his government 
based its decision on an independent assessment of its national interests, on a careful study of 
the country’s future in all domains … conforming to the aspirations of the Libyan leadership 
and people” (Jentleson and Whytock, 2005:48). After the country reviewed its security 
interests the Libyan government realised that the nuclear programme was counter-productive, 
and a burden on its own national security. Libyan policy-makers had stated on numerous 
occasions that a review of the costs and benefits associated with the programme should be 
undertaken, and this was considered to contribute towards a re-thinking of the regime’s 
original intention to acquire or develop a nuclear weapons programme.  
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In view of the above interpretations, it might be possible that Qaddafi did in fact suspect that 
his regime would be next on the agenda of Western powers, and that he personally might 
suffer the same fate as Saddam Hussein. If he had not perceived this threat, it is unlikely that 
he would have abandoned his ambition to obtain nuclear weapons since he believed the 
achievement of these would have ensured his control of Libya and the survival of his regime. 
Additionally, if Qaddafi had anticipated a regime change, it would have been irrational for 
him to disarm. However, the regime received assurances from the US and Britain, that there 
would not be a regime change and that they simply wanted a policy change (Jentleson and 
Whytock, 2005:82). Thus, there was a strong incentive to denuclearise Libya ‘voluntarily’, 
and if the regime had felt threatened at that time it would have been impossible to obtain the 
desired dismantlement. The nuclear programme, if successful, would have served as a 
deterrent. In the same way, SCUD B and C missiles were vital components in Libya’s 
armament and represented strategic weapons, yet Qaddafi pledged to dismantle them 
(Interview with Saad Mujber, summer 2012).  
In the same vein, Litwak (2008) argues that in contrast to the regime change in Iraq, Libya 
received credible assurances that the regime would not be removed as long as it agreed to 
dismantle its nuclear programme, allow weapons inspectors, and change its policies (i.e. 
support for terrorism, and nuclear proliferation). According to him, had Qaddafi suspected 
that the US and international community would topple his regime, he would not have 
renounced his unconventional weapons, and would have continued to acquire nuclear 
capabilities since these would serve as a strategic deterrent to any aggression (Litwak, 
2008:25). 
Proponents of realism have argued that Libya’s stance regarding its denuclearisation was 
explained in terms of a fear of suffering the same fate as Iraq. However, if Qaddafi’s regime 
feared a similar invasion, he would not have made a concession regarding the long range 
missiles when giving up the nuclear weapons. In fact, the long range missiles are strategic 
weapons and would have played a vital role in deterring external aggression. Qaddafi’s 
regime in the aftermath of the US airstrike on Libya in April 1986, fired Scud missiles 
towards the Italian island of Lampedusa.  According to Stanik (2003:199), “[i]n a desperate 
attempt to retaliate against the United States, Qaddafi ordered his army to launch two Soviet-
built SS-1 Scud Ballistic missiles at the U.S Coast Guard long-range navigation station on the 
Italian Island of Lampedusa”. It is worth noting that any state would preserve such 
conventional weapons for its security in the face of perceived threat. Therefore, Qaddafi, 
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keen to maintain himself in power, chose to renounce his nuclear weapons programme in 
order to make Libya more stable, ensure its economic growth, and facilitate its return to the 
international community. In view of Libya’s recent behaviour, and the overall shift of its 
policies, the denuclearisation of the country might be attributed to realism. Qaddafi’s regime 
realised that it was in its own economic and political interests for the regime to change its 
attitudes and alter its foreign and security policies. 
It is worth underlining that the IAEA was unaware of the negotiations in 2003 between 
Libya, Britain, and the US. It had been excluded from the discussion concerning Libya’s 
nuclear weapons programme, due to the fact that the external pressure which was exerted on 
Qaddafi’s regime for many years came from the powerful states (US and UK) and not from 
the IAEA, which actually had no power to exert pressure on countries that violated the 
safeguards of the IAEA (i.e. Libya, North Korea, and Iran). Accordingly, the IAEA was 
informed symbolically as the concerned organisation, of nuclear activities.   
According to the former head of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, it was “only the night 
before Libya’s declaration on 19th December 2003, I was informed by the British intelligence 
that there will be an announcement on Libya. A joint statement by President Bush and former 
Prime Minister Blair will remark on Libya”. El-Baradei also said “on the same night I learnt 
from Matoug Mohamed Matoug, then deputy prime minister that the foreign minister will 
declare that Libya decided to dismantle its WMD” (El-Baradei, 2011:149).  
The Libyan representatives knew that the IAEA would not be the appropriate actor to contact 
in order to unveil its nuclear programme, and hence, it was decided to deal directly with 
Qaddafi’s main adversaries, the US and Britain, due to their influence in international and 
Libyan politics. In fact, if Qaddafi’s regime had approached the IAEA regarding its secret 
nuclear weapons programme, this would not have been enough to end the sanctions, isolation, 
and threat of military action, since the IAEA could only be involved with Libya’s nuclear 
programme, meaning that the other disputed issues such as the Lockerbie bombing, the US 
unilateral sanctions, and its threat of military action on states harbouring or supporting 
terrorism, would remain. Qaddafi realised the gravity of his regime’s policies and 
consequently approached the powerful actors (the US, UK, and France) in order to end the 
long years of confrontation with the West in general and the US in particular. Libya’s 
compliance with the powerful actor would benefit Qaddafi’s regime and also attract foreign 
investment, technology for its oil industry, and for the country’s infrastructure. 
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From this perspective, it appears that the Libyan policies were driven by realist accounts 
which assume that the regime responded to external pressures either the economic sanctions 
or the threat of use of force. However, other motivating factors particularly the internal ones 
suggested otherwise. For instance, the fact that the regime realised the costs of the continuity 
of Libya’s nuclear programme would adversely influence its economic, security and social 
cohesion in the country. This indeed reflects the fact that the change in Libya’s policies was 
not only a result of the external pressure but also domestic pressure was an important factor 
in this regard. Although the external and internal pressure can be explained by the realist 
approach, analysing the behaviour of the Libyan regime and its response to the external and 
internal pressure could be understood from a constructivist point of view. In fact, the 
acceptance of Qaddafi’s regime to negotiate and dismantle its nuclear programme might be 
considered as an obligation to internal and external norms such as peaceful co-existence, 
economic development, respecting human rights and avoiding internal turmoil. 
 
5.4.4 Verification and Assessment of Libya’s Nuclear Programme 
The second round of negotiations between Libya, the US and Britain was held on 5
th
 January 
2004, in London. At that stage, the discussions focused on the modalities for implementing 
the agreement following Libya’s public and official announcement. The representatives asked 
the Libyan government to facilitate the disarmament and fulfil its commitment to abandon all 
the items related to uranium enrichment, the whole chemical programme, and Scud B and C 
the long range missiles (Tucker, 2009:367). In the aftermath of Libya’s announcement of 
denuclearisation, the Qaddafi regime allowed the IAEA to verify the dismantlement and 
assess the nuclear programme. Several inspectors from international institutions were allowed 
to visit nuclear sites in different locations. According to Tucker, “the mood of the meeting 
was dramatically different from the tense atmosphere that had prevailed during the 
negotiations over Qaddafi’s statement. All the three sides emphasised co-operation, 
partnership, and completing Libya’s disarmament as expeditiously as possible” (Tucker, 
2009:367).  (See figure 5.1 below).  
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The Various Nuclear Sites in Libya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Deadly Arsenals (2005), www.proliferationNews.org 
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The USA and Britain were still very concerned about Qaddafi’s unpredictable behaviour. 
Therefore, they both approached the IAEA to ensure that the decision to dismantle would 
indeed be carried out and that Qaddafi would co-operate in the process. John Bolton, and 
William Ehrman,
321
 met on 19
th
 January 2004 with the Director General of the IAEA. The 
three parties discussed the issue of the implementation of the agreement once Libya decided 
to renounce its nuclear weapons program and any related activities. They agreed that the 
IAEA would make the appropriate verification in accordance with its role under the NPT. 
Additionally, the US and Britain, in view of their expertise and experience in nuclear matters, 
affirmed that they would remove the nuclear parts and sensitive equipment after the IAEA 
verification.
322
  
Libya also co-operated fully with inspectors from the IAEA. According to the former 
Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed El-Baradei (2011:157), “[t]he path was eased by the 
Libyans’ full and consistent co-operation. Their readiness to provide information and access 
made the technical verification work refreshingly straightforward for the IAEA inspectors”. 
The IAEA inspectors were given access to all plants and were allowed to inspect the weapons 
sites without obstacles from the Libyan government. It is worth noting that the dismantlement 
of the first phase was immediate, and completed several weeks after the announcement. This 
open and transparent co-operation with IAEA inspectors allowed the unveiling of Libya’s 
‘nascent’ nuclear programme. Additionally, the team concluded that Libya did not engage in 
nuclear ‘weaponisation’. The nuclear weapons design was kept with Matoug, and IAEA 
experts noted that the weapons design lacked significant parts (El-Baradei, 2011:155).     
Moreover, Matoug, the person in charge of the nuclear programme, had several meetings 
with El-Baradei in Vienna to ensure that the inspection was conducted according to the 
clauses of the agreement. In late January 2004, the IAEA inspectors ended their verification 
and produced an assessment of Libya’s nuclear capabilities.  Libya’s co-operation was unlike 
the experience of the IAEA in Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. This indicates that Libya co-
operated fully with the IAEA inspectors, and with the USA and Britain. According to El-
Baradei, the agreement between the IAEA and the US representatives gave both sides a role 
to play. The IAEA would engage in verification, measurement, and the US would provide the 
logistics (El-Baradei, 2011:156-157). Libya’s compliance in denuclearisation is one example 
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of the shift in Libya’s external policies, and the move towards international re-integration, but 
should also be seen as resulting from Qaddafi’s underlying aim to remain in power.  
The US played a major role in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, by ensuring 
the transfer of the nuclear and other sensitive materials outside Libya. According to the US 
Department of State report by Paula A DeSutter,
323
 by the beginning of 2004, the US and the 
British teams had removed all the sensitive parts of Libya’s nukes and long range missiles.324 
The team ensured that Libya had handed over the weapons design, which was supplied by A 
Q Khan (having been bought from the black market). The Libyan officials supplied the 
weapons design to the US and the British teams which also removed centrifuge parts, 
equipment, and uranium hexafluoride (UF6) that was also supplied through the Khan 
Network. Additionally, the Libyan regime allowed the removal of five long range missiles 
(SCUD-C). There was an agreement between the Libyan government and its American 
counterpart, during the negotiations, to ship the nuclear parts to the US. Accordingly, all the 
material was flown to the US by the end of January 2004, and subsequently stored in the 
national laboratory at Oak Ridge, Tennessee (Nolan, 2009:103). The measures taken by the 
US and Britain were effective in achieving the phase of the dismantling, since the 
accomplishment of the transfer and the verification of Libya’s nuclear materials by them and 
the IAEA made the Libyan case a non-proliferation success, thereby supporting the peace and 
security of the world.   
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair benefitted greatly from Libya’s announcement to 
denuclearise. This can be seen in the light of the allegations made about Iraq’s WMDs 
proving to be unfounded and causing huge embarrassment to both leaders. However, the 
main beneficiary was Qaddafi, who, due to his decision to give up Libya’s programme and 
accept the dismantlement of his nukes, convinced the US, Britain, and the international 
community of his willingness to change his regime’s behaviour without any change in the 
political system (Coreara, 2006:194). Years later, it appears that the declared goodwill of 
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Qaddafi was purely a calculated political strategy to ensure his security and regime’s 
survival.    
By voluntarily renouncing his nuclear weapons programme and long range missiles, which he 
had pursued for at least three decades as part of his security strategy, Qaddafi must have 
radically changed his perspectives on security. It does not seem sensible to agree with the 
opinions of those, especially politicians, who have argued that Qaddafi’s concessions and 
decision to denuclearise came about because of President Bush’s foreign policy in regard to 
nuclear non-proliferation. If that was the case, Qaddafi would not have given up the long 
range missiles or at least delayed their surrender. When Qaddafi’s regime was willing to 
dismantle its nuclear weapons programme under external pressure, the US and UK forced it 
to abandon the long range missiles although they were not part of their initial demands.    
To prove to the rest of the world that his change in policies was underpinned by genuine 
attitude shifts in the regime, Qaddafi stated in an AU summit in Maputo in 2003, that “Africa 
produces uranuim but the criminal is he who tranforms it into destructive weapons instead of 
putting it to civilian and peaceful uses” (Stottlemyre, 2012:195). He also reiterated that he 
would lead other countries in their efforts to dismantle their nuclear weapons and maintained 
that Libya’s dismantlment of its nuclear programmme was consistent with the progress of the 
international community.  
Qaddafi realised that pursuing a nuclear programme would have a negative impact on Libya’s 
security and national interests. For instance, in an interview given in 2005, he stated: 
We started to ask ourselves, ‘By manufacturing nuclear weapons, against 
whom are we going to use them?’ World alliances have changed. We had 
no target. And then we started thinking about the cost. If someone attacks 
you and you use a nuclear bomb, you are in effect using it against yourself 
(Cirincione et al., 2005:319) . 
According to a former Libyan representative at the IAEA, the Qaddafi regime had voluntarily 
dismantled its nuclear programme because it wanted to be rehabilitated with the international 
community.
325
  
The interviewee added that Libya was trying, through its denuclearisation, to obtain material, 
and political gains, in order to find a compromise with Western countries. The main aim was 
to obtain international acceptance during the rule of Qaddafi, especially in view of his 
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regime’s previous policies (i.e. violations of human rights, and the support for regional and 
international terrorist organisations). Moreover, the same official maintained that Libya 
wanted to be seen as a peaceful rather than a terrorist state, and to improve its relationship 
with most countries across the world. The evidence of that is the enactment of laws for the 
liberalisation of the economy, the reopening of embassies in the European capitals and the 
United States of America, and the intention and the will to facilitate the mission of the 
IAEA’s inspectors. Additionally, as a former prime minister put it, “I think that the main 
reason was the pressure made by some countries US and Britain”. In fact, the external 
pressure and coercion could be one of the factors behind the concession  made by Libya to 
denuclearise (Interview with former Libyan representative at the IAEA, summer, 2012). 
The first statement aired by the Foreign Minister was on 19 December 2003, Abdulrahman 
Shalgum, and this reflects the commitment Libya wanted to make regarding nuclear non-
proliferation:  
Libya has decided to limit its missile activities to missiles with a range 
consistent with that agreed under the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) … Libya wishes to reaffirm that it considers itself bound by the 
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Agreement on 
Safeguard, the IAEA, and the Convention on the Biological Weapons and 
that it accepts any other commitment, including the Additional Protocol to 
the IAEA, Safeguard Agreement, the Chemical Weapons Conventions, and 
the Biological Weapons Conventions (Hochman, 2006:70).  
Shalgum’s statement demonstrated that the surrender of Qaddafi’s regime’s nuclear stockpile 
and long range missiles was a sign of Libya’s compliance with the world’s most powerful 
states. It is important to point out that the negotiation of Libya’s denuclearisation was with 
the powerful states rather than with the concerned agency the IAEA. The Libyan regime’s 
non-compliance with the US and Britain would further isolate and impose yet more sanctions 
on the country. In this regard, Qaddafi’s regime abandoned its ideology, sovereignty and 
opted for economic gains as well as political interests (i.e. attracting foreign investment, and 
normalising relations with the US).  
The transformation of Libya is viewed as a reorientation move by Qaddafi towards the 
international community. O’Reilly argues that Qaddafi changed his perception and world 
views during the late 1990s. His beliefs became more positive, and in particular after the 
diplomatic engagement (i.e. after 1999), his previous perception, stance, and ideological 
incentives were radically transformed due to the new world circumstances. According to him,  
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positive perceptions about the nature of the political universe and greater 
optimism about the realization of political goals were directly tied to 
improved perceptions of others in the international system. Specifically, 
Qaddafi began viewing others more positively, with the exception that co-
operative actions on his part would be reciprocated (O’Reilly, 2010:289).  
The influential role of Qaddafi’s son, Saif, in the politics of Libya, may have convinced 
Qaddafi to give up the nuclear programme. Saif had the full trust of his father, as he was 
expected to be the heir to his rule. According to cables sent by Polaschik, Charge d’ Affairs, 
from the US Embassy in Tripoli, on 30 November 2009,  revealed by wikileaks, Qaddafi’s 
son was one of the people who had a significant role in the normalisation process between 
Libya and the Western world. He had played a major role in transforming Libya and 
confronting the hardliners who wanted to retain the nuclear programme. Saif, who was 
authorised by his father’s government, complained to the US ambassador that Libya was 
frustrated with the slow pace of normalisation between Libya and the US in various areas 
such as economic, security, and military.
 326
 Consequently, Libya halted the shipment of the 
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) stockpile to Russia, due to the fact that Libya did not 
receive its expected compensation from the US in the military and economic domains. The 
US ambassador warned Qaddafi’s son that stopping the shipment would have grave 
consequences on the bilateral relations. According to the same cable:  
Saif stated that Libya’s decision to give up its WMD programs was 
contingent upon compensation from the U.S., including the purchase of 
conventional weapons and non-conventional military equipment; security 
cooperation; military cooperation; civil-nuclear cooperation and assistance 
… Saif noted that Libya was a small, rich country, surrounded by large, 
powerful, poorer neighbors. Yet Libya, the only Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) signatory in the region, had given up all of its 
conventional weapons and could not purchase replacement systems or 
military equipment from the United States.
327
 
Evidently, what Saif stated to the US ambassador indicates that the Libyan regime did not 
voluntarily end its nuclear weapons stockpile as was portrayed by the regime, but was rather 
pressured by the US to dismantle it, together with its long range missiles, and to join the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
Qaddafi’s new posture in the last decade of his rule was different from that in the first decade 
when he took power. After years of hostility towards the West, open support for terrorism, 
and for outlawed organisations, the regime’s policies shifted in a positive direction towards 
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supporting international institutions. This shift was considered important in the reorientation 
of Libya’s behaviour. Since the announcement of Libya’s denuclearisation in 2003, Qaddafi 
became a supporter of multilateral institutions such as the International Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), the Additional Protocol, and the Convention of Biological Weapons. Qaddafi 
demanded that the countries in the region abide by the treaties of non-proliferation and urged 
them not to violate the NPT and its obligations (Hochman, 2009:30). Therefore, surprising 
most political analysts and observers, Qaddafi embraced the same organisations which he had 
previously ignored, and denounced. This in turn indicates that the regime was under pressure 
to do so.  
Indeed, Qaddafi’s long defiant stance regarding various issues between Libya and the West, 
particularly the US, had dramatically changed by the beginning of the new millennium. The 
major event which might have provoked such a rapid shift by the Libyan regime was the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and its repercussions on small countries like Libya. The fall of 
the Berlin wall and the end of the bipolar era prompted the Libyan government to adapt more 
prudent foreign and security policies. The incentives behind Libya’s new attitude were 
confirmed in an interview conducted with a Libyan senior official
328
 who held various 
ministerial positions in Qaddafi’s regime. According to him: 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc was a huge event. 
It substantially altered the reality of the world. Indeed, all countries had to 
reconsider their foreign policies due to this extraordinary event. In 
particular, third world countries and those who had special relationship with 
the Soviet Union. You should know that, at that time Libya had strong 
relations with the Soviet Union. It was relying a lot on this powerful ally, 
especially as regard to armament and the political support. When the 
collapse happened there is no doubts that the people in charge had to 
reconsider their foreign policies in particular the subsequent development 
of international politics. 
Libya had to appease the West in general and the US in particular, in order to avoid new 
sanctions or military confrontation. Accordingly, Qaddafi’s regime abandoned its security 
interests under international pressure and favoured economic interests and political 
reintegration with the international community.  
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5.4.5 Libyan Gains in Return of its Denuclearisation 
In considering what gains were made by Libya after its about turn in respect of its nuclear 
weapons plans, several questions can be asked, these being: What are the advantages of 
Libya’s dismantlement of its nuclear stockpile on a national and international level? Did the 
international community reward Libya for taking this important step or not? To what extent 
did Libya benefit from its decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. This section 
provides an indication of how these issues were addressed. According to a senior official in 
the Libyan foreign ministry,
329
 the US agreed that it would assist Libya in the following: 
1. The conversion of Tajura reactors in order to produce low-enriched fuel. 
2. Treatment of radioactive waste and its transport for burying it in a country. 
3. The creation of a regional centre for nuclear medicine to treat cancer which would 
benefit not only Libya but also its neighbouring countries. 
4. The desalination project: An agreement was made with the Americans, during the 
visit made by experts, regarding the equipment characteristics in order to conduct 
the desalination process (providing water to the main cities and saving the 
groundwater). However, not all that was agreed upon became a reality, despite the 
fact that samples from the Libyan sea water were taken.  
5. The radioisotopes project, which was very slow, and consisted of a project of the 
clean room and its transformation to the production of pharmaceutical kits (the 
Tajoura research centre previously had a large stock of radioisotopes, radioactive 
waste, and low-enriched uranium fuel). This was not achieved.  
6. There were also issues suspended such as the technique of transforming the solar 
energy for the production of electricity, and the water desalination and the 
production of hydrogen. 
A former Libyan representative at the IAEA who asked not to be named, stated that Libya 
was hoping to obtain more gains in the military and economic field but, according to him, the 
only positive results were the improvement of Libya’s relationship with the West and its 
removal from the US list of states supporting terrorism. Other promises made during 
negotiations, such as help in the scientific field and the offering of international scholarships, 
did not materialise (Interview with the Libyan representative at the IAEA, summer, 2012).  
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According to the veteran ambassador Saad Mujber, Libya benefitted from the dismantlement 
of its nuclear programme through being allowed to reintegrate in various international 
institutions.
330
 However, the remarkable aspect was Libya’s election to the UN Commission 
of Human Rights in Geneva in 2003.
331
 Libya won the election by a secret ballot, with 33 
members voting for, three countries against, and 17 countries abstaining. In fact, Libya’s 
election was facilitated by the developing countries, whilst the US, Canada, and Guatemala 
voted against it. Although Libya did not respect human rights, it was nevertheless, elected the 
chair of commission. Libya was not marginalised after the sanctions were lifted and the 
relations with the Western powers were re-established.  
The shift in the Qaddafi regime’s policies was made apparent when Libya was elected to the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This emphasises that the international community 
and the powerful states realised that the regime had effected a radical transformation in its 
behaviour and policies. If Qaddafi had not altered his stance on foreign and security policies, 
Libya would not have held its rotation as the UNSC chair for one month. A former Libyan 
prime minister asserted that Libya’s return to the international fold was vital for Qaddafi’s 
regime.
332
 He stated: 
Libya was elected in the Security Council of the United Nations, in 2007, 
which proved that Libya was accepted again internationally. This is no 
doubt that it helps the improvement of bilateral relations with the USA, as 
well as with other countries, it had also ecomomic effects either direct or 
indirect on the country, with new investments made in Libya and the 
coming of big companies, keen to offer their services in various projects. 
Unfortunately at that time, the decisions taken in this field were not 
appropriate. To summarise, it can be said that Libya did benefit greatly 
from its decision to dismantle its nuclear programme. 
 
Qaddafi and his regime were welcomed by various states and international powers due to the 
change in its external behaviour. Libya’s denuclearisation was in fact a victory for the 
international community, as this achievement brought the belief that the world had less of a 
threat to its peace and security by this action. And the fact that Libya had abandoned its 
nuclear programme in order to be welcomed back into the international arena was considered 
far less costly in sovereign terms, than would have occurred had Libya suffered the same fate 
as Iraq. Coercion tools such as sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and the threat of military 
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action explicitly worked in the Libyan case. Also from Libya’s perspective, as was argued by 
the interviewees, Libya gained political and economic leverage as a result of its policy shift, 
especially after the US lifted its sanctions and normalised relations.  
From the perspective of the former head of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, the rationale 
behind Qaddafi’s decision to dismantle the nuclear programme was the new image he wanted 
to present to the world - a new Libya built on peace, fraternity, and solidarity (i.e. a ‘peaceful 
country’). El Baradei noted that, just days after the announcement, he visited Libya, and met 
with Qaddafi regarding nuclear proliferation: 
He [Qaddafi] had reached the conclusion that weapons of mass destruction 
would not add to Libya’s security. They should be gotten rid of, he 
declared, not only in Libya but also in the Middle East and globally (El 
Baradei, 2011:152).  
Moreover, El-Baradei stated that Qaddafi wanted Libya to be a role model to others pursuing 
nuclear weapons proliferation. Qaddafi’s stance, ideology, and world views were 
transformed. He realised that economic interests and pragmatism were better for his regime 
than a defiant posture which would make the country more vulnerable to further sanction and 
isolation 
In fact, Qaddafi was allowed to visit the European Commission in Brussels in 2004, a year 
after Libya dismantled its nuclear stockpile. During this particular visit, he reiterated Libya’s 
intention to lead other states in their abandonment of their nuclear programmes. The shift 
from defiance to co-operation enhanced Qaddafi’s position within the world community. In 
this respect, Hochman maintained that “Libya, which was in the lead and led the liberation 
movement in the Third World and Africa, now has decided to lead the peace movement all 
over the world” (Hochman, 2006:70). 
In fact, however, this was an over-statement by Hochman, since documents concerning 
Libya’s intelligence, published on 21 February 2013 by the Arab newspaper “Asharq Al-
Awsat”, revealed that Qaddafi’s regime was active in supporting various groups and 
attempting to destabilise several countries in the Arab and African world (i.e. Yemen, Mali, 
Mauritania, Algeria, Niger, Sudan, and Polisario in Morocco) until the Libyan uprising in 
2011.
333
 So, although the Libyan regime was pretending to promote peace and reconciliation 
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between various groups, in actuality it was supporting one group over another for its own 
political interests and leverage in the Africa. 
After Qaddafi ceased his unlawful activities, reformulated state policies, and fulfilled the 
demands of the international community, he was able to rehabilitate himself after decades of 
international pressure and isolation; consequently, he began to mediate in regional conflicts.  
Regardless of his previous posture, Qaddafi wanted to show the world that his priorities had 
altered and were influenced by economic interests and pragmatism. According Takeyh 
(2001:67) 
The colonel has embarked on a high-profile diplomatic campaign to settle 
conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Horn of Africa, 
Sudan, and Sierra Leone. Libya has also signed bilateral trade and cultural 
pacts with Niger, Senegal, and South Africa, while extending aid to 
Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe ... Most 
of these initiatives have yet to produce substantial practical results. But 
their importance lies in the fact that, after decades of attempting to subvert 
Africa’s state system, Qaddafi is now making positive contributions to the 
continent’s political cohesion and economic rehabilitation. 
 
Contrary to Takeyh’s statement regarding Qaddafi’s peace initiatives in Africa, Qaddafi was 
seeking only his political interests. According to cables sent by the US embassy in Tripoli to 
Washington, several African presidents deplored Qaddafi’s bullying and manipulation. For 
instance, it was documented that there was a “[d]eep distrust of Gaddafi among other African 
leaders; Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, for example, feared a Libyan attack on his 
aircraft”.334 This indicates Qaddafi’s involvement in some regional disputes for political gains 
such as his presidency of the African Union.  
 
In light of Qaddafi’s radical changes and his reorientation of Libyan foreign and security 
polices, several statesmen and senior officials from Europe, Latin America, Russia, and of 
course Africa, paid him visits. The security and economic interests were top aspects of the 
new co-operation between Libya and the world. Libya also held various African, Arab, and 
international summits, a sign that the regime was considered to be rehabilitated and accepted 
by most states. According to a former Libyan ambassador Saad Mujber,
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Several important politicians came to Libya and were received by Qaddafi, 
in his tent, among them Tony Blair, Berlusconi, Sarkozy, Putin, Schroeder, 
Rice, the King of Spain and the PM of Portugal. I am sorry for the West, 
they came rushing just because of petrol and dollars. All these countries 
which were adamant against him they have come.  
 
Libya’s transformation during the last decade of Qaddafi’s rule was quite significant. For 
instance, it was characterised by full co-operation in numerous areas, whether in economy, 
security (in particular by fully collaborating on the issues of illegal immigration and 
international terrorism), or drug trafficking. The result of such transformation was that 
Libya’s relations with countries such as the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and the US shifted 
radically. 
 
In the international arena, Qaddafi was the chairperson of the African Union in 2009-2010, 
and indeed wanted to extend his presidency for another year but his effort was rebuffed due 
to the AU charter. Also in 2009, the former Libyan foreign minister and Qaddafi’s personal 
envoy to Africa, Ali Triki, was elected the chairman of the General Assembly of the UN 
(UNGA).
336
  Such elections would not have transpired had the Libyan regime retained its 
previous stance regarding its foreign and security policies. Certainly, there would have been 
no general consensus among the UN member states to elect Libya to chair the UNGA in the 
situation where Qaddafi’s regime remained defiant regarding issues such as terrorism, nuclear 
proliferation, Lockerbie, and the UTA disaster.    
 
5.5 Libya and the West - From Antagonism to Partnership 
Qaddafi’s reorientation of Libya’s external politics was vital in order to be accepted and 
reintegrated within the world community. However, the domestic reforms led by that 
Qaddafi’s son, with the assistance of Libyan intellectuals and technocrats living abroad such 
as, Mahmoud Gibril who held the economic development fund and Shukri Ghanem who later 
became a Prime Minister, failed to achieve the desired internal improvements expected by 
many (Stottlemyre, 2012:197). This failure resulted from the fact that Qaddafi’s political 
motivation to transform the unique political system that he had created was far from strong, 
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standing as an obstacle to the achievement of the hoped-for reforms, which remained elusive, 
due to Qaddafi’s unwillingness to step down or resign. The regime failed to adequately 
address the domestic problems and the other issues related to basic human rights, such as 
allowing political parties, and writing a constitution. Indeed, had Qaddafi allowed those 
political reforms, it would have jeopardised his rule and the political system he espoused. 
On the international stage, Libya’s economic co-operation with the major European countries 
and international actors was vastly significant. The previous obstacles between Libya and 
those countries were removed after Libya accepted responsibility for the Lockerbie and UTA 
tragedies, agreed to give compensation to the families of the victims, ended its support for 
terrorism, and abandoned the nuclear weapons programme. However, Qaddafi kept control of 
the Libyan state with an iron fist, and his political system of ‘Jamahiriyah’ remained 
unchanged. Since Qaddafi had first presented his political system in 1977 to the Libyan 
population, he had always reiterated that his role was ‘only a guide and not a ruler’. However, 
the approval of Qaddafi to dismantle his nuclear weapons programme in 2003 and accept 
responsibility for his regime’s previous actions implies otherwise, and confirms that he was 
indeed, Libya’s ultimate ruler. 
Although the Libyan regime managed to transform its external relations with the West and 
the international community, domestically several issues remained ignored. These domestic 
issues were not priorities to Qaddafi’s regime and, hence, grievances from inside the country 
remained a threshold to Qaddafi’s rule. According to Human Rights Watch: 
The country’s rehabilitation has led some improvement in the situation there, but 
notes that freedom of expression and political opposition are still severely 
curtailed and that political prisoners are still being detained. Indeed, being 
involved in a group or activity that opposes the ideology set in the revolution of 
1969-which saw Colonel Qaddafi seize power—is still punishable by death 
(Seymour, 2008:16).
337
 
The transition of power in Libya was not realistic due to the lack of Qaddafi’s political will, 
the absence of political parties, a constitution, and elections. In normal circumstances, a real 
transition would have been achieved through the promulgation of a constitution, the 
legalisation of political parties, and the holding of elections. Instead, Qaddafi’s strategy was 
to appoint his sons in key and sensitive positions. For instance, the national security was 
headed by Muatasim, while the military brigade was under the control of his other son 
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Khamis.  Saif, Qaddafi’s most prominent son and his likely successor, was involved mainly 
in domestic and external politics, although he did not have an official position within the 
government. 
The rehabilitation of Qaddafi’s regime was followed by encouraging steps from different 
European countries. The United Kingdom normalised its relations with Libya after several 
years without diplomatic ties. The first Libyan ambassador to the UK Mohamed Elzway was 
appointed after the Lockerbie verdict, and the restoration of the relations was fully 
implemented by both countries. This new start was reinforced by several projects and the UK 
participated in Libya’s economic development, through the signing of several oil contracts, 
and the commitment to improve the education system of the country.  On 25 March 2004, the 
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair made an official visit to Libya, becoming the first PM to 
visit the country since Winston Churchill’s visit (during the Second World War). In fact, 
Blair was enthusiastic about the new co-operation and keen to ensure a solid economic 
relationship with Libya. He went as far as describing Qaddafi as a “respectable member of 
the international community” (Ronen, 2006:281). The rapprochement between the UK paved 
the way for Qaddafi diplomatically, economically, and militarily, and enhanced his position 
internationally.  
In fact, Europe’s relations with Libya after 2003 were rewarding for Qaddafi as well as for 
the European economies. After the sanctions were lifted, the European countries suspended 
the arms embargo imposed on Libya and started to export military equipment to Qaddafi’s 
regime. That period witnessed a rise in political activities, with several senior officials 
visiting Libya and trying to convince Libya to participate in different projects and proposing 
to Qaddafi’s regime the sale of conventional arms. Those states which were praising the 
‘new’ Qaddafi, neglected or ignored what was happening within the country such as the lack 
of genuine democratic reform and a proper respect for human rights. For instance, Italy, 
Britain, and France secured deals in arms transfer and in energy with Qaddafi’s regime. The 
lifting of the sanctions and isolation of Libya allowed the European states to obtain lucrative 
oil contracts, which were essential for European oil importers as they were experiencing a 
definite need to diversify their suppliers and to be less dependent on Russia. Hence, European 
countries continued to deal with Qaddafi in the arms trade, despite Libya’s poor record of 
human rights. Another crucial element was Qaddafi’s willingness to co-operate with the West 
by controlling immigration from the shores of Libya. This co-operation was welcomed by the 
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European countries (Lutterbeck, 2009:170-171), keen to attend to their own problems of 
illegal immigration.    
For instance, Italy, one of Libya’s closest neighbours in Europe, enhanced its relations with 
Libya and pleaded for Libya’s reintegration within the international community. In fact, since 
the handover of the Lockerbie suspects, Libya and Italy had established extensive trade and 
investment ties. Moreover, in 2004 Libya completed a pipeline to supply energy to Italy. The 
regime also requested amicable reparations for Italy’s colonial period and the damage 
associated with it, and simultaneously it suggested to several other African countries that they 
too should make claims for compensation from their previous colonisers (Mezran and De 
Maio, 2007:444).  
As mentioned previously, the new phenomenon of illegal immigration by sea from Africa to 
Europe was a significant matter.
338
 The waves of illegal immigration on the southern shores 
of European countries such as Malta and Italy prompted much debate in Europe, Libya being 
the point of departure for those illegal migrants. Consequently, the Italian government took 
measures to tackle the problem and paid the expenses to deport the immigrants from Libya 
back to their original countries. The Italian government also assisted Libya in establishing a 
detention centre, and trained its police officers in how to deal with cases of asylum and 
immigration. On various occasions, Libya claimed that it was unable to serve as the coast 
guard of Europe and European states to participate by sharing the burden. France also 
enhanced its relations with Libya, especially in the military and nuclear energy domains (St 
John, 2012:240). Moreover, Libya’s commitment to the regional institutions demonstrated 
the importance of the regional organisations to Qaddafi’s regime.  For instance, in May 2002, 
Qaddafi’s regime hosted the Foreign Ministers’ Conference of the 5+5 forum, the only Euro-
Mediterranean meeting where Libya holds full membership (Núñez, 2012:6).  
 
5.5.1 Libya and the US 
In fact, in the aftermath of Libya’s nuclear weapons programme dismantlement, the USA 
began to lift the unilateral sanctions imposed on Qaddafi’s regime in 2004, and hence, the 
basis for establishing better relations between the two countries was implemented. It is worth 
mentioning that diplomatic relations between the two states had been severed for three 
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decades, and there were no functioning embassies in Washington and Tripoli; instead, there 
was only an ‘interest section” operated by the Belgian embassy. In mid-2004, the State 
Department appointed a small number of personnel to the newly-opened Liaison Office 
(USLO) in Tripoli. The USLO members had to deal with the foreign ministry in passing 
messages, in implementing the agreement of December 2003, and the removal of the 
materials of the nuclear programme, and in arranging officials’ visits by the congressional 
staff. Health, education, and economic interests were all vital aspects of the new co-operation 
between the two countries. For instance, several Libyan delegations visited USA universities, 
and American doctors visited Libyan hospitals to assess the country’s health needs (Chorin, 
2012:88). 
Furthermore, after the lifting of sanctions, Libya was permitted to negotiate its membership 
with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since the US also removed its veto in respect of 
Libya’s membership. In September 2004, President Bush removed the status of ‘national 
emergency’ which Reagan had declared in relation to Libya in 1986, and in November he 
asked Congress to lift the US bar on Export-Import Bank loans to Libya, an extremely 
important step for US investment in Libya. In return, the Libyan regime granted US 
companies eleven exploration and production licences. Furthermore, in 2005, the US 
removed the travel ban on Libyan diplomats, allowing them to move freely in the US. This 
was followed by a major step by Washington to expand its military co-operation with Libya 
(St John, 2012:245). 
Indeed, after Libya joined the global alliance on the war on terrorism, Qaddafi’s regime 
succeeded in adding its own enemy to the US list of terror groups. For instance, in 2006 the 
US government maintained that the LIFG was one of the terrorist groups threatening 
international peace and stability. In this matter, the Bush administration stated: “the Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group threatens global safety and stability through the use of violence and 
its ideological alliance with al Qaida and other brutal terrorist organizations”.339 By its 
participation in this way, Qaddafi paved the way for his regime’s acceptance by the US, the 
most powerful state in the world, and this new alliance with the US facilitated the 
commemoration of a new chapter in Libya’s US relations. 
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In July 2007, Gene Gretz was nominated ambassador to Libya, and Condoleezza Rice, the 
US Secretary of State, paid a visit to Qaddafi in September 2008. In fact, Rice was the most 
senior official to visit Libya ever since the visit of Vice President Richard Nixon in 1957.  
During her visit to Tripoli, Rice stated “[i]t is a historic moment and it is one that has come 
after a lot of difficulty and the suffering of many people that will never be forgotten or 
assuaged, American in particular, for who I am very concerned” (Kawczynski, 2011:179-
180). The appointment of a US ambassador to Libya and Rice’s visit to Qaddafi represented 
the full normalisation of Libya’s US relations as well as acceptance of Qaddafi.    
 
In 2010, the Obama administration requested the financing of various projects such as 
providing training to Libya’s security forces, and co-operating in the improvement of Libyan 
security capabilities, particularly in sensitive areas such as the control of the Libyan borders, 
the fight against terrorism activities, and the monitoring of Libyan imports/exports.
340
 The 
objective was to develop Libya’s air transport capabilities through the training of the Libyan 
Air Force (LAF), and to train the Libyan Coast Guard for all types of activities they might 
have to conduct. Accordingly, Obama requested specific Foreign Military Financing for 
Libya. The US was also concerned about the volatile situation in the Sahel (Mali–Niger in 
particular). Consequently, it sought further funding through the Trans-Sahara Counter 
Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) initiative. This initiative focuses essentially on providing 
assistance for anti-terrorism, financially helping counter-terrorism efforts, preventing 
eventual terrorist activities, and attempting to weaken promoters’ ideology in various ways, 
either through appropriate education, the strengthening of local cultures, and/or 
information programming (Moss, 2010:17). The US support for Qaddafi’s regime since 
Libya ended its support for terrorist groups, and dismantled its nuclear weapons programme 
and long range missiles in 2003, enhanced Qaddafi’s prestige and leverage globally.  
 
5.6 Theoretical Discussion 
From the above discussion regarding the Libyan dismantlement of its nuclear programme and 
the change in its policies in this particular period (2001-2003), it is evident that the behaviour 
of the Libyan regime was influenced by various factors (i.e. internal and external), which 
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forced the regime to denuclearise. This means that the realist assumptions are more relevant 
than those of other approaches, such as constructivism. On the one hand, it was clear that the 
regime tried to avoid a military confrontation, particularly with the powerful states, which did 
not spare any efforts to pressurise the Libyan government to the degree to which they 
threatened to use force. One the other hand, the international isolation, in addition to the 
economic sanctions, which adversely affected the economic and political attitude of 
Qaddafi’s government, had played a crucial role in the change in Libya’s external policies. 
This in turn, left the Libyan population discontented due to their suffering twelve years of 
sanctions and isolation, which had made life inside the country miserable. In fact, this opened 
another door which forced Qaddafi’s regime to find a way to lift those sanctions and end its 
isolation.  
Indeed, the change of Libyan policies and its nuclear weapons dismantlement were not a 
result of respect for the regional and international norms, as constructivists claimed. Rather, 
this can be understood as a response to external pressure imposed by international institutions 
such as the UN and the EU, or by individual states such as the US, UK, and France. An 
interesting point to be underlined here is the fact that some relevant mechanisms with the 
responsibility of dealing with the problem of nuclear weapons (i.e. IAEA), were ineffective, 
particularly in the Libyan case.  For example, it is clear from the above analysis that the role 
of the powerful states was more influential in securing the abandonment of Libya’s nuclear 
weapons programme than any other actors, including the IAEA. In fact, the regime agreed to 
eliminate its nuclear stockpile including its long range missiles under a stringent verification 
by US, British experts and IAEA inspectors. This is evidence that realism is the best 
approach to explain and then understand the motives of states’ nuclearisation and 
denuclearisation. This conforms to one of the main realist assumptions that international 
institutions do not have any independent effect without the involvement of the powerful 
states. Moreover, internal pressure made it necessary for the government to seek an exit to all 
its problems with the international community. 
Contrary to the first period 1969-1981 and similar to the second period 1982-2000, the 
approach of neoclassical realism appeared to be on the increase. For instance the internal 
dynamics of Libya had increased from the last period (i.e. there was an increase in domestic 
pressure by different segments of the Libyan strata). Despite the fact there were calls from 
within the reformist groups and the close circle of Qaddafi to make political reforms, the 
response of Qaddafi’s regime to the internal pressure and the reformists was elusive.  
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Regardless of the rise of domestic pressure and calls for change in the third period, the 
internal dynamics of Libya influenced the policy shift of the regime but on a small scale and 
it was intangible. Indeed, the domestic reforms which occurred in Libya during the last 
decade of Qaddafi’s rule were not on time (i.e. release of LIFG prisoners, increase wages and 
economic). These reforms came in the aftermath of Libya’s denuclearisation in 2003.The 
causes of Libya’s transformation were mainly driven by external effect; internal pressure was 
not sufficient to coerce Qaddafi’s regime policy change. 
To sum up, the change in Qaddafi’s regime behaviour was due to a combination of internal 
and external factors, which forced Libya to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. One 
of the important lessons of the Libyan case study regarding the proliferation of its nuclear 
weapons programme is that states cannot give up their nuclear weapons programmes without 
coercion and enforcement approach.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
In a similar fashion to the previous chapter, this one has investigated a set of major issues 
identified in the theoretical framework and highlighted their relevance to the last phase of 
Qaddafi’s rule. The chapter began by analysing the domestic issues which had been 
influenced by international isolation, the economic sanctions, and the association of Libya 
with terrorism. The dire consequences of these factors had alienated and changed the public 
attitude towards the regime. Indeed, the Libyan people suffered from twelve years of 
economic sanctions in which their socio-economic lives became very hard. Moreover, the 
isolated status of Libya, and the country’s association with terrorism had adversely affected 
several segments of Libyan society (i.e. businessmen). This in turn, created a big gap between 
Qaddafi’s government and its own people which simultaneously exerted an internal pressure 
on the government to change its policies in order to find an exit from its self inflicted 
problems with the international community.  
The chapter then analysed the regional and external pressures imposed on the regime. In this 
regard, a particular focus was given to the involvement of powerful states regarding many 
issues such as Lockerbie, UTA, the Berlin discotheque, and the nuclear weapons programme. 
Furthermore, this section analysed the involvement of the UN through imposing the 
economic sanctions, and the state of isolation. Without any doubt, this external pressure had a 
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crucial impact on the Libyan government and eventually compelled it to change its foreign 
and security policies, including dismantling its nuclear weapons programme. From this 
perspective, it is clear that the Libyan policy shift was due to both internal and external 
pressure, which confirms the theoretical argument of this study that the realist theory is the 
most relevant to explain and understand the attitude of Qaddafi’s regime. More specifically, 
the growing influence of the domestic pressure on the regime and various external pressures 
including international isolation economic sanctions and threat of military action were behind 
the shift in Libya’s policies, in particular its nuclear weapons programme. These empirical 
results represent a huge challenge to the constructivist accounts that states can cooperate and 
obey international norms in this context.   
Accordingly, the transformation of the regime’s policies had changed its image on both levels 
(internal and external). On the internal level, the regime started to make some reforms in the 
economic and political spheres. For instance, it tried to liberalise the economy and attempted 
to reconcile with the opposition groups both inside and outside Libya. On the international 
level, the regime took significant steps towards reconciling with the international community. 
These are seen firstly, through the regime’s changed attitude towards terrorism and its 
subsequent removal from the US terrorist list; and secondly, through the regime’s compliance 
with the conditions associated with Lockerbie, the UTA, and the Berlin discotheque being 
met, and the subsequent removal of the economic sanctions and effectively, its political 
isolation. These events effectively allowed the country to re-involve and reintegrate within 
the international community and become an important actor on the security and economic 
level. Regarding the security realm, Qaddafi’s regime collaborated with many international 
actors in relation to the war on terror. For example, it became involved in many activities 
with neighbouring states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen as well as with powerful states 
such as the US, UK, and France regarding the exchange of intelligence information that on 
many occasions, led to the capture of terrorist figures. On the economic level, the Libyan 
economy widened its activities with several clients from different parts of the world (i.e. 
Africa, Europe, Asia, and the American continents). Indeed, the shift of Libyan policies did 
benefit the regime and its elites who were loyal to the regime (they were allowed to have a 
stake in high street shops such as Marks and Spencer, and in private aviation companies such 
as Buraq air), although it brought no advantage to the Libyan public. Furthermore, the regime 
condemned terrorism, and this announcement in particular, increased Qaddafi’s regime 
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credibility. Nonetheless, all these improvements in the country’s political and economic 
situations, were not reflected on the living standards of its people and their prosperity.  
This successful conclusion regarding the Libyan case provides important lessons to the 
international community in dealing with similar cases of nuclear proliferation. In fact, the 
internal and external pressures obliged Qaddafi’s government to transform from the rogue 
state it was, to an effective actor in the international community. As discussed previously, the 
pressure by the powerful states either through economic and military embargo or the threat of 
military action, compelled the regime to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. 
Similarly, the consequences of the UN economic sanctions and international isolation which 
had been imposed on the regime and had been sustained for many years, did play a role in 
Libya’s nuclear non-proliferation. In the same vein, the growing internal pressure had its 
effect upon Libya’s behaviour, adding to the forces for change. These facts can enrich the 
literature and provide considerable tools in dealing with nuclear non-proliferation in other 
instances. Respectively, the Libyan case could be considered as a good example to reduce 
nuclear weapons proliferation.   
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction  
In the aftermath of the Cold War, nuclear non-proliferation has emerged as one of the most 
important challenges in international relations and international security. Indeed, the efforts 
of some states to acquire nuclear weapons have focused international attention on the 
phenomenon of nuclear weapons. The most significant element which has been observed 
regarding the research in this area is the fact that the majority of literature available in this 
field has concentrated on the developed world, with little attention having been directed to 
developing countries, especially in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa. Some 
such countries were at one time keen to acquire nuclear capability but realised later that this 
ambition was counter-productive and eventually decided to dismantle their programmes in 
this respect. Accordingly, the present research was conducted to fill this gap in the existing 
literature by considering the specific example of Libya. In doing so, the study has focused on 
Libya’s nuclearisation and denuclearisation as a case study, the findings from which could be 
generalised to other Middle Eastern, African and Asian countries such as Syria, Iran, India, 
Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa. This thesis argues that Libya would not have 
abandoned its nuclear weapons programme without internal, regional, and international 
pressure. Hence, the factors being used to examine and analyse the reorientation of Qaddafi’s 
policies, specifically the dismantlement of Libya’s nuclear weapon programme in 2003, are 
internal, regional, and international ones. The internal factors cover oil, ideology, 
colonialism, and domestic pressure. The regional factors include pressure from neighbours, 
isolation, and containment. And finally, the international factors cover pressure from the 
major powers and other institutions, economic sanctions, the threat of military action, and 
diplomatic isolation.   
 
6.2 The Empirical Contribution 
 
The first period between 1969 and 1981 shows that Libya’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons 
was in fact motivated by regional and external factors. The Cold War, proxy wars, 
bipolarities, hegemony, regional rivalries, struggle for power, regional as well as external 
pressure, and leadership in the region were prominent factors behind the Qaddafi regime’s 
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security policies and its desire to obtain nuclear weapons. As discussed in Chapter Three, the 
regime’s nuclear weapons ambition in the early 1970s was motivated by a number of regional 
and international factors. At the regional level, Qaddafi and the Free Unionist Officers found 
themselves amidst the Cold War alliances and proxy wars in the volatile region of the Middle 
East and North Africa. Additionally, the Libyan regime’s fear of its neighbours (i.e. the 
Egyptian attack on Libya in July 1977) was an important influence in the drive to acquire 
conventional and unconventional weapons. At an international level, Qaddafi’s antagonism 
with the Western world in general and the US in particular, encouraged the regime to pursue 
the acquisition of nuclear weaponry. Further, Qaddafi’s intention to become an international 
leader could not be fulfilled in the absence of him possessing deterring power (i.e. nuclear 
weapons). 
 
Moreover, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) did not consider Libya completely 
sovereign due to the presence of foreign military bases. The RCC believed that Libya was a 
weak state and its military would be unable to deter or prevent any foreign aggression against 
Libyan territory. For these reasons, the new rulers of the regime wanted to transform Libya 
into a powerful state of the Middle East and Africa. In fact, throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
the Libyan regime sought to obtain various conventional and unconventional military 
equipment and consequently approached a number of countries (i.e. Russia, UK, France, 
China, Pakistan, and India) in order to buy an ‘off the shelf’ nuclear bomb. This in turn 
reflects that the regime was seeking military power and intended to become a powerful state 
in the region. Furthermore, regional and external pressure, security imperatives, power and 
leadership in the Arab World during the 1970s and 1980s were crucial factors in Libya’s 
desire to acquire nuclear weapons.  
Libya’s financial capacity served as an enabling factor in the regime’s ambitions to 
accumulate military power, pursue aggressive foreign and security policies, and arm itself 
with unconventional weapons. This factor was present from the early period of the Qaddafi 
regime, being underpinned by the flow of oil revenues which facilitated the regime’s efforts 
to obtain military hardware in order to become influential in regional and international 
politics. Overall, the Qaddafi regime wanted to play a leading role in both regional and 
international politics, unlike its predecessor which was much more passive and less ambitious 
in respect of overpowering its neighbouring countries. Additionally, the regime realised that 
the country had to be militarily strong to face any regional threats or foreign aggression. 
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Undoubtedly, oil was a crucial element among the internal factors analysed in the first period, 
since oil wealth allowed the Libyan government to finance and equip several movements 
around the world, which were perceived by the international community as a threat to 
international peace and security. The availability of oil revenues to Qaddafi’s regime 
encouraged the regime’s nuclear ambitions and facilitated its nuclear programme. 
The ideological beliefs of Qaddafi and the military officers were also an important factor in 
Libya’s quest for conventional and unconventional weapons. Qaddafi came to power during 
the Cold War era, while the world was divided into Eastern and Western blocs. It was also 
during the heyday of Arab nationalism, which was led by the charismatic Egyptian President 
Nasser, who tried to unite the Arab World but failed in most of his unification initiatives due 
to leadership rivalries and different views on Middle Eastern politics. Indeed, those leaders 
(Nasser, Assad, Qaddafi, and Numeiry) all wanted powerful Arab countries with military 
capability able to counter foreign aggression. Moreover, the ideological conviction of 
Qaddafi was an important aspect of his policies. However, it was observed that this ideology 
came into play only when the issue was outside the Libyan boundaries and not affecting 
Libya’s national security (i.e. Arab World, Africa, Latin America).    
The regional pressure and rivalries between Libya and other countries was very much a 
concern of the Qaddafi regime and policies, as has been shown specifically in the first 
empirical chapter. In fact, regional insecurity and regime insecurity, particularly in the 
countries neighbouring Libya, produced fear of the Qaddafi regime within Libya’s immediate 
periphery. Such a hostile stance on the part of Libya resulted from the fact that Libya’s rulers 
perceived the country to be weak, and to be surrounded by powerful neighbours (i.e. Egypt, 
and Algeria), meaning that it was necessary to acquire military armaments to strengthen the 
country in order to protect it from any threats. Furthermore, the Libyan regime feared that it 
might be targeted by its larger neighbours because of its natural resources (i.e. oil and gas) 
and small population, and thus, the imperative for the regime to build its military as a counter 
to regional aggression was even more pressing.  
On the international level, the pressure of foreign actors during this first period encouraged 
the regime to acquire nuclear weapons and pursue aggressive external policies (i.e. the 
support for revolutionary movements, and international terrorism). Since the onset of 
Qaddafi’s coup in 1969, Libya had opposed the West, unlike the monarchical regime that had 
had close ties with the West in general, and Britain, US, and France in particular. Moreover, 
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Libya post-1969 had changed its posture socially, economically, and politically as it had 
become an antagonistic state seeking to export its revolution and destabilise the region. After 
Qaddafi’s regime secured the evacuation of the British and US military bases from Libya, the 
regime changed its behaviour and attitude regarding the US and Britain. Accordingly, 
Qaddafi had aligned his country with the Soviet Union and maintained the same stance for 
decades in terms of his rhetoric and deeds. The result was that during that period, the regime 
came into several direct military confrontations with the US.
341
 Additionally, the Libyan 
regime was on a collision course with Britain and the US through its completely opposing 
views on world issues, and specifically issues in the region (i.e. Palestinian/Israeli question 
and support of the IRA).  
To sum up, the analysis of the period between 1969 and 1981 demonstrates that the effect of 
internal (domestic) factors had a weak impact on the regime’s policies despite the fact that 
the domestic factors had an impact during the monarchical era (1951-1969).
342
 Although the 
regime used colonialism, oil, and ideology to justify the path of its policies, especially 
external policies, their impact was relatively lower than the other factors as noted in the first 
chapter. For instance, Qaddafi’s ideology was not significant, specifically if there was a threat 
to the regime from a neighbouring country. In fact, Qaddafi used his ideology more when the 
subject was further away from its periphery. Despite the fact that the regional influence was 
stronger than the domestic one in the period analysed, external pressure was overwhelmingly 
a prominent driver for the regime’s external policies. Indeed, the first empirical chapter 
confirmed that internal, regional, and international factors provided the motivation for 
Qaddafi’s calculations to acquire nuclear weapons and to opt to pursue adventurist policies. 
The internal factors, such as oil, ideology, and colonialism were also motivating factors in the 
regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
 
On the regional level, the effect of regional factors on Libya’s policies was more prominent 
than internal pressures. In spite of the fact that the regime was aligned to Egypt (in Nasser’s 
time), Algeria, and Sudan during the early years of Qaddafi’s rule, the regime nonetheless 
feared that it might be targeted or that one of its powerful neighbours might expand its 
territory and seize its oil fields or invade the country as Sadat actually did in the late 1970s. 
There were also other regional issues such as Libya’s conflict with Chad, and Qaddafi’s 
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 See pages (81-149) regarding the influence of the domestic factor during the monarchical era. 
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regime enmity with other countries in the region (i.e. Morocco, Iraq, Sudan, and Tunisia). 
Indeed, Libya’s tensions with other countries in the region were due either to its desire for 
leadership in the Arab World, to the position of other Arab countries on the Arab/Israeli 
issue, or to the wish to acquire military capability in order to become a regional power. 
Accordingly, the first chapter suggests that the influence of the regional factors (i.e. regional 
rivalries and regional insecurity) is stronger in comparison to the domestic factors. In fact, the 
effect of regional dynamics on the Qaddafi regime’s policies was higher in the period 
analysed. In this regard, the regional factor played an important role and was more influential 
in Libya’s pursuit of its policies and its quest to acquire nuclear weapons.  
 
International pressure in various forms was the core driver of the Qaddafi regime’s 
nuclearisation effort. These specific outside threats from powerful states, and its antagonism 
with the Western states motivated the Libyan regime to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, the 
Libyan regime’s attempt to obtain nuclear weapons capacity was driven mainly by security 
imperatives such as deterring foreign intervention from powerful countries (i.e. US or UK). 
Qaddafi’s regime also reiterated that Libya’s pursuit of nuclear weapons would enhance the 
status of the Arab World and counter Israel’s nuclear capability and long range missiles, both 
considered as security threats. The most important factors in the first period analysed can be 
seen to be regional and international pressures, arising from several events and situations. 
The Cold War, antagonism with the US and Britain, the need to deter external threats to 
Libya’s security, and regional insecurity and rivalries, all served as sources of threat to Libya.   
 
Analysis of Libyan behaviour during the period suggests that states may change their foreign 
and security policies under continuous international, regional, and internal pressure. These 
last two are relatively moderate in comparison with the first one. Indeed, for the second 
period (1982-2000), it has been shown that there are several elements which affected Libya’s 
external policies.  This period did in fact, witness the peak of Libya’s attempt to develop a 
nuclear capacity and to conduct an adventurist foreign policy. Libya’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons was accelerated especially following the US air raids on the country in 1986 to 
punish Qaddafi’s regime for its involvement in international terrorism. The regime realised 
that the country was more vulnerable to outside aggression and further military attacks. 
However, decades of constant international pressures in various forms, such as threat of 
military force, economic sanctions, and international isolation, together with regional and 
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domestic pressure, compelled the regime to abandon its radical and defiant policies and to opt 
for more conciliatory ones (i.e. from a rogue state to a compliant state). 
 
Moreover, the analysis of the same period, shows how the Libyan regime had abandoned 
Qaddafi’s ideology and attempted, on more than one occasion, to approach the West in 
general and the US in particular, in order to resolve outstanding issues. However, although 
the regime did attempt to normalise its relations with the international community, it was 
simultaneously pursing nuclear weapons due to Qaddafi’s fear that it would become a 
military target of its powerful neighbours or from further afield. In addition, the international, 
regional, and internal pressure exerted on Libya for decades, weakened the country 
economically, politically, and militarily, thereby increasing the domestic pressure on 
Qaddafi’s regime. The Libyan public did, in fact, suffer for several years from the economic 
circumstances which negatively affected the nation’s education, health, and unemployment, 
bringing under-development and a travel ban. Public opinion was that Qaddafi’s 
misbehaviour as authorised by the regime’s hostile policies was the reason for the 
population’s sufferings.  
 
Over time, these cumulative pressures compelled Libya to affect a shift in its external policies 
from them reflecting a belligerent stance to a more lenient one in comparison to the previous 
two decades. In brief, this chapter suggests that Libya’s policies in the mid-1990s started to 
witness the initial departure of Libya’s hostile attitudes and the advent of more ones towards 
the international community. To meet its obligations, the regime had handed over the 
Lockerbie suspects in 1999, pledged to compensate the victims’ relatives, and end its support 
for terrorism. In this regard, the Libyan regime, after several years of negotiations with the 
powerful actors, complied with and fulfilled the demands of the UNSC resolutions. 
Furthermore, the international community and the US in particular were not only seeking to 
coerce Libya in respect of Lockerbie and UTA, but also regarding Qaddafi’s efforts to 
acquire non-conventional weapons and long range missiles.  
 
In terms of the influence of internal, regional, and external factors, the second period found 
that the effects of the above three elements were diverse, especially in comparison with the 
outcomes of the first period. In contrast to the first period analysed (1969-1981), there were 
relative variations in the internal, regional, and international factors assessed between 1982 
and 2000. Indeed, the effect of internal factors in this period varied due to a number of 
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reasons (i.e. creation of opposition groups outside Libya, domestic stagnation because of the 
regime’s internal economic policies, growing militant Islamists groups, and the diluted role of 
the military because of its failed attempts to topple Qaddafi). It was shown that Qaddafi’s 
ideology had no impact on Libya’s policies at all. 
 
In fact, the role of ideology was confined to areas far away from Libya’s periphery (i.e. 
colonialism, imperialism, and Arab nationalism). These were the themes that Qaddafi used in 
his ideological speeches. As Black argues (2003:254) “Qaddafi’s ideology and rule are 
constantly changing”. For instance, on the one hand Qaddafi’s regime used its ideology when 
the affair was far away and did not threaten Libya’s national security or the regime. On the 
other hand, ideology was neglected by the regime when the affair threatened the regime. 
Interests and pragmatism were considered more significant in Qaddafi’s policies specifically 
in trade and security.  
 
Regarding the role of oil on Libya’s policies in the second period between 1982 through to 
2000, the chapter shows that the influence of oil was different from in the first period. The 
declining oil revenues and exports in this second period had adversely affected the ability of 
the government to implement its domestic and foreign policies due to the imposed sanctions 
and isolation. While in the 1970s, oil revenues secured domestic support and boosted several 
projects (i.e. pursuit of nuclear weapons, and internal developments), the subsequent period 
(1982-2000) had a negative impact on the regime’s policies. For instance, due to the 
sanctions, the oil industry received relatively low income and this affected the national 
economy, subsequently compelling the regime to change its behaviour towards terrorism. 
However, and despite all these challenges, the pursuit of Libya’s nuclear programme 
continued during this difficult period, and ultimately forced Qaddafi’s regime to reorient its 
policies. Accordingly, internal factors, such as oil and ideology did not play a crucial role, 
and were no longer assets in terms of supporting the regime’s policies due to the nature of the 
external pressure being exerted on the regime. Moreover, the effect of domestic pressure on 
Qaddafi’s regime was stronger in comparison to the previous period.  
 
The influence of the regional dynamic (1982-2000) in the second period remained the same. 
In fact, regional reaction to Libya’s policies had increased from simply being antagonistic, to 
being one characterised by the wish to isolate and contain Libya. Qaddafi’s subversive 
policies and involvement in the internal affairs of Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, 
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and Morocco, posed a threat to these varying neighbouring countries. For instance, Libya 
backed separatists’ movements in Sudan, meddled in Egyptian domestic affairs, supported 
the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara conflict, and attempted to export Qaddafi’s version 
of revolution to its neighbours (Mauritania and Algeria). Moreover, there were several 
occasions when Qaddafi’s regime clashed with other Arab governments as a result of various 
incidents, some ideological, and others concerned with Qaddafi’s efforts to export his 
personal version of revolution. This behaviour compelled these states to counter Qaddafi’s 
activities by isolating his regime in different regional forums and international institutions. 
Other regional issues such as Libya’s involvement in Chad, provoked the reaction of the 
international community (France, the US, Egypt), and compelled the regime to end its 
military intervention and withdraw its troops. By the mid-1990s Qaddafi’s regime was forced 
to abandon its aggressive policies in order to lift at least the regional pressure.  
 
The regional isolation forced regime in Libya to change, and by the end of the 1990s, the 
regime’s political orientation was towards Africa, rather than the Arab World where it had 
initially focused. The new direction was taken in order to generate new alliances and 
leverage. And despite the fact that there was co-operation between Libya and the Arab 
countries in various fields such as security and the fight against extremism, Qaddafi’s regime 
considered the rapprochement with Africa more promising than the engagement with the 
Arab World.  The new focus of Libya’s policies towards Africa and away from Arab World 
reflected Qaddafi’s desire to re-establish himself as a regional as well as an international 
leader. Qaddafi’s shift of policies in favour of African states was considered as the best 
strategy to adopt in order to fulfil his leadership aspirations (i.e. leadership of the African 
Union), and move away from the intricacies of relationships within the Arab World. 
Therefore, the regime reinforced its ties with several African countries, by contributing to 
their development through investment in various political, economic, and agricultural 
projects. It is worth underlining here that when the Arab countries boycotted Qaddafi’s 
regime during the sanctions period (1992-2003), several African presidents came to Libya by 
air in violation of the UNSC resolutions (748). Qaddafi also wanted to enhance his influence 
and leadership in the African institutions through financial means, and particularly by 
supporting African regional and international organisations (e.g. IGAD, ECOWAS, CEN 
SAD, and AU).   
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The second period (1982-2000) confirms a continuation of the influence being brought to 
bear on the regime by international pressure. Indeed, this element had grown such that 
specifically in the late 1990s, it had a strong role in forcing change in some of Libya’s 
policies. The Libyan regime had to meet the demands of the UNSC in return for the easing of 
international sanctions and the situation of isolation it had been placed in. Qaddafi had 
insisted that Libya was a victim of ‘neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist powers’ through the 
UN, after proposals by the Libyan government to put the Lockerbie suspects on trial by the 
Arab League or alternative international institutions failed. When the regime complied with 
the international community by handing over the Lockerbie suspects for trial at Hague in the 
Netherlands, the UNSC lifted its travel ban that had been implemented in 1992. In response, 
Qaddafi maintained that his government’s agreement with the UN was a success for Libya 
(Stottlemyer, 2012:194). However, Libya’s initial compliance in the mid-1990s did not 
provoke the immediate lift of all unilateral and multilateral sanctions (i.e. ILSA). As a weak 
state, Libya could not defy the international community and the powerful actors. Hence, it 
can be understood that Libya’s policy change in this period was overwhelmingly the result of 
international pressure, whilst domestic and regional pressures had played a relatively modest 
role in influencing the change in Libya’s behaviour. In brief, the impact of the external factor 
was stronger than internal and regional factors in this period. 
 
The analysis of third period investigated (2001-2003) confirms the argument of this study 
that states can change their foreign/security policies and abandon their nuclear weapons 
programme in response to a combination of factors such as internal and international 
pressure, economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and threat of military force. The findings 
of this study have the potential to provide important lessons to deal with such similar cases in 
order to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons, make war less likely, increase regional 
and international stability, and promote international peace and security. Indeed, the period 
2001-2003 witnessed a complete change in Libya’s behaviour, especially regarding its 
domestic policies, and its attitudes towards terrorism, and the possession of nuclear weapons. 
A window of opportunity emerged for the Libyan government after the events of 11 
September 2001. This atrocity motivated Qaddafi to approach the US again and attempt to 
rejoin the international community’s effort to tackle militant Islamist groups. 
 
In fact, Libya was one of the countries that supported the US war on terror efforts, and its 
intelligence apparatus provided information on some terror groups that the regime had known 
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previously. As discussed in detail in Chapter Five, the Libyan regime opted for compliance 
and co-operation with the international community and did not challenge the UNSC 
resolutions mentioned earlier. Nonetheless, despite Libya’s co-operation in the war on terror, 
other unresolved issues, such as Lockerbie, and the country’s possession of unconventional 
weapons, stood in the way of any genuine rapprochment between Libya and the world’s 
powerful actors (the US and the UK). Consequently, Libya’s foreign and security policies in 
this period shifted in various aspects (i.e. declining support for terrorism, compliance with the 
UN resolutions, and attempting to promote peace in some conflicts in Africa). 
With regard to Libya’s previous subversive activities and its meddling in several countries, it 
was decided to change these behaviours by promoting regional institutions and frameworks, 
to end all forms of support for terrorism, and also to renounce its unlawful activities in the 
region. The ultimate and most significant change which occurred in Libya’s security policy 
was in fact in December 2003, when Libya’s foreign minister announced that it had decided 
to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme and long range missiles. This came as the result 
of a sustained coercive attempt by the major world powers and institutions to effect change in 
Libya’s foreign and security policies, and through the impact of other domestic, regional, and 
international factors.    
In as far as the effect of internal, regional, and international factors in the third period is 
concerned, the chapter attempts to demonstrate that regional factors played only a modest 
role in this period, whereas internal and international factors were crucial components in 
Libya’s transformation. There was no regional pressure exerted on the regime by its 
neighbours or by other regional institutions as had been the case previously. Libya had 
become an active member in several regional frameworks and institutions, especially after the 
partial removal of the sanctions, and the issues that had once cause animosity were under 
control or had dissolved. Hence, the regional incentive did not appear to be an influential 
factor in Libya’s shift in its security and foreign policy. Libya had opted for regional co-
operation, especially on issues such as security and economy, between neighbouring 
countries. A significant aspect of this regional co-operation was Libya’s security integration 
with its periphery. Other initiatives such as the proposal of a United Africa, were intended to 
extend the regime’s influence throughout African countries especially through providing 
financial support for African institutions.  
 
 269 
The internal factor, on the other hand, was seen to quite definitely exert a very significant 
impact on Libya’s policies. Indeed, internal pressure on the regime had been was mounting 
for many years, but it increased in particular, after the imposition of the economic sanctions. 
For instance, the military establishment remained marginalised for several years and the 
regime depended on the security apparatus and security brigades for national security. Hence, 
experiencing such marginalisation, the military did not influence Qaddafi’s policies due to 
the regime’s dependence on alternative forces loyal to Qaddafi, for its security. The regime 
also had control of some militant Islamist groups inside, especially after the events of 11 
September 2001. 
 
Moreover, the regime attempted to implement some internal reforms concerning its economy 
and investment in order to pacify the population who were disappointed with the stagnation 
of Libya’s domestic economy. Therefore, with the assistance of some technocrats, the 
Qaddafi regime attempted to change the nation’s economic policies by for instance, opening 
doors for investment, and privatising some state-run organisations and companies. The 
technocrats and reformists were backed by Qaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam who, with the 
approval of his father, had supported Libya’s new economic reforms in order to reduce youth 
unemployment and find new prospects in the local job market. The reformist group had also 
advised the Libyan regime to develop good relations with the international community in 
order to sustain the economic, political, and social viability of Libya in the age of 
globalisation. On the political level, there was an attempt to draft a constitution as this would 
permit transition of power from Qaddafi, allow political parties, and eventually bring change 
in the political system. However, such political reforms and developments were 
inconceivable for a regime like Qaddafi’s. 
 
With regard to the effect of the external factor, the chapter confirms that the international 
pressure in various forms was the essential force behind Libya’s policy shifts. In fact, there 
was constant international pressure throughout the years of Qaddafi’s rule. Even though 
Libya had approached the US on more than one occasion in the past to normalise its relations, 
it was only after Libya complied with the demands of the international community regarding 
the Lockerbie affair and the UTA bombing, that the sanctions were eased. Libya’s decision to 
compensate the victims and accept responsibility for bombing Pan Am 103 flight over 
Lockerbie, the UTA the French airliner, and the Berlin discotheque had partially contributed 
to the lifting of the UN sanctions and the ending of Libya’s isolation in 2001. 
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The most decisive moment and important aspect of Libya’s change was its denuclearisation 
in December 2003, a step that surprised many observers and analysts of Libya. Although the 
negotiations started nine months before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the decision to dismantle 
the nuclear weapons programme was accelerated due to that war. The capture of a ship 
loaded with thousands of centrifuges en-route to Libya, in a joint effort by the US, Italy and 
Britain intelligence, greatly assisted in securing the compliance of Qaddafi’s regime with the 
powerful actors’ wish for it to denuclearise (Müller, 2007:87). Indeed, in order to completely 
normalise its relationship with the international community and fully return to the fold of the 
moderate countries, Libya had to comply entirely with the demands of the UNSC resolutions. 
In the aftermath of the Qaddafi regime’s compliance, and as a result of the coercion exercised 
by the powerful actors such as the US, UK, and France, Libya transformed itself from a rogue 
state to a moderate state. Accordingly, Qaddafi’s regime promised an international 
inspection/verification of its unconventional stockpile and agreed to accede to treaties such as 
the CWC and the MTCR. Furthermore, Libya was co-operative and non-confrontational 
during the dismantlement process and international verification by the relevant agencies. 
Qaddafi’s cooperation with the international community confirmed the regime change in 
respect of its foreign and security policies.  
 
In return for the nuclear concession made in 2003 and Libya’s compliance with the 
international community, the remaining sanctions were lifted, thereby ending the isolation 
endured by Libya. The unprecedented step towards international peace and stability taken by 
Libya by its nuclearisation was welcomed by the international community, which became 
willing to relate with the country once again. Moreover, Libya managed to attract foreign 
companies to build its infrastructure and develop its oil fields especially after the US lifted 
the ILSA. It is worth underlining that Qaddafi had also gained more leverage and status after 
exiting the self-inflicted predicaments. For instance, Qaddafi visited several European 
capitals (Brussels, Paris, and Rome) and also attended the UN meeting in 2009. In fact, 
gaining a seat in the Security Council in 2009 could be considered as an example of Libya’s 
acceptance by the rest of the world, as an effective actor in the international arena.  
 
Certainly, the reluctance of Libya to comply and change its posture towards the powerful 
states and the international community, had kept Qaddafi’s regime under international 
sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Additionally, the threat of using military force against the 
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regime if its policies regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons, did not change, was also 
very real. It is evident, therefore, that there would have been no rapprochement had the 
Qaddafi regime not bowed to the combination of international pressures. An important 
observation to be made here is that the regional influence was not as great as it had been 
previously, and as discussed in Chapters Three and Four. In fact, Chapter Five has revealed 
that it was a continuation of internal pressure (i.e. domestic stagnation, public pressure, 
unemployment, and low wages) and external pressure (i.e. international diplomatic isolation, 
sanctions, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003), that prompted Qaddafi to seriously re-consider 
his political stance. Undoubtedly, the overall shift of the Libyan regime’s foreign and security 
policies, and its nuclear concession were motivated by both internal and external factors.  
 
In the last decade of Qaddafi’s regime (2003–2011) apparent steps were taken towards 
implementing the political and socio-economic reforms promised to the country, and a new 
outlook was presented by the regime in dealing with the international community. However, 
the new initiatives did not reflect the real intentions of the political leadership, as was evident 
from the harsh reaction against the Libyan population following the peaceful protests of 
February 2011. With the coming of the Arab Spring, Qaddafi’s government had to face not 
only the domestic rebellions, but also the international community as a whole, which 
eventually led to the collapse of the regime. It should also be noted that the change in 2011 
did not only occur in Libya but was across the Middle Eastern and North African regions. 
This longed-for transformation among the various populations involved dramatically 
impacted upon countries in the region such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria in 
various aspects - socially, economically, and politically.  
 
In the light of the foregoing, it is empirically evident that there were internal, regional and 
international factors behind Libya’s nuclearisation and denuclearisation. These factors can be 
applied to understand other cases and to determine the relevant policies which could decrease 
the proliferation of the nuclear weapons phenomenon. However, these lessons can only be 
applied to autocratic regimes (i.e. Libya) or weak states with a weak economy.  For example, 
the relevant policies applied to the Libyan case have the potential to influence nuclear 
policies in authoritarian states like Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and North Korea. In contrast, 
these policies are worthless when it comes to dealing with big and powerful states such as 
India, Pakistan, South Africa and China.   
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6.3 Scholarly Contribution  
Despite the fact that there are various theories in the international relations field which can 
explain and understand the phenomenon of nuclearisation and denuclearisation (i.e. 
deterrence theory, balance of power theory, and the English School), this study concentrates 
on constructivism and realism as the leading theories in IR. Indeed, the majority of literature 
in this regard has focused on these theories as the best approaches to explain the motivations 
of nuclear weapons acquisition and dismantlement. 
 
6.3.1 The Constructivist Approach: Unmet Expectations 
Constructivism has been considered by several scholars to be the most appropriate approach 
to explain the Libyan incentives to acquire, and then surrender its nuclear weapons. Indeed, 
constructivism can explain parts of the Libyan regime’s reorientation, specifically regarding 
the shift in Libya’s external policies. Scholars such as Rublee (2007 and 2012), and Hochman 
(2006 and 2009) have associated Libya’s denuclearisation and the change in Libya’s 
behaviour with the need to adhere to regional and international norms. According to these 
scholars, the Libyan regime and its leadership were affected by changes in ideas, beliefs, and 
norms as espoused by regional and international institutions. Hence, the regime is believed to 
have respected the expectations of moderate behaviour from states, especially in terms of 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and adventurist foreign policy.  
Even though Libya was an active member of several regional and international institutions, it 
can be observed that the regime did not join those institutions with genuine intentions. 
Indeed, the motivations demonstrated by the Qaddafi regime were far from being associated 
with the principle of new beliefs in international institutions, or with regional and 
international expectations of moderate behaviour from states (i.e. such that rogue states 
become moderate states) which respects international law and human rights. Additionally, the 
Libyan regime’s active membership in several regional institutions was a ploy used in order 
to extend Qaddafi’s influence on some countries, especially in the African continent. Within 
this context, the reorientation of the regime’s policies was driven by self-interest, 
pragmatism, desire to increase power, and obtain leverage in different spheres. It was not 
driven by regional or international norms, as Libya under Qaddafi’s rule, was an authoritarian 
state. Hence, respect for international institutions and international law, respect for human 
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rights, freedom of speech, and tolerance of political parties, were all absent from the regime’s 
calculations. In fact, the comparative empirical examinations undertaken in Chapters Four 
and Five reveal that the Libyan regime did not abide by regional and international norms. The 
regime adherence to international norms was purely the result of external pressure exerted for 
more than two decades by the international community and powerful actors such as the US, 
UK, and France. This is not to imply that the constructivist approach does not have 
explanatory power in respect of the pursuit of nuclear weapons and subsequent 
dismantlement. However, the Libyan case can be better explained by the realist theory.  
 
6.3.2 The Realist Approach: An Appropriate Explanation  
Libya’s initial shift began in the mid-1990s when Libya approached the US regarding the 
possibility of normalising its relations. The turning approach, and the most important aspect 
of Libya’s change was when Libya agreed to hand over the Lockerbie suspects in 1999 in 
compliance with the UNSC Resolution 748. As shown previously in Chapters Three and 
Four, Libya found itself exposed to regional pressure in some instances, and to 
unilateral/multilateral external pressures for several years because of its policies. Qaddafi’s 
regime was under constant threat of more economic sanctions and isolation, and on some 
occasions, under threat of military force (i.e. Reagan 1986, and Bush post-2001). All these 
elements became unbearable for the Libyan regime, especially as the regime knew that the 
threat of military force was not an empty one. Decades of isolation, international economic 
sanctions, and threats by the Bush doctrine of enforced ‘regime change’ induced Libya to 
change its stance from one of defiance to one of compliance. The Libyan regime had to 
seriously consider the demands of the international community, among which were demands 
to end its support for terrorism, accept responsibility for the actions of its citizens, and 
compensate the relatives of the victims of the Lockerbie, UTA, and the Berlin Discotheque 
terrorist bombings.  
The consequences of the economic sanctions, the international isolation, and later the 
invasion of Iraq, were certainly behind the concessions made by Qaddafi’s government. 
Another condition in Libya’s rehabilitation and readmission to the international community 
was for it to end its nuclear weapons programme. Interestingly, Libya had to fulfil those 
conditions in return for an end to the international economic sanctions, the international 
isolation it had experienced, and the threats of enforced regime change. The use of coercion 
 274 
by powerful actors and the international community with Qaddafi’s regime, through political 
and economic tools, and military threat, was the principal force behind Libya’s rehabilitation. 
From the analysis in this chapter, it is evident that the consequences of the domestic and 
external pressure, isolation, economic sanctions, and the threat of military action left 
Qaddafi’s regime with no option but to change its policies, included in which was the 
concession regarding its nuclear programme in 2003. These aspects can only be explained by 
the realist theory. 
 
During the last decade of Qaddafi’s rule (2001-2011), two major events (i.e. 11 September, 
and the Invasion of Iraq) might have accelerated the co-operation of Qaddafi’s regime by 
demonstrating the potential for Libya to be facing a similar violent fate to that of the Iraqi and 
Taliban regimes. Indeed, Libya seemed to have grasped this as a real possibility, and had in 
fact been seeking an opportunity for several years to try to emerge from its isolated position 
on the international stage, to secure the removal of economic sanctions, to attract foreign 
investments, and to normalise its relations with the international community. As a response to 
the above-mentioned events, the Libyan regime complied and collaborated actively with the 
US, Britain and the rest of the international community on the ‘war on terror’. From the first 
instance, Libya showed its profound interest in assisting the international community to 
tackle the phenomenon of Islamic extremism. Indeed, the Libyan regime realised that it 
would be in its interests to comply with the US and to fully co-operate in eradicating 
extremist activities. The regime did not tolerate any domestic opposition, especially clamping 
down on Islamist groups, since one such group had attempted to topple Qaddafi’s regime by 
the use of force on more than one occasion. 
 
It is evident from the preceding chapters that the Libyan regime’s policies and rehabilitation 
were influenced by a combination of internal, regional, and external factors. But, as explained 
in detail throughout the thesis, and particularly in the three empirical chapters, the external 
factor was more apparent in its influence. Regarding the most appropriate theoretical 
framework for explaining the change in Libya’s policies after the mid-1990s, this thesis 
argues that a greater understanding of Qaddafi’s policy reorientation in the fourth decade of 
his rule is obtained by the use of realism. Libya’s accession to certain treaties such as the 
Chemical Weapons Convention in 2004 (CWC), was not due to Qaddafi’s consideration of 
the taboo associated with chemical weapons but instead resulted from the pressure exerted by 
powerful states (i.e. the US and UK) in their negotiations with Libya.  
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After the collapse of the regime in 2011, a huge chemical stockpile was discovered in Libya. 
Such a finding confirmed that Libya was pressured to adhere to the CWC, rather than 
willingly agreeing to respect international institutions and treaties.
343
 This discovery also 
shows that Qaddafi’s regime feared that all the concessions made would not be sufficient to 
deter potential threats and protect the regime from such external threats and foreign 
aggression. Qaddafi remained convinced that despite all his agreements with Western 
powers, he still had to be prudent and cautious regarding his nuclear concessions.  
 
In fact, Qaddafi’s regime had hidden a chemical stockpile, including mustard gas, from the 
concerned agencies and did not declare it when Libya agreed to dismantle all its 
unconventional weapons. The regime intended to hide the undeclared chemical stocks in 
order to use them in some future conflict, thereby flouting all the rules concerning 
unconventional weaponry. This supports the argument of the study that realism remains the 
most robust theory for explaining Libya’s nuclearisation in the early 1970s and its 
denuclearisation in 2003 which was considered as an unprecedented move towards non-
proliferation success.  
 
To sum up this section, the behaviour of Libya and its change regarding domestic, regional, 
and external policies were induced mainly by external pressure such as sanctions, isolation, 
and the threat of military force. Had the regime not changed its posture regarding the issues 
that were associated with it before its rehabilitation,
344
 it would have suffered major negative 
consequences, which would certainly have included further economic sanctions and greater, 
and eventually the use of military force to remove it. The domestic and regional factors were 
also important, but they did not play a constant role throughout the years. Applying the 
constructivist and realist frameworks to this case study in different periods of time suggests 
that the realist approach is more relevant in understanding and explaining the motivations 
behind the desire to acquire nuclear weapons and simultaneously the factors influencing the 
decision to dismantle nuclear stockpiles. An important lesson that can be learned in this 
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 For more information see Kulesa, L (2013) “Eliminating chemical weapons stockpile” published by the 
Polish Institute of International Affair. Available at: https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/eliminating-
hemical-weapons-stockpiles#.U3XzO2rI2ow  
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Libya was previously known as a ‘rogue regime’ and ‘state of concern’ because of the bad image and 
behaviour related to it during the first two decades of Qaddafi’s rule.  
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regard is that military and economic instruments of coercion are more persuasive and 
influential than political ones.  
 
6.4   Observations 
 
The Libyan case which has been thoroughly investigated in this study, provides a 
contemporary example of a dramatic shift in policies and behaviour. Qaddafi’s regime 
realised that its core interests changed, and believed that its nuclear weapons programme 
would be seen by the international community as a strategic liability and not a potential 
deterrent to its security. Thus, Libya’s decision to denuclearise in 2003 came after the 
regime’s gradual change in its economic and security perceptions throughout the years it was 
in power. Indeed, Libya’s shift in foreign and security policies, and specifically its nuclear 
weapons programme reversal, were demonstrated in response to a combination of targeted 
sanctions, political isolation, intelligence sharing on nuclear activities, and export controls to 
prevent the acquisition of fissile materials. Using these economic and political tools, the 
international community made it extremely difficult and expensive for states, and especially 
those with weak economies, to obtain nuclear weapons. Consequently, states might be 
prompted to forego their ambitions to arm themselves with nuclear weaponry. 
 
On the whole, and because of the specificity and complexity of the Libyan case (i.e. the 
regime’s aggressive foreign policy, its support for terrorism, and decades of dictatorship), it 
might be challenging to replicate the denuclearisation path taken by Libya, in other 
circumstances. Certainly, countries such as North Korea, share some similarities with Libya 
such as the dominance of one single figure in the political system, and that individual’s 
influence on decision-making and its implementation. Applying the same tools might 
convince such leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons or abandon their nuclear weapons 
programme in return for rewards such as the removal of sanctions and the normalisation of 
diplomatic relations. In some circumstances, the threat of using military force can also be 
considered as a useful tool, especially when used with a combination of other measures such 
as economic sanctions and political isolation, as was the case with Libya. An additional 
support to the above argument that states do surrender their unconventional weapons when 
exposed to extensive international pressure, is the recent example of Syria. When the Syrian 
regime used chemical weapons against Syrian people in August 2013, the international 
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community led by the US threatened the regime with military intervention. As a result of 
such pressure and the real possibility of military action by powerful actors in the world, the 
Syrian regime agreed to give up its chemical stockpile in a specific timeframe (Mills, 
2014:9). Undoubtedly, this type of response is considered hard to achieve in other instances, 
such as the case of Iran, or with other states which are strong economically and militarily.  
 
This study observes that the international community needs to be aware that the regional 
rivalries in the Middle East and North Africa motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons. 
Accordingly, it is by addressing the security concern for states in the region (i.e. reassuring 
regional governments) that nuclear weapons proliferation can be reduced. For instance, 
Israeli nuclear capability has always been a subject of anxiety for the Arab countries and Iran, 
and criticism has been expressed in various negotiations concerning the non-proliferation 
treaty (NPT). The Israeli refusal to accede to the NPT treaty, or to allow the IAEA inspectors 
to check its nuclear facilities, has been and will continue to be used as a justification by 
potential nuclear weapons proliferators. Moreover, Israel as an undeclared nuclear power 
could also be an instigator for Iran’s desire to obtain nuclear weapons, and this in turn 
triggers other states in the region to follow suit.  In other words, Iran’s nuclear aspiration to 
become a nuclear power in the region, would eventually lead other countries to consider the 
nuclear option. For example, the Gulf countries feel threatened and therefore, need to protect 
themselves from the Iranian expansionist policies such as that country’s involvement in Iraq, 
Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen. Additionally, that same prediction would apply in 
North Africa, involving for example, Morocco, Algeria, and or Egypt, all potentially equal in 
perceiving nuclear weapons capability as a deterrent against expansionist interests of close 
neighbours.  
 
The UN and other institutions should be neutral in dealing with member states regarding 
nuclear weapons acquisition. Several states accuse the international institutions of using 
double standards in their dealings with developing countries. Therefore, it is vital to 
encourage regional nuclear weapons-free zones by international institutions such as the IAEA 
without any exceptions (Elbaradei, 2011:236). Indeed, for common interest and for 
international peace and stability, it is imperative to support the establishment of regional 
nuclear weapons-free zones, especially in troubled regions such as the Middle East and North 
Africa. Accordingly, the international community in general, and the US in particular, should 
encourage Israel to accede to the NPT and join a regional nuclear weapons-free zone.  
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States that are willing to dismantle their nuclear capabilities or their nuclear weapons 
programmes should be rewarded by the international community. However, not all states are 
willing to concur with such an idea, and Iran and North Korea both consider that the 
dismantling of Libya’s nuclear programme was a suicidal move since there was little 
reparation from the international community for its denuclearisation, and indeed there was 
NATO intervention in 2011. Such intervention could stand to deter any chances of 
denuclearisation by countries similar to Libya (i.e. North Korea, and Iran). Indeed, for some 
countries the acquisition of nuclear weapons is believed to be vital for their survival due to 
the fact that nuclear weapons states have not been attacked (i.e. Pakistan, and North Korea), 
while non-nuclear weapons states (i.e. Iraq, and Libya), have been. A good example in this 
regard is the recent tension between Russia and Ukraine. In fact, if Ukraine still had its 
nuclear weapons stockpile, Russia might not have seized Crimea and defied international 
community demands. The forceful downfall of Qaddafi in 2011 will justify the pursuit of 
nuclear weapons capability by states that feel threatened. This in turn will weaken and 
undermine the post-Cold War non-proliferation vision. Consequently, any threat of military 
action will certainly discourage any effort to renounce nuclear weapons acquisition.  
 
6.5 Final Remarks  
To sum up, I would like to review for the final time, the essential value of this thesis. 
Considering again the following three main questions of this research project: What were the 
factors behind Libya’s desire to obtain a nuclear weapons programme? What are the causes 
of Qaddafi’s regime transformation and concessions to denuclearise? What are the effective 
tools to persuade states such as Libya to dismantle their nuclear weapons programme? I 
believe this thesis makes a valuable contribution to debates surrounding nuclear proliferation 
and non-proliferation by comparing and analysing three different periods of the Libyan case. 
In short, the proposed answer is that states can indeed give up their nuclear weapons 
programmes. However, denuclearisation depends on both internal pressure such as 
unemployment and public pressure and constant international pressure such as economic 
sanctions, international isolation, and the threat of military force. 
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Appendix  
Interviews  
The interviews took place in summer 2012 in Tripoli, Libya. It is necessary to specify the fact 
that many officials from different institutions were unwilling to be named as well as certain 
diplomats and analysts, particularly those who are closely involved in Libya’s foreign policy 
and the nuclear weapons programme. Indeed, the attitude of some interviewees is completely 
understandable in view of the sensitivity of such areas. Therefore, only one interviewee was 
willing to be named and signed the consent form out of nineteen interviewees.   
Saad Mujber held senior positions in Qaddafi’s government such as, Deputy of Head the 
General People’s Congress ‘Parliament’, Deputy of foreign minister 2002, Former 
ambassador at France, Algeria, and Iran.  
 
The Questions for Qualitative Interviews 
1. Did the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War affect the 
course of Libya’s foreign policy? 
 
2. Were there internal, regional and external motivations behind Libya’s nuclear 
aspirations? 
 
3. What effects have the attacks on 11th of September 2001, and the subsequent war on 
terror, and United States foreign policy had on Libya’s foreign and security policy? 
 
4.  Has Libya changed its course of foreign policy to preserve its regime survival? 
 
5. Did Libya’s nuclear weapon programme face financial, technical and economic 
hardship which affected its discontinuation? 
 
6. What effects have the invasion of Iraq in 2003 on Libya to dismantle its nuclear 
programme?                                                
 
7. Did the UN sanctions affect the continuation of Libya’s nuclear weapons programme? 
 
8. Did Libya opt for dismantling its nuclear weapons programme to end international 
isolation? 
 
9. Did the seizure of ship loaded with key elements for Libya’s nuclear programme 
affected its continuation? 
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10. Did Libya approach the United States and Britain to negotiate the end of its nuclear 
programme? 
 
11. What was the role of the United States and Britain in convincing Libya to discontinue 
its nuclear weapons programme? 
 
12. What were the repercussions of Libya’s nuclear programme dismantlement on the 
international scene? 
 
13. What were the motivating factors that led Libya to voluntary dismantle its nuclear 
weapons programme? 
 
14. What were the incentives behind the shift in Libya’s foreign policy ? 
 
15. What did Libya gain from the policy change regarding its nuclear weapon programme 
and foreign policy as a whole? 
 
16.  Was the international community’s response  satisfactory to the Libyan regime? 
 
17.  What are the lessons that the Libyan case can provide in order to decrease the nuclear 
weapons proliferation? 
 
 
 
 
 
